social justice
and rule of law
addressing the growth of
a pluralist Indonesian democracy

Editors:
Thomas J. Conners
Frank Dhont
Mason C. Hoadley
Adam D. Tyson

Yale Indonesia Forum
International Conference Book Series 3
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Diponegoro University
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW: ADDRESSING THE GROWTH OF A PLURALIST INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY

Editors:
Thomas J. Conners
Frank Dhont
Mason C. Hoadley
Adam D. Tyson

Yale Indonesia Forum
International Conference Book Series 3
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Diponegoro University
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW:
ADDRESSING THE GROWTH OF A PLURALIST
INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY

Published by:

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Diponegoro University Publisher
Address: Jl. Prof. H. Soedarto, SH
Tembalang Semarang PO BOX 1269,
Central Java, Indonesia
Phone: +62-24-7464507
Facsimile: +62-24-7464505
Website: risp.undip.ac.id

Yale Indonesia Forum
International Conference Book Series

2011

Editors:
Thomas J. Conners
Frank D'hont
Mason C. Hoadley
Adam D. Tyson

Cover Design:
Amyanti Koesmadini

iii

Copyright protected by law
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publisher.

Request for permission to make copies of any part of this work should be directed to the publisher. Additional copies of the work may be obtained from the publisher.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Thomas J. Conners</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIVIL SOCIETY and SOCIAL JUSTICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: Problems and Challenges</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hurriyah</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why the State Fails to Tackle Corruption: Ineffectiveness and Ambiguity of Responses</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Budi Setiyono</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of NGOs, the Electoral Commission (KPU), and the Ministry of Home Affairs in Crafting the Comprehensive Voter’s Rights</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ikhsan Darmawan</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Praise of Corruption</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mason C. Hoadley</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Journalism and Media Pluralism in Indonesia</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Yohanes Widodo</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW

SOCIAL JUSTICE and RELIGION

Pluralism versus Islamic Orthodoxy: Public Debate over Lia Aminuddin, Founder of Salamullah Religious Cult
Al Makin

The Plurality of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia:
Three Cases from Central Java
Sung-Min Kim

Conceptualizing Feminist Identity and Gender Issues among Muslim Intellectual Elites in Indonesia
Alimatul Qibtiyah

Local Discourse and Practice of Women’s Leadership:
Contemporary Interpretation of Kodrat Perempuan in Public Engagement
Kusmana

REGIONAL RIGHTS

Lifting the Veil on Social Justice in the West Kalimantan Border Region of Borneo
Johan Weintré

Decentralization in Indonesia: Strengthening or Weakening Nationalism
Joko Purnomo

Activating Adat: The Continuous Search for Rights and Recognition in Indonesia
Adam D. Tyson

Developing Public Trust in Policymaking for a Transitional Society: a Papua Case Study
Theofransus Litaay

In and Out of the Newspapers: Ethnic Land Claims and the
Regional Press in East Kalimantan ............................................. 451
Laurens Bakker

PEOPLE IN THE MARGIN OF SOCIETY

Japanese Diaspora in Indonesia .................................................. 477
Eiichi Hayashi

A Case of Romusha in Yogyakarta .............................................. 493
Frank Dhont
Conceptualizing Feminist Identity and Gender Issues among Muslim Intellectual Elites in Indonesia

Alimatul Qibtiyah
University of Western Sydney;
Islamic State University, Yogyakarta

Introduction

Being a self-identified feminist activist in Southeast Asia (and indeed most of the world) is to invite controversies related to various understandings of the term ‘feminist’ that carry positive or negative social connotations. This is increasingly salient in the Muslim world where conceptions of feminist identity, gender issues and activism are set against different textual interpretations of Islam. For example, there are controversial differences between literal Islam

---

3 The findings in this chapter are based on field research and data collection in Yogyakarta for six months in 2010. I would like to thank all my supervisors who have helped me through this arduous task, particularly Dr. Julia D Howell, whose useful guidance and brilliant ideas as well as spirit and support gave me confidence to write this chapter. Also many thanks to all respondents for the insightful ideas, without you this research is nothing.
and liberal Islam. Therefore this chapter examines the contestations surrounding feminist identity and the conceptualization of gender issues by Muslim intellectual elites in Indonesia. This provides a conceptual framework for an empirical investigation of feminist identities among Muslim academics, which includes lecturers and researchers in the Center for Women’s Studies (Pusat Studi Wanita, hereafter PSW) and the Center for Gender Studies (Pusat Studi Gender, hereafter PSG). Both PSW and PSG are university centers of learning, and this study focuses on six such centers in Yogyakarta.²

The lively debate between Muslim intellectual elites and activists in Indonesia concerning feminist identities and gender issues are grounded in four key factors. First, from a broad historical perspective, the social structure in traditional Indonesian society provided women the opportunity to achieve high status and relatively elevated positions (Goody 1976; Atkinson and Errington 1990). The second (related) factor is a long history of feminist awareness in Indonesia, even if feminism as a modern discipline and movement originated from Western scholarship and literature, and has only recently been embraced by Indonesian academic departments and institutes. Third, no matter what continent or country one visits, self-identified feminists and gender activists are a source of controversy. Finally, Indonesian intellectuals are embroiled in a dynamic debate about the prospects for a legitimate form of ‘Islamic feminism’ to take hold in centers of higher learning. In other words, the search for compatibility between religious

² PSW and PSG are university study centers. Some of them are under research departments and some are independent units. They do not have a fixed set of courses or curriculum. Core PSW and PSG staff are drawn from lecturers in academic departments or research centers across the university. They tend to run programs in collaboration with international donor, the Indonesian government, and national non-government organizations (NGOs).
precepts and pluralistic social movements is ongoing and fraught with difficulties, but concerned Indonesians should not be deterred from joining in the controversial debate.

Indonesian context

It is generally held that modern Indonesian feminism began in Java with Radan Ajeng Kartini (1879–1904). Since Kartini’s time more than seventy women’s organizations have emerged, including Putri Merdeka (Independent Women), Isteri Sedar (the Conscious Wife), ‘Aisyiyah (a women’s organization associated with Muhammadiyah), Muslimat (a women’s organization associated with Masjumi), Keutamaan Istri (Virtuous Wives), and Pawijatan Wanito (the Educated Woman) (Qibtiyah 2009). Women have enjoyed relatively high social status throughout Indonesian history, from pre-colonial times to the post-independence era (Goody 1976; Atkinson and Errington 1990). Some notable figures even held leadership positions. Examples include Queen Sima in seventh century Jepara, the ‘wisdom queen’ Tri Buana Tungga Dewi in (Majapahit 1328–1350), the reign of the four queens in Aceh (1641–1699), and the great nineteenth century queen Siti Aisyah We Tenriolle of Ternate (Vreede-de Stuers 1960; Parawansa 2002; Sanday 2002; It 2005). These great cultural traditions were endangered by the gender ideology of the New Order, characterized as ‘state ibuism’ (Suryakusuma 2004). Women’s roles were represented as wife and mother (ibu) throughout the country through processes of domestication.

Owing to the influence of Islamic groups endorsing the spread of sharia law, gender equality has been under threat since the 1970s (Robinson 2007). Religious conservatism and political repression combined to create a narrative about the proper role and status of women in society, one limited to motherhood and marriage with
reproductive and supportive (secondary) functions. The term kepala keluarga (head of family) became synonymous with the father figure, the man of the house. This has given rise to contestations and debates about gender in Indonesia. Many members of Islamic revivalist groups are educated in public universities and have limited specialist education in Islamic studies. For those with specialized education, they tend to graduate from Middle Eastern institutions where scholars frequently interpret Islamic core texts such as al-Qur'an and hadiths (sacred and prophetic narratives) literally (Burhanudin and Fathurahman 2004). In general they are against pembaharuan (revisionist or reformist) Islamic philosophy, particularly ‘Western’ ideas about gender equality and feminism that are not suitable for the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, it is felt that all those who endorse modern revisionist ideas are transgressors, violating Islamic law against the will of God (Burhanudin and Fathurahman 2004). As a backlash against moderate and pluralistic religious trends in Indonesia, purist Islamic groups with Middle Eastern linkages are intensifying their publishing activities and outreach programs in Indonesia (Robinson 2001; Hasan 2005).

In the midst seemingly incompatible trends towards greater democratization and the growing influence of Middle Eastern Islam in Indonesia, Muslim feminists are developing new paradigms and concepts of gender identity and equality. The gender ideology and ibuism imposed by the New Order regime (1966–1998) and more recently by Islamist and Salafi revivalist groups are criticized for their divisiveness and intolerance. In response, it is argued that Islam can be a legitimate source of gender equality if religious texts are interpreted properly and contextually.

In the late 1980s the government of Indonesia established PSWs and PSGs at prominent universities across the country. The aims
were to develop new methodologies and theoretical foundations for gender research, as well as to support government policies for women’s empowerment and gender equity (Burhanudin and Fathurahman 2004). According to Sadli (2010), the main objective of centers such as PSW and PSG is to provide data on women issues relevant to specific provincial and local settings. This is a positive development, constituting a rising awareness among (mostly male) decision-makers and politicians that women’s issues demand greater attention and respect. Pragmatic linkages were made between gender and development, and the government focused on funding allocations and initiatives for women in order to stimulate university-government-community partnerships (Sadli 2010). Given the fact that PSWs and PSGs were government-sponsored initiatives it is unsurprising that they served late-New Order prerogatives and were instrumental in maintaining traditional gender roles. Nevertheless, in the 1990s these centers began to produce new programs of study that promoted the interests of women, challenged the dominant patriarchal culture and provided egalitarian interpretations of gender in Islam.

In the 1990s new public forums, organizations and publishers began disseminating information that was intended to be liberating for women. The publisher Pustaka Bandung, for instance, commissioned several books concerned with gender equality, including Fateema Mernissi’s (1994) Women in Islam and Amina Wadud’s (1994) Women in the Qur’an. In the same year a prestigious Indonesian academic journal called Ulumul Qur’an published a special edition on women’s issues, including analysis of feminism, Islamic feminism and anti-feminism. This gave impetus to the gender rights movement, providing an opportunity for Indonesian activists and members of PSWs and PSGs to read and discuss the contents of Ulumul Qur’an directly with prominent
Islamic feminists from the other parts of the world, most notably Asghar Ali Engineer, Rifat Hasan and Amina Wadud (Jamhari and Ropi 2003). Therefore, as Arimbi (2009) correctly pointed out, the 1990s witnessed the shift away from state iBuism and toward a new feminist discourse in Indonesia that included Islamic feminism.

In May 1998 Suharto’s New Order regime was toppled by internal strife, national student movements and international financial crises, marking the start of the turbulent reform era (era reformasi). In 2000 Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid, made an important contribution to the feminist movement by issuing Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in National Development. This policy had a significant impact on the development of PSWs and PSGs in terms of female participation in education and other institutions. For instance, Kull (2009) found that there has been a consistent increase in the number of female students enrolling in higher Islamic education for several decades, and women now constitute nearly half of all university students in Islamic studies programs. This trend also applies to female postgraduate students, researchers and lecturers in Indonesia.

One method used to examine the growth of feminism, feminist identities and gender perspectives in Indonesia was to focus on the attitudes and aspirations of the members of PSWs and PSGs. These members constitute an elite intellectual grouping, and although they do not represent society as a whole, they often act as social intermediaries and cultural brokers in the areas of gender equality and feminist identity. In some Islamic universities they are crucial trendsetters, shaping opinions and critically engaging with Islamic studies and feminist writings from the West, the Middle East and Asia. For example, from 2002 onwards a PSW called Institute...
Islam Negeri (UIN) Yogyakarta has emerged as one of Indonesia's most active Islamic research institutions on Islam and gender (Doorn-Harder 2006). Therefore, if so inclined, members of PSWs and PSGs can become agents of change by spreading information, research findings and new interpretations about women in Islam throughout Indonesia, both in academic settings and at grassroots levels (Jamhari and Ropi 2003). In order to better understand the challenges faced by these trendsetters, a review of the dominant interpretations and conceptualizations of gender and Islam is needed.

Conceptualizing gender issues

*Literal Islam and gender*

There is considerable disagreement among Indonesian Muslims about gender issues. These range from the ideal Muslim woman (obedience versus assertiveness), the status and role of women (public versus private), social issues such as polygamy, modes of dress and reproductive rights, and women in politics (leadership). In practice men often enjoy a 'double impact' in society. The *aqiqah* ritual, for instance, is instructive. At birth two goats are sacrificed for a boy, while only one goat is sacrificed for a girl. In juridical matters the value of two female witnesses is equal to that of one male witness. There are also concerns about inheritance, with men entitled to more than women by virtue of their birthright. In order to engage with these unequal gendered practices it is necessary to compare and contrast the different interpretations of Islamic texts and narratives. Rahim (2006) frames this as a discursive contest between liberal and literal Islam.

Literal Islam can be characterized as a time-frozen absolutist approach to the reading of the Qur'an and sacred *hadiths*. 
Contemporary laws, politics and social norms – including Islamic feminism and Southeast Asian syncretism – are devised by humans and are thus inherently flawed (Abdullah 2002; Rahim 2006). Proponents of literal Islam do not form a homogeneous entity, however. In Indonesia they are split organizationally and divided over several issues. The followers can be from *masarakat kolot* (conservative social groups), radical, fundamental or revivalist groups such as Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Dakwah Campus institution or LDK), Tarbiyah movements, Hizbut Tahrir or and Salafi Dakwah movements (Machmudi 2008; Mubarak 2008).

The search for religious purity begins with narratives dating back to seventh century Hijaz, Mecca and Medina. Ancient Arabic texts are not problematized and the evolution of Islamic scholarship is ignored. Conservative teachings emphasize rigid dogma, absolute conformity and no intermingling with local languages, customs or traditions. As a consequence of men and women having different God-given *kodrat* (roles and responsibilities) they have different social roles and positions. Women’s main *kodrat* is domestic childbearing and rearing (reproductive), whereas men are expected to earn money for the family (productive). There are concerns that if women earn money outside the home, their children will be ignorant and bad-mannered because they are not able to gain a proper education from their mothers.

Understood literally, religious texts support the institution of polygamy. Proponents of literal Islam deny that polygamy causes suffering for women and children, asserting instead that polygamy is part of the beauty of Islamic teaching. Furthermore, they advertise their ‘moral’ and ‘honorable’ support for early marriage and polygamy to prevent *zina*, the sin of adultery (Doorn-Harder 2006). In what is a rather low estimation of the character of man, it is believed that men with multiple wives will be less likely to engage in extramarital sex. Polygamy has rampant social costs. In an era with suspicious or even common notions of sexual permissiveness and unchastity, the impact of polygamy is devastating. In several countries, particularly in the Middle East, the practice is widespread and accepted as a cultural norm. Women are often treated as mere commodities, with little or no say in their own lives or the lives of their children. The practice of polygamy is often accompanied by violence against women, including physical and psychological abuse.

**Liberal Islam**

Liberal Islam is a movement that seeks to reconcile Islamic law with modern values and social norms. It believes in the equality of the sexes and the protection of women’s rights. Liberal Islam advocates for a more inclusive and just approach to Islamic law, which is based on the interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah (the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad). Liberal Islam rejects the notion that polygamy is a timeless and universal Islamic principle.

Therefore, pro women’s rights in ecc Islam is gender neutral, it is anyone who seeks justice, honesty, the absence of evil deeds such as corruption and arrogance. Proponents of liberal Islam argue that the Quran and the Sunnah are not static and that new interpretations are necessary to address modern challenges. Liberal Islam advocates for a more inclusive and just approach to Islamic law, which is based on the interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah. It seeks to reconcile Islamic law with modern values and social norms, and to promote the rights of women and other marginalized groups.
extramarital relations with strangers or prostitutes. Polygamy has also been touted as a means of contending against the rampant social evils found in European societies (Vreede-de Stuers 1960). In an equally low estimation of women, they are often treated with suspicion in cases of sexual abuse, violence or rape. Suspicions are aroused with regards to the wearing of proper Islamic dress and mannerisms in keeping with a woman’s dignity (Burhanudin and Fathurahman 2004). It is concluded that extreme crimes such as rape would never happen in ‘good’ or pure Islamic societies where sharia law is strictly adhered to (Doorn-Harder 2006). Liberal Islam, by contrast, is framed as socially progressive, moderate and inclusive. This has obvious implications for thoughts and deeds related to gender rights and feminist identities.

**Liberal Islam and gender**

Liberal Islam is framed as progressive and advocates equality between men and women in all aspects of life. Men and women have the same status and sacred duties because everyone is created equal. Therefore, progressive liberals endorse feminist ideas about equal rights in economic, social and political spheres (Esposito 1998; Rahim 2006). Although biologically different, men and women have equal status, position and rights in the family, society and state. Piety is gender neutral. An honorable and pious person in the eyes of God is anyone who implements the basic values of Islam, such as peace, justice, honesty, friendship, equality and generosity, and who shuns evil deeds such as injustice, oppression, discrimination, dishonesty and arrogance.

Proponents of liberal Islam come mainly from the younger generation Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah affiliates and activists in some NGOs, such as Rahima, the Yayasan Kesejahteraan
Fatayat (Fatayat Welfare Foundation or YKF), and the Amal Hayati-Rifka Annisa (Women’s Crisis Center). Prominent scholars of a liberal persuasion include Cicik Farha (1999), Nasaruddin Umar (1999), Muhammad Husein (2001), Ruhaini Dzuhayatin (2001), Lily Zakiyah Munir (2002) and Musdah Mulia (2005). Musdah Mulia accepts the label ‘Islamic feminist’ and argues that the only hierarchy ordained by God is a hierarchy between the Creator (God/Khaliq) and all God’s creatures (makhluk). Among humankind there is no right to claim individual supremacy based on gender. A king is not the God of his people; a husband is not the lord of his wife. Based on tauhid (oneness), one of Islam’s most fundamental concepts, Mulia (2005) argues that people can submit only to God and cannot discriminate against or oppress one another.

The liberal view holds that the position of Muslim women was much more egalitarian in the early years of Islam, before the final codification of Islamic law by tenth century male legalists who sought to circumscribe women’s public activities in the interests of maintaining patriarchal order (Mulia 2005). Indeed, the closer an Islamic scholar was to the Prophet Muhammad’s era, the less gender biases he evinced. For example, Abu Hanifah (699–767), the oldest leader of the imam madzab (Islamic school), had a more flexible interpretation of women’s status than the three imams who succeeded him. Conversely, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), the newest imam madzab, has the strictest interpretation of religious texts. Therefore the liberal approach to understanding Islam goes back to

---

Nahdlatul Ulama was established in Surabaya in 1926 to strengthen traditional Islam. NU is known as a traditionalist organization due to its support from people of rural areas and its adherents is around 35 million. Muhammadiyah is an Islamic organization founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta as a reformist socio-religious movement advocating ijithad (creative interpretation of the Qur’an and hadiths). It is the second largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia with 30 million members. For more, see: [http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Islam/default.htm](http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Islam/default.htm).
back to the canonical texts (al-Qur'an and hadiths) but broadens the scope for *ijtihad* (interpretation). It considers the influences of place and time on the revelation and recording of texts, understanding them as shaped by social, cultural and geographical conditions (Abdullah 1996; Abdullah 2002). This approach follows the principle of fallibility of human knowledge and takes into account the historicity of human understanding. A variety of disciplines are therefore incorporated, including history, philosophy, psychology, sociology and anthropology to reach different understandings of the meanings of sacred texts. These meanings should be tested continually in daily life, openly discussed and, if necessary, reinterpreted. This generates a post-dogmatic religiosity, deconstructing religious dogmas that do not support gender equality, for instance, and reconstructing them in line with newly legitimated social norms. Of course, as the term implies, dogmas have been internalized in the Muslim consciousness for centuries, and it is not easy for liberals to challenge fundamental problems such as gender equality and feminist identity.

Those of a liberal persuasion also tend to employ a hermeneutic approach. In the social sciences, the hermeneutic approach is a method of interpretation that can be used to rethink and challenge dominant or dogmatic ideas. In other words, hermeneutics is a method of transposing "a meaning-complex created by someone else into our own understanding of ourselves and our world" (Bleichner 1980, 1). Hermeneutics is about ascertaining the exact meaning of words, sentences and texts at the time they were written, including the teachings, grammatical composition and embedded worldviews contained in the texts (Wadud 1999). Even though contemporary gender issues are not directly examined, the hermeneutic approach can be applied to women's issues by analyzing them in the context of similar
discussions and principles in the Qur'an, and in light of similar language and syntactical structure used in the Qur'an (Wadud 1999).

In practical matters, gender equality requires that both men and women have an equal standing before the law as well as in financial matters, including the right to an equitable share of an inheritance (Mulia 2005). The double impact enjoyed by men may have served a purpose at one point in history, although this should be subject to revision as circumstances change. In terms of leadership, it is only natural that women have the right to assume positions of power, and even become imams leading the sholat (prayer services). With regards to the practice of polygamy, this has grown redundant and unacceptable because, like slavery, it is out of date with current attitudes and values, and creates social problems for women, children, families and communities (Qibtiyah 2006). Obviously, the situation faced by women today, particularly widows, is vastly different from the situation during the Prophet Muhammad’s era. Widows today can remarry and be more independent, both economically and psychologically, than before. Therefore it holds that polygamy is no longer an effective institution for social justice and welfare.

Moderate Islam and gender

Beyond the dualism of Rahim’s (2006) discursive contest between literal (conservative) Islam and liberal Islam, Burhanuddin and Fathurrahman (2004) propose a third category – moderate Islam. This moderate alternative (or ‘third way’) is based on a flexible interpretive approach to religious texts, relying on both literal and liberal interpretations depending on the circumstance and context to Western and Islamic values. While moderates are critical of the harshness of literal texts, they continue to hold on to the values. For instance, Kesopa Wanita (Women’s Rights Movement) has advocated for equal rights for women and the abolition of polygamy. However, they are also critical of the excesses of liberal interpretations, such as the interpretation of the hibah (legacy) rules (Shafie 1954) where property can pass to a male relative, thereby excluding women. Interestingly, these moderates propose a middle way that recognizes the need for change while respecting Islamic values.

Moderate Islam, therefore, seeks to find a balance between the extremes of literal and liberal interpretations, aiming to ensure that women’s rights are respected while maintaining Islamic values.

260
and context. It is argued that the feminist spirit is not limited to Western traditions. Islam's earliest teachings dealt with gender inequality, and therefore feminism is compatible with Islamic values. While sharing literal Islam's reverence for the Quran, moderates are more open to critical ideas and contextual readings of old texts. Munawar Chalil, a prominent Muhammadiyah scholar, wrote two books that gave a strong representation of moderate ideas: *Kesopanan Perempuan* (Women’s Decency) in 1936 and *Nilai Wanita* (Women’s Values) in 1954. Chalil traced the evolution of gender relations and decided that there were three key historical periods beginning with degradation, followed by deification and finally resulting in processes of equalization. According to Chalil (1954) Islam acknowledges that men and women are created equal but also have important differences in terms of public and private *kodrats* (God-given roles and responsibilities).

Moderate Islam is relatively flexible and pragmatic when dealing with changing socio-political circumstances. For instance, in certain circumstances it is deemed acceptable for women to contribute to the family income. Moderates do tend to agree with the literal Islam position about entitlements to an inheritance, but they encourage negotiations and 'charitable' acts such as giving gifts or drafting a hibah (will) to ensure a just distribution of assets. Woman can assume leadership roles in politics and society so long as they have the ability and capacity, although in family affairs and public rituals men should remain in charge. With regards to polygamy, the moderate orientation asserts that it is lawful under certain conditions. For example, a wife may be infertile, and this justifies polygamy on condition that a husband treats all wives and children equally, extending to psychological and material needs. Interestingly, moderates argue that the lawfulness of polygamy can
be understood from the universal concept of justice (Burhanuddin and Fathurrahman 2004). A verse about polygamy in the Qur’an (An-nisa': 3) relates to justice for the poor and marginalized through the protection of widows and orphans. This allows observers to reconcile religious precepts, gender and feminist issues, although there are criticisms that Burhanuddin and Fathurrahman (2004) rely too heavily on Western conceptions and attitudes towards feminism at the expense of properly developed Asian values. To overcome these limitations Woodward’s (2001) broader schema for categorizing modern Islamic feminism will be deployed.

Woodward (2001) argues that contemporary Islamic debates and discourses in Indonesia can be classified into five variants. The first is indigenized Islam, a derivative of what Geertz (1960) termed abangan (nominal Muslim) groups who identify themselves as Muslims but practice a form of syncretized religion, blended with local adat (customary) systems. Second, there is the traditional Sunni Islam of Nahdlatul Ulama that highlights classical legal, theological and mystical texts. Nahdlatul Ulama members usually hail from pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) and rural areas, and they tend to accept local cultural traditions as long as Islamic values are not compromised. The third variant of modern Islam is that of Muhammadiyah, an organization that concentrates on education and social agendas, rejects mysticism and mobilizes support from mainly urban areas. Fourth, transnational Islamist movements promoting highly politicized anti-Western interpretations of Islam. Their discourses are centered on jihad and sharia law and are found most commonly on university campuses and in large metropolitan areas. Finally, neo-modernism strives to synthesize Islamic precepts with modern democratic values such as tolerance, gender equality and pluralism. Concluded that gender issues in Islamic texts at the most influence.

PSWs/PSGs in

Building now proceed ‘feminist’ identity discussions universities and discussion on who claim to have label. For a study from Yogyakarta. To include a respondent intensively interview. Agenda, I propose identify a consider why categories (if baseline from feminism and activists and six case study religiously based University Muhammadiy
and pluralism. Based on these competing categorizations it can be concluded that there is no single, unified Muslim understanding of gender issues in Indonesia. The ways in which observers understand Islamic texts and the paradigms they use to perceive foreign ideas are the most influential factors for this plurality of understandings.

**PSWs/PSGs in Yogyakarta**

Building on the conceptual framework set out above, I shall now proceed to critically examine controversies surrounding ‘feminist’ identities among Muslim gender activists in Indonesian universities using quantitative and qualitative methods. The discussion on feminist identity helps distinguish between those who claim to have such an identity and those who reject the feminist label. For a statistical analysis of feminist identity, data is drawn from samples of employees from public and Islamic universities in Yogyakarta. The samples are gender activists and scholars which include lecturers, researchers and postgraduate students. Some of respondents are considered gender activists because they have been intensively involved in NGOs. In the search for deeper meanings and agendas, I proceed to explore what ‘feminist’ means for those who self-identify as feminists. For those respondents who do not, I consider why they reject that identity and what alternative labels or categories (if any) are preferred. This provides a comparative baseline from which to examine local understandings of Western feminism and the impact this is having on Indonesian gender activists and scholars from PSWs and PSGs. The research is based on six case studies of PSWs and PSGs in Yogyakarta. Three are religiously based PSWs/PSGs from UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, University of Islam Indonesia (UII) and University of Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY). Another three are located
public universities: Gadjah Mada University (UGM), State University of Yogyakarta (UNY) and University of National Development (UPN). The total number of survey respondents was 165, and the distribution was 70 male and 95 female, 105 from religiously based universities and 60 from public universities. Since the establishment of PSWs and PSGs there have been male members. All respondents have been involved in PSWs and PSGs, and identify as Muslims. In-depth interviews were conducted with 25 respondents across all categories, and pseudonyms are used to ensure the confidentiality of all respondents.

Respondents' social backgrounds

Table 1 shows the range of respondents' social backgrounds. The age group is quite diverse, ranging from 20 to 70 years of age, and around 75% of respondents are younger than 45 years of age. The majority of respondents are from Java (83%), have an educational background in the social sciences (80%), and have little overseas experience (63%).4 Respondents also predominantly have low prejudice toward feminism (78%).

---

4 Levels of overseas experience (small, medium and high) are determined by how often respondents go abroad and what type of visit they are taking. Respondents who go overseas for postgraduate studies receive a high value. People who only go overseas for hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, by contrast, received a smaller value because every Muslim is expected to undertake hajj.
Table 1: Respondents' Social Backgrounds  
(n=165, M=70, F=95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Backgrounds</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>&lt;45 years of age (young)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;45 years of age (old)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Javanese</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Backgrounds</td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Social Science</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Experience</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of Feminism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice toward Feminism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches toward Gender Issues in Islam</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation.

Table 1 also shows that respondents' understandings on contentious gender issues are mostly progressive. In the overall score, it does not show any respondents who subscribe to the literal Islam conservative approach. However, as the following sections of this chapter show, by analyzing the detailed data on contentious gender issues it can be seen that there are literal understandings among respondents on certain gender issues. Table 1 demonstrates that male and female respondents from all social backgrounds have the same pattern of responses.

Feminist identity
The rejection of feminist identity

An important issue among women and gender activists is that of identity. 'Feminist' as an identity is more controversial than the term feminism as a doctrine or theory. Many authors of Islamic
feminism literature adamantly refuse to being labeled 'Islamic feminists' (Badran 2008). Being a self-identified feminist is controversial among women activists both in the West and the East, including Indonesian feminists. In the Western context, many of the so-called young generation or 'third wave' activists are reluctant to identify themselves as feminists (Caro and Fox 2008; Gromisch 2009).

In the Indonesian context, the reluctance to self-identify as a feminist stems from the stigma attached to the feminist label. Feminists are linked to either leftist (communist) or liberal tendencies that promote individualism, selfishness and immoral behaviors such as premarital sex (Wieringa 2002; Suryakusuma 2004; Doorn-Harder 2006). Identification as a feminist is also conflated with being anti-men, against women's natural reproductive attributes, against kodrat, sympathetic to lesbianism, rebellious, and damaging toward Islamic aqidah principles and sharia laws (Sadli 2002; Mulia 2004). As a result of these negative connotations, many Indonesian women's organizations make the disclaimer that "even though we struggle for women's rights, we are not feminists" (Suryakusuma 2004, 271).

Based on gender activism and scholarship in Yogyakarta, there seem to be four key reasons why people do not refer to themselves as feminists (Qibtiyah 2010). First, to be a bona fide feminist one needs advanced levels of knowledge, the will to engage in activities such as demonstrations or rallies, and the will to join NGOs involved in gender issues. Second, many people are deterred by the socio-

---

5 The 'third wave' of feminism began in the 1990s. It is more pluralistic, realistic, multicultural and flexible. According to Jacob (2001), this was predominantly driven by young women who celebrated their pluralities by embracing their personal and political contradictions. For example, they choose to wear makeup and pink cloth while maintaining a critical stance toward the misogyny and racism inherent in the cosmetic industry, and refusing to follow a feminist party line.
cultural misunderstandings and negative associations that the feminist label brings. Therefore, although someone may not have any problem with the feminist identity in private, the public rejection of this label is part of one’s strategic positioning within society. Third, some people simply believe that the term ‘feminist’ is an anathema, ignoring the natural order of gender roles and relations. Finally, there are misunderstandings about the term itself, with ‘feminists perceived to be defenders of romanticized notions of motherhood, womanhood and femininity (Qibtiyah 2010).

The association between gender and feminist identity

As mentioned, one of the important issues among Indonesian Muslim feminists is that of identity. I found that although all survey respondents and interviewees are either gender activists, defined as those who have been involved in NGOs or are concerned with gender issues, not all of them self-identify as ‘feminists’. Moreover, when the sample is analyzed based on sex, the percentage of male respondents who are self-identified ‘feminists’ is slightly higher (22%) than those who reject the label (21%). Conversely, the share of female respondents who are self-identified ‘feminists’ is significantly lower (22%) than the share of ‘non-feminists’ (35%). This is an interesting finding because in the Asian context, feminism is perceived to be a concern for women and women’s issues. It was expected that a higher percentage of women in PSWs and PSGs would embrace the ‘feminist’ identity compared with male respondents, but the figures from Yogyakarta revealed that this is not always the case. However, when discussing polygamy, male respondents have less progressive views than females (Qibtiyah 2010).

Recent research examines why more female respondents identify as ‘non-feminist,’ suggesting it could be related to the stigma
or negative connotations attached to the term feminist (Qibtiyah 2010). These include perceptions of hostility towards women, in particular the 'traditional' role of women in domestic and social affairs, reactions against the kordat, hatred of men, the desire to dominate gendered relations, and tolerance towards lesbianism. For male respondents who support feminism or self-identify as 'feminists,' the opposite is true. It may be even be a sign of compassion or heightened sensitivity for gender rights and equality. Therefore there seems to be a higher risk for female feminists in Indonesian society. Also it could be linked to PSW/PSG programs which are less focused on feminist studies than gender studies. For example, between the years 2000 and 2010 PSW UIN published 42 books and journals, and only one publication discussed feminism (PSW UIN 2006; PSW UIN n.d.). Similar to PSW UIN, PSW UGM also focuses its programs on gender, holding international conferences on gender and politics, and conducting research on gender and education, gender and agriculture, gender and economy, and gender and law (PSW UGM n.d.).

Male and female respondents constitute the same proportion of the total number of self-identified feminists (22%) because both male and female activists have become involved in gender activism in Indonesia (Nuruzzaman 2005). Given the social history of Indonesia it is not surprising that feminism has transgender appeal. In the traditional social structure many women achieved relatively elevated positions and high status in their community, and some even became leaders (Atkinson and Errington 1990). Indeed, women's rights and freedoms in traditional Javanese society have been impressive compared with their counterparts in the Middle East and Africa. It is well known that in some Arab countries women cannot venture outside the house without a male 'protector,' cannot be seen in public without the burqa (garment that fully covers the

The association body), 1976; White women are same as those respondents. feminists is 2% feminism is ac-

Figure 1 show universities w are the same as those respondents. feminists is 2% feminism is ac-

Figure 1:

n= 165

Public University

Source: Own Comp

Data shows, determining religiosity. Af/ in Islamic univ
body), and are not permitted to drive automobiles (Goody 1976; White 2006; Arimbi 2009). By contrast, most Indonesian women are socially mobile, have a public identity, engage in community affairs, and are entitled to an inheritance (although the terms are still contentious).

The association between type of university and feminist identity

Figure 1 shows that the percentage of respondents from Islamic universities who are self-identified feminists (31%) is almost the same as those who reject the label (32%). Conversely, the share of respondents from public universities who are self-identified feminists is significantly lower (13%) than the share of 'non-feminists' (24%). This is an interesting finding that suggests feminism is actually stronger in Islamic universities.

Figure 1: Respondents by Type of University and Identity

Source: Own Compilation

Data shows, however, that the type of university is not the determining social factor for feminist identity or individual religiosity. Approximately 71% of female respondents from public universities wear a hijab (partial head covering), whereas everyone in Islamic university wears a hijab as a symbol of Islamic identity,
and most respondents have been active in Islamic women's organizations such as Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul 'Aisyiyah (from Muhammadiyah), or Muslimat (from Nahdlatul Ulama). Many male respondents from public universities have also been directly involved in Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama. Therefore there is no significance different among staff from Islamic universities and public universities with regards to their religiosity and participation in religious organizations.

Islamic and Muslim feminists

The debate surrounding feminist identity also extends to questions of compatibility between feminism and Islam. There are principled objections to the term 'Islamic feminism' based on distinctions between theology and sociology, between sacred beliefs and faith on the one hand, and social norms and practices on the other (Mojab 2001; Moghadam 2002). It is held that Muslims in general, and Indonesians in particular, do not need to import what are presented as 'Western' values since they have their own religious texts, customs and traditions that are more relevant and culturally appropriate. By contrast, a growing number of contemporary scholars contend that Islam and feminism are in fact harmonious. According to Majid (1998) and Moghadam (2002), it is possible to reconcile 'Islamic feminism' because Islam promotes gender equality, even if social practices have led to the subordination of women in some Muslims countries.

These debates contribute to the emergence of a confident but self-reflective identity among female activists in Indonesia. According to Doorn-Harder (2006), the young generations are more comfortable being called feminists than the older generation. Representing the elder generation, Saparinah Sadli (2002) remains
reluctant to use the term 'Indonesian feminism' because Indonesian intellectuals have yet to develop their own theory of feminism. As a representative of the new generation, Musda Mulia (2005) embraces the Islamic feminist label. This is not without qualification, of course. Young generations are forced to acknowledge distinctions between 'Islamic feminism' and 'Muslim feminism'. According to Cooke (2001) 'Islamic' is the more relevant identity marker as it signifies an Islamic tradition of feminism, whereas Muslim feminism simply refers to feminists who embrace Islam but who do not necessarily practice the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, 'Islamic' implies a particular kind of self-positioning that informs one's way of life (thoughts and deeds), and interprets the questioning of Islamic epistemology as an expansion of their faith rather than a rejection of it.

During in-depth interviews, some respondent differentiated between 'Islamic Feminist' and 'Muslim Feminist'. Gizela (a pseudonym), a lecturer at an Islamic university in Yogyakarta, described an Islamic feminist as someone who has autonomy, power and the capability to reinterpret fundamental values about gender equality within Islam, whereas a Muslim feminist is anyone who embraces Islam and may not necessarily be concerned with Islamic teachings on gender (interview, 5 May 2010). Furthermore, Gizela argues that a Muslim feminist is a woman or man who embraces Islam as it is printed in a Kartu Tanda Penduduk (personal identity card), and who is not inclined to challenge this identity nor engage in deeper learning. For Gizela, she is confident to say that she is a 'Islamic feminist' because she understands tafsir Qur'an (exegesis, commentary) and the sacred hadiths, has knowledge of the foundation of Islamic values and teachings, and therefore has the tools and capacity to reconstruct Islamic teachings based on gender equality. Another PSW/PSG respondent, Sita, labels herself a
'Muslim feminist' because she feels this is more appropriate for the practitioner, whereas 'Islamic feminist' is not a personal label but rather a discourse on feminism (Qibtiyah 2010).

The appeal of labels

Respondents who self-identified as 'feminists' were offered four choices in order to determine the most appealing and the least popular labels. The choices were 'Islamic Feminist', 'Muslim Feminist', a combination of 'Islamic Feminist' and 'Muslim Feminist', and 'Others'. For the same purpose, four choices were offered to respondents who did not accept the 'feminist' label. The four choices were 'Gender Activist', 'Women Activist', a combination of 'Gender Activist' and 'Women Activist', and 'Others'.

My research shows that 'Muslim Feminist' is the most popular self-label (18%) among the self-identified feminist group. The least popular label for this group is the combination of 'Islamic Feminist' and 'Muslim Feminist' (only 7%), while 10% of respondents identified themselves as 'Islamic Feminist'. On the 'Other' option (9%), the most popular for sub-label is 'Feminist' only. Some respondents argue that they do not need additional labels such as Islamic Feminist, Muslim feminist or others. For example, Nova calls herself a 'feminist plus' because she not only pays attention to women's issues, but also other marginalized groups such as the disabled, children and non-heterosexual groups (interview 24 February 2010).

For those respondents who did not accept the 'feminist' label, the 'Others' option was the most popular choice (27%), and only 1% of respondents chose the combined 'Gender Activist' and 'Women

Self-identified fem

My inter feminists with identified Istan Yogyakarta, a inequality exp treated equally Nova, a PSW/P a 'feminist plus opportunities participate in a February 2010)

Furtherm feminism is not
Activist'. There are a variety of labels in the 'Others' option such as 'caring about gender issues', 'researcher on women's studies', 'good Muslim', and 'gender equality concept user'. While this option was frequently selected, the data indicates that the 'Gender Activist' option is the most preferred label among members of this group (Qibtiyah 2010). There are various understandings of the term 'feminist' among survey respondents and interviewees. This is evident from responses to my in-depth interview with PSW gender researchers and activists. Self-identified feminists clearly do not conflate social practices with the term 'feminist'. They do, however, define the term in diverse ways. Respondents who do not identify as 'feminists' explain that there are two meanings of the term 'feminist', one being negative, the other being positive. I will compare the range of understandings of the term 'feminism' for both those people who are self-identified feminists and for those who are non-feminists.

Self-identified feminist's understandings of 'feminist'

My interviews show the positive association of self-identified feminists with feminism. For example, according to Dullah, a self-identified Islamic feminist and a lecturer at an Islamic university in Yogyakarta, a feminist is "someone who is aware that there is inequality experienced by women, and that women should be treated equally as human beings" (interview, 8 February 2010). Nova, a PSW/PSG lecturer from a public university who calls herself a 'feminist plus', defines a feminist as "someone who strives to create opportunities for marginalized groups, including women, to participate in activities" such as politics and activism (interview, 24 February 2010).

Furthermore, according to some self-identified feminists, feminism is not merely recognition that women have the same
capabilities, rights and goals that men do, but should extend to actualization and empowerment. To be a feminist is not limited to those who participate in demonstrations or join NGOs, but also includes those who advocate gender equality and rights through teachings, publications and involvement in university affairs. Therefore, Gizela argues that feminists are aware of inequality and endeavor to empower the marginalized, can engage in public activism, as well as offer philosophical interpretations of gender and society (interview, 5 May 2010).

According to Sita, a lecturer at an Islamic university and self-identified as a Muslim Feminist, the label ‘feminist’ depends on a person’s mindset rather than a person’s ascriptive status as a man or a woman (interview, 3 June 2010). Therefore, a man can also be a feminist. Although there are certain experiences that only women can ‘know’, understand and properly explain, men can still help examine gender relations in society and government policy (Belenky et al. 1986). This is reinforced by the views of Tria, another lecturer at an Islamic university: “a feminist can be a man or a woman, [anyone] who is aware of unequal relations between men and women and strives to overcome inequality” (interview, 20 May 2010). Tria believes that men can also be oppressed, for instance by the fixed views about their roles as family heads and sole breadwinners.

Non-feminist understandings of ‘feminist’

There are three non-feminist understandings of ‘feminist’: these are positive, neutral and negative. A neutral understanding is held by Maman, a respondent from an Islamic university who self-identifies as a non-feminist. Maman argues that the different treatment between the sexes is part of the ‘natural order’ and is therefore unproblematic. To paraphrase, he sees the position of men...
and women as natural, so we should treat men and women proportionally without turning gendered ideas into an ideology. This is his understanding about the gender relationship, one that is grounded in Islamic teaching. Maman’s family and neighbors do not find any problem with this issue (interview, 5 May 2010).

Some non-feminist respondents define the term ‘feminist’ positively. This is interesting because some who reject a feminist identity define the term ‘feminist’ in a positive way, such as someone who struggles for gender equality, has a deep concern for and knowledge of women’s issues, and frequently joins NGOs. As Dama, a lecturer from an Islamic university, indicates, “I don’t want to call myself a feminist because, in my understanding, a feminist is someone who has a deep knowledge of the concepts and issues” (interview, 12 June 2010). Beyond being sympathetic, a genuine feminist has an advanced level of understanding of feminist epistemology. Similarly, Hera, a lecturer from a public university in Yogyakarta, claims that her writings only relate to and reflect feminist thoughts: “I want to be a feminist but am not ready yet. A feminist struggles in the NGO sector and conducts real academic research. I have yet to conduct research [about women and economics], and so [in a sense] I am a failed feminist” (interview, 1 June 2010).

It has been demonstrated that many academics who reject the feminist identity actually define the term in positive way. While there are many social interpretations of what constitutes a feminist, male scholars such as Abdullah, a lecturer from an Islamic university, argues that the term should be defined in a positive manner, as someone struggling for equal rights and status for men and women in society and in the privacy of their own home (interview, 22 May 2010). Another male colleague, Zihan, admitted that “socially I do not call myself a feminist because there are many negative
associations, but privately I have no problem with the feminist identity so long as the meaning is connected to the struggle for equality between men and women (interview, 19 May 2010). Therefore, Zihan rejects feminist identity publically as part of his strategic positioning.

Finally, there are those who reject feminist identification because they have misunderstood the term and perceive 'feminist' negatively. While critics of feminism often focus on the innate goodness of motherhood, womanhood and femininity, some respondents mistakenly attributed these characteristics to feminists. One male respondent from an Islamic university, Muhsinun, stated that "a feminist is someone who has a female attitude, character and personality" (interview, 24 February 2010). Similarly, Joko, a lecturer from an Islamic university, suggested that he was opposed to feminism because feminists were portrayed as "someone who has motherhood or womanhood characteristics, because of that I am not a feminist" (interview, 24 May 2010). Based on publication and research records, Muhsinun and Joko have conducted programs on gender mainstreaming, but do not have any publications focusing on women, gender and feminism.

The main reason why people reject the feminist identification, however, is because they define feminist in a negative manner. This is based either on conviction or misunderstandings of the term. Some of the negative associations of the term feminist mentioned by respondents from PSW's and PSG's include feminism being too extreme, radical and in violation of women's kodrat. Examples of 'unnatural' behaviors include instances when women want to become boxers or football players, when they attempt to dominate men or claim that men and women are exactly the same, when women do not want to experience childbirth, and when they accept lesbianism. For specific examples from interviewees, Wulan, a

-------------
lecturer fi
is someone who
the same in all
lecturer from a
who is very extr
life" (interview
university in Ye
women's natur
become boxers.

Based on
there are four k
feminists. First,
of knowledge, t
or rallies, and
Second, many
misunderstand;
brings. Therefor
the feminist ide
part of one's str;
simply believe t
natural order mis
understand to be def
womanhood an

Feminist ident
issues in Islam

As dem
understand;
In the overall sc
lecturer from an Islamic university, contends that “a feminist is someone who wants the position of men and women to be exactly the same in all aspects of life” (interview, 17 June 2010). Hidayah, a lecturer from a public university, argues that a feminist is “someone who is very extreme and wants to be the same as men in all aspects of life” (interview, 24 February 2010). Ana, a lecturer from a public university in Yogyakarta, maintains that being a feminist “is against women’s natural attributes, [particularly] when women desire to become boxers or becak [rickshaw] drivers” (interview, 1 June 2010).

Based on the data analyzed from Yogyakarta, it seems that there are four key reasons why people do not refer to themselves as feminists. First, to be a bona fide feminist one needs advanced levels of knowledge, the will to engage in activities such as demonstrations or rallies, and the will to join NGOs involved in gender issues. Second, many people are deterred by the socio-cultural misunderstandings and negative associations that the feminist label brings. Therefore, although someone may not have any problem with the feminist identity in private, the public rejection of this label is part of one’s strategic positioning within society. Third, some people simply believe that the term ‘feminist’ is an anathema, ignoring the natural order of gender roles and relations. Finally, there are misunderstandings about the term itself, with ‘feminists’ perceived to be defenders of romanticized notions of motherhood, womanhood and femininity.

Feminist identity and the approach towards contentious gender issues in Islam

As demonstrated previously in Table 1, respondents’ understandings of contentious gender issues are mostly progressive. In the overall scoring, there are no respondents who subscribe to the
literal Islam approach. However, by analyzing the detailed data and individual variables related to gender, it can be seen that there are some literal understandings among respondents. In addition to identities and labels, respondents were asked about contentious gender issues relevant to Muslim communities in Indonesia. The ten key issues focused upon by respondents were gender equality (linked to status), the kodrat, the roles of men and women in domestic (private) and public spheres, leadership capabilities, inheritance entitlements, the creation of women from the parturient rib, juridical competencies (two female witnesses being equal to one male witness), polygamy, equal rights between husbands and wives, and equal opportunities to make decisions among family members.

Overall there are no significant differences in approaches toward gender issues between faculty members and researchers in PSWs/PSGs from Islamic or public universities, or between male and female respondents. When it comes to the ten contentious gender issues listed above, the majority of respondents elicited liberal tendencies and perspectives. A detailed examination of the data, however, reveals that some respondents can be characterized as moderate or even literal in their outlook. Based on demographics and membership status, the majority of respondents have tertiary education, 75% fall within a younger age group (below 45 years old), 81% are from a social sciences background and have been involved in Muhammadiyah, Aisyiyah or Muslimat, and therefore it can be argued that the majority subscribe to a liberal progressive interpretation of gender issues and Islamic feminism. It is expected that this sample of scholars will support efforts to synthesize Islamic and modern principles by linking the founding principles and teachings of Islam to contemporary values and agendas such as tolerance, democratization, gender equality and religious pluralism.

Over 90% of respondents see equality in both sexual rights (feminist) and equal rights (based on companionship). The issue of the imam (leader) is highly divisive, and it is found that this last issue of representation, however, affects activists or Muslims.

Table 2: Responses to gender issues by type of approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Issues and Approaches</th>
<th>Literal (%)</th>
<th>Moderate (%)</th>
<th>Liberal (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's Leadership</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation

Table 2 illustrates the moderate/approximate positions. The field is significant given that issues such as late 1980s the not the early 2000s it and academic research 2010 the Majelis'
Over 90% of respondents had liberal interpretations of gender equality in both the domestic and public sphere, as well as equal sexual rights (for pleasure and expression) between husbands and wives, and equal powers to make decisions among family members (based on competencies rather than gender). Perhaps the most controversial finding concerns the inclusion of leadership positions for women in ritual activities, specifically a woman serving as an imam (leader) for adult men in sholat (obligatory prayer). This is highly divisive, and it is expected that the majority of readers would find this last suggestion offensive. For those who are familiar with this issue, however, it is common to ask why even more gender activists or Muslim feminists are not agitating for greater female representation.

Table 2: Respondents' Understandings of Leadership Abilities for Muslim Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Issues and Types of Approaches</th>
<th>Respondents' understandings</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>leadership abilities for Muslim women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal 1%</td>
<td>Women cannot be leaders of men</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate 70%</td>
<td>Women can be leaders of men as long as they have the capability, but not in sholat</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal 27%</td>
<td>Women can be leaders of adult men if they have the capability, including in sholat</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation

Table 2 illustrates that approximately 70% of respondents adopt a moderate approach to the question of women in leadership positions. The fact that 27% elicited a liberal interpretation is significant given the controversy surrounding this issue. Prior to the late 1980s the notion of women imam in sholat was never discussed. By the early 2000s it has become the subject of controversial discourses and academic research projects (Suryadilaga 2003; Subhan 2008). In 2010 the Majelis Tarjih Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah (National
Board of Muhammadiyah’s Legal Affairs Committee) held a national discussion on this issue in Malang, East Java (Qibtiyah and Susilaningsih 2010).

During the in-depth interviews, there were some contrasting ideas about women imam. Some respondents believe that in prayer, there should be an equal partnership, meaning that whoever has more knowledge should have the opportunity to be an imam. Conversely, some respondents argue that in the ritual activities included in sholat, a woman is not allowed to serve as an imam for adult men in sholat even if she has superior knowledge. Wira, Darma and Gizela, all self-identified feminists from Islamic universities, argue progressively that merit and knowledge alone should determine one’s eligibility to lead prayer (interviews conducted in May 2010). Darma concedes that it is normal to be makmun (a follower in sholat) led or initiated by his mother or wife (interview, 9 May 2010). Darma recalls returning to Yogyakarta to see his mother performing sholat and wudlu (purification), and found that the most important principle is jamaah (togetherness) regardless of who leads prayer. Gizela affirms this view, arguing that an examination of Al Qur’an and hadiths shows that there is no single valid text that prohibits a woman to be imam for adult men (interview, 25 May 2010).

Two PSW/PSG colleagues from Islamic universities, Joko and Maman, reject this position, arguing that gender positions are fixed when it comes to religious and ritual activities, and that tradition should be respected (interviews held in May 2010). Some respondents who favor the liberal progressive approach in relation to leadership roles for women do not actually practice their beliefs in daily life for strategic reasons. Hera and Siti, for instance, and reluctant to take a public stand and publish their findings because of social and professional obstacles, and they also feel it would be counterproductive and may even engender a violent backlash.
Table 3: The Approach towards Gender and Feminist Identity - Group Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approach Toward Gender in Islam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Identified Feminist</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27.6986</td>
<td>2.09950</td>
<td>2.4573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Identified Non-Feminist</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>25.7283</td>
<td>2.40925</td>
<td>2.5118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The Approach towards Gender and Feminist Identity - Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>Std. Error Difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach Toward Gender Issues</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>5.519</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.9704</td>
<td>.35700</td>
<td>1.2654, 3.6753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.620</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>5.607</td>
<td>161.53</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.9704</td>
<td>.35139</td>
<td>1.2764, 2.6628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation

Tables 3 and 4 (above) show that the self-identified feminist group has a higher mean score (27.6986) than those who reject the feminist label (25.7283). The higher the score, the more progressive they are. Tables 3 and 4 also show that the significant value (2-tailed) score on the different approaches toward contentious gender issues in Islam is equal to .000 (p < .000). This means that there is a very significant association between feminist identity and the approach toward contentious gender issues in Islam. The more progressive one's understandings of the Islamic texts, the more likely they identify themselves as feminists. In other words, respondents who identify themselves as 'feminist' are predominantly those who have a more liberal progressive approach to gender in Islam.
Conclusion

Identifying oneself as a feminist remains a controversial issue for all those concerned with women’s rights and gender issues in Indonesia. This controversy relates to the various understandings and misunderstandings of the term ‘feminist’ and the polarizing effect it can have in society. For strategic reasons, many gender scholars from PSWs and PSGs do not publicly identify themselves as ‘feminists’, although they have no qualms about using this label in private. The enduring negative connotations surrounding feminists make it difficult for women to reconcile their interests and identities in contemporary social settings. Even university scholars struggle with issues such as the kodrat, gender domination, sexuality and lesbianism.

In terms of approaches toward gender issues in Islam, survey respondents and interviewees primarily adopted liberal interpretations. Overall more than 90% of respondents hold progressive views about the equal roles of men and women in domestic and public spheres, equal sexual rights between husbands and wives, and equal powers to make decisions among family members. More detailed examinations of the survey data, however, revealed that on specific issues a majority of respondents can be characterized as moderate. For instance, the majority of respondents adopt a moderate position when it comes to the inclusion of female leaders during sholat, although a highly significant minority indicated that they feel women can lead adult men in prayer so long as they are qualified and capable. There is a very significant association between feminist identity and the approach toward contentious gender issues in Islam. The more progressively they understand Islamic texts, the more likely they are to identify themselves as feminists.

Indonesian intellectuals, scholars and researchers from PSWs and PSGs continue to be embroiled in a dynamic debate about the
prospects for a legitimate form of 'Islamic feminism' to resonate with a wider audience. The search for compatibility between religious precepts and pluralistic social movements is ongoing and fraught with difficulties, but given the positive indicators revealed in this chapter, concerned Indonesians should not be deterred from joining in the controversial debate.

List of References


