Al Makin: Working paper: Plurality Denied

Presented at the conference of Negotiating Diversity in Indonesia, School of Social Sciences, Management University, Singapore, November 5-6, 2012.

Plurality denied:

The defeat of pluralism advocates in Indonesia during the reformation era

Al Makin
Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University

Plurality Denied

Indonesia is fertile not only for the diverse flora and fauna growing across the archipelago but also for the birth of various faiths and religions. Various songs, paintings, and poems dedicated to praise the lands’ fertility of this archipelago. The leaves of green coconut trees waves along shores, whereas paddies turn yellow in various fields. Mountains stand high. Water flows in rivers. Huts made from bamboo by farmers adds the beauty of this classical landscape often appearing in many painting, such as by Basuki Abdullah, Dullah, Widayat, and other contemporary artists. However, we have to put new decoration in the landscape dominating the towns and villages across the country given the newest development of religiosity after the reformation movement, that is the significant increase number of mosques in every corner of village and town. Indeed, various mosques with Middle Eastern domes offer different architectural style from those of traditional mosques with limasan roofs. To put the point modestly, conservatism is on the rise. Islamism gains momentum in the era of freedom of expression.

So far, Indonesian’s fertility has been overemphasized in the Indonesian worldview. In fact, in hundreds of fertile islands, various local faiths and beliefs also grew. On the other hand, from Soekarno to SBY period the Indonesian government seems to have denied this reality. Only five or six religions—Islam, Protestant, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism—are officially acknowledged by the government. Criticism to the major religions may bring someone to arrest, or even jail, charged with the 1965 blasphemy law. Pluralism is denied. The old policy of the New Order which sought for uniformity and simplicity of people’s faith for the sake of political control and stability is still maintained under SBY’s administration.

Historically speaking, the birth of various prophets who declared new religions has marked various watersheds in the nation’s history. To illustrate, during the Dutch colonial era, prophets born from various ethnicities and localities, from Diponegoro in Yogyakarta, Sisingamangaraja IX in Tapanuli, Samin Surosentiko in the border of Central and East Java, to other lesser prophets across Java during the early twentieth century, assumed leadership over their own people in the struggle against the colonial government. The story goes that these prophets claimed to have received divine messages with the noble task of restoring the nation’s pride, identity, and faith. Most of the campaigns led by these prophets however were
extinguished by the Dutch with an effective tactic of arresting and sending them into exile through which to separate these prophets from their people. Although only few local religions founded by native prophets during colonial period, such as Parmalim in Sumatera, survive, the emergence of new prophets never cease until today.

Indeed, after the independence of the nation, more prophets emerged. They claimed to have received new divine revelation, by which they taught Indonesians with teachings in accordance with the new atmosphere in the aftermath of the declaration of the nation’s independence. Most of them founded new religions, which, however, regarded by the Indonesian government as mere sects or aliran kebatinan or kepercayaan, put under the umbrella of one of six religions. In the country where diversity is undeniable reality under which prophets never cease to emerge, these mushrooming religions never achieve the status of religions, like their counterparts from India, Europe, and Middle East. As result, some of the sect leaders lament that whereas the government acknowledged imported religions such as Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism, local religions’ existence is denied. Once again, these local faiths have no right to be called religions. For many, this contradicts the spirit of the State Constitution (UUD 1945) chapter 29, which guarantees the freedom of each citizen to embrace any religion, belief, or faith. Ironically, the followers of these local religions have to put one of the six official religions in their ID card and other official documents. They cannot declare their own identity as the followers of Saminism, Parmalim, Pangestu, and other local religions. The faiths of these groups were also categorized as part of ‘culture,’ not regarded as divine revelation, coordinated under the Ministry of Culture and scrutinized by the Attorney General. On the other hand, the number of aliran kebatinan always grows from time to time. In 1980 there were around 600 sects. The New Order government tried to take political advantage from them, by promising them to elevate their status as religions. But Islamists pushed back. The sects remain sects, never be regarded as religions.

After the reformation period, freedom of expression also shows two tendencies. First, the plurality of Indonesia appears in the public. Those who were oppressed by the New Order tried to show their faces and voice. Secondly, the spirit of Islamism, which was also suppressed by Soeharto, came to stage yet to annihilate the freedom itself and silence diverse voices other than their own. The first tendency can be seen in the number of people rebelled against the six established religions. Many claimed to have received revelation from God to establish new religions, despite different motivation and context with which claimants recruited followers and found cults. The prophethood of Muhammad, a khatam doctrine guarded by Muslim around the world, was shaken many times. The government arrested these prophets, Ahmad Mushoddeq who founded Qiyadah Islamiyah, Lia Aminuddin who founded Eden group, Imam Solihin who claimed to be the reincarnation of Sukarno, and others. From Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara,
Kalimantan, Sumatera to Java, prophets never ceased to emerge from the Old Order to Reformasi. This reality is denied by the government, charging claimants to prophethood with the 1965 blasphemy law and KUHP (the book of criminal code) 156. Most of them were put in jail from two to three years.

Islamic orthodoxy prevails

Although Islam is embraced by the majority, Indonesia is never an Islamic state. In fact, Indonesians embrace so many faiths and beliefs—a fact which is much more complex than merely six official religions acknowledged by the government. The state’s symbol bird garuda holds ribbon in which words read bhineka tunggal ika interpreted as diversity in unity. However, to what extent the term diversity is appreciated in both political and social dimensions remains uncertain. The government from Sukarno to Susilo Bambang Yudhonooy has always been confronted with the dilemma between religious freedom and the growing pressure of Islamic orthodoxy which often shows muscle to control political and social dimension of the Indonesians. In short, to simplify complex faiths and beliefs in the country by acknowledging only six religions embraced by Indonesians contradicts blatant diversity in the plural society. It is an obvious denial.

The first denial of plurality is by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1953. Upon finding 360 new religions declared by native prophets, the Ministry set limit the definition of religion with Semitic global standard, according to which a religion has to be founded by a prophet, who brought a scripture containing universal teachings embraced by citizens of the world. To side with the Ministry’s stance, in 1954 the government founded Pakem (Pengawasan Aliiran Kepercayaan Masyarakat/Mystical Sects in Society Watchdog) in order to monitor the local religions and new sects.

To recall history, Sukarno was ideologically a syncretic and politically accommodative. From his youth during which he was a prolific writer, he envisioned the harmony and unity of diverse elements of Indonesia, e.g. Sukarno’s motto Nasakom (Nationalism, Communism, and


Religion. However, Islamic orthodoxy’s pressure prevailed, particularly in the wake of 1965 tragedy. Soeharto, on the other hand, exhibited a rather ambivalent attitude between his own religious practice, political interests, and the latent Islamic power in the country’s politics. Soeharto, an observing Javanese mysticism and like his predecessor, showed a secular and nationalist ideology, but was careful in managing pressure from Islamic groups in the country. In 1970s there seems hope for mystical sects, courted by Soeharto’s political machine Golkar with the purpose to attract six hundreds mystical sects to support Soeharto’s legitimacy to rule the country.

In 1971 the Attorney General banned 167 from 282 sects recorded. Worse still, the blasphemy law played a vital role in curbing freedom and religious expression. Indeed, many have become the prey of this regulation: the editor of Sastra magazine Hans Bague (HB) Jassin for publishing KI Panji Kusmin’s controversial short Langit Makin Medung (the Sky is cloudier) in which prophet Muhammad was described to have descended to Indonesia (1968); the editor of Monitor magazine Arswendo Atmowilopo for publishing his survey which positions Muhammad as eleventh among the Indonesian figures (1990); Saleh from Situbondo who said that Allah is creature (1996); Mas’ud Simanungkalit for writing the book Kutemukan Kebernaran Sejati Dalam al-Quran in which the author changes the Islamic testimony, “There is no God but Allah and Isa Mahidyah (Jesus the Messiah) God’s sprit and word” (2005); Mangapin Sibuea from Bandung for delivering speech “Kiamat dunia akan segera terjadi/The doomsday is imminent”—Subuea also gathered followers to commit suicide (2005); Rus’an from Palu who wrote an article “Islam agama yang gagal/Islam is the religion of failure” (2005); Ardhi Husein from Probolinggo who wrote Menembus Gelap Menuju Terang/From Darkness to Light in which the author says that Iblis (devil) has more faith than human, Veda, Tripitaka, Tao and Confusions book are among Abrahamic holy book, more God’s revelation today, paradise not only for Muslims, having faith does not mean having religion, being Muslim not necessarily Islam (2005); Yusman Roy for declaring Islamic prayers equipped with Indonesian translation; and Lia Aminuddin who declared the abolishment of Islam.

The MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council), which was founded under Soeharto’s bless in 1975 with the hope to serve as a media connecting the government’s legitimacy and Muslim communities’ interests, further push the Islamic orthodoxy into a stronger position. The position of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is also worth noting. Of the Ministries of Religious Affairs under Soeharto, Mukti Ali was the proponent of religious dialogue and pluralism. With regard to

---

3 Ahmad Nurcholis, et. al., 11 Tahun ICRP Melawan Kekerasan Atas nama Agama (Jakarta: ICRP, 2011) 7-17.
4 See Rumadi, Delik Penodaaan Agama dan Kehidupan Beragama dalam RUU KUHP (Jakarta: the Wahid Institute, 2007) 20-57.
mystical sects, Mukti Ali also called upon the government give more space and freedom. But his successor, Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara showed a sterner attitude to put the sects back under the Ministry of Education and Culture. This discriminative policy on the local religions by the Ministry remains firm until the reform era.

**Pluralism under attack in the reformation era**

In the wake of Soeharto’s fall in 1998, conservatism and radicalism seized the momentum to come to public and political stage. Two indications can be seen. First, new Islamist political parties—PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), PBB (Crescent Party), PBR (Great Crescent Party)—joined the contests of general elections. Second, many radical groups—like the FPI (Front Islamic Defenders), HTI (Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir), MMI (Indonesian Council for Jihadi people), FUI (Islamic Community Forum), FAPB (Front for Anti-Apostasy in Bekasi)—advocated their ideology in the public domain and media, holding mass rallies on the streets and attacking ‘deviant’ minorities.

Of the presidents after the reform era, only Abdurrachman Wachid consistently guarded the values of pluralism. Of his endeavors, Wachid proposed judicial review over the 1965 blasphemy law, which was supported by many Indonesian intellectuals, NGO activists, and religious leaders who brought this review in the Constitutional Court in 2010. However, the tide of Islamic radicalism and conservatism was too strong. On the other hand, the defenders of pluralism and freedom took certain distance from political pragmatism. Radical groups unleashed terrors outside and inside the court during the review of the 1965 law. Political parties with Islamic affiliation were also involved with the hope of taking radical voters’ voice. Violent means and terrors during the court sessions indeed defeated the advocates of pluralism. The court under the leadership of Machfud MD, Abdurrahman Wachid’s close friend, was deterred. The

---

5 Niels Mulder, Mysticism in Java 24.
6 See the discussion among Indonesian intellectuals before the independent period, Adrée Feillard, “The Constrained Place of Local Tradition, The discourse of Indonesian traditionalist ulama in th 1930s” in Picard and madinier, The Politics of religions in Indonesia 51.
7 Interview with Marnakkok Naipospos, Balige, June 14, 2012.
8 Islam refers to the religion with its history, dogma, and followers. Islamism, on the other hand, is “a response to modernity that has transformed the religion of Islam into a political ideology. Islamism is therefore pre-eminently concerned with changing society and political institutions in order to bring both the state and society into conformity with an understanding of Islam. Among other things, this involves formalising the state’s constitutional and legislative recognition of Islam and, for radical Islamists, introducing the Shariah or Islamic law.” See Greg barton, Jemaah Islamiyah, Radical Islamism in Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005) 29.
9 See e.g. Ismail Hasani and bonar tigor Naipospos, Dari Radikalisme menuju Terorisme, Studi Relasi dan Transformasi Organisasi Islam Radical di Jawa Tengah dan D.I. Yogyakarta (Jakarta: Pustaka Media, 2012).
judicial review was therefore rejected.\textsuperscript{11} The blasphemy law remains legitimate on which many cult and sect leaders can be brought to court and sent to jail.\textsuperscript{12}

It is worth noting that during the two terms of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the defeat of pluralism was apparent. The president seems deterred by the MUI’s increasingly louder voice in the public. In fact, the MUI’s chairman Makruf Amin serves as a member of president’s advisory council. Radical leaders, like Gatot (al-Khatthath) from HTI and FUI, have penetrated the council board.\textsuperscript{13} Although Yudhoyono showed a stern attitude toward terrorism, he remains inaction against conservatism and radicalism on the rise.

In 2007 the MUI officially set up the criteria on which they determine the status of deviant sects.

1. Denying one of six pillars of faith (rukun iman): faith in God, angels (malaikat), scriptures (kitab), messengers (rasul), the end of the world (qiyamah), and God’s determination (qadla dan qadar); or denying one of the five pillars of Islam: two testimonies (stating Allah as the only God and Muhammad as the only God’s messenger), prayers (salat), almsgiving (zakat), fasting during Ramadan (puasa), and pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj).
2. Believing or following theological doctrines other than recommended by the Quran and Sunnah
3. Believing in divine revelation after the Quran
4. Denying the authenticity of the Quran
5. Interpreting the Quran not based on the criteria of tafsir (orthodox quranic exegesis)
6. Denying hadith (Prophet tradition) as the second source of Islam
7. Defying, insulting, or scorning one of the prophets or messengers of God
8. Denying Muhammad as the last messenger of God
9. Changing, adding or reducing, Islamic rituals.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} On arguments of those who proposed judicial reviews, See e.g. ed. Ismail Hasani, Putusan Uji Materi Undang-Undang no. 1/PNPS/1965 tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Jakarta: n.p. 2010); Margiono, Muktiono, Rumadi, and Soelisitoyo Irianto, “Bukan Jalan Tengah” Eksaminasi Publik Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Perihal Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 1 PNPS Tahun 1965 Tentang Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama (Jakarta: ILRC, 2010).
\textsuperscript{13} Hasani and Naipospos, Wajah Para Pembela Islam 104-106.
\textsuperscript{14} Mimbar Ulama, Suara Majelis Ulama Indonesia, no. 341, Rabi’ul Awwal 1429/March 2008, 8.
Al Makin: Working paper: Plurality Denied
Presented at the conference of Negotiating Diversity in Indonesia, School of Social Sciences, Management University, Singapore, November 5-6, 2012.

Looking at the above tight criteria, one can easily conclude that no sect will pass these regulations. It is impossible to fulfill all nine requirements, even for the MUI boards. With these criteria, the MUI has privilege to pinpoint any suspicious groups and brand them deviant.

In practice, the MUI can use its authority to further blacken minorities—Ahmadiyah, Shi’ite, Sufi, Christians, and those who hold different view (deviant) from majority Sunnite Islam in the country, which were easily attacked by mob and radical groups. The Setara Institute found the increase of violence in the name of religion, from 94 cases in 2010 to 99 in 2011. Interestingly, the majority of Indonesian Muslims remain silent when seeing many intolerant and discriminative actions by the radicals. Hasani and Naipospos called this as ‘passive intolerance,’ by which the two mean that the majority did not participate in the actions, but let the actions happen without opposition. Nor does the government make serious efforts to prevent these crimes on behalf of religion. Radical groups even felt supports from the government institutions, such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the MUI, and Bakorpakem (Coordinating Council for Monitoring Mystical groups in Society).

Radical groups on the street

According to many surveys conducted by the LSI and CISI in 2011 and 2012, Islamist parties, such as the PKS, would suffer from losing votes in the next general election. The same tendency also rings true for the PBB (Crescent Party) and PPP (Unity Development). More moderate and

---

22 Ahmad Suaedy, “Religious Freedom and Violence” 146-152.
national Islamic party, such as PAN and PKB, are struggling to overcome internal conflicts. On the other hand, nationalist and secular parties such as Democrat, PDIP, and Golkar have more advantages. However, defeated in the ballot does not mean the end of their struggle for domination. Islamism combined with radicalism used the public sphere and the media to advocate their ideology. The following radical organizations often came to the streets to show their force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Place of operation</th>
<th>Year of establishment</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDDII (Institute of Islamic preaching Indonesia)</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cholil Ridwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPPI (Research and observation of Islam Institute)</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Amin Djamaluddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTI (HIsbut Tahrir Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Ismail Yusanto Muhammad al-Khattath (Gatot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKASWJ (ahlusunnah wal jamaah communication forum)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikhwanul Muslimin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI (Islam Defenders front)</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Habib Rizieq Shihab Munarman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garis (Islamic reform movement)</td>
<td>Cianjur</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Chep Hernawan Anwar Haryono Husain Umar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tholiban</td>
<td>Tasikmalaya</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ajengan Zenzen Asep Mausul Afandi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMI (Mujahidin council of Indonesia)</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Fauzan al Anshory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUI (Islamic community forum)</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Muhammad al-Khattath (Gatot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP3Syi (research for implementing islamic sharia institute)</td>
<td>Garut</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Qudsi Nawawi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These organizations held reacted harshly to various issues—pope Benedict speech in Regensburg in 2007, Danish cartoons controversy in 2008, pornography bill in 2010, Bush visit to Indonesia in 2009, heretic issues, Lady Gaga concert in Jakarta in 2012. Through their mass actions, they also demanded the government to disband minorities, such as Ahmadiyah, Eden, Inkar Sunah, shiite. Furthermore, some radical groups played role in the field attacking mosques belonging to Ahmadiyah in Cirebon, Nusa Tenggara, other part of West Java, and churches to minority Christians in Bekasi and Bogor. They assaulted the Eden group in Senen and Bogor. They ambushed peaceful parade by activists of AKKBB (alliance for freedom of religions and faith) in Senen Jakarta. They showed intolerance in the public, from attacking churches in Jakarta (HGKB) and Bogor (GK Yasmin). They spread terrors in many court trials—Habib Riziq’s trial due to his role in attacking the AKKBB (alliance for the freedom of religions), Lia Eden’s, and the judicial review of the 1965 blasphemy law. Other organizations bearing blatant names with their activities as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Leaders/Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAPB (Bekasi anti apostasy front)</td>
<td>Bekasi</td>
<td>2008(?)</td>
<td>Abu al-Izz (Wawan Arwani) Murhali Barda Bernard Abdul Jabar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geram (Anti Ahmadiyah people’s movement)</td>
<td>Garut</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Qudsi Nawawi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the arguments by radical leaders is interesting. The FPI leader Habib Rizieq, for instance, envisions the cleanness of Jakarta from sins committed by the Jakartans, about which the government is silent. The leaders of Tholiban in Tasikmalaya Ajengan Zensen and Asep
Mausul Afandi also aim at eradicating sin in the district. The same reasons can be found in Anwar Haryono and Husain Umar the leaders of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah who also founded the GARIS. Chep Hermawan founded Garis in Cianjur. Al-Khattat or Gatot, originally refers to cassava in Java, formed FUI, used to be the head of the HTI. But giving up his HTI identity, he is more active in the FUI. Graduated from the IPB, he is know as a lobbyist, forming alliance among many radical leaders, and infiltrating in moderate local and national Islamic organizations.

The common platform shared by the above organizations: 1. Radical and puritan 2. Intolerance to other faiths 3. Violent actions if necessary. These also achieve common goals and teachings: 1. To impose Islamic sharia upon the society, but not aiming at building Islamic state, 2. Amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (calling to virtue and prohibiting sins). 3. Suspicious to other faiths, 4. Against pluralism, liberalism, and secularism (they called them sipilis) (Hasani, 117).

They applied the following strategy: 1. Political alliance, FPI support Wiranto as president in 2004 election, some army and police leaders are also associated with the FPI. The current chief national police, Timor Pradopo, often visited Habieb Rizieq house, prior to and after his installment with the new task 2. Consolidating solidarity among various Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, Hasyim Muzadi support disbanding liberalism in the NU, 3. Infiltrating to MUI, Cholil Ridwan from DDI, founded by M. Natsir, Gatot and Ismail Yusanto from HTI. Cholil Ridwan and Yaqub called JIL as devil network. It is therefore not surprising that the MUI pronounced edict banning pluralism, liberalism, and secularism.

At the local level they also do lobby to the local government, as they did to the national level. They also hired lawyers for their purpose in the legal battle. The most important goal is the sharia imposed upon Indonesia. The following is problematic law mostly related to sharia at the local level:

| Criminalizing women | 38 |
| Controlling women’s bodies | 21 |
| Limiting Ahmadiyah’s religious activities | 9 |
| Limiting the houses of worship of non-Muslims/non mainstream Islam | 82 |
| | 150 |

These are sharia local ordinances found in the following area: Aceh, Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Indramayu, Serang, Pandeglang, Kota Tangerang, Bulukumba, Maros, Enrekang, Gowa,
Feeling defeated

Indeed, from my interviews with various intellectuals in Jakarta, liberal and moderates, the advocates of pluralism, were indeed devastated. They feel defeated at least faced with the following cases:

- Intolerant attitude shown by radicals and Islamist prevailed in the public
- Persecution, and prosecution in the state courts of minority groups (Eden, Ahmadiyah, Inkar Sunnah, JIL, Shi’ite)
- Pornography bill passed by the house under the radicals’ pressure
- Judicial review 1965 blasphemy law failed thank to radicals’ pressure
- Secularism, liberalism, and pluralism earn bad image in the public
- Eden leaders, and other claimants to prophethood, put in jails
- Disbanding Ahmadiya activities in various local areas
- Joint three ministerial decree signed by the Supreme Court, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Interior Ministry
- Perpetrators of minorities, burning mosques, churches, and attacking, even murdering minority members receive light punishment put in jail from three months to one year

Nong Darul Mahmada, a female activist of Liberal Network and Freedom Institute Jakarta, experienced being attacked by the Islamists, during the Monas Jakarta on June 1, 2008, in a mass rally with the AKKBB (alliance for freedom of religions and faiths) in commemorating the birth of Pancasila (Five Principle), the foundation of the state. The mass rally aimed at recalling the true plural Indonesia, consisting of diverse beliefs and faiths, which all have rights to live equally. The main agenda is to raise the questions over minorities’ rights, persecuted by radicals, from Ahmadiyah, Eden, and Liberal Network. The assault on the liberal and moderate activists in Monas was under the control of the commander in field of the FPI, Munarman, a former director of the LBH, legal aid institute of Jakarta.

Nong takes a conspiracy theory seriously into account. She speculates that the MUI, Ulema council took a role as the whistler blower, pronouncing edicts, such as deviant status, haram (forbidden) teachings, and other status to certain groups, from Ahmadiyah, Shiah, Eden, to
Liberal network. Radical mass organizations followed up the edict with actions in the forms of mass rallies, supporting the edict, by intimidating both society and the government, and assaulting places of worships, groups, or other violent actions. Nong sees that radicals in Indonesia have systematic and well organized actions. The division of labor also well executed. All was under the command of the MUI indirectly.

Indeed, Nong felt terrors in various occasions, in the court trials, the Eden case, judicial review 1965 blasphemy law, and Habib Riziq court trial. Nong believes that external factors outside the courts, radicals' protests indeed have impact upon judges and attorneys' decisions. Rachman, Lia, Andito (leaders of Eden) were sentence dto jail from two to three years, only because they hold their faith in the Lia’s divinity and prophethood seen as a new religion. The murderers of Ahmadiyah received only three months. Riziq received 1,5 year sentence, but only spent few months in jail.

The radicals also adopted cunning tactic, from spreading rumors to managing the issue discrediting liberal and moderate intellectual. For instance, the HTI activists spread the rumors that liberals are supported by the Jews, Zionists and Christians with a lot of money. After that, radicals assemble with mass and mob threatening to burn the JIL’s office and that of Wahid Institute, founded by Gus Dur.

There is also rumor that during the arrest of Riziq, in his house, some documents were confiscated, revealing that there is close relation between Wiranto, the army general under Soeharto and Habibie, and Riziq. Many speculate that some generals, not only Wiranto and politicians, used FPI for various purposes.

Nong further told me about the 1st June tragedy. The police already knew there would be an attack on the rally by the radicals. The committee of the peaceful action in Monas received warning from the police, who request the committee to cancel the event. The committee however refused to do so. They argued that the event was planned for a long time, the media also spread the news about the event. Some Ahmadiyah activists also joined.

According to Nong, during preparation of the event in the Monas, there are two events, first mass rally held by the PDIP (Democratic party for struggle), second by the HTI (Hizbit Tahrir). The HTI handed over the field command to Munarman. Nong also witnessed the radicals in the field used violence in their actions. Her husband, Guntur Romli was beaten, fell unconscious and put in the hospital for a month. They beat women and children during the monas incident. She also saw Munarman strangled his own man whom he suspected as a member of the AKKBB.
Musdah Mulia, a lecturer at Islamic University Jakarta and chairwoman of the ICRP, NGO for pluralism and religious dialogue, feels that pluralism, liberalism, and secularism totally defeated lately. The government, on the other hand, remains inaction in response to various issues. The same concern also conveyed by Dawam Rahardjo, renown activist, and Lutfie Syaukanie, another JIL activist. Musdah realized that the idea of liberalism and pluralism belong to the elite intellectuals, who have no mass grass root ‘s support. The Islamists on the other hand gain support from the mass below.

Musdah is bold and persistent with her ideas of pluralism and religious dialogue. During her activities she received various death threat in many forms, phone calls, short messages via cell phone, face to face intimidation, and email terror. Once she spoke in television, after which she received death threat.

The bitterest experience was during the 1965 judicial review, where some radicals used all means to intimidate those who support the idea. The 1965 law states that anyone cannot express hate to, or misinterpretation of, any religions embraced by Indonesians. This law is rubber, simply put, can be used to persecute minority groups, which are considered to deviate from the mainstream.

During the court sessions, like in other court trials involving issues of pluralism and liberalism, radicals yelled inside with God is great, filling the room with noise, using gesture, eyes intimidation, and blocking the passage to the court. Huge mass assembled outside and inside the court.

Nong and Lutfie Syaukanie witnessed that before a session in the court, radicals slaughtered a goat in front of the court. When blood shed, the slaughters said, “Anyone who want to change the law of blasphemy, I will slaughter like this goat.”

Garin Nugaraha’s car, a movie director, was destroyed. Garin serves as witness supporting the review of the law, as it curbed art activities.

Dawam Rahardjo told me that SBY was under the spell of Makruf Amin, the chairman of the MUI. SBY’s government simply failed to uphold the national constitution. The Indonesian state according to Dawam should not align with one of religions, but it should be fair and neutral in positioning many religions. Given some chaotic situation, Dawam still held secularism, like in Turkey and as envisioned by Soekarno the first president, which is the best solution for
Indonesia. For Dawam, politics mixed with religions is a dirty game. When secularism is applied, it saves not only the state but also religions. However, faced with the current situation, Dawam felt defeated.

According to Isnur, LBH activist, in rejecting the judicial review, the radical Islamists under the command of the current Minister of Religious Affairs and the leader of PPP Suryadarma Ali, were well organized. Around 27 Islamist organizations were assembled. They fought together with the common goal that is to defend the blasphemy law. Isnur speculated that the PPP also organized terrors on the streets and people, with throwing rotten eggs to LBH’s office in Jakarta. His colleague Nurcholish from LBH was beaten and strangled. All supporters of blasphemy law could not enter the court building—all passages were filled with people yelling God is great. The police guarded the witnesses to find special passage to the inside of the court.

Worse, judges and attorney received threats. Besides, some judges exhibited Islamist ideology. Reading and interpreting pluralism and freedom of religions from Islamist magazine, that is Hidayatullah.com, a renown online media expressing jihad and labeling progressive Muslim intellectuals as infidels. Mahfudz MD, the head of constitutional court, a formerly supporter of religious freedom, could do nothing to defend the pluralism principle. He was under pressure and bowed to radicals’ threat.

Lutfie Syaukanie, however, remarked some judges during the court session, such as Lindan Zulfan, Aqil Mukhtar, who clearly exhibited Islamism. To Lutfie the process of judicial review can be likened to hitting a wall, which is so stubborn and strong, impossible to break. The theme of religious freedom and human right has no place in the court. Everybody in the court sung God is great, leaving no room for other words. The court is too noisy for any rational discussion. Lutfie witnessed that Ifdal Kasim, the director of the human rights of Indonesia, received terrors during reading his testimony. Many unimportant interruptions were shouted merely to distract Kasim’s speech. Lutfie also received no different treatment.

Upon experiencing all processes of the court, with the fact that the silent majority is really silent, Lutfie concluded that Indonesians are conservative and religious, who defend the law of blasphemy, if they were asked about this. But in politics Indonesians remain secular, preferring secular parties to Islamist parties. However, Lutfie showed optimism pointing the fact that the country features much better situation than Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt. In politics and more precisely in various general elections, Islamism was easily beaten. But Islamism never gives up, finding other ways to survive. Lutfie went further that Islamist parties never reach more
than 20 percent, except the Masyumi under M. Natsir in the 1955 election. However, for Syaukanie, pluralism and liberalism is not given in a society, this modern ideology with values and principles is invented by thinkers who should achieve and struggle for its establishment in society.

Back To Isnur, who remarked that Syafii Maarif, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization, failed to attend the court session during judicial review of the blasphemy law. Isnur speculated that Maarif, like other intellectuals, received terror and threats. Yuniati Chuzaiyah from woman section of the Indonesian Human Right received sexual harassment, during her testimony. Some yelled nasty words to her. The process of judicial review passed a bumpy and dangerous road, full of terror and death threats. Isnur also lament of the death of the AKKBB, abandoned by many activists like Kyai Maman from Cirebon. In short, Isnur, like Musdah, Nong, Lutfie, Dawam, and Hasani, felt defeated.

Conclusion
Since the independence of Indonesia, plurality in the Indonesians’ faiths and beliefs has been under appreciated. The government denied the existence and status of various local beliefs, forcing those who embraced local faiths to choose one of the six religions as their identity. Simplification and the effort of making uniformity made by the government for the sake of social and political control denied the plurality of the Indonesian society. The judicial review of the 1965 blasphemy law reflects the strong position of orthodoxy and recent growth of radicalism and conservatism advocated by only a small number of people but effectively deterring the government and dominating the silent majority’s voices. The advocates of pluralism, who reject political pragmatism and have weak root in the grassroots level, are easily assaulted and defeated via religious jargon and sentiments. Pluralism is a new ideology invented by modern people to cope plural society. In the Indonesian context, an uphill struggle is still needed. Pluralism advocates should adopt at least two strategies: making the common people understand the principles of pluralism easily in order to win their support in the process of propagation, and convincing the government that pluralist ideology is a capital by which to enhance the survival of the nation with plural population in ethnicities, traditions, and faiths. That only elite intellectuals serve as the guardians of pluralism is still vulnerable.