Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam

Explaining the "Conservative Turn"

EDITED BY
MARTIN VAN BRUINESSEN

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Singapore
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LIST OF INDOONESIAN MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

Aisyiah
Muhammadiah's women's association (named after the prophet Muhammad's beloved wife, Aysha).

Al Irsyad
Muslim reformist association, exclusively active among Indonesia's Arab community.

Baitul Muslimin
Indonesia
(Indonesian House of Muslims) Muslim “wing” of the nationalist political party PDI-P, established in 2007 under the patronage of Megawati Sukarnoputri and leading personalities from Muhammadiah and NU.

Bakom-PKB
Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (Contact Organ for Awareness of the Unity of the Nation), a body aiming at the integration of Indonesian Chinese into the Indonesian nation through conversion to Islam. Established in 1974 by the (Chinese Indonesian) economist Junus Jahja as the successor to a similar body (LPKB, Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa) that he had established under the Old Order and that was dissolved in 1967.
Bakor Pakem  Badan Kordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Spiritual Movements in Society), an official body (affiliated with the Attorney General's office) charged with the surveillance of religious sects and movements. Unlike the MUI, which can only declare certain teachings and practices deviant and un-Islamic, Pakem can recommend banning them.

BAZ  Badan Amil Zakat (Office for Collecting the Alms Tax).

BKPRMI  Badan Kontak Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia (Contact Organ of Indonesian Mosque Youth), a semi-official association, with central offices in Jakarta's Istiqlal mosque, the state mosque.

BKSP  Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren (Association for Cooperation between Pesantrens), a West Java-based association of ulama, mostly with former Masyumi affiliations.

BMI (1)  Bank Muamalat Indonesia, Indonesia's first Islamic bank, opened by Soeharto in 1991. Considered as one of the first achievements of ICMI and an indication of the “Islamic turn” in the late New Order.

BMI (2)  Baitul Muslimin Indonesia, Muslim wing of PDI-P.

Brigade Hizbullah  Currently a militia affiliated with the Partai Bulan Bintang. In 1998 it was a large and broad coalition of militant youth groups, the major component of Pam Swakarsa.

Darul Arqam (1)  Lit. “The House of Arqam” (Arqam was one of the Prophet's companions, in whose house the first Muslims used to gather). Religious movement of Sufi inspiration and strong millenarian beliefs, originally established in Malaysia and also active in Indonesia since the 1980s. Banned in Malaysia; declared a “deviant sect” by the MUI in Indonesia and formally dissolved in 1994. The Malaysian Darul Arqam used its extensive network to transform itself into a successful trading corporation, the Rufaqa' Corporation.
Darul Arqam (2)  The same name is used for a religious training programme within Muhammadiyah and the staff and members cooperating in it. Hence several Muhammadiyah pesantrens have adopted this name. There is no connection with the above movement.

Darul Islam The movement for establishing an Islamic state that controlled parts of West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh until 1962 or 1963 and that has maintained an underground existence ever since. Also known as DI and NII/TII (q.v.).

DDI Darud Dakwah wal Irsyad (House of Predication and Guidance), Muslim educational association, established by the Buginese scholar Haji Abd. Rahman Ambo Dalle (d.1996), whose school in Sengkang in South Sulawesi produced many graduates who became leading scholars, and spawned a network of secondary schools among Buginese communities all over Indonesia.

DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation), a body established by Mohamad Natsir and other former Masyumi leaders in 1967, with the aim of making Indonesian Muslims more Islamic.

Depag Departemen Agama (Ministry of Religious Affairs). Recently renamed Kementerian Agama.

DI see Darul Islam

DKM Dewan Kesejahteraan Masjid (Mosque Welfare Council). Many mosques have a DKM that occupies itself with the social welfare of the mosque’s congregation (jama’ah), e.g. in the form of a funeral fund.

DMI Dewan Masjid Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Mosques), the umbrella organization of mosque committees.

èLSAD Lembaga Studi Agama dan Demokrasi (Institute for the Study of Religion and Democracy), Surabaya-based NGO active among the NU constituency.
Fahmina Institute | Cirebon-based NGO, active in the pesantren world and focusing on gender issues. Led by Kyai Haji Husein Muhammad.

Fatayat NU | Nahdlatul Ulama’s young women’s association.

FKAWJ | Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (Forum of Communication of the People of the Prophet’s Path and his Congregation), one of two wings of the Indonesian “purist” Salafi movement, established and led by Ja’far Umar Thalib. It gave rise to the armed militia, Laskar Jihad.

FPI | Front Pembela Islam (Front for the Defence of Islam), Jakarta-based vigilante group, led by “Habib” Rizieq Syihab, known for raids on bars and nightclubs and demonstrations against enemies of Islam and “deviant” groups.

FPIS | Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (Muslim Youth Front of Surakarta), a radical vigilante group in Solo that gained notoriety in the first post-Soeharto years for raids on bars, nightclubs and hotels with foreign guests.

FSPP | Forum Silaturrahim Pondok Pesantren (Forum for Friendly Relations between Pondok Pesantrens), a Banten-based association of pesantren ulama that has been actively agitating for implementation of the Shariah.

FUI | Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (Forum for Islamic Brotherhood), a front organization of the MUI for mass mobilization, with representatives of various Muslim organizations. First emerged during Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, and organized demonstrations to influence the political process. Not to be confused with the Front Umat Islam.

FUI | Front Umat Islam (Front of the Muslim Community), a loose coalition of radical groups brought together by HTI leader Al-Khatthath in the early 2000s. A similar coalition with the same name had earlier been established in South Sulawesi in 1999.
Furkon Youth group affiliated with ICMI in the period of transition from the Soeharto to the post-Soeharto period.

FUUI Forum Ulama Umat Islam (Forum of Scholars of the Islamic Nation), a small, West-Java based group that issues statements showing sympathy for radical groups such as Ba’asyir’s MMI. Gained national notoriety by issuing a fatwa declaring Ulil Abshar-Abdalla of the Liberal Islam Network an apostate who deserves to be killed. Its chairman, ‘Athian Ali M. Da’i, and secretary-general, “Ustadz” Hedi Muhamad, gained some renown for their radical statements, but have not impressed anyone with the level of their religious learning.

GAI Gerakan Ahmadiyah (Lahore) Indonesia, the national-level organization of the Indonesian branch of the Lahore Ahmadiyah.

GPI Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Islamic Youth Movement), established in 1967 to take the place of the banned GPII.

GPII Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement), youth movement of Masyumi, established in 1945 and dissolved in 1963 by Sukarno. Although the organization does not officially exist anymore, its network of solidarity still appears to be largely intact.

GPK Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah (Youth of the Ka’bah Movement), paramilitary youth movement affiliated with the PPP. The Ka’bah (the huge black cube in Mecca’s holy mosque) had been an electoral symbol of the PPP until the New Order regime ordered the party to replace it with a less overtly Islamic symbol.

GUPPI Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam (Consortium for the Improvement of Islamic Education), a Golkar-affiliated association of ulama. Several former Darul Islam activists were re-integrated into society through GUPPI.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hidayatullah</td>
<td>The name of a pesantren established in 1973 in Balikpapan (East Kalimantan) by Abdullah Said, a former adjutant of Kahar Muzakkar, the leader of the Darul Islam of South Sulawesi. This school became the centre of an Indonesia-wide network of local associations. The journal <em>Suara Hidayatullah</em>, associated with this network and published since 1988, is one of Indonesia’s most successful and prominent radical Islamic publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPMI</td>
<td>Himpunan Pengusaha Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Businessmen).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbut Tahrir</td>
<td>see HTI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMI</td>
<td>Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Students’ Association), moderately reformist students’ union, in the 1950s and 1960s ideologically close to Masyumi though formally independent of it. In the 1970s, it became associated with the modernist thought of Nurcholish Madjid. In 1986, a group that resisted the HMI board’s acceptance of Soeharto’s “sole ideology” policy and established the unofficial HMI-MPO (Majelis Penyelamatan Organisasi, Council for Saving the Organization).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTI</td>
<td>Hizbut Tahrir wilayah Indonesia (Liberation Party, region Indonesia), the Indonesian branch of this transnational movement that aims to establish a new caliphate and unite the entire Muslim world under its banner. The party rejects democracy and opposes taking part in Indonesian elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAIN</td>
<td>Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICIP</td>
<td>International Center for Islam and Pluralism, an NGO that was established at the initiative of, and with generous support from, The Asia Foundation. Organizes seminars, has introduced many foreign Muslim thinkers of liberal persuasion to the Indonesian public.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ICMI
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Alliance of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), an association of educated Muslims (mostly civil servants), formally established by B.J. Habibie in December 1990, with Soeharto’s explicit endorsement.

IJABI
Ikatan Jama’ah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (Indonesian Assembly of Ahl al-Bait Associations), organization of converts to Shi’ism, led by Jalaluddin Rachmat. (<www.jalal-center.com>).

IMM
Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Students’ Association).

IMMIM
Ikatan Masjid dan Mushalla Muttahidah (United Association of Mosques and Prayer Houses), based in South Sulawesi.

INSISTS
Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilization. Conservative think-tank established by graduates of ISTAC in Malaysia (the Institute for Islamic Thought and Civilization). Focus is on the Islamization of knowledge. [Initially named INSIST, but since there is also a left-leaning development NGO of that name, a final “S” was added to represent the first consonant of “civilization”.

Islam Jama’ah
Sectarian movement emerging in the 1950s, under the leadership of the charismatic teacher Nurhasan Ubaidah of Kediri (also known as Amir Nurhasan Lubis). The first Indonesian Islamic movement with a jama’a structure and strong authoritarian leadership. Repeatedly declared a deviant sect, but surviving under different names (Lemkari, LDII) under the patronage of various Golkar personalities.

JAI
Jama’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, the national-level organization of the Indonesian branch of the Qadian Ahmadiyah.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jama’ah Islamiyah</td>
<td>“Islamic Congregation”, an Islamist network or organization established by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The name is mentioned several times in the late 1970s and appears synonymous with the Usroh movement led by these men. In the mid-1990s, when Sungkar broke with the Darul Islam movement, his network again became called Jama’ah Islamiyah or JI. Documents later captured by security forces suggest that JI had a well-developed regional structure covering all of Southeast Asia and Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’ah Tabligh</td>
<td>Transnational piety movement with a strong missionary character, of South Asian origin. Active in Indonesia from the 1980s onwards (and perhaps even earlier). Internationally known as Tablighi Jama'at.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat Chair (al-Jam‘iyah al-Khayriyya)</td>
<td>Benevolent and educational association of “traditionalist” Arabs, established in 1905.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAT</td>
<td>Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (Jama‘ah Ansar al-Tawhid, Congregation of the Helpers of Belief in the One God), association established by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir after his break with the MMI in 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JATMI</td>
<td>Jam’iyah Ahlith Thoriqah al-Mu’tabarah Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Respectable Sufi Orders), umbrella organization of “orthodox” Sufi orders that joined forces to distinguish themselves from heterodox mystical movements. After a political conflict within the organization in the late 1970s, the orders whose leaders were loyal to the NU massively left this association and established the JATMN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JATMN</td>
<td>Jam’iyah Ahlith Thoriqah al-Mu’tabarah Nahdliyyin (Association of Respectable Sufi Orders Affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>see Jama’ah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIL</td>
<td>Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
JIMM  Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network), a loose group of progressive young thinkers of Muhammadiyah background, not formally part of the Muhammadiyah organization (as Pemuda Muhammadiyah and IMM are).

KAHMI  Korps Alumni Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, the association of former HMI members. A powerful and influential network due to the strategic positions many members have in business, bureaucracy and politics.

KAMI  Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students), action front of anti-communist and anti-Sukarno students whose demonstrations in 1965–66, closely coordinated with the military, played a role in ushering in the New Order.

KAMMI  Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students), students' association affiliated with the Tarbiyah movement, established in March 1998. Ideologically close to the PKS though officially independent. (<http://kammi.or.id/last>)

KISDI  Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World), action committee closely associated with the DDII, that during the 1990s carried out increasingly aggressive street demonstrations against foreign embassies and against media it considered to have insulted Islam in their reporting.

KOMPAK  Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Action Committee for Crisis Management). Relief organization established by DDII at the time of inter-religious conflicts. KOMPAK sent humanitarian and, allegedly, military help to embattled Muslim communities.
KPPSI  Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari’ah Islam (Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of the Islamic Shari’a), a pressure group in South Sulawesi agitating for shari’a legislation in the province. Many members have family connections with the Darul Islam movement in this province.

KUA  Kantor Urusan Agama (Office for Religious Affairs), the local office of the Department, in charge of performing and registering marriages, offering services to pilgrims departing for Mecca, etc.

KUII  Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Congress of the Muslim Umma). The first congress of this name, in which all major Muslim associations took part, took place in November 1945; here Masyumi was constituted as a political party. A Fourth Congress, again attended by all major organizations, including some of the more radical ones, was held in April 2005 at the initiative of the MUI.

KW IX  Komando Wilayah IX (9th Regional Command), regional structure of the underground Darul Islam movement (NII) covering the region Jakarta-Banten.

Lakpesdam  Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources), NU-affiliated NGO (<http://www.lakpesdam.or.id>). Besides the central, Jakarta-based NGO, there are several such NGOs at the provincial level, usually going by the same name (abbreviated as LKPSDM).

LAPAR  Lembaga Advokasi dan Pendidikan Anak Rakyat (People’s Institute for Advocacy and Education), a Makassar-based NGO whose members are mostly former PMII activists. It took a clear position against the formalization of shari’a in South Sulawesi.

LDII  Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Institute for Islamic Predication), one of several names adopted by the sectarian movement Islam Jama’ah in an attempt to evade a ban. Other names included LKI or Lemkari,
Lembaga Karyawan Indonesia (Institute of Indonesian Employees).

LDK Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Institute for Religious Propagation), association based in the campus mosque that is in charge of religious activities.

Lemkari see LKI

LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences), an institute in Jakarta for teaching Arabic and the Salafi/Wahhabi version of Islam, established and funded by Saudi Arabia.

LKI Lembaga Karyawan Indonesia (also Lemkari, Institute of Indonesian Employees), one of several names adopted by the sectarian movement Islam Jama’ah. See LDII.

LKIS Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (Institute for Islamic and Social Studies), Yogyakarta-based NGO active among the NU constituency.

LKPSDM see Lakpesdam

LPPI Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (Institute for Islamic Study and Research). Led by M. Amin Djamaluddin and with IAIN and Azhar graduate Hartono Ahmad Jaiz as its most vocal publicist, this institute has been in the forefront of the struggle against what it considers to be deviant teachings, in writing as well as in the form of violent action.

LPPOM-MUI Lembaga Pengkajian Pangan, Obat-Obatan dan Kosmetika Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Institute for Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Assessment of the Indonesian Ulama Council).

LP3ES Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and Information), trendsetting research institute and development NGO, established in 1971 by former student activists affiliated with Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LP3SyI</td>
<td>Lembaga Pengkajian Penegakan Penerapan Syariat Islam (Institute for the Study of the Establishment and Implementation of Islamic Shariah), an action committee in Garut (West Java) striving for the adoption of Shariah-based regional regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSAF</td>
<td>Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (Institute for the Study of Religion and Philosophy), established in the mid-1980s by liberal Muslims of Masyumi background. Led by M. Dawam Rahardjo. Published the journal <em>Ulumul Qur’an</em>, which introduced many new concepts into the intellectual debates of the period and contained serious, appreciative articles on other religions as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maarif Institute</td>
<td>Think-tank established by Syafi’i Maarif prior to his resignation as Muhammadiyah’s chairman (2004), in order to provide an institutional setting to “liberal” Muhammadiyah activists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAN</td>
<td>Madrasah Aliyah Negeri, state school of upper secondary level offering a curriculum of 30 per cent religious and 70 per cent general subjects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), established as an umbrella of all Indonesian Muslim organizations towards the end of the Japanese occupation; became a political party upon Independence, and was dissolved in 1960 after a grave conflict with Sukarno. Although there has been no organization of this name for almost half a century now, it still appeals to the loyalties of a significant segment of the Muslim community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MER-C</td>
<td>Medical Emergency Rescue Committee, a Muslim NGO established in 1999 to bring medical relief to conflict zones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Holy Warriors), an association established in 2000 to provide a legal framework for various groups striving to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state, most of them originating in the Darul Islam movement. Until 2008,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was the amir or commander of this organization; Irfan S. Awwas was and remains its chief organizer.

MTA
Majelis Tafsir Alqur’an (Council for Exegesis of the Qur’an), a reformist association originating in Solo that directs its dakwah activities especially towards a lower-class following with little education and syncretistic (abangan) background.

Muhammadiyah
Muslim reformist association, established in 1912. The second largest organization of Indonesia.

MUI
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council), established in 1975 as an official interface between the government and the Muslim umma, advising the government and explaining (i.e. legitimizing) government policy to the nation. After the demise of the New Order, MUI took greater distance from the government (although still partially funded by it) and has acted like a pressure group.

Muslimat NU
Nahdatul Ulama’s women’s association.

Nahdatul Ulama (NU)
Muslim traditionalist association, established in 1926. The largest organization in the country, and arguably the largest Muslim association in the world.

Nasyiatul Aisyiah
Muhammadiyah’s young women’s association.

NII/TII
Negara Islam Indonesia/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State/Army).

NU
see Nahdatul Ulama

PAKEM
see Bakor Pakem

Pam Swakarsa
Voluntary Security Force, recruited by the military (more specifically by General Wiranto) among Muslim youth groups, at the time of the special session of the People’s Legislative Assembly in November 1998 (following Soeharto’s abdication). This is the origin of all later
Muslim militias. Major components were the Brigade Hizbullah, then a 100,000 to 125,000 strong coalition of various factions, and Furkon, a youth group affiliated with ICMI.

PAN Partai Amanah Nasional (National Mandate Party), a secular party established in the Reformation period by Amien Rais and a rainbow coalition of intellectuals. Considered to be close to Muhammadiyah because this organization is strongly represented in it.

Paramadina Institute established in 1986 as a “klub kajian agama” (religious study club) to disseminate sophisticated religious ideas among Indonesia’s rising Muslim middle class. Strongly associated with alumni of the student movement HMI. During his lifetime, Nurcholish Madjid (d. 2005) was the figurehead and contributed strongly to its liberal and pluralistic discourse. A university of the same name was established towards 2000.

Parmusi Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Party of Indonesian Muslims), political party established in 1968 to take the place of the banned Masyumi party and appeal to the reformist Muslim vote.

PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party), political party with an Islamic (pro-shari’a) programme, targeting the Masyumi constituency but representing only a tiny fraction of it (crescent and star were the symbol of Masyumi).

PDII Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Centre for Islamic Propagation), a body established by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1969, as a pro-government alternative to DDII.

Persis Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), puritan reformist Muslim association with centres in Bandung and Bangil.

Perti Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Union for Islamic Education), an originally West Sumatra-based association of traditionalist religious schools; became a political party in 1948. Part of Perti merged in 1973 with other Muslim
parties into PPP, another part joined Golkar (within which it remained a distinct entity named Tarbiyah Islamiyah).

PII Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students), association of Muslim students (secondary school and higher), affiliated with Masyumi. Though officially dissolved, it remained active for most of the New Order period.

PITI Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Union of Chinese Muslims).

PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), political party established by activists of the Tarbiyah movement, the Indonesian version of the Muslim Brotherhood, in 1998. For technical reasons dissolved in 2003 and re-established as PKS.

PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party), Muslim political party, established by Abdurrahman Wahid and leading NU kyais in 1998, and appealing to the traditionalist segment of Indonesian Muslims.

PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party), successor to the PK.

PMB Partai Matahari Bangsa (Sun of the Nation Party), established in 2006 by young Muhammadiyah activists as a Muhammadiyah-based political party, but not recognized as such by Muhammadiyah.

PMI Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Parmusi (Party of Indonesian Muslims), political party established in 1968 to take the place of the banned Masyumi party and appealing to the reformist Muslim vote.

PMII Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students’ Movement), NU-affiliated students’ association.

PPIM Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Centre for Islamic and Social Studies), a research institute at the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UIN</td>
<td>UIN (formerly IAIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Ciputat, Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unity for Development Party), political party established in 1973 through the forced merger of the various Muslim political parties, notably the NU and the PMI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3M</td>
<td>Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society), NGO carrying out pesantren-based development projects and various forms of training. Both the NU and the Masyumi network are represented in its board; since its establishment in 1986, the director has been Masdar F. Mas’udi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPTI</td>
<td>Partai Politik Tharikat Islam (Political Party of Muslim Sufi Orders), later renamed Persatuan Pengamal Tarekat Islam (Union of Muslim Sufi Order Devotees), a political party established in the late 1940s by a Minangkabau teacher of the Naqshbandi order. Under Guided Democracy it was transformed into a “functional group” and joined the corporatist functional group (golongan karya, Golkar) joint secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSII</td>
<td>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, political party emerging from the Sarekat Islam movement. Merged into PPP in 1973. Contested the 1999 elections as an independent party, but won no seat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTDI</td>
<td>Pendidikan Tinggi Dakwah Islam ([Institute for] Higher Education in Islamic Predication), established and led by the firebrand preacher Usman al-Hafidy in Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUI</td>
<td>Persatuan Umat Islam (Union of the Muslim Umma), West Java-based educational association, politically affiliated with Masyumi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabithah</td>
<td>Contact organ of Alawis, i.e. sayyids or descendants of the Prophet, established in the 1920s to defend the common interests of this elite among the Arab community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawiyah</td>
<td>Muslim NGO focusing on gender issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Indonesian Muslim Organizations and Institutions

RMI  Rabithah Ma’ahid Indonesia (Indonesian League of Institutes [of Islamic Education]), association of pesantrens affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama.

SI  Sarekat Islam

Syarikat  NU-based NGO focusing on reconciliation between families of victims and perpetrators of the 1965–66 mass killings.

Tablighi Jama’at  see Jama’ah Tabligh

Tarbiyah  Lit. “educating, disciplining”, an Islamic movement based on the method and ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, that became influential on university campuses from the 1980s onwards. Gave rise to the students’ association KAMMI, which played a part in the protest demonstrations of the late New Order, and to the political party PK(S).

TII  Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army of Indonesia), the military wing of the Darul Islam movement.

UIN  Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University). The IAINs of Ciputat (Jakarta), Bandung, Yogyakarta, Malang and Makassar were upgraded to full universities with the addition of a number of non-religious faculties.

Wahdah  Islamiyah  (Islamic Unity), a Muslim association of Salafi orientation, based in South Sulawesi with branches in various other provinces. Focuses on education and social work, according to its website. (<www.wahdah.or.id>)

Wahid Institute  Think-tank established by people loyal to Abdurrahman Wahid and focusing especially on issues of religious pluralism. (<www.wahidinstitute.org>)

YAPI  Yayasan Pesantren Islam (Islamic Pesantren Foundation), a Shi‘i centre based in Bangil, established in 1976 by Ustadz Husein bin Abu Bakar Al-Habsyi, i.e. before the Iranian revolution and the subsequent wave of conversions to Shi‘ism. (<http://www.yapibangil.org>)
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GLOSSARY

abangan (Jav) nominal Muslim

ahl al-balli wa al-‘aqd (Ar) “those who loosen and bind”: an elite that takes decisions on behalf of the entire community (or organization)

Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama‘ah (Ind) “followers of the Prophet’s tradition and congregation”: the orthodox mainstream, to which all non-sectarian Muslims claim to belong

ahl al-sunnah wa-l-jama`ah (Ar) (religious) movement

aliran (Ind) deviant sect

aliran sesat (Ind) commander

ansar (Ar) “helpers”: the men who joined Muhammad during the Medina period

‘aqidah (Ind/Ar) creed, belief

bid`ah (Ind/Ar) “innovation”: beliefs and practices that cannot be shown to have been present at the time of the Prophet and his immediate successors

bupati (Ind) regent, governor of a regency of kabupaten, the administrative unit below the level of the province
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cabang (Ind)</td>
<td>branch (of an organization, at the regency level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>da’i (Ar)</td>
<td>Islamic preacher, proselytizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dakwah (Ind), da’wa (Ar)</td>
<td>preaching, proselytization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>darurah (Ar)</td>
<td>emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dewan (Ind, &lt;Pers/Ar diwan)</td>
<td>council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dlubur (Jav, &lt;Ar zuhr)</td>
<td>noon prayer</td>
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<tr>
<td>fatwa (Ar)</td>
<td>authoritative opinion, issued in response to a question</td>
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<tr>
<td>fiqh (Ar)</td>
<td>Islamic jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ghazwul fikri (Ar: al-ghazw al-fikri)</td>
<td>“war of thought”, cultural invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golongan Karya, Golkar (Ind)</td>
<td>Functional Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>hadits (Ind), hadith (Ar)</td>
<td>report on sayings or deeds of the Prophet, handed down orally for the first three centuries by a chain of transmitters (nawi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>halal (Ar)</td>
<td>licit, allowed by Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>haram (Ar)</td>
<td>illicit, forbidden</td>
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<tr>
<td>harakah (Ind, Ar)</td>
<td>movement; more specifically: Islamist movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hijab (Ar)</td>
<td>Islamic covering of head and shoulders (for women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hijrah (Ind, Ar)</td>
<td>emigration; esp. the Prophet’s emigration from Mecca to Medina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘ibadah (Ind/Ar)</td>
<td>worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Id al-Adha (Ar)</td>
<td>Feast of Sacrifice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ijtima’ (Ar)</td>
<td>meeting, convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun</td>
<td>Muslim Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>infaq (Ar)</td>
<td>spending (for a charitable purpose)</td>
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<tr>
<td>inlander (Dutch)</td>
<td>indigenous Indonesian</td>
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<tr>
<td>islah (Ar)</td>
<td>reform (of Islam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jama`ah (Ind/Ar)</td>
<td>“congregation”: Islamic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jihad (Ar)</td>
<td>effort, “holy war”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kejawan (Ind/Jav)</td>
<td>Javanese syncretistic mysticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khaul (Jav, &lt;Ar hawl)</td>
<td>death anniversary of a saintly person</td>
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<tr>
<td>khurafat (Ar)</td>
<td>superstition</td>
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<tr>
<td>kiai (Jav)</td>
<td>religious teacher heading a traditional pesantren</td>
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<tr>
<td>laskar, lasykar (Ind)</td>
<td>militia, paramilitary group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ma’had ‘ali (Ar)</td>
<td>institute for higher education; more specifically college-level Islamic school</td>
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<tr>
<td>madrasah</td>
<td>Islamic school</td>
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<tr>
<td>diniyah (Ind, Ar)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>madzhab (Ind), madhhab (Ar)</td>
<td>school of Islamic jurisprudence</td>
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<tr>
<td>majelis (Ind), majlis (Ar)</td>
<td>council, gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td>majelis taklim (Ind)</td>
<td>religious study group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maksiat (Ind), ma’siyya (Ar)</td>
<td>immoral practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
manhaj (Ar) method, approach
masjid (Ar) mosque
mu`amalat (Ar) conduct, behaviour; the part of Islamic jurisprudence that concerns human interactions
mujahidin (Ar) “holy warriors”
munkarat (Ar) reprehensible acts
murtad (Ar) apostate
mushalla (Ind/Ar) prayer room
pemuda (Ind) youth
pemurtadan (Ind/Ar) apostasy, luring Muslims away from Islam
penghulu (Ind) religious official, appointed by a local court or the colonial administration
perwakilan (Ind) representation: provincial branch of an organization
pesantren (Jav, Ind) traditional Islamic boarding school
pondok (Jav) (1) dormitory in a pesantren; (2) pesantren
priyayi (Jav) bureaucratic upper class
sadaqah (Ar) voluntary charitable gift
santri (Jav) (1) student in a pesantren; (2) pious, practicing Muslim
sayyid (Ind/Ar) descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
syahadah (Ind/Ar) Muslim confession of faith (the proclamation that there is one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet)
Glossary

`tajdid` (Ar)  “renewal”: revitalization of Islam

tafsir (Ar)  Qur’anic exegesis

takhayul (Ind/Ar) beliefs based on fantasies and hallucinations

taklim (Ind), `ta’lim` (Ar) religious instruction. See also majelis taklim

tarbiyah (Ind, Ar) intensive Islamic education, disciplining

tarjih (Ar) preference: establishing the best of various opinions

tausiyah (Ind), tawsiyya (Ar) advice, counsel

`ukhuwah` (Ind), `ukhuwwa` (Ar) brotherhood

`ulama` (Ar) scholars of Islamic learning

`ummah` (Ind/Ar) the community of all Muslims

`usrah` (Ind/Ar) “nuclear family”: small and tightly-knit study groups in Muslim Brotherhood-influenced movements

`ustadz` (Ind), `ustadh` (Ar) religious teacher

`zakat` (Ar) obligatory Islamic alms-giving

`ziyarah` (Ind/Ar) pilgrimage, grave visitation
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Ahmad Najib Burhani is a researcher in theology and philosophy of religion at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and a Ph.D. candidate in Religious Studies, with emphasis on minority religions with Islamic origins, at the University of California in Santa Barbara. He published several books, including *Sufisme Kota: Berpikir Jernih, Menemukan Spiritualitas Positif* (2001), *Islam Dinamis: Menggugat Peran Agama, Membongkar Doktrin yang Membatu* (2001) and *Muhammadiyah Jawa* (2010), and numerous articles, including “Revealing the Neglected Missions: Some Comments on the Javanese Elements of Muhammadiyah Reformism”, *Studia Islamika* 12, no. 1 (2005) and “Lakum dinukum wa-liya dini: The Muhammadiyah’s stance towards interfaith relations”, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 22 (2011). Najib can be contacted at najib27@yahoo.com.

Moch Nur Ichwan is a lecturer of Islamic politics at the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta and the director of the research institute CIS-Form at that university. He obtained his Ph.D. degree from the University of Tilburg in 2006, with a dissertation titled “Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966–2004”. A Rubicon grant from Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) enabled him to carry out postdoctoral research on the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2008–09). His current research concerns various forms of resistance to the imposition of Shariah in Aceh. Ichwan’s recent publications include “The Making of a Pancasila State: Political Debates on Secularism, Islam and the State in Indonesia”, *SOIAS Research Paper Series* No. 6, Sophia Organization for Islamic Area Studies, Sophia University (February 2012); “Official Ulema
and the Politics of Re-Islamization: The Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, Shari’atization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order Aceh”, *Journal of Islamic Studies* 22 (2011). Ichwan can be contacted at ichwanmoe@yahoo.com.

**Mujiburrahman** is a lecturer at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Antasari in Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, where he also obtained his undergraduate degree. He pursued postgraduate studies at McGill University, Montreal, was a Ph.D. fellow at the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) and obtained his doctorate from Utrecht University. His dissertation was published as *Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order* (2006). His other publications include *Mengindonesiakan Islam* (2008), *Polisi Tidur, Kekuasaan Membela Yang Bayar* (2010), *Badingsan Banjar-Dayak: Identitas Agama dan Ekonomi Etnisitas di Kalimantan Selatan* (2011) and numerous articles, most recently “Religion and dialogue in Indonesia: from the Soeharto period to the present”, *Studia Islamika* 17, no. 3 (2010). Mujiburrahman can be contacted at mujib71@hotmail.com.

**Muhammad Wildan** is a lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, where he also did his undergraduate studies. He received an MA in Islamic Studies at Leiden University in 1999 and pursued doctoral studies at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) in Kuala Lumpur, where he submitted his dissertation “Radical Islamism in Solo: A Quest of Muslims’ Identity in a Town of Central Java” (2009). A graduate of Pondok Ngruki himself, he is engaged in efforts to exert a moderating influence in this and related pesantren in the region of Solo. Wildan can be contacted at wildan71@yahoo.com.

**Martin van Bruinessen** is Emeritus Professor of Comparative Studies of Contemporary Muslim Societies at Utrecht University and was one of the chairs at the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM). His most recent publications include the edited volumes *The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages* (with Farish A. Noor and Yoginder Sikand (2008), *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates* (with Khalid Masud and Armando Salvatore, 2009), and *Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe* (with Stefano Allievi, 2011), and a collection of articles on traditionalist Islam in Indonesia, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat* (2012). Martin can be contacted at m.vanbruinessen@uu.nl.
The collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998 led to the opening up of previously unimaginable political opportunities and transformations in Indonesian society. The Reformasi (reformation) movement demanded democratization, good governance, and the empowerment of civil society. Most existing Muslim organizations redefined their orientation and political platforms, as did most other associations; and many new Muslim organizations, movements, and political parties emerged, armed with new nationalist, liberal or Islamist paradigms. They have endeavoured to present their own concepts of Reformasi, and to avoid the stigma of being anti-Reformasi.

The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama, or MUI), a semi-official institution of Indonesian ulama established by Soeharto in 1975, is no exception. At the beginning of the Reformasi era, the MUI seemed disoriented and struggled to come to terms with the changes. During the Habibie era, it focused not on issuing fatwas, but on producing tausiyahs to legitimize a number of Habibie’s policies, and, in the period
in which Habibie was confronted with political moves to discredit him, by visiting the president at the palace. It was only at the 2000 National Congress, during the Abdurrahman Wahid era, that the MUI proclaimed its ambition to change its role from being the “khadim al-hukumah” (servant of the government) to serving as the “khadim al-ummah” (servant of the ummah). This resonated with the central Reformasi concept of empowering society vis-à-vis the state, besides expressing the MUI’s vision of its own agenda-setting role in the Reformasi process. Since that time, the MUI has endeavoured to reposition itself in Indonesia’s transitional politics by defending more conservative Muslim interests and aspirations. This can be seen from various fatwas, tausiyahs, and other statements produced by the MUI, and in the way in which it has dealt with social, political, economic and cultural issues.

In the present study, I shall focus on the MUI’s endeavours to redefine its role in the post-Soeharto era, analyse its transformation from a government-oriented to an ummah-oriented body, and explore the implications of this transformation. Particular emphasis will be given to the way in which the MUI has exercised its power as the “semi-official religious authority” in the country and the way it has defined “moderate Islam”, which is in fact “puritanical moderate Islam” based on Sunni orthodoxy, in the context of ideologically and organizationally pluralistic Indonesian Islam. Below we will examine a number of issues that best reflect the MUI’s changing role in post-New Order Indonesia, as well as its newly developed position in national politics. These issues range from the certification of halal foods and Islamic banking services to the “purification” of public morality (action against pornography and “porno-action”), education (the polemic on the Draft Law on the National Education System), the image of Islam (jihad and terrorism), Islamic thought (religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism), and Islamic faith (deviant belief and the Ahmadiyah movement).

“SOFTENING THE HARDLINERS, HARDENING THE SOFT-MINDED”: THE MUI’S PURITANICAL MODERATION

The post-New Order MUI has introduced a new approach to the ummah, that is, in KH. Ma’ruf Amin’s words, “softening the hardliners, hardening the soft-minded”. However, the current state of the MUI’s world-view is no longer characterized by moderate Islam per se, but rather by “puritanical moderate Islam”. The Council has always represented a moderate interpretation of
Islamic orthodoxy, and its orientation continues to be a moderate one, but it has undergone a shift towards more puritanical and strictly literalist interpretations of the faith during the last decade. This is part of what Van Bruinessen has called the “conservative turn” (Bruinessen 2011). The MUI puts forward puritanical moderate Islam, not puritanical radical Islam, as the ideal version for Indonesia, although it would not be impossible for the organization to turn to the latter type in the future. The MUI has retained its original concerns in the field of Islamic law, faith, morality and interest, but in these fields it has increasingly tended towards more puritan and conservative positions. In the past, the ideological struggle within the MUI was between Islamic traditionalism of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Islamic modernism of Muhammadiyah, with the latter achieving victory (even when NU-affiliated ulama presided over the MUI). Presently, traditionalists, modernists, puritans and radicals vie for influence in the Council, and it is the reformist and puritanical voices that are victorious. The fact that the most senior positions in the Council have been held by ulama affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama has not made a difference, because these ulama happen to be closer to puritanical reformism than to mainstream traditionalism. There are very few radicals in the Council, but they have a significant voice, especially in influencing the tausiyahs or fatwas that are formulated not only by the Fatwa Commission and leadership board, but also by the forums that invite representatives from other Islamic organizations or movements, such as the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (FUI), the Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia (KUII), and the Ijtima’ Ulama. It is in these forums that the radicals have the opportunity to express their strict and rigid views, rhetorically accusing all those who have different opinions of hypocrisy (nifaq), sinfulness (fisq) or infidelity (kufr).

As a puritanical moderate Islamic organization, the MUI is characterized by a number of key tendencies. First, its normative orientation towards issues of halal and haram (licit and illicit) has become more legalistic in the sense of going beyond the boundaries of the traditional schools of Islamic law. It deals not only with purely religious issues, but also with the certification of halal food, cosmetics, drugs, banking, insurance, and other financial and economic issues, as well as political leadership — although it does not question the extent to which the state is Islamic. Second, its theological orientation has been basically conservative since its establishment, and has become more puritanical with the recruitment of some new and more radical members. The shift to a more puritanical position first became apparent at the 2000 National Congress, when the issue of Christianization through education emerged, and even more puritanical since the 2005
National Congress, when the fatwas on religious liberalism, secularism and pluralism, the Ahmadiyah, interreligious prayer, interreligious inheritance, and interreligious marriage were issued. Third, its moralistic orientation has become more puritanical and interventionist in public affairs, not only through fatwas and tausiyahs and other public statements, but also through legal and political processes in parliament and mass demonstrations. Fourth, its ideological orientation has become more exclusive, protecting the interests of the Muslim ummah rather than inclusive national interests. However, despite these puritanical orientations, the MUI has tried to be moderate. Its moderation is indicated by, among other things, its rejection of radicalism and terrorism, its (admittedly selective) acceptance of modernity, and its acceptance of the Indonesian nation-state based on Pancasila and modern democracy, and not on Islam.

As mentioned above, there were already moves towards a more puritanical stance by the time of the 2000 National Congress, at which the MUI announced its new orientation towards becoming the khadim al-ummah (the servant of the Muslim community). Incontrovertibly, the biggest question raised by the slogan khadim al-ummah is: who is the ummah? When I asked MUI leaders in Jakarta and in local MUI offices for clarification on this matter, their answers varied. Some replied that ummah in this sense includes “all Muslims” in Indonesia, regardless of their ideological and political preferences, radical or liberal. Referring to the current MUI fatwas against religious liberalism, secularism and pluralism, others prefer to exclude liberal Muslims and those with “deviant beliefs” (aliran sesat), since they may pose a danger to the ummah. This second group has gone so far as to suggest that the MUI should not offer liberal Muslims MUI membership, and should instead be tolerant of so-called “puritan” and “radical” Muslims (such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [DDII], Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia [HTI] and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia [MMI]) instead. Despite these differences, the general policy of the MUI is reflected in the phrase: melunakkan yang terlalu keras, mengeraskan yang terlalu lunak (which literally means: “softening those who are too hard, and hardening those who are too soft”). This implies that the MUI is playing the politics of “mediation”, as most MUI leaders believe, in the hope that both extremes will be persuaded to embrace “moderation”. Despite this, it is clear that there has also been a change of course within the MUI towards a more conservative stance, reflected in the various fatwas and tausiyahs that it has issued since 2000.

In a move that would have been inconceivable under the New Order, a number of Muslim hardliners have been recruited, such as Adian Husaini,
Cholil Ridwan and Amin Djamaluddin. Although more inclusion has been evident since the 2000 National Conference, until 2005 this had not resulted in the representation of radical organizations in the MUI. At the 2005 National Conference, members of such Islamist movements as the HTI and Front Umat Islam (FUI) were recruited to occupy certain positions in the central MUI and in some provincial and district offices, depending on the respective local politics inside and outside the MUI. This strategy is the simplest way of implementing the MUI’s supposedly new identity as the “khidim al-ummah”.

This generosity of spirit has not been extended to “liberal Muslims”, whether directly involved in Jaringan Islam Liberal (the Liberal Islam Network, or JIL) or otherwise associated with liberal interpretations of Islam. A few intellectuals considered as “liberal”, including Masdar F. Ma’sudi and Siti Musdah Mulia, had been members of the MUI’s central board up to 2005, although they were never involved in decision-making. From 2005 on, however, when the MUI issued its notorious anti-liberal fatwas, the Council has made efforts to protect itself from dangerous ideological influences by excluding all liberal Muslims from its ranks.

This policy has been implemented not only in the central MUI, but also in most provincial and district MUI offices.

There are indications that it will not be easy for the MUI to pursue its “moderation” strategy. Some extreme radical Muslim circles blame the MUI for being too soft, and, more specifically, too slow to endorse the implementation of Islamic Shariah. Conversely, according to liberal Muslims, the MUI has gone too far in its interference in both the public and private dimensions of religious life. The latter also realize that a number of MUI fatwas and tausiyahs have been blatantly counter-productive, as they have hampered the progress of democratization in the country. They believe that some MUI fatwas threaten interreligious harmony and, indeed, the future of democracy (Munawar-Rachman 2010, pp. 26–38). Despite their disappointment in the MUI, however, radical groups have not rejected the organization and, instead, some of them have decided on positive action and have tried to penetrate the MUI by becoming members. They have proclaimed that they will try to change the MUI from within. The liberals, on the other hand, show no such tendencies. Instead, they have attempted to deconstruct the authority of the ulama council from outside, by developing discourses that undermine the MUI’s authority and authoritativeness. Some have even called for the MUI’s dissolution.

The MUI’s negative reaction to liberal Muslims has been a logical response in such circumstances. The issuance of the fatwa on religious
pluralism, liberalism and secularism, as we will see below, indicates the absence of liberal scholars within the MUI, and the failure of the liberals to win the MUI’s sympathy. There have also been efforts, as a consequence of the fatwa on religious liberalism, to cleanse the MUI of all liberal ideas and of the scholars who support them. This may explain why there has been a “conservativization”, in the sense of theological, legal, and moral puritanization, if not “radicalization”, process visible in MUI discourses, and why the “moderating” efforts have resulted in “puritanical moderate” Islam, as we shall see from the cases discussed below.

**BECOMING A “SERVANT OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY”: THE PURITANICAL TURN**

After the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998, the MUI tried unsuccessfully to shake off its association with the New Order regime. During the B.J. Habibie era, the MUI adopted a position of unambiguous support for the Habibie regime. The relationship between the MUI and Habibie had been built up over many years during the New Order period, and had grown closer since the establishment of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, or ICMI), of which Habibie was the founding chairman, in late 1990. The ICMI and the MUI also cooperated assiduously in many religious activities, including the establishment of the first Islamic bank, Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia (BMI) (Porter 2002). Most Muslims had long considered Habibie to be the ideal Muslim intellectual, claiming that he had a “German brain but a Ka’ba heart” (*otak Jerman tapi berhati Ka’bah*). At that time, Habibie was regarded as one of the most important Muslim figures, implying that, were political forces to oppose him, this could have a deleterious impact on Muslim society. Therefore, the MUI was placed in the position of defending Habibie against his opponents and supporting him in his bid to be elected as the next president. Before the general election, MUI issued three *tausiyyah* s (on 29 April, 20 May and 1 June 1999). Respectively, these *tausiyyah* s called for Muslims to participate in the election peacefully; for the choices of other Muslim political parties to be respected; and for the Qur’anic prohibition of non-Muslims standing as Muslim leaders (*auliya’*) to be respected (Ichwan 2005, pp. 55–58). It is clear that here, the MUI promoted Muslim political interests against those of nationalists and non-Muslims.

In 1998, the MUI revived the Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Ummah Congress, or KUII), which was held between
3 and 7 November that year. This Congress was considered to be the continuation of Muktamar Islam Indonesia (known as the first KUII), held on 7–8 November 1945.\(^{15}\) Organized after the collapse of Soeharto's New Order, this congress was politically significant in that it demonstrated the emergence of Islam as a political force. However, the Congress included some liberal thinkers, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Dawam Rahardjo, Azyumardi Azra, and Syafii Anwar, who were later excluded from the consecutive congresses. The KUII became a forum for discussing political, social, economic and religious issues. These issues would then be taken up by the MUI National Congress, which could not be held until after the 1999 general election. Later, the KUII became one of the most important forums for Islamic organizations and movements to voice their views and interests and to attempt to influence MUI fatwas and policies.

It is worthwhile to consider the MUI's role in the general elections, held on 7 June 1999. These were the first democratic elections since 1955, and no fewer than forty-eight parties with various ideological positions took part. The results were surprising: the secular nationalist parties won more votes than the Muslim-based nationalist parties and the Islamic parties together.\(^{16}\) The results were as follows: PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, or Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle), with 34 per cent of the vote and 153 seats in parliament; Golkar (Golongan Karya, or the Party of the Functional Groups), with 22 per cent of the vote and 120 seats; PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or the National Awakening Party), with 12 per cent and 51 seats; PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or the Development Unity Party), with 10 per cent and 58 seats; and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or the National Mandate Party), with 7 per cent and 34 seats.\(^{17}\)

In 1999, the president was not yet directly elected; the elections were only for parliament, and parliament, in turn, decided on the president.\(^{18}\) Given the majority obtained by the secular parties, it appeared impossible that an individual who was strongly associated with Islam would be chosen as president, unless Muslim politicians in secular parties supported him and no politicians from Islamic or Muslim-based parties allied with secular politicians. At first glance, this appeared unlikely. Muslims politicians, both within parliament and beyond, found themselves facing a struggle.\(^{19}\) In addition to expecting support from other Islamic organizations and movements, it was hoped that the MUI would assist them. Less than two months after the elections, the MUI held a national working conference, from 23–26 July 1999. There was a rumour that the MUI would produce
a fatwa against the appointment of a female president or leader (aimed at Megawati). In fact, this never happened. It seems that the MUI trod very carefully when dealing with the delicate political situation. Nevertheless, it finally issued a *tadzikrah* statement on 25 September 1999, defending Habibie’s position regarding the controversy surrounding the Bank Bali scandal, interreligious conflict in Ambon and the East Timor referendum — thus broadcasting a clear message about the MUI’s political position *vis-à-vis* the presidential election (Ichwan 2005, pp. 58–59).

Having the MUI’s support, however, was of little help to Habibie, who was attempting to defend his position. His “state of the nation” address was rejected by most Members of Parliament, and although this did not actually prevent him from running in the presidential election, he decided to withdraw his candidacy. Habibie’s withdrawal put the MUI in an even more difficult position, because this signified that it had lost its strongest patron in the government. It was, in fact, not only a defeat for Habibie, but also for the MUI.

The era of President Abdurrahman Wahid brought momentum for change. From the beginning of his presidential term of office, Wahid’s political statements and attitudes on Islamic issues were seen as controversial in certain Muslim circles, including those of the MUI. Sometimes Wahid was even perceived as being hostile to Islamic interests, from his standpoints on Communism and Israel to those on the Muslim-Christian civil war in the Moluccas, and his open rejection of a fatwa by the MUI on a food additive it declared *haram*. Perhaps this was not surprising: Wahid had been a well-known and controversial intellectual figure since the 1970s. He had also been a fierce critic of the MUI, demanding that the organization become independent of the government and that it leave the Istiqlal Mosque, a state-funded mosque built during the Sukarno era. These criticisms and the controversial nature of Wahid’s approach left the MUI in a propitious position to declare its new vision. Having previously been seen as the “servant of the government” (*khadim al-hukumah*), from now on, it would strive to be the “servant of *ummah*” (*khadim al-ummah*). The proclamation was made at the MUI National Congress in 2000. In short, therefore, the period from the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998 to the National Congress in 2000 can be regarded as a period of reorientation and loosening of the ties with the state.

The years between the national congresses of 2000 and 2005 constitute the second distinct phase of developments in the MUI of the post-Soeharto period. The 2000 National Congress was an important moment in the
reconstitution of the MUI, marked by the revision of the organization's statutes. In an important break with the recent past, the MUI declared that Islam was again its guiding principle, instead of the state ideology, Pancasila. The transformation of the MUI is even more apparent in the document in which the Council presents itself, the “Outlook of the Indonesian Council of Ulama” (Wawasan Majelis Ulama Indonesia). This text lists its five major roles: (1) to act as heir of the Prophets (warathat al-anbiya', a traditional description of the task of the ulama); (2) to issue fatwas; (3) to act as guide and servant of the Muslim community (khadim al-ummah); (4) reform and revival of Islam (islah wa tajdid); and (5) to enjoin good and forbid evil (al-amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar) (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2000, pp. 12–15). The three last points, not present in the earlier statutes, indicate clearly the MUI’s new orientation. The concept of khadim al-ummah, as observed above, marked the shift from providing religious legitimacy to the regime and supporting its development agenda to representing Muslim interests — which are not purely religious but also economic and political. Islah and tajdid are terms from the agenda of religious reform associated with the puritan Persatuan Islam (Persis) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) as well as the modernist Muhammadiyah (but much less so with the NU). Enjoining good and forbidding evil, finally, is a core concept of Islamic social morality and is in principle embraced by most, if not all, Muslim organizations. However, it has connotations of enforcing the Shari‘ah not by legislation but through various forms of persuasion, including vigilante action.

The 2000 National Congress also discussed other issues that reflected more conservative views of Islam and an awareness of the Muslim community’s interests. It put forward reflections on how an ulama council should be organized, and how its newly adopted slogan, khadim al-ummah, should be put into action. The MUI declared that it was an “independent” organization. The President and the Minister of Religious Affairs were no longer the organization’s official patron (pelindung) and chief adviser, respectively. Having become more “independent”, the MUI was able to distance itself from the ruling party and from the hurly-burly of national politics during the 2004 general election.

Claims of independence from the government notwithstanding, the MUI did not achieve (and probably never sought) a full separation of the ties connecting it with the government, and it remains quite unlike other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It retains close links with the government, especially (but not exclusively) with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It moved out of the Istiqlal Mosque, but currently uses an office
building owned by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that has been lent to the MUI free of cost for an “indeterminate period of time”. Moreover, all post-New Order Ministers of Religious Affairs (KH Tholchah Hasan, Maftuh Basyuni and Suryadharma Ali) have been members of the MUI’s Advisory Board. The MUI has also received donations from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. A number of MUI activities were organized in cooperation with various government bodies, such as the Ministries of Religious Affairs, Communication and Information, National Education, Culture and Tourism, Defence and Security, Interior Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Employment, and Social Affairs.

The MUI also reorganized the way of discussing religious questions and issuing fatwas, which it continues to see as one of its main tasks. In 2003 a new forum was established, called *Ijtima’ Ulama* (Ulama Assembly), in which members of the MUI’s Fatwa Commission from all over Indonesia (including Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama of Aceh) were invited to participate. Meeting every three years, the Ijtima’ discusses three important clusters of issues: (1) *maṣa’il asasiyah wataniyah* (fundamental national issues); (2) *maṣa’il waqi’iyah mu’ashirah* (contemporary issues); and (3) *maṣa’il qanuniyah* (legal issues). With this forum, the MUI has established its political moderation with the first cluster, responds to contemporary issues with the second cluster, and with the third, criticizes existing laws and draft laws being discussed in parliament. With this greater degree of flexibility, the MUI has become more active in directly responding to political issues, both national and international, by handing down fatwas and *tausiyahs*. It can also be effective in less direct ways. For example, it takes part in organizing street demonstrations through a body known as the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (FUI). However, it should be underlined that the MUI is not opposed to Pancasila as many radical Muslim groups are, and has even justified the existence of Pancasila as a “national philosophy” and part of a national consensus “to protect religious glory and regulate the welfare of shared life”. This support for Pancasila differentiates the organization from other puritanical radical Islamic groups.

This shift in the MUI’s discourse and activities needs to be seen against the background of an upsurge of Islamic radical activism in the wake of Soeharto’s resignation. The Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, or FPI), formally established on 17 August 1998, pioneered vigilante activism directed against nightclubs and other places of sin, and became involved in numerous violent demonstrations. The militia Laskar Jihad, emerging from a Salafi group naming itself Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal
Jamaah (FKAWJ, established on 14 February 1998), sent its members to take part in Muslim-Christian conflicts that broke out in various regions. The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, which had long been present underground, emerged from clandestinity and openly declared its existence in 2000. In the same year, various Islamist groups and individuals of a radical persuasion who shared the ideal of an Islamic state established the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Holy Warriors), which openly proclaimed its allegiance to the historical Darul Islam movement. A paramilitary group that appeared affiliated with the MMI, Laskar Mujahidin, also took part in fighting in the Moluccas. The prominent presence of these movements has influenced the MUI’s perception of issues of concern to the ummah and thereby contributed, as we shall see below, to a shift in its discourse and the tone of its fatwas.

The MUI’s National Congress of July 2005 marked the beginning of a third phase, continuing at the time of writing, in which the Council positioned itself as a firm defender of a conservative conception of orthodoxy. It took issue with, and strongly condemned: inter-faith prayer, inter-faith marriage, and inter-faith inheritance; religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism; so-called deviant beliefs, including the Ahmadiyah sect; dealings with the spirit world (kahanah) and fortune-telling (irafah); and any form of conversion of Muslims away from conservative orthodoxy (“apostasy”). Most of these concerns were reflected in the fatwas issued during the 2005 conference.

The struggle against “deviant beliefs”, of which the Ahmadiyah and a local prophetic cult, al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, were the first main targets, was put on a more systematic footing with the publication of the MUI’s “Guide for Identifying Deviant Beliefs” in 2007, which contains ten criteria of “deviant belief”. The Council’s response to alleged apostasy concerned especially Christianization, an issue with which notably the DDII had long been obsessed. In November 2006, the MUI established a Komite Nasional Penanggulangan Bahaya Pemurtadan (National Committee for Overcoming the Threat of Apostasy), which soon took position alongside various radical Islamist groups in actions against the building of (new) churches and against missionary activity. In this issue the MUI clearly adopted the radical Islamist agenda of challenging the development of Christian communities. Key roles were played by some of MUI leaders recruited after 2000, such as KH Cholil Ridwan (chairman of the committee), Amin Djamaluddin and Abu Deedat, who had previously been actively engaged in anti-Christianization and anti-apostasy movements.
PURIFYING FOODS AND OTHER CONSUMABLE PRODUCTS: HALAL CERTIFICATION

In Indonesia, *halal* certification has been managed by the MUI through its Institute for Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Assessment (LPPOM-MUI). Established on 6 January 1989, it took until 1994 before it issued its first *halal* certificate. The institute comprises two interrelated sub-institutions, one consisting of food scientists who deal with the laboratory assessment of foods, drinks, drugs, cosmetics and other products (located in Bogor and established in cooperation with the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) in 1994), the other consisting of Shariah experts (Fatwa Commission). It is the latter who decide whether or not the products are *halal* and issue a corresponding fatwa. The fatwa is then translated into a “*halal* certificate”. Therefore, according to the MUI, a *halal* certificate is a written fatwa on the *halal*-ness of a product. To ensure the continued *halal* quality, the MUI formulated the so-called Halal Assurance System (HAS) in 2005 (not implemented until 2008), by which the factories of *halal* products recognized by the LPPOM-MUI are held to maintain independently the *halal* quality of these products. For this purpose, the factories should have their own internal *halal* auditor (for small factories) or institution (for big factories) (LPPOM-MUI 2008a). The MUI believes it needs a monopoly of the (financially very lucrative) *halal* certification in order to protect Muslim consumers from products that are of doubtful quality.

*Halal* certification became a major issue in the early Reformasi era in the context of the trend towards re-Islamization of the public sphere. Habibie endorsed it during his presidency by issuing Governmental Regulation No 69/1999 on Food Labelling and Advertisement, which regulated *halal* labelling. In the Abdurrahman Wahid era, the question of *halal* and *haram* food substances had become important enough to be capable of mobilizing opposition to the president. The LPPOM-MUI issued a fatwa declaring the popular food additive Ajinomoto (monosodium glutamate) *haram* because a pig enzyme was used in its production. Wahid, a Muslim scholar himself, challenged the fatwa, arguing that although the enzyme was used in the production process, none of it remained present in the final product, and offering analogies with other cases where mere contact with a *haram* substance does not automatically make other substances *haram* too. To this he added the argument that a boycott of this product had a negative impact on the economy and on employment. He failed to convince most Muslim politicians, who sided with the MUI in this case and took up positions against him. This case probably strengthened the MUI’s claims
and gave it the political support to continue supervising halal foods and other consumable products.

Despite the MUI’s monopoly, there is actually no strong legal basis for an NGO to deal with halal certification, because there is only a Letter of Cooperation, signed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Health, and the MUI on 21 June 1996. This was a compromise between these institutions, reached after long negotiations as to which institution should be in charge of managing halal certification.36 The MUI considers the other existing laws and regulations as insufficient to protect the Muslim right to halal products, and as a justification for recognizing the LPPOM-MUI as the only institution for halal certification.37 Therefore it called for a special law on halal product assurance, which should recognize and confirm the existence of LPPOM-MUI. However, the government, notably the Ministry of Religious Affairs, has its own agenda and appears interested in keeping the lucrative halal labelling business in its own hands.38

Halal food and non-food products are not merely matters of religious normativity, but represent a considerable economic business potential. The halal market has expanded significantly in the last decade, and the Indonesian Ministry of Trade perceives great potential for Indonesian exporters. In 2005 it estimated that the European Union alone, with 20 million Muslims, might import $195 million worth of halal products. At that time, Indonesia’s non-oil, non-gas exports to Europe amounted to approximately $10 billion. This did not yet include halal products, a market segment that remained unexplored but that the Ministry was determined to capture.39 At the third World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF 2007), held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 28 May 2007, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said in his Special Keynote Address: “We would be remiss if we did not take advantage of the halal market” (Yudhoyono 2007).

The MUI is aware not only of the increasing volume of the halal market worldwide, but also of the importance of international recognition as an authoritative institution for halal certification. The drive behind its efforts to gain such recognition is ideological as well as economic in nature. Western capitalist states have procedures of quality assurance based on health and sometimes political considerations (such as human rights concerns), which has made it difficult for some Muslim countries to export their products to the U.S. or Europe. Muslim countries, the MUI argues, should implement not only health quality assurance, but also halal assurance, so that the producers in the West are also obliged to meet Muslim consumers’ demands for halal quality.40 At the same time, the MUI has been acutely aware of the potential
earnings of halal certification, which may considerably reduce its dependence on government funding. In the past decade, halal certification has been one of the chief sources of income for the MUI (along with certification of Shariah banking, on which more below). It has therefore valiantly defended its de facto monopoly and expanded its activities throughout the country. As the demand for halal products continued to grow, the MUI established branches of the LPPOM-MUI in more than twenty provinces and cities (LPPOM-MUI 2008b). Despite criticisms, the LPPOM-MUI remains the sole institution of halal certification in Indonesia.

PURIFYING THE MARKET: SUPPORTING ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE

The government’s support for Shariah banking cannot be disassociated from the economic and political crises that hit Indonesia in 1997 and were followed by the fall of Soeharto in 1998. It is true that the country’s first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), was founded in 1991 with direct backing from Soeharto (Hefner 1996), but this was not followed by the establishment of any other Shariah banks until 1999, when several conventional banks adopted Shariah-compliant banking as part of their operations. The government at that time needed to revive economic development and trust in conventional banking was undermined. Some of the conventional banks were not managed well so that they collapsed, deepening the economic crisis. Owners of other conventional banks left the country and set up businesses abroad. The government needed alternative economic institutions that it hoped could stimulate national economic development. In this context, Islamic or Shariah-based economic institutions appeared to provide that alternative.

To endorse the development of Islamic banks, in 2003, the MUI issued a fatwa declaring conventional interest-based banking haram. As recently as 2000, the MUI had still considered conventional banking permissible on the basis of the consideration that a situation of darurah (emergency) prevailed. By 2003, however, there existed a reasonable number of Shariah banks, and the MUI decided that there was no more need for conventional banking. KH Ma’ruf Amin, the main actor behind the fatwa, told a journalist that the number of bank branches offering Shariah-compliant services had at that moment reached 210, and that certain banking practitioners had assured him that this was sufficient to declare conventional banking haram henceforth. However, a fatwa is not binding,
and thus far only a few Muslims have been persuaded to move their money from conventional banks to Islamic banks. Many conventional banks were, however, persuaded to prevent future losses by opening “Shariah windows” or establishing semi-independent Shariah branches. Most Islamic banks as well as conventional banks with “Shariah windows” have a Shariah Advisory Board (Dewan Pengawas Syariah), in which they prudently appointed prominent members of the MUI.\(^4\)

The MUI has established a special body for dealing with banking and related matters (such as insurance), the National Shariah Council (Dewan Syariah Nasional, DSN). This body inspects all financial products individually and issues a fatwa for each one. This has resulted in a considerable output in fatwas on Shariah-compliant financial products, on which the central bank (Bank Indonesia) and the Ministry of Finance have come to rely. These two institutions do not issue permits for new “Islamic” financial products unless there is a corresponding fatwa from the DSN. In this sense, the MUI has obtained real influence over the government’s policies concerning Islamic economics.

Nonetheless, in practice, the laws of economics prevail over those of state and religion. The introduction of new “Islamic” financial products require both a fatwa and a regulation from the state’s financial institutions. When the market does not follow, the fatwas and regulations remain irrelevant. However, unlike other markets, the Shariah market responds to the degree of Shariah-mindedness of its participants, and not just to economic considerations. Compliance with Shariah principles and values becomes important in the banking system to the extent that the customer considers it to be important. For the MUI, persuading Muslims of the obligation to shift to more “Islamic” economic transactions is as important as ensuring that the proper financial products are available. The MUI’s active interventions in support of Shariah-compliant banking may be considered a component of what some have termed “market Islam”. This term refers to “how Islamic practices are mobilized to facilitate the transition from an authoritarian regime of state-fostered development to organizing labour and commercial activity according to market principles” (Rudnyckyj 2009\(^a\), p. 185). As a concept, it is similar to that of “civil Islam”, which refers to the potential role of Islamic institutions in the democratic transition (Hefner 2000). Market Islam, however, is designed to merge Muslim religious practice and capitalist ethics, rather than to create commensurability between Islam and democracy. It aims to purify the economic market.
PURIFYING PUBLIC MORALITY: COUNTERING PORNOGRAPHY AND “PORNO-ACTION”

One of the roles that the MUI has assumed is that of the protector of public morality. It justifies this on the grounds that, because most Indonesians are Muslims, the MUI — as the representative of the ulama — is legally obliged to offer them guidance on public morality. The 1998 KUII, organized by the MUI, and the 2000 National Congress of the MUI recommended that the MUI tackle thirteen kinds of munkarat (“reprehensible acts”): deviant beliefs, corruption and bribery, adultery, abortion, pornography and “porno-action” (pornoaksi), narcotics, gambling, alcohol, intellectual copyright, criminality, destruction of the environment, violence, and enmity. Among other suggestions, the KUII recommended that the MUI issue a fatwa and draw up a draft law on pornography and “porno-action”. This proposal was motivated by the growing number of explicit programmes on TV channels, CDs, DVDs and Internet sites, as well pornographic books and magazines.

The MUI duly issued a fatwa on Pornography and Porno-action (no. 287/2001) and drew up its own version of the Draft Law on Anti-Pornography and “Porno-action”, which has elicited numerous public debates and controversies since it was first proposed in 2002. It would be correct to say that the Draft Law that was debated in parliament was a product of the MUI, although it was formally submitted by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Draft Law was in fact a response to recommendations made in the MUI fatwa, especially Point 2.1, which demands all state apparatuses “create a legal statute which pays genuine attention to the content and is reinforced by the sanctions which function as zawajir and mawani” [i.e., making evil-doers repent and preventing others from committing the same sin] (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2003, p. 304).

Amidst the controversy on the Draft Law on Anti-Pornography and “Porno-action”, the international “men’s magazine”, Playboy, published its first edition in Indonesia in April 2006, despite strong protests lodged before its publication. A group of FPI members attacked the building in which the Playboy office was situated. Not surprisingly, the MUI was among the bodies supporting the protest movements against Playboy. In its Ma’lumat (public statement), the Team for Securing the Draft Law on Pornography and “Porno-action”, which included the MUI and representatives of other Islamic organizations, expressed the view that the publication of Playboy, an icon of pornography, was “tantamount to a declaration of war on the moral health of the nation” and that no response was possible other
than “a declaration of war against all kinds of pornography and porno-action which they considered undermining the nation’s morality” (quoted in Abdullah 2006, pp. 6–7). They raised the slogan “eradicate pornography, protect the nation’s morality, make Indonesia dignified” (Berantas pornografi, lindungi akhlak bangsa, wujudkan Indonesia bermartabat).

The Team for Securing the Draft Law on Pornography and “Porno-action” symbolized the close relation between MUI and Islamist movements, especially those coordinated by the FUI, in facing the pornography — although this does not mean that they had similarly close relations in other cases. The said Ma’lumat was signed by the head of the MUI’s Fatwa Commission, KH. Ma’ruf Amin, and the coordinator of the protest actions, Muhammad al-Khattath, the prominent leader of the FUI and HTI. The MUI and the Islamists were in this case in complete ideological agreement on the importance of challenging pornography and “porno-action”. This was followed by legal proceedings against the editor of Playboy and the artists whose pornographic artwork appeared in it. Playboy paid no heed to their protests, and the magazine continued to be published in Indonesia. However, its editor, Erwin Arnada, was finally brought to court in 2009, found guilty under Articles 281–82 of the Penal Code (on public morality) and sentenced to two years imprisonment. After this, publication of Indonesian Playboy was discontinued.

The Draft Law underwent a number of changes as attempts were made to satisfy opposing groups, before it was finally approved by parliament on 30 October 2008. Although not all of the MUI’s demands were incorporated, including use of the term “porno-action”, the spirit of the law is line with the MUI rather than with “secular” forces. Undoubtedly, seen from the MUI’s viewpoint, the imprisonment of the editor of Indonesian Playboy and the discontinuation of this magazine, as well as the enactment of the Pornography Law were great successes.

PURIFYING THE SCHOOLS: PREVENTING APOSTASY THROUGH THE NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM

Through the Ministry of Education, the government proposed a Draft Law on the National Education System to parliament on 2 May 2003. The draft law suffered a stormy passage through parliament, however, because a number of legislators thought that it displayed a heavy Muslim bias. The same draft was proposed again on 20 May 2003, but again failed to achieve a consensus. This caused controversy between proponents and opponents
of the draft law. The latter, both inside and beyond parliament, argued that it did not do justice to the religiously pluralistic nature of Indonesian society, and that it was therefore undemocratic. Among its provisions, the draft law would have obliged schools to provide all their students with teaching of religious subjects by teachers of their own religion. This would disproportionately affect Christian schools, which are generally considered the best, so that many Muslim parents send their children there, whereas few if any Christian parents would send their children to a Muslim school. Concerned Muslim puritans have long deplored this situation as rife with the danger of Christianization, and therefore felt that the new law might finally restore the balance. The opponents of the draft law believed that this provision would be difficult to implement, as certain religiously plural private schools would find it difficult to provide teachers based on the religious orientation of their students. The proponents of the draft law, the majority of whom were Muslims, believed that the law was “pluralistic” and “democratic”, on the grounds that it reflected the rights of believers to be given religious instruction.

The MUI played an important role in the promulgation of the draft law. The MUI was consulted from the outset, having been requested to read and give feedback on the first draft. Although the same task was also required of other, non-Muslim, representative religious organizations, the draft law was in line with Muslim views on education. Several organizations representing other religions later joined the protests against the draft law. The MUI appears to have played a significant role in adding an Islamic touch to the Draft Law — quite apart from the fact that the Minister of National Education at the time, Professor Malik Fadjar, was a prominent Muhammadiyah leader and a former Minister of Religious Affairs. The MUI was also active in organizing support at both the national and local levels. Various large demonstrations were organized by the Forum Ukhawah Islamiyah, the MUI’s vehicle for mobilizing grassroots support, in which representatives of almost all Islamic organizations in Indonesia took part. The national demonstrations in Jakarta were also supported by a number of MUI branches around Jakarta, including those from the provinces of Banten and West Java, and other more remote branches, such as Yogyakarta and South Sulawesi.  

On 1 June 2003, the FUI and the MUI organized a demonstration they called “Aksi Sejuta Ummat” (Action of One Million Muslims) in front of the Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta’s middle-class district of Kebayoran Baru. The demonstration was attended by thousands of Muslims from various backgrounds and such disparate organizations as the Muhammadiyah,
Nahdlatul Ulama, the DDII, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), the HTI, and the MUI. The MUI was likewise an important supporter of other Muslim demonstrations in various regions. This was a moment when the MUI was deeply involved in the fine details of the political struggle, no longer confining itself to a “behind-a-desk” style of politics (consultation, issuing fatwas and tausiyahs and the like), but instead throwing itself into street politics. This was a palpable sign that the issue of education had become very important to the MUI. Most MUI leaders consider education to be the first line of defence in protecting the religious beliefs of Muslim children (aqidah). In their perception, education can easily be used as a means of luring Muslim students away from Islam (riddah or pemurtadan, apostasy) or, at the very least, to introduce them to un-Islamic teachings. The MUI’s leaders were afraid of attempts to convert Muslim students to Christianity, their fears fed by the alleged conversion of many Muslim students who attended Roman Catholic or Protestant schools, which were generally (perceived to be) of much higher quality than state schools or Muslim private schools.46

Muslims were not the only group to be roused into action by the proposed law. Counter-demonstrations were arranged by the Masyarakat Prihatin Pendidikan Nasional (Society Concerned with National Education, or MPPN), a coalition of mostly Roman Catholic schools in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. One large demonstration was staged in front of the parliament building on 5 June 2003. Similar demonstrations were also held in Medan, Palembang, Yogyakarta, North Sulawesi, Denpasar, Kupang, and Flores. They demanded that the draft law should take Indonesian plurality into consideration (Tempo Interaktif, 5 June 2003).

Towards the final session of parliament, the MUI general secretary, Din Syamsuddin, personally campaigned in some regions to drum up Muslim support for parliamentary approval of the draft law. At the Tabligh Akbar in Sidoarjo, Syamsuddin said that the MUI would ensure that legislators approved the draft law, and that the organization would back them up; and he called on Muslims to join the “Aksi Sejuta Ummat” demonstration to be held in front of parliament on 10 June 2003 (Kompas, 10 June 2003). Huge numbers of Muslim demonstrators poured in from neighbouring regions. The Banten MUI organized the demonstrators who descended on Jakarta in more than 380 buses, while others came on their own initiative. Professor KH. Wahab Afif, the chairperson of the Banten MUI, estimated that, in all, about 40,000 Bantenese Muslims joined the demonstration in Jakarta.47

The draft law was approved by parliament on 11 June 2003.48 This elicited protests and demonstrations in many regions, but these remained
without further effect. The Muslim groups had achieved a real victory, but the victory was particularly sweet for the MUI, which, from the initial drafting process onwards, had helped to ensure that the law did not run counter to Muslim aspirations and interests.

**PURIFYING THE IMAGE OF ISLAM: REJECTING TERRORISM, DEFENDING JIHAD**

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, and in response to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the MUI organized a meeting of the FUI that was attended by thirty-two representatives of Islamic organizations. The then MUI secretary general, Professor Din Syamsuddin, read out an MUI statement which condemned the terrorist attacks, but also felt compelled to call upon Muslims to prepare for jihad should the U.S. and its allies commit any act of aggression against Afghanistan in their search for Osama bin Laden, who was alleged to have masterminded the attacks. The MUI later clarified that it meant jihad in its generic sense as a struggle for good, and not in the sense of jihad as war.

In its Fatwa on Terrorism (fatwa no. 3/2004), which was the result of the Ijtima’ Ulama (ulama meeting) of 16 December 2003 and issued on 24 January 2004, the MUI also made a distinction between jihad and terrorism (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2010, pp. 725–29). The fatwa declared that jihad encompasses two meanings: first, jihad pertains to every difficult endeavour, or readiness to shoulder difficulties in combating and defending against any manifestation of enemy aggression; and second, jihad pertains to all difficult and continuing endeavours to protect and honour Allah’s word (li i’lai kalimatillah). Moreover, in both its senses, jihad should be undertaken for the sake of reform (islah), if necessary by war; and it is intended to establish Allah’s religion and/or to protect the rights of the oppressed (terzalimi). Lastly, it should be pursued according to the Shariah by targeting clearly defined enemies. Despite these nuances, the fatwa’s notion of jihad is still based on conflict, and ultimately entails war (qital or harb). It did not refer to the classical distinction between the “smaller jihad” (jihad asghar), which is a physical struggle, and the “greater jihad” (jihad akbar) or spiritual struggle against weakness and evil in one’s self. The latter sense is entirely absent from the fatwa.

The MUI’s fatwa did, however, explicitly take issue with terrorism. It states unequivocally that, “terrorism is a crime against humanity and civilization, a serious threat to state authority, security, world peace and the prosperity of society. Terrorism is a form of organized transnational
crime; it can be defined as an extraordinary form of criminal violence with indiscriminate targets.” Terrorism is described as destructive (ifsad) and anarchical or chaotic action (fauda), which is perpetrated for the purpose of creating fear and/or annihilating other groups; it is committed without regard to rules; and its targets are unlimited. The fatwa states that committing terrorism is haram (forbidden), but that pursuing jihad is an obligation. The fatwa also declares suicide bombings haram, like any other form of suicide, but it permits warlike struggle for the sake of Islam, even when this may claim the lives of innocent victims. Its message is clear: jihad should not be equated with terrorism, and vice versa.

The formulation of this fatwa reflects the MUI’s problematic position regarding the issues of jihad and terrorism. The MUI did its best to respond to international terrorism, but in doing so, it also had to take the orthodox view of jihad into consideration. In other words, while the MUI wanted its fatwa on terrorism to gain international acceptance, it simultaneously justified it according to Islamic law. By adopting this moderate position, the MUI circumvented the liability of being charged by the international community with having a pro-terrorist attitude, and from being accused of harbouring anti-jihad sentiments by Islamist groups. In doing so, it was vulnerable to being misunderstood by both sides. Some Islamists criticized the MUI for being afraid of the West, but it also came under fire from “secular” activists who claimed that the MUI was dancing to the tune of radical movements (Jakarta Post, 1 August 2005). It was an object lesson for the MUI on how to survive: while it should stand firm on the grounds of Sunni orthodoxy in order to maintain its credibility as the most authoritative religious institution in Indonesia, at the same time, it should also never lose sight of the political context, either locally or globally.

**PURIFYING ISLAMIC THOUGHT: AGAINST RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, LIBERALISM AND SECULARISM**

Since the 1970s, Indonesia has seen the development of various strands of critical religious thought that differed considerably from mainstream reformist thought, and that aroused deep suspicions among conservatives and puritans both in the Muhammadiyah and NU. In response to the increasing presence of radical Islamic voices in the public sphere after the fall of Soeharto, the critical trends manifested themselves in various organized forms and platforms. They described themselves and their religious thought by a range of different names, including post-traditionalist Islam, emancipatory Islam, progressive Islam, and liberal Islam. Perhaps the most unusual example
of this phenomenon was the establishment of Jaringan Islam Liberal (the Liberal Islam Network, or JIL) in 2001. The activities and thinking of this organization, which promotes critical thinking and the adoption of a liberal and rational attitude to religious teachings, have been a source of anxiety to most Islamists and ulama in the region. A host of articles and books attacking their projects have been published. On 30 November 2002, Forum Ulama Umat Islam (FUUI) — a “private” organization of ulama, led by Athian Ali M. Da’i — issued a fatwa stating that it is considered *halal* (lawful) to shed the blood of anyone who dishonours Allah, the Prophet Muhammad, Islam, and the Islamic *ummah* (*Pikiran Rakyat*, 26 December 2002). This fatwa was particularly controversial, as it appeared to be a direct response to a programmatic statement by former JIL coordinator Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, in which he expressed his liberal views (Abshar-Abdalla 2002). It was the first fatwa in modern Indonesian history to condemn a person for blasphemy and consequently to sanction the perpetration of violence against him.\(^5\) In response, the FUUI claimed that the fatwa did not mention any particular name, but that all persons who entertain such (liberal) understandings of Islam are blasphemers.

Despite the strength of their reaction, the ulama felt that they had not done enough to put a stop to the JIL’s activities and those of other liberal Islamic movements. They needed stronger legitimacy, which could only be accorded by an MUI fatwa. The Fourth Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia, held in Jakarta in April 2005, recommended that the MUI issue a fatwa denouncing liberal Islam, specifically mentioning the JIL, because it disseminated heterodox, “deviant” (*sesat*) thoughts or teachings which could “mislead the *ummah*”. The head of the DDII, Husein Umar, said that the seeds of thought developed by the JIL should be included under the category of “reprehensible actions” (*munkarat, kemungkaran*). He also considered that the JIL presented a challenge to Islamic *da’wah*. Some months beforehand, similar demands had also been voiced at the MUI Regional Coordination Meeting (Rakorda) for the MUI chapters of East Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). The head of the organizing committee of the KUII, Din Syamsuddin, believed that this sentiment reflected the aspirations of mainstream Islamic organizations in the country, and that these could not simply be disregarded. Although he did not name specific organizations, he described the forces of secularism and liberalism as menacing challenges to *da’wah*, saying that they could engender “shallowness of faith” (*pendangkalan akidah*).\(^5\) The issue of liberal Islam had been anticipated prior to the congress, because it was mentioned in a booklet, *Materi IV Masalah Aktual Keumatan dan Kebangsaan*, that
was circulated among the participants (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2005c, pp. 40–41, 47–50).

In response, the 2005 National Congress of the MUI issued fatwa no. 7/2005 on Religious Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism. This fatwa soon caused controversy, because it not only had implications for liberal thought in Islam, but was also bound to impinge on inter-religious relations in such a religiously plural society. Because the terms “pluralism”, “liberalism” and “secularism” are not fully clarified within the text of the fatwa, their meanings can be interpreted differently. Some scholars simply omit the word “religious” so that the fatwa opposes all forms of pluralism, liberalism and secularism; others argue that it stands against religious pluralism in particular, and not other kinds of pluralism, as well as against secularism and all varieties of liberalism, whether religious or not. In its explanation of the fatwa, which was written later after the controversy had emerged, the MUI clarified that the text should be read as “religious pluralism”, “religious liberalism”, and “religious secularism”, implying that only pluralism, liberalism and secularism within religious belief are rejected. The MUI fatwa does in fact promote this final reading, but the problem is that neither the MUI nor, for that matter, anyone else, is able to exercise control over the different interpretations that emerged.

The most severe criticism of the fatwa came from liberal-progressive Muslims, including Abdurrahman Wahid, Azyumardi Azra (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah), Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (JIL), Djohan Effendi (International Centre for Religious Pluralism), Syafi’i Anwar (International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, or ICIP) and Dawam Rahadjo (Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat, or LSAF). Their principal contention was that either the MUI’s leaders did not fully understand the terms “pluralism”, “liberalism” and “secularism”, or that their understanding deviated from the academic definition of these terms. Azyumardi Azra, for instance, criticized the fact that they had taken the Qur’an and hadith literally, without applying reason to their interpretations. He believes that the Qur’an teaches tolerance of other religions. In his view, the Qur’an and Prophet accept differences not only as reality but also as Allah’s grace. He interpreted the MUI’s rejection of liberalism as an indication that the MUI thought liberals no longer believed in the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad or true Islamic teachings, and did not even bother to perform the daily prayers (salat). He suggested that the MUI should evaluate its own methodology of ijtihad (Tempo Interaktif, 2 August 2005). Syafii Anwar, meanwhile, asserted that the MUI’s fatwa was a serious violation of religious freedom. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla said that it reflected the “stupidity” (tolol) of the MUI ulama. Moeslim Abdurahman
considered that it was the MUI, rather than the liberals, who had deviated from the true faith (Tempo Interaktif, 4 August 2005). Dawam Rahardjo even said that in issuing an unreasonable fatwa the MUI had in fact itself committed blasphemy. Generally speaking, they considered the MUI’s fatwa to be in breach of freedom of expression and human rights.55

This criticism of the fatwa by liberal Muslims was challenged by the hardliner Adian Husaini in his book, *Pluralisme Agama: Haram*, published a couple of months after the issuance of the fatwa (Husaini 2005). As with the MUI fatwa, Adian Husaini understood religious pluralism to be an ideology which considers all religions to be equally true. In another book, the head of the MUI in East Java, KH. Abdussomad Buchori, accused JIL of being part of the so-called “religious pluralism sect” (*sekte pluralisme agama*) (Buchori 2006). However, unlike Adian, Abdussomad demonstrated a better understanding of the JIL and of the discourse on religious pluralism. Published by the MUI of Surabaya, the book reflects the official MUI position on the issue, and endorses the fatwa.56

The issuance of the fatwa has elicited some concerned responses from non-Muslim leaders, because, as religious minorities, they expect tolerance and wisdom from the Muslim majority. They are apprehensive that the fatwa will spark intolerance and hostility towards them. They are also convinced that lay Muslims will interpret the fatwa as meaning that cordial relations and cooperation with non-Muslims are prohibited.57 If this were indeed to happen, it would deal a considerable blow to decades-long attempts to build inter-religious dialogue. It does not help that Adian Husaini, one of the radicals who were recruited into the MUI in the early 2000s, was made a member of the MUI’s Commission for Harmonious Relations amongst Religious Communities. The fatwa as well as Husaini’s fierce rejection of pluralism indicate that the views on religious harmony prevailing in the MUI are superficial and full of prejudice.

The impact of the fatwa, especially as it relates to “religious pluralism”, has been cause for concern. Most preachers on TV have been careful to avoid the word “pluralism” and have instead spoken of “plurality” when discussing inter-religious relations. Hence, they talk about “plurality” without “pluralism”. Anti-pluralism speeches have frequently been made in mosques, especially those with conservative and radical inclinations. Most Islamist magazines, such as *Sabili*, *Hidayatullah*, *Al-Wa’ie*, and *Risalah Mujahidin*, have been actively engaged in the campaign against “religious pluralism”. What is surprising is that the government, and in particular the Ministry of Religious Affairs, has failed to recognize the precariousness of the country’s future inter-religious relations.
PURIFYING THE ISLAMIC FAITH: EXCLUDING THE AHMADIYAH MOVEMENT FROM ISLAM

On 15 July 2005, in the run-up to the 2005 MUI’s National Congress (which was to be held two weeks later), a hostile crowd of between 5,000 and 10,000 people, led by activists of the FPI and the Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (Islamic Research and Study Institute, or LPPI), attacked the campus of the Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Ahmadiyah Congregation, or JAI) in Parung, near Bogor in West Java, demanding the dissolution of this organization. In the view of at least some analysts, the attack appeared to be intended as a message to the MUI National Congress that it should tackle the problem of the Ahmadiyah. As leaders of the crowd claimed, the Ahmadiyah movement had deviated from the Islamic religion and should be banned.58 Made uneasy by this attack, more than 1,000 Ahmadiyah followers sought police protection in Bandung, the capital of the province of West Java, to ensure that the security of their two mosques in Cikutra and Bojongloa was safeguarded.

The Ahmadiyah movement worldwide is divided into the Qadian branch, led by the khalifat al-masih, the successors of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and the Lahore branch, led by Muhammad Ali, who has striven to bring the Ahmadiyah closer to the Sunni tradition. The JAI is Indonesia’s Qadiani organization, while the Lahore branch has formed its own organization, Gerakan Ahmadiyah Lahore Indonesia (GAI).59 From the orthodox point of view, the Qadian branch is particularly deviant, notably because of their conviction that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was divinely inspired and therefore a prophet. As early as 1980, the MUI had already issued a fatwa on the Ahmadiyah, in which it declared only the Qadiani branch to be incompatible with Islam. Among the general public there is considerable confusion as to the nature of the beliefs of the Ahmadiyah and the difference between its two branches, and the Islamist activists of the 2000s were equally upset by both branches. Estimates of the numbers of Ahmadiyah followers diverge widely: Ahmadiyah spokespersons claim 300,000 to 400,000 followers, whereas the Ministry of Religious Affairs speaks of 50,000 to 80,000 (Crouch 2009, p. 5). The Qadian branch appears to be considerably larger than the Lahore branch.

The 1980 MUI fatwa on Ahmadiyah was used to legitimize the “Parung violence” of 2005; indeed, the attackers publicly claimed that they were inspired by the 1980 fatwa. But why did such a violent attack not occur under the New Order, under which the fatwa had been issued? Why did it take twenty-five years to unleash violence? There must have been
other factors at work than the fatwa itself, and this was indeed the case. First and foremost, there has been a significant shift in Islamist political attitudes since the collapse of the Soeharto regime, induced mainly by the Reformasi spirit of democratization. This has allowed critics to articulate their views more openly and even to resort to violence, unheard of during the Soeharto era. Their views on the Ahmadiyah and other “deviant beliefs” were overwhelmingly negative, and they were convinced that the Ahmadiyah had strayed beyond the boundaries of Islam. In their view, the Ahmadiyah movement is no longer a part of Islam, and its followers are “non-Muslims”.

Such views have recently been fuelled by a number of books and pamphlets condemning the Ahmadiyah movement’s “deviation” from Islamic teachings in a more provocative way. Some books condemning the Ahmadiyyah had been published before the Reformasi, but they portrayed the Ahmadiyah as part of Islam, although not part of Sunni orthodoxy. Starting some years before the 2005 violence, a new series of books on the subject, especially those published by the LPPI, argued that Ahmadiyah was not part of Islam and accused the movement of being hostile to Islam. Amin Djamaluddin, the director of LPPI, is a frequent critic of Ahmadiyah. His aim is either to eliminate Ahmadiyah, both Qadian and Lahore, from the country, or to make it an independent religion outside Islam, as in Pakistan. Besides accusing Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of being a “false prophet”, Djamaluddin also accused the Ahmadiyah movement of “having its own scripture” (meaning the Tadhbirah, the most substantial of Ghulam Ahmad’s books), of “plagiarizing the Qur’an”, “changing the Qur’an”, “counterfeiting the Qur’an”, “hijacking the Qur’an”, and “changing the words of the syahadah (confession of faith)”. Such terms were not used in previous publications on the subject. The LPPI books present the evidence in detail, pointing at the numerous similarities between the Tadhbirah and the Qur’an, as well as additions to or alterations of the Qur’anic narrative. Moreover, unlike other publishers, the LPPI is not content with simply publishing books attacking the Ahmadiyah and other “deviant beliefs”. It has also mounted actual campaigns against the sect, which have undoubtedly fanned hatred and prejudice against the Ahmadiyah.

Five years earlier, in its National Congress of 2000, the MUI had indicated that “aliran sesat” (deviant sects) constitute a danger for the mainstream ummah. Although it did not specify which sects it considered deviant, the statement reflected the MUI’s desire to deal with this issue. This was then reinforced in the Fourth KUII, coordinated by the MUI and held in April 2005, three months prior to the attack in Parung. Indeed,
the KUII gave higher priority to the issue of deviant and heterodox sects than to other major social problems such as corruption, bribery, adultery, abortion, pornography, porno-action, narcotics, gambling, alcohol, intellectual copyright, criminality, destruction of the environment, violence and enmity (Olle 2006, p. 2).

The attack at Parung, as mentioned earlier, appeared to be intended as a strong message to the MUI urging it to be much more stringent in its handling of the Ahmadiyah movement at the upcoming congress. It also expressed the Islamists’ frustration that in spite of the 1980 fatwa, the Ahmadiyah had been able to continue its activities, and signalled their conviction that action was needed. At the MUI congress, it became clear that the views of the MUI had shifted towards those of the anti-Ahmadiyah activists. In the new Ahmadiyah fatwa, issued at the congress, the MUI no longer restricted its censure of the Ahmadiyah to the Qadian group but declared both branches to be equally deviant and outside Islam. It moreover lobbied the government in order to have the fatwa followed up by a legal ban of the Ahmadiyah.

This shift in the MUI’s position on the Ahmadiyah was no doubt in part due to the overall shift towards more puritanical and conservative positions on the part of leading members of the MUI. More specifically, the most vocal critic of the Ahmadiyah and other “deviant sects”, Amin Djamaluddin, whose LPPI was one of the organizers of the attack in Parung, appears to have had a considerable influence on the MUI’s thinking on the issue; the various accusations of replacing, plagiarizing and abrogating the Qur’an, which he directed at the Ahmadiyah (see above), however incoherent, became part of the MUI’s own discourse. To further buttress its condemnation of the Ahmadiyah, the MUI formulated in 2007 ten explicit criteria of “deviant belief”, in order to systematically exclude non-mainstream Islamic groups from the “right” belief, and even from Islam.\textsuperscript{64} Seen from this perspective, Ahmadiyah fits almost all of the criteria.

The JAI and GAI each responded differently to the fatwa. The JAI chairman Abdul Basit, accompanied by the well-known Muhammadiyah intellectual M. Dawam Rahardjo, asked the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) to help it to prepare legal measures against the MUI and the attackers.\textsuperscript{65} Their agitation was understandable, because the demonstrators had used both psychological and physical violence against the JAI. The GAI took a different course and published a book criticizing the fatwa, written by Ali Yasir, former chairperson of GAI. Ali Yasir claimed that most of the fatwas referring to the Ahmadiyah movement are directed against the
Qadian and not against the Lahore Ahmadiyah, but that the MUI fatwa had deliberately selected some foreign fatwas (especially from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) that had been directed against them. Yasir even suspected that the fatwa was issued to satisfy demands made by the Rabitat al-`Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League) and its Saudi sponsors.  

The MUI denied that it was responsible for the violence against Ahmadiyah. During the public hearing held before parliament, the head of the Fatwa Commission, KH. Ma’ruf Amin, explained that the MUI had never enforced its fatwas violently, and that it had no control over the interpretation of those who might have understood the fatwa differently. The MUI also circulated a letter ordering local MUI branches to respond peacefully to MUI fatwas, including that concerning Ahmadiyah. In the second published edition of the controversial fatwas (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2005b), the Fatwa Commission included explanations of the fatwas, and it also offered some guidance to “avoid misunderstanding and abuse” of the fatwas. Here we need only quote point four, as it is most relevant to the present discussion: “… the MUI cannot justify any acts leading to the destruction of others, let alone anarchical attacks against groups, affairs or activities which are not in step with the MUI fatwas; because such acts are not tolerated by Islamic teachings”.  

Despite the MUI’s explanations, violence against the Ahmadiyah movement did not cease and it continued to use the MUI fatwa as its justification. On 4 February 2006, the houses of Ahmadiyah followers in Gegerung and Lingsar villages, West Lombok, were attacked and set on fire. The fatwas were unquestionably used or abused by Islamist groups to attack the houses of followers of the movement. More than 130 harassed Ahmadiyah believers asked for political asylum in Australia, but this was not forthcoming. Until quite recently they had been accommodated in the Transito Majeluk dormitory; afraid of attacks, they did not dare to return to their homes. Unfortunately, both central and local government were unable or unwilling to guarantee their right to live peacefully. Rather, both shared the attackers’ view that Ahmadiyah was not part of Islam. The central government had no clear solution as to how to protect Ahmadiyah believers’ civil rights.

A survey conducted by the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Centre for Islamic and Social Studies, or PPIM) in 2006 showed some surprising results. About 47 per cent of the respondents supported the MUI fatwa on the Ahmadiyah sect; 28.7 per cent of the respondents agreed with the expulsion of Ahmadiyah followers from their current residences; but only 0.6 per cent had ever actually expelled
Ahmadiyah followers. The survey indicates that there is strong support for the MUI fatwa among Muslim communities. Although no such survey was undertaken during the New Order, we can safely assume that there was less support for the MUI fatwa of 1980, even though it was a less sweeping condemnation of the Ahmadiyah. Despite the fatwa, the Qadian continues to survive, and almost no violent attacks have been reported. Although only 0.6 per cent of people surveyed had actually driven Ahmadiyah members away from their homes, those who supported the expulsion of the Ahmadiyah followers were also numerous; about a half of those who support the fatwa (Jahroni 2006). The figure of 0.6 per cent only covers those who took part in such action in the past, and it is impossible to predict how many of those agreeing with the expulsion might actually put their views into practice in the future.\footnote{70}

The bloodiest action against the Ahmadiyah community following the issuance of the MUI fatwa of 2005 was the attack on the Ahmadiyah community in Cikeusik, in Pandeglang, Banten, that took place on 6 February 2011. Three Ahmadiyah members were killed and a number of others were injured. Some attackers brought blades and swords, and police officers on the spot did nothing to prevent the violence. What is surprising is that the Minister for Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali, who is also the chairman of the PPP, has strongly endorsed the idea of a legal ban of the Ahmadiyah unless it accepts the status of an independent religion (i.e., different from Islam). He personally believes that the Ahmadiyah movement has violated Islam and should be excluded from Islam. He explicitly refers to MUI fatwas on the Ahmadiyah, and not to the existing state constitution and legal statutes. He was quoted as saying, “It is in the competence of the MUI to observe whether or not the Ahmadiyah is part of Islam; the MUI has confirmed that the Ahmadiyah has deviated [from Islam] and therefore it should be dissolved as soon as possible” (\textit{Republika}, 20 March 2011).

It is undisputable that the MUI’s fatwas of 1980 and 2005 on the Ahmadiyah were used by certain Islamist movements to commit violence and crimes against other citizens who were members of the Ahmadiyah movement. Mosques, offices, educational campuses and even houses were burnt as a result. These members lost their rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, to live peacefully, to social security, to education, to possess property, and to equality before the law. In short, the state has discriminated against Ahmadiyah members and has treated them like second-class citizens.
The MUI has been trying to re-establish its authority and gain fresh recognition as the “true” defender of the Islamic ummah. It wants to shed its burdensome image as the “servant of the government”. The initial period after the fall of the Soeharto regime was a difficult time for the council. It had to adapt to the Reformasi agenda, while at the same time formulating its own concept of reform. Before long, it began to use the slogan, “the servant of the Muslim community” (khadim al-ummah). The MUI has done its utmost to prove itself the main protector of the Islamic aqidah (faith) and Muslim interests in Indonesia. This fits the internal logic of the MUI, which reasons that other religions have their own councils of scholars, such as the WALUBI for Buddhism, to protect their respective adherents’ faith and interests.

By and large, the MUI has shifted from a moderate to a “puritanical moderate” path to protect Sunni orthodoxy; ideologically, this path is tinged with puritanism and conservatism. This stems largely from the involvement of Muslim hardliners in various regional and national MUI congresses, which address problems that require an MUI response, and from the membership of the MUI, both central and regional. The rhetorical slogan, “softening the hardliners, hardening the soft-minded”, has proved useful to the MUI in its efforts to build a moderate image in the face of opposing radicalizing and liberalizing forces. As a body that has been portrayed as one of the “soft”, or indeed the “softest”, of the New Order Muslim institutions, the MUI is now trying to “harden” itself, and it has been quite successful in presenting this new image through various discourses. Yet, the degree to which it will become harder depends very much on the struggle between the moderate and conservative wings within the MUI — there being no liberal wing, liberals having been gradually excluded from the organization since the 2000 National Congress, and drastically since the issuance of the fatwa on religious liberalism, secularism and pluralism. The result has been puritanical moderate Islam. The MUI has concerned itself not only with Islamic law, but also with the Islamization of public morality, education, thought and faith.

The issue of Shariah implementation is not considered by all Indonesian regions to be equally strategic or relevant. Although the central MUI instructed local chapters to support the creation of Shariah-inspired bylaws, the response has been more sporadic than consistent, depending on the actions of Shariah-oriented pressure groups in the particular region, as
well as the political will of local governments and parliaments. In this context, the MUI generally acts as a “channel” or “mediator” between the Shariah-oriented pressure groups, the government, and parliament. Despite this fact, both the central and the local MUIs have contributed to the success of the creation of Shariah-inspired bylaws in a number of regions. Nonetheless, only a limited number of local MUI chapters adopted the “formalization” paradigm, especially in those regions where Shariah-oriented pressure groups are actively articulating their ideological frameworks.

The most serious problem is that the MUI’s puritanical moderate discursive products (fatwas or tausiyahs) have been used or abused by radical Islamists to enforce their ideological interests by interpreting them arbitrarily. Some of these efforts have led to the violation of human rights, such as in the cases of fatwas on religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism; of pornography and “porno-action”; and of the Ahmadiyah, as argued in this chapter. Today, despite the limited number of Muslim hardliners in the organization, the MUI has produced fatwas and other discourses which justify the practices of radical Muslims, and, to some extent, even defend them. Representatives of progressive or liberal Muslim movements have been systematically excluded from membership of the MUI. Many critics consider the MUI, because of the disproportionate influence of the relatively few radical members and the absence of balancing progressive voices, as a potential threat to human rights, freedom of thought, and freedom of religious practice and conscience in Indonesia.

However, we may perceive other trends in the MUI as well. As argued above, the organization has, through its efforts in halal certification of food and drugs as well as financial products, positioned itself as a central player in the field of “market Islam”. This role is likely to strengthen the existing trends of moderation and conservatism rather than radical Islamist inclinations. The MUI’s interventions in the economic sphere may even occasionally be “progressive”, as in the case of a recent fatwa on environmentally safe mining (Fatwa no. 22 of 2011). In this fatwa, that was hailed by the Ministry of the Environment (which may have requested it), the MUI appears to be supporting the mining industry as well as the objective of environmental protection. In the sphere of market Islam, the MUI appears to have no difficulty adopting liberal positions. It appears unwilling, however, to adopt a more flexible position where freedom of religion is concerned. The MUI favours moderation, but only of the puritanical kind.
Elsewhere (Ichwan 2005) I have discussed the MUI’s transformation in the early Reformasi era through its political *fatwas* and *tausiyahs*, produced during the B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid eras. The present article offers a broader picture of the MUI’s transformation, from the collapse of the New Order to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s first period, covering not only its discursive products (*fatwas* and *tausiyahs*), but also its political attitudes.

The MUI was established by Soeharto on 26 July 1975 (17 Rajab 1395 AH), at the Ulama Conference held by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The official roles played by the MUI, as set out by Soeharto in his speech delivered at that conference, were: (1) to serve as the translator of concepts and activities of national or local development for the people; (2) to give advice and recommendations to the government concerning religious life; (3) to become a mediator between the government and the *ulama*; and (4) to provide a place where the *ulama* could discuss problems related to their duties (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1995, pp. 18–20).

Apart from producing *fatwas*, the MUI also issues *tadzkirah* (admonitions), *amanah* (mandates/instructions), *pernyataan sikap* (position statements), *himbauan* (appeals/suggestions), *sumbangan pemikiran* (considered opinions), and *tausiyah* (recommendations/advice). The term *tausiyah* means admonition, mandate, instruction, advice, thought contribution, and suggestion. Therefore, it is logical to categorize these non- *fatwa* discourses as “tausiyah”. This is also the way the *Mimbar Ulama*, the official MUI magazine, organizes its “tausiyah” rubric, which includes MUI non- *fatwa* discourses. See Ichwan (2005), pp. 50–53; Wehr (1973), p. 1075.

I exclude Aceh here, because the MUI of Aceh transformed itself into the Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (Council of Ulama Deliberation, or MPU) in 2001. Unlike the MUI, the MPU is part of the local state apparatus. On the MPU, see Ichwan (2011).

In this study, I define “puritanical moderate Islam” as basically moderate Islamic thought and practices that are imbued with some aspects of puritanical Islamic teachings emphasizing the purity of the faith from any polytheistic (*shirk*) beliefs and associated beliefs, including blasphemy, heresy, heterodoxy, and apostasy (*pemurtadan*) as well as religious liberalism, secularism and pluralism (usually in the sense of relativism); adopts a stricter legal orientation in *ibadah* (devotion); is more sensitive to morality issues, such as pornography and gambling, which it defines as “*munkarat*” (sinful actions); is more aware of the exclusive political interests of the Muslim ummah; but at the same time endorses Islamic economic development through a Shari’ah-based banking system and *halal* market, and recognizes and even supports an ideologically non-Islamic nation-state. I use the term “puritanical moderate Islam” for the MUI, because although it used to be less puritan, it has undergone
a process of theological, legal, and moral puritanization in the last decade, despite attempting to be moderate in its puritanical orientation. It puts forward “puritanical moderate Islam”, not “puritanical radical Islam”, as an ideal type of Indonesian Islam. It also implies that moderate Islam is pluralistic; there are other kinds of moderate Islam, such as traditionalist moderate Islam embraced by Nahdlatul Ulama (the NU) and modernist moderate Islam embraced by Muhammadiyah. Saeed defines puritanism merely in theological terms (Saeed 2007, pp. 397–98).

The text of these fatwas was published in Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2005a).

Interview with KH. Amin Ma’ruf, former head of the Fatwa Commission, 16 July 2008. Another formulation is sometimes used: “Mengerem yang terlalu cepat, mempercepat yang terlalu lambat” [slowing down the fastest, speeding up the slowest]. Interview with KH. A. Baijuri Khatib, secretary of the MUI of Kota Tangerang, April 2007.

By this, I mean that the MUI has tried to lead Muslims in certain directions that are idealized by the MUI; that is, “moderate” Islam, or to be precise, “puritanical moderate” Islam.

All three have been involved in agitation against “liberal” or “heterodox” groups. Adian Husaini, a young and radical DDII activist, currently is deputy head of the MUI’s Commission for Harmony among Religious Believers, an important institution for dialogue with other religious communities; Cholil Ridwan is one of the chairmen (ketua) of the MUI; and Amin Djamaluddin, is a member of the Commission for Research and Development. Husaini was recruited before 2005, and Ridwan and Djamaluddin were recruited in 2005. It is surprising that Amin Djamaluddin’s name is not mentioned as part of the MUI’s boards for 2005–10 and 2010–15. However, he is mentioned as a “member” of the Commission for Research and Development in internal documents, e.g., Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2007), p. 7. Djamaluddin became known through a number of books fiercely criticizing various “deviant” sects, published by his own “research institute”, the LPPI. We shall encounter him below as one of the leading anti-Ahmadiyah agitators.

It has become conventional, as Halliday points out, to distinguish “Islamic” from “Islamist” movements, the former denoting any religiously oriented trend, the latter the specific Islamic variant of fundamentalism. Nikki Keddie has argued that the term “Islamist” is probably the most accurate, distinguishing belief (“Islamic”) from “movements designed to increase the role of Islam in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state”. See Halliday (1995), p. 399; Keddie (1986), p. 26.

It has become common among Islamists to associate those who oppose the idea of Shari’a implementation with the JIL, even though these opponents might not be members of the JIL or might disagree with most of its standpoints. The “liberals” expelled from the MUI included the only prominent woman member, Siti Musdah Mulia, a feminist scholar and activist who promotes
gender equality and human rights. There was internal informal discussion in the central MUI on whether or not Musdah Mulia’s husband, Prof. Dr Ahmad Thib Raya, who also was a member of central MUI, should also be removed, because of the liberal ideas of his wife. The final decision was that he should not be associated with his wife, because he does not share her liberal ideas. One of the administrative officials of MUI told me that he was also questioned via email by a member of MUI on some controversial issues which had been discussed in liberal Muslim circles. Although the questioner claimed that it was just for a discussion, the staff member who was questioned felt that this was a test to see whether he was a liberal.

Interview with Ustadz Enting Ali Abdul Karim, Lc, Serang, 1 April 2007. Ustadz Enting later joined Abubakar Ba’asyir’s Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT). The same view was expressed by Shobbarin Syakur, the secretary of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), in my conversation with him during the third MMI Congress, 9 August 2008. MMI did not wish to join the MUI because of its different ideological stance.

Thus Adian Husaini, in a eulogy of Habibie published under the New Order (Husaini 1995). Later, Adian Husaini joined the MUI, reportedly at the invitation of the then secretary general, Din Syamsuddin.

During colonial times, there were actually thirteen Muslim Congress between 1922 and 1945. It is not entirely clear why the KUII of 1998 was called the “second KUII” — possibly referring to the 1945 Muslim Congress, which used exactly the same name, as its relevant predecessor. See Azra (1999), pp. iii–xiv.

Secular nationalist parties include the PDI-P and Golkar; Muslim-based nationalist parties include the PKB and the PAN; and Islamic parties include the PPP, the PKS and the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, or the Moon and Crescent Party).

Twenty-one parties obtained at least one of the 462 seats in parliament (out of a total of 500 contested seats). The remaining 38 seats were assigned to delegates from the armed forces. See Liddle (2000), pp. 33–34.

Later, constitutional changes introduced direct presidential elections, and these took place for the first time in 2004.

Facing such a problem, Amien Rais and other Muslim political leaders, especially those with a “modernist” religious orientation, created the so-called “Middle Axis” (Poros Tengah) coalition. This endeavoured to gain support from Muslim legislators from various parties, including secular parties. The problem was that the PKB, which is mostly NU-based and has a “traditionalist” religious orientation, had strong connections with the nationalist secular party, the PDI-P. If PKB legislators took sides with the PDI-P, Megawati would become president. The Middle Axis had no choice but to support Abdurrahman Wahid as president. The deal was made between the Middle Axis and the PKB, and the eventual outcome was obvious: Megawati was defeated, and
Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the fourth president of Indonesia. See Platzdasch (2009), pp. 270, 273.

The Bank Bali scandal erupted after a payment by Bank Bali of more than $70 million to a firm run by Setya Novanto, a leading official in the ruling Golkar party, for the recovery of loans from the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). The central bank and IBRA approved repayment of the loans. However, an audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers questioned whether the loans were eligible for repayment. Most opposition parties claimed that the money had been plundered for Habibie’s re-election, because the key figures in the scandal were on President Habibie’s informal re-election committee (Tim Sukses). Soon after Soeharto’s resignation, interreligious conflict in Ambon broke out between Muslims and Christians, during which many from both sides were killed or injured. Habibie had no clear vision on how to end the conflict. Moreover, Habibie’s policy of supporting the East Timor referendum on 30 August 1999, one month before the parliamentary session, led to this province’s independence (East Timor had been annexed in 1975). While this policy was praised by the international community, it was condemned by most political parties. It seems that the close and affectionate relationship between the MUI and Habibie was caused by the fact that most members of the MUI elite at that time were also members of the ICMI, and most of them viewed Habibie as someone who represented the hopes and interests of certain Muslim circles. Sharma (2003), p. 165; Symonds (1999).

Despite his severe criticism, Wahid had in fact allocated land in Jakarta for a MUI building and had granted it Rp 5 billion per year in a perpetual fund (dana abadi) from a promised total of Rp 25 billion, which would be given over five years. Due to Wahid’s fall in 2001, the MUI only received one payment of Rp 5 billion, and the next president, President Megawati, did not continue Wahid’s policy. Interview with Sholahuddin Al-Aiyub, assistant to the MUI chairperson, KH Sahal Mahfudz, Jakarta, 28 March 2007.

A revision of the statutes is essential for any organization that wishes to make reforms. This does not necessarily imply that all organizations should embark on reforms after revising their statutes. Statutes are merely an official requirement for any public organization. In some organizations, reform does not require any alterations to their statutes. However, if an organization does reformulate its statutes, naturally such reform will be reflected in this reformulation.

Article 2 of the MUI statutes reads: “This organization is based on Islam”. Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Wawasan dan PD/PRT Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2000), p. 21. Soon after the collapse of the New Order regime, the House of Representatives, under the leadership of Amien Rais, issued a decree stating that Pancasila would no longer be the “sole ideological foundation” (asas tunggal) of mass organizations, thereby complying with the demands of most Muslim organizations. In the previous statutes, the MUI had explicitly made Pancasila its ideological
foundation (asas) and Islam its religious foundation (aqidah). Mentioning both Pancasila and Islam in one and the same breath was actually a survival tactic to circumvent the ban. Although it was unthinkable that the MUI would be banned under the New Order, it seems that the MUI did not want to take the risk. In its third National Congress in July 1985, the MUI revised its previous statutes and put Pancasila as its asas and Islam as its aqidah. It seems that in doing so, it was inspired by the NU, which was the first Muslim organization to adopt such a formulation.

On the 2004 general election, see Nakamura (2005).

Statement heard by the author during the inaugural speech given by the Minister for Religious Affairs, 23 July 2008.

In 2008, the MUI received IDR 3 billion. It was said that such an amount was “not enough”, but would “suffice for maintaining the routine activities”. See Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2008b), p. v.

The results of the 2003, 2006, and 2009 Ijtimas can be found in Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2010), pp. 713–845.

This should not be confused with Front Umat Islam (Front for Islamic Ummah), also abbreviated as the FUI. Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah is part of the MUI’s loose, ad hoc institutions under the Commission for Ukhuwah Islamiyah, which is comprised of representatives of Muslim organizations. The Commission for Ukhuwah Islamiyah has existed since the establishment of the MUI in 1975. The idea of establishing a forum of ukhuwah (fraternity) between Muslim organizations and personalities first emerged at the MUI National Congress of 1980 and was reiterated at the 1984 National Working Conference (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1995, pp. 47, 114, 124–25). The Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah was finally established in 1989, by persons who represented the puritan side of the spectrum but including prominent critics of the New Order (Platzdasch 2009, pp. 38, 76). Not much was heard from it until it was revived by the MUI in the early 2000s. The Front Umat Islam, meanwhile, is an independent vehicle for Muslim activism in which various Muslim organizations, most of them of a radical orientation, are represented. Muhammad al-Khatthath, who was one of the important leaders of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), is also the secretary general of Front Umat Islam. The name and abbreviation (FUI) appear to have been deliberately chosen to create confusion with the MUI’s Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah and suggest MUI backing for the demonstrations and other actions Khatthath organized. This is expressed, for instance, in the first consideration of the Decision of the Ijtimas Ulama of 2006 on “Masa’il Asasiyah Wathaniyah” (fundamental national issues). In the Decision of the Ijtimas Ulama of 2009, this stance is formulated more systematically, that “Pancasila as a national philosophy and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia constitute an endeavour to protect the religious glory and regulate the welfare of shared life” (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2010, pp. 747, 783).
On these and various other radical groups that emerged, see Bruinessen (2002). Other issues reflected in the fatwas issued in 2005 are criteria of *maslahah* (the common good); women as *salat* leaders; protection of intellectual property rights; relinquishing private property for public use; and the death penalty for certain crimes (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2005b). I refer to the second edition of this book; the first edition did not contain any explanation of the fatwas. The second edition was published in response to public demand for such an explanation, because they had aroused much controversy.

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (2008a), pp. 7–8. The details of the ten criteria of “deviant belief” will be set out further below.

An excellent overview of the discourses on Christianization is presented in Mujiburrahman (2006).

Its establishment was based on MUI’s own letter No. Kep-018/MUI/I/1989, not on a government decree.

More precisely, the fatwa concerned Ajinomoto produced between June 1999 and the end of November 2000, when it was manufactured using bacto soytone, a pig enzyme, instead of the usual polypeptone, a soybean-based enzyme (Kobayashi 2002). Ajinomoto is produced by a major Japanese transnational corporation, which gave the issue an international dimension, affecting relations with Japan.

Soeharto played an important role in making this possible. This policy should be read in the context of Soeharto’s “Islamic turn” around 1989 or 1990, in which he supported the establishment of the All-Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) and Bank Muamalat Indonesia and endorsed other policies concerning Islam. On the Islamic turn, although the *halal* issue is not fully discussed, see Liddle (1996), pp. 613–34.


The Ministry’s efforts to take over *halal* certification management date back to the Megawati era, when the then Minister for Religious Affairs, Said Agil Husin al-Munawar, issued Ministerial Decree No. 518/2001 on the Guidance and Procedure of Assessment and Decision for Halal Foods (2001) and drafted a special Government Regulation on Labelling of Halal Products (2003). This draft was rejected not only by other government institutions, such as the Ministry of Industry and Trade, but also by various associations of producers and traders. These supported, instead, MUI’s *halal* certification, but not *halal* labelling as regulated by the draft regulation, which would lead to increased costs of production and thereby overburden consumers. The Indonesian Consumers Foundation (YLKI) perceived the commercial motive behind the draft regulation (*Kompas*, 11 July 2003; *Sinar Harapan*, 10 July 2003). Because of protest and criticism, the draft regulation was never issued by the State Secretariat. The Ministry of Religious Affairs drafted a Law on Halal Product Assurance in 2005, but did not see it pass until recently (2011).
These figures were cited in a newspaper article (Hakim 2005). One of the sources mentioned there as an expert of halal marketing, the French marketing consultant Antoine Bonnel, elsewhere gives the much larger estimate for the volume of the European halal market of EUR 15 billion (US$19.5 billion). See <http://www.saphirnews.com/Halal-C-est-au-consommateur-musulman-d-etre-arbitre_a3681.html>.

Interview with Ichwan Sam, secretary general of the MUI, Jakarta, 16 June 2009; and with Dr Amirsyah Tambunan, member of Commission of Research of MUI, Jakarta, 16 June 2009.

Armanto (2003). Significantly, before issuing this fatwa, the MUI had consulted Indonesia’s central bank not to request its consent but to ask whether the Shariah banking institutions were ready to be put into operation.

Thus as of 31 December 2006, the Shariah Supervisory Board of the Bank Muamalat Indonesia consisted of the following persons: KH. M.A. Sahal Mahfudh (Chairman), KH. Mâruf Amin, Prof. Dr H. Muardi Chatib, Prof. Dr H. Umar Shihab, and that of the Bank BNI consisted of KH. Mâruf Amin and Dr Hasanuddin. All of these figures belong to the MUI elite.

The term “porno-action” does not exist in the English dictionary. It is a local, Indonesian creation and functions as a translation of pornoaksi. Unlike pornography, “porno-action” means sensual behaviour that arouses sexual attraction in public or as a means of business.

The fact that an anti-porn Draft Law was no longer discussed in parliament, that the movements for and against the law are no longer heard for relatively long time, and the fact that Playboy continued to appear for several years led to rumours that large sums of money from the pornography business had effectively silenced the issue. Though obviously impossible to prove, this conspiracy theory would explain recent events.

Interview with Prof. Burhanuddin Daya, the former head of the MUI’s Ukhuwah Islamiyah Committee of Yogyakarta, 29 December 2006; and Prof. Abdur Rahim Yunus, the former secretary of the MUI branch of South Sulawesi, 20 January 2007.

Interview with Prof. Umar Shihab, Jakarta, 27 March 2007; Prof. Burhanuddin Daja, Yogyakarta, 29 December 2006. See also Hutapea (2003), pp. 28–29.

Interview with Prof. KH. Wahab Afif, Serang, 3 April 2007, and Drs H. Sibli Sarjaya, LML, the general secretary of the Banten chapter of the MUI, 2 April 2007.

Most political factions approved the Draft Law, with the exception of the PDI-P, which did not attend the final session. The Christian-dominated parliamentary group Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia (KKI) had previously disagreed with the draft law and considered that it was not ready for final agreement. As most factions did approve it, however, KKI eventually also agreed to accept it.
The terms “post-traditionalist” and “emancipatory Islam” are usually associated with young NU intellectuals involved in such NGOs as LAKPESDAM and P3M (Pusat Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat), Jakarta; “progressive Islam” with the ICIP (International Centre for Islam and Pluralism) and the Internet-based discussion forum, Islam Progresif; while “liberal Islam” primarily refers to the JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal), whose activists are mostly NU young intellectuals, and the JIMM (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah).

Prior to the twentieth century, there had been *fatwas* against the deviant Sufism of the legendary saints Shaikh Siti Jenar and Shaikh Ahmad Mutamakkin, who had claimed to be God incarnate and were sentenced to death.

Din Syamsuddin mentioned two examples of liberal thought: the view that religion is just like organism that develops continuously, and that the Qur’an is not the final revelation. The latter example seems to refer to the Ahmadiyah. *Pikiran Rakyat*, 20 April 2005.

Gillespie (2007) even translates the phrase in five different ways: (1) “pluralism, liberalism and secularism”, omitting the word “religious” in the title of his article; (2) “secularism, pluralism and liberal Islamic movements”; (3) “religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism”; (4) “religious pluralism, liberalism and religious secularism”; (5) “pluralism, liberalism and religious secularism” (Gillespie 2007, pp. 202, 219).

Ulil Abshar-Abdalla later apologized for using these words.

“I call it the “official view” because there are a number of MUI members who do not fully agree with this MUI *fatwa*, and in fact several prominent members previously held different views. For instance, one of the most influential chairpersons of MUI, Amidhan, had written in 1999 that “pluralism is a fact” (Amidhan 1999).

Interview with Dr Zakariya Ngelow (lecturer at the State Christian College), Makassar, January 2007.

On the attack on the Ahmadiyah campus in Parung, see Hamdi (2007); on the broader issues, see Olle (2006) and Crouch (2009).

On the history of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, see Zulkarnain (2005).

These books, most of them inspired by the Muslim World League, include: al-Hadar (1977); Thaha (1981); al-Badry (1981); Hariadi (1988) and Daulay (1990).


Interview with Amin Djamaluddin, 14 July 2008.
Djamaluddin (2000). Indeed, the Qadiani Ahmadiyyah (JAI) did respond to these allegations by publishing a book entitled *Penjelasan Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia 2001). But such a book was not a means to win over most Sunni Muslim readers, who already harboured prejudices against the movement.

The ten criteria of “deviant belief” are: (1) rejecting the pillars of faith (*rukun iman*) and pillars of Islam (*rukun islam*); (2) believing and/or following a belief (*aqidah*) incompatible with *shariah* proofs; (3) believing that there is revelation (*wahy*) after the Qur’an; (4) rejecting the authenticity and/or the truth of the contents of the Qur’an; (5) interpreting the Qur’an without basing this interpretation on the (correct) principles of interpretation; (6) rejecting the prophetic tradition (*hadith*) as the source of Islamic teachings; (7) disrespecting, disgracing and/or downgrading the Prophets and Messengers (of Allah); (8) rejecting Muhammad as the final Prophet and Messenger; (9) changing the principles of devotion (*ibadah*) established by *shariah*; and (10) accusing other Muslims of being “unbelievers” (*kaﬁr*) without the proper basis of *shariah* (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2008a, pp. 7–8).


Interview with Ali Yasir, former chairperson of the GAI, Yogyakarta, 23 April 2007. When the second edition of the MUI book was published, Ali Yasir also revised his book, commenting on the explanation of the MUI fatwa that condemned the Ahmadiyyah Sect.

Interviews with Prof. Abdur Rahim Yunus, Makassar, January 2007, and Prof. KH. Wahab Afﬁ, Serang, April 2007. Although there are no Ahmadiyyah followers in Bulukumba, the local MUI also received the instruction from the provincial MUI. Interview with KH. Tjamiruddin, the general secretary of the MUI of Bulukumba, January 2007.


The second half of 2007 witnessed the emergence of other “deviant beliefs”. The first was known as al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, whose leader (Ahmad Musaddeq) declared himself to be a new prophet and the promised messiah (*al-masib al-mau’ud*); and the second, al-Qur’an Suci, which claims that Muslims need to rely only on the Qur’an and not the *hadith*. The MUI also issued a fatwa stating that the al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah and the al-Qur’an Suci were deviant. Violence against the members and property of these movements had already erupted prior to the issuance of the fatwa, and this violence subsequently intensified. Despite the fact that the fatwa discourages the use of violence and insists on the peaceful treatment of the followers of these movements, some Muslim groups, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI),
have simply ignored these prescriptions. They are convinced that “deviant” movements are a munkarat that should be eliminated, once and for all.

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