Jajat Burhanudin is the Executive Director at the Center for the Study of Islam and Society, Jakarta.
Kees van Dijk is emeritus professor of the History of Modern Islam in Indonesia.

As elsewhere in the Islamic world a stricter adherence to Islam has gained strength in Indonesia. Does the image of Islam in Indonesia as a model of moderation still hold? It is a topic of debate in Indonesia itself and abroad. This book is a reflection of this discussion. Besides contributions focusing on the specific characteristics of Indonesian Islam others deal with such diverse topics as Salafi groups and their propaganda, radio stations, Muslim transvestites, the pioneering work of Muslim feminists, and the debate about rules of inheritance and divorce.

“This timely book addresses the issue of the moderate nature of Indonesian Islam and presents a picture which confirm as well as contradict this image, thus showing the complexity of Islam in Indonesia.”

Dr. Nico J. G. Kaptein, Leiden University
The ICAS Publications Series consists of Monographs and Edited Volumes. The Series takes a multidisciplinary approach to issues of interregional and multilateral importance for Asia in a global context. The Series aims to stimulate dialogue amongst scholars and civil society groups at the local, regional and international levels.

The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) was founded in 1997. Its main goals are to transcend the boundaries between disciplines, between nations studied, and between the geographic origins of the Asia scholars involved. ICAS has grown into the largest biennial Asia studies event covering all subjects of Asia studies. So far six editions of ICAS have been held respectively in Leiden (1998), Berlin (2001), Singapore (2003), Shanghai (2005), Kuala Lumpur (2007), Daejeon, South Korea (2009) and Honolulu, Hawai’i (2011).

In 2001 the ICAS secretariat was founded which guarantees the continuity of the ICAS process. In 2004 the ICAS Book Prize (IBP) was established in order to create by way of a global competition both an international focus for publications on Asia while at the same time increasing their visibility worldwide. Also in 2005 the ICAS Publications Series were established.

For more information: www.icassecretariat.org
Islam in Indonesia

Contrasting Images and Interpretations

Edited by
Jajat Burhanudin and Kees van Dijk
Contents

Introduction 7

1 Comparing different streams of Islam
Wrestling with words and definitions 15
Kees van Dijk

2 Defining Indonesian Islam
An examination of the construction of the national Islamic identity of traditionalist and modernist Muslims 25
Ahmad Najib Burhani

3 Indonesia in the global scheme of Islamic things
Sustaining the virtuous circle of education, associations and democracy 49
Robert W. Hefner

4 Distinguishing Indonesian Islam
Some lessons to learn 63
Azyumardi Azra

5 Islam, state and society in democratising Indonesia
A historical reflection 75
Taufik Abdullah

6 The politics of piety in the Pondok Pesantren Khusus Waria
Al-Fattah Senin-Kamis Yogyakarta
Negotiating the Islamic religious embodiment 91
Dian Maya Safitri

7 The Indonesian Muslim feminist reinterpretation of inheritance
Nina Nurmila 109

8 Managing familial issues
Unique features of legal reform in Indonesia 123
Euis Nurlaelawati
A new generation of feminists within traditional Islam
An Indonesian exception
Andrée Feillard and Pieterella van Doorn-Harder

Religious pluralism and contested religious authority in
contemporary Indonesian Islam
A. Mustofa Bisri and Emha Ainun Nadjib
Asfa Widiyanto

Islam and humanitarian affairs
The middle class and new patterns of social activism
Hilman Latief

Dakwah radio in Surakarta
A contest for Islamic identity
Sunarwoto

Muslim fundamentalism in education institutions
A case study of Rohani Islam in high schools in Cirebon
Didin Nurul Rosidin

Majlis Tafsir Al-Qur’an and its struggle for Islamic
reformism
Syaifudin Zuhri

Glossary

About the editors and contributors

Bibliography

Index
In recent years, the way Islam manifests itself in Indonesia has changed. As elsewhere in the Muslim world, there is stricter adherence to Islam, and fundamentalism has gained strength. An increasing number of Indonesian Muslims are observing the tenets of their religion more faithfully. More people fulfil the hajj, one of the basic pillars of Islam, and an increasing number of women wear a headscarf, sometimes a very fashionable one. These women include members of a segment of society that used to be considered the embodiment of secularism and syncretism, known in Indonesia as the abangan.

National surveys confirm this trend. In the last ten years or so, Muslims in Indonesia have become more religious in their attitudes and practices. The use of rituals associated with abangan culture has decreased, to be replaced by those of more observant Muslims, the santri. As a result, Islamic symbols and elements can be seen everywhere in Indonesian public life, including in liberal and capitalist institutions such as company offices and shopping malls.

The increasing emphasis on Islam is also reflected in the shifting position of fundamentalist groups. Since Suharto was forced to step down in the late 1990s, Indonesia has witnessed a growing religious militancy. Not only have the militants increased in number, but they are also more actively engaged in missionary activities among fellow Muslims. Various radical organisations have emerged, including the FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Front of the Defenders of Islam), the MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters) and the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Force). With a militant agenda of purifying Islam, these organisations are engaged in a series of violent acts against others, creating concern among moderate Muslims, who still form a majority in Indonesia. Their aspiration is to implement Islamic law in the public sphere, which in Indonesia is supposed to be religiously neutral.

The aims of these radical Muslim organisations are congruent with those of a number of Islamic political parties in parliament, while in some regions local administrations are trying to enforce proper Islamic conduct. The fatwa-giving commission of the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Religious Scholars) – the institution en-
trusted by the government with this task – and its regional chapters, at times also acts as the guardian of a strict interpretation of Islam.

Contributing to this trend has been the changing relationship between the state and Islam since around the turn of the century. After Indonesia became independent on 17 August 1945, its history as a nation is usually divided into three parts: the Old Order when Sukarno was President, the New Order when Suharto was in power, and the post-1998 period. The Sukarno years were coloured by antagonism between adherents of a religiously neutral state – or the Pancasila state, named after the five principles formulated by Sukarno in 1945 as the ideological foundation of political life – and the proponents of an Islamic state. A number of these proponents took up arms, fighting for an Islamic State of Indonesia (also known as the Darul Islam rebellion); others tried to realise their ideals through constitutional means by striving for a majority in the representative bodies. In the Constituent Assembly, the political institution tasked with defining the nature of the Indonesian state, those in favour of giving the Indonesian state an Islamic base and those against were more or less in balance. The deadlock this caused induced Sukarno to re-introduce the Constitution promulgated in 1945, which mentions Pancasila in its preamble, on 5 July 1959.

The period that followed was one of intense indoctrination of the Pancasila state ideology and increased domestic tension and repression. Deeply religious Muslims and the organisations that represented them were among those who suffered. Hard hit was Masjumi, the political party of the adherents of Islamic modernism, a stream of thinking that had reached Indonesia around the turn of the twentieth century and that had spread gradually and steadily. The government accused Masjumi leaders of siding with the Darul Islam and a second rebellion that took place in Sumatra and had regional rather than religious sentiments as its roots. Consequently, Masjumi was banned in 1960. The large modernist socio-religious organisation, Muhammadiyah, was allowed to continue to exist, as was its traditionalist counterpart, the Nahdlatul Ulama; but it became impossible for the leaders of either organisation to publicly criticise government policy in any field.

Suharto’s New Order brought some relief, but only partially so. The generals who came to power in 1965 were highly suspicious of political Islam and the Masjumi. The authorities introduced a new term – right extremism – for political Islam and for demands for a state based on syariah instead of Pancasila. Only those fundamentalist groups that kept clear of politics and did not question Pancasila as the basis of the state were tolerated. Speaking out against the national ideology meant imprisonment or life in exile, if not worse. Masjumi remained a forbidden party. Banned from politics, as a number of the contributions to
this book explain, a number of its leaders decided to concentrate their efforts on propagating their strict interpretation of Islam, stimulating the spread of such ideas. A similar mechanism was at work in the universities, especially the secular ones. With students forbidden from engaging in political activities, the campus mosques became centres of religious activity.

Government policy culminated in 1985 when, on pain of being banned, all organisations and political parties, including the religious ones, were obliged to acknowledge Pancasila as their asas tunggal, their ‘only basis’. Rather naively, the government concluded from the general compliance that Pancasila was safe. For Suharto, this was a reason to allow greater participation by devout Muslims in politics and for the introduction of measures intended to placate the Islamic community, such as the establishment of an Islamic bank and the ‘compilation’ of Islamic family law.

President Suharto was forced to step down in May 1998, and the Reformasi (Reform) period began. Full freedom of speech and of association was stressed as being among the most important achievements of this new political era. Muslims persecuted for their religious ideas were released from prison or returned home from exile. The asas tunggal became irrelevant. People were allowed to campaign for the establishment of an Islamic state. Some propagated Islamisation ‘from above’ – that is, the establishment of an Islamic state and enforcement of Islamic legislation. Others made reform of society, not of the state, their principal aim, concentrating on winning over the population to their ideals before implementing Islamic law.

Pancasila has maintained its importance. Most Islamic political parties, including the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party), a new popular Islamist party, acknowledge Pancasila and reject the idea of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. At the same time, more than ever, secular parties emphasise that Islam also matters to them and to their members and voters, and they even join forces with their Islamic counterparts in certain regions or on certain issues. This has given some of the new legislation on the national and regional levels a distinctly fundamentalist Islamic stamp.

Religious debate has changed and intensified. In part, this is because new hard-line groups are allowed to publicly attest to their radical ideas. Some of these – the above-mentioned FPI, MMI and Laskar Jihad – do not shrink from violence. Zealously defending what they consider to be true Islam, they vehemently protest against people and groups who are seen as a threat to Islam or in their eyes betray Islam, such as members of the Ahmadiyah, or those they accuse of breaking the rules of moral conduct that should be upheld in public. At times, they also make it impossible to hold services at Christian houses of
worship, which they claim have been built without the requisite permits. Members of the FPI and like-minded groups may be in the forefront when it comes to physical attacks on those whom they have identified as the main enemies of their religious convictions. Their rowdy demonstrations and raids – including raids on pubs and discotheques – often go unchecked, with the authorities and police hesitant to act or to protect the targets of their fury; either because they sympathise with the protests, are afraid to act, or simply cannot decide which measures should be taken. This gives such groups greater influence than their numerical strength would warrant.

A telling example is the visit to Indonesia by the Canadian author Irshad Manji to promote her book, *Allah, Liberty and Love* (banned in Malaysia), in May 2012. Book presentations in Jakarta and Yogyakarta were raided by hardliners of the FPI and other groups, or cancelled by the authorities. One signing, organised by the Jakarta branch of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AIJ), did proceed, but only after its organisers had enlisted the help of Banser, a youth group usually employed to provide security at Nahdlatul Ulama events. When fundamentalist Muslims – and in this respect, the MUI and its local chapters must also be mentioned – speak out against individuals, groups or activities, there is a fair chance that their demands will be met. In May 2012, for instance, protests by the MUI, the FPI and like-minded groups resulted in the Jakarta police refusing to issue a permit for a planned concert by Lady Gaga. The national police, the final authority on the matter, made permission dependent on a positive recommendation by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the MUI – a recommendation that both refused to give. In the end, Lady Gaga’s management cancelled the concert.

Irshad Manji does not hide the fact that she is a lesbian, and the fact that Banser facilitated the AIJ meeting is an indication of the complexity of Islamic relations in Indonesia. The proselytising nature of Salafi and other Islamist groups poses a challenge to long-established, large socio-religious organisations such as Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. Islamists condemn some of the religious practices and beliefs of the latter and try to win over their members and followers, competing for control of mosques and other religious institutions. At the same time, radical Muslims and a section of Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama membership may find common ground in their rejection of liberal or progressive Muslims, often young intellectuals and graduates from Islamic universities whose opinions about tolerance, justice and equality (including gender equality) they detest. These two factions can also unite on other issues. Leaders of Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama are members of the MUI, and may sit on the boards of hard-line groups. Their fundamentalist
ideas do not go unchallenged. Religious debate has become very lively, especially due to the fact that progressive Muslims who refuse to accept the strict fundamentalist interpretations propagated are making themselves heard.

How to interpret such recent developments is a topic of debate. Islam in Indonesia, characterised by its moderation and tolerance, has been held up as a model for other Muslim nations. Does this image still hold? The very visible presence and activities of radical groups have led some to conclude that Indonesian Islam is losing its moderate disposition. This is a topic of debate in Indonesia itself, and among foreign scholars and observers. In a statement about the commotion surrounding her visit to Indonesia, Irshad Manji was quoted in the *Jakarta Post* (11 May 2012) as saying that four years earlier, she had experienced Indonesia as ‘a nation of tolerance, openness and pluralism’, and that in her book she ‘described Indonesia as a model for the Muslim world’. She suggested that Indonesia had changed since her last visit, which was not in fact the case. Journalists also express their unease over the fact that the uncompromising stand taken by some Indonesian Muslims is in contrast to the peaceful and tolerant Islam with which Indonesia is often associated. In reports about mob violence or the activities of certain Islamic groups in Indonesia in English-language Indonesian newspapers or newspapers published abroad, it is now common to find journalists explaining that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims are moderate and tolerant, and that it is only a fringe minority that acts and thinks differently.

The variety of manifestations of Islam in Indonesia and the ongoing discussion between representatives of different streams of Islam this implies formed the inspiration for this book. It brings together a selection of papers presented at the conference entitled ‘Is Indonesian Islam Different? Islam in Indonesia in a Comparative International Perspective’, held in Bogor, Indonesia in January 2011, and organised by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society of the UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, and the Training Indonesia’s Young Leaders Programme of Leiden University.

The contributions are arranged in three sections. In the first section, some general questions and evaluations are presented. Kees van Dijk and Ahmad Najib Burhani discuss how we should understand the use of the term ‘Indonesian Islam’. Robert B. Hefner and Azyumardi Azra identify the specific accomplishments of the Muslim community in Indonesia. Hefner concentrates on the prominence of long-established welfare associations, the dynamics and openness of its educational system, and the early consensus that Islam and constitutional democracy are compatible. Azyumardi Azra also calls attention to the peaceful spread of Islam in Indonesia, the accommodation of local tradition,
and the position of women in Indonesian society. In the final article in this section, Taufik Abdullah explores the response of Muslims during Suharto’s New Order, when Islamic organisations were denied a significant role in politics, and the emergence of networks of liberal young Muslim intellectuals and religious thinkers promoting tolerance and pluralism in the period of ‘openness’ that followed.

The second section deals with liberal interpretations of Islam and humanitarian activities, topics that tend not to get much coverage because of the massive attention that is given in Indonesia and elsewhere to manifestations of intolerance. Dian Maya Safitri sketches life at an Islamic religious school for transgenders and transsexuals. Nina Nurmilia challenges the literal approach to the Qur'anic verses on inheritance division, according to which a male always receives twice as much as a female, because it does not take into account the difference in kinship systems in the Middle East and Indonesia and the current context of Indonesian gender relations. Euis Nurlaelawati analyses the reforms in family law introduced in the Suharto era and investigates whether judges in Islamic courts follow them in cases in which they have to decide on allowing polygamy. In their contribution, Andrée Feillard and Pieternella van Doorn-Harder focus on the activities of Indonesian Muslim feminists, especially those from the Nahdlatul Ulama, and the challenges they face. They argue that these Muslim feminists play a pivotal role. Their thorough religious education equips them to enter into religious gender debates from which secular feminists, lacking such a background, tend to shy away. Central to Asfa Widiyanto’s plea for religious pluralism in Indonesia are two Sufi-inspired men of letters, Mustofa Bisri and Emha Ainun Nadjib, who do not hesitate to speak out against intolerance, but who are still respected in Islamist circles due to their renown as Islamic scholars. The section concludes with a study by Hilman Latief on the growth of a new Islamic middle class in Indonesia, its role in modernising Islamic social activism, and the development of middle-class, faith-based humanitarian associations.

In the final section, the focus turns to Salafi groups and their way of operating and recruitment. Sunarwoto examines Islamic radio stations in Surakarta, one of the centres of Islamic radicalism in Java, and their different interpretations of what Islamic radio stations should broadcast. Didin Nurul Rosidin compares the activities of two Islamic student associations at two Senior High Schools in Cirebon, West Java. Finally, Syaifuddin Zuhri reports on his research on a Salafi group in Surakarta, and the modern and traditional communication networks it uses to propagate its fundamentalist ideas.

Concomitant with the growing emphasis on Islam in Indonesia has been not only the spread of Arabic expressions and technical Islamic
terms but also the desire by some to use the correct transliteration. For example, it is not unusual to find different authors spelling the same word differently. This diversity has been maintained in this volume. The same approach has been taken to the spelling of personal names and names of organisations, where the spelling reforms of 1947 and 1972 have left their mark.

Finally, our appreciation goes to the organisers of the Bogor conference and to Anna Yeadell, who corrected the English of the contributions presented in this volume.
8 Managing familial issues

Unique features of legal reform in Indonesia

Euis Nurlaelawati

Introduction

Indonesian state law on Muslim familial issues, as embodied in Marriage Law No. 1/1974 and Presidential Instruction No. 1/1991 regarding the Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam), introduced a number of reforms reflecting the inclusion of local customs, state interests and new issues in Islamic discourse in Indonesia, including gender issues. By doing so, it attempted to achieve an amalgamation of the classical legal doctrines of Islam, state interests and local tradition or *adat*. The accommodation of local tradition and state interests makes the law distinctly different from similar laws issued elsewhere in the Muslim world. The rules on representation of heirs, obligatory bequest (*wasiat wajiba*) and joint property are examples of the special characteristics of Indonesian law in this field. The distinctive features become even stronger when we look at how judges deal with family law.

This chapter examines how Indonesian state law addresses issues of Muslim family law by looking at specific questions relating to reforms. It discusses some examples of reform by observing the key concepts and interpretations of Islam used in drafting the new rules. It then compares the results with laws introduced in other Muslim countries in order to draw attention to similarities and differences and to analyse the factors that underlie the uniqueness of the Indonesian approach.

Ideas of reform in Islamic family law

The introduction of Islamic principles into national law has been a topic of discussion since Indonesia became independent in 1945. Indonesian Muslims now have what has come to be called the Kompilasi Hukum Islam, henceforth referred to here as the *kompilasi*. Issued in 1991, the *kompilasi* systematises and brings together in one book the Islamic legal rules regarding family law derived from various *fiqh*
texts. Its compilation is one of a number of remarkable examples of the trend of legal codification in the Muslim world. The kompilasi is divided into three volumes on marriage, inheritance and endowment respectively. Its issuance by the Indonesian government complemented the reform of the religious judicial system in Indonesia, which had previously seen the ratification of the Religious Judicature Act in 1989 as the formal law regulating the position of religious courts within the national legal system and their composition, jurisdiction and procedures.

From the perspective of legal development, this piece of state legalisation – which should now, it is being proposed, be amended and re-issued as two separate laws, one on marriage and one on inheritance – reflects a long struggle by Muslims for the application of Islamic law in Indonesia. The preliminary efforts took place in the 1950s and early 1960s, when Hazairin and Hasbi al-Shiddieqy had the idea of establishing an Indonesian school of Islamic law (Feener 2002; Nurlaelawati 2010). In the 1980s, the agenda emerged again when Munawir Sjadzali suggested the re-actualisation of Islamic law, which developed in the direction of the unification of legal references in the religious courts (Nurlaelawati 2010).

The kompilasi owes its origins to the idea of formulating a distinct Indonesian school of Islamic law, as proposed by Hazairin (1905-1975). A scholar of both Islamic and adat law at the University of Indonesia, Hazairin sought to bridge the gap between the two by advocating the development of a distinctive body of Islamic law. He was convinced that the reform of Islamic law was not an individual matter but rather a collective task to be completed by representatives of the community, working in close partnership with the state. He wanted to see problems in the Muslim community solved by formal institutions with the authority to act on religious issues (Feener 2002).

Hazairin’s ideas were too radical and extreme for the majority of Indonesian Muslim leaders, and inevitably elicited opposition. In fact, they got no positive response until 1961, when Hasbi ash-Shiddieqy, a professor at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Yogyakarta, argued the need to establish a new school of Islamic law that took greater account of Indonesia’s social and historical context (Yudian Wahyudi 1993). Hasbi thought that what had traditionally been considered as Islamic law among the founders of the madhhab should actually be considered ‘Arab fiqh’. In this context, he argued that Islam could only remain a vital source of guidance in the lives of Indonesian Muslims when the methods of understanding scripture and law could be re-conceptualised in accordance with the specific conditions and current needs of Indonesian society. For this purpose, he called for a new and more directly relevant method in order to achieve the appropriate
interpretation and application of principles from the original source to particular cases and conditions (Feener 2010).

Hasbi and Hazairin’s visions on the formulation and application of Indonesian fiqh emphasised a sense of Indonesian-ness, in terms of both the specific local conditions prevailing in Indonesia and the particular character of the Indonesian state, especially in relation to its legal policy base, Pancasila, the ideology of the state. There is no doubt that these ideas are a reflection of the thinking that lay at the core of the Islamic legal discourse at that time. Although they gained no widespread acceptance at that moment and no support from the Sukarno regime – which in the context of the political competition that was rife in those years tended to see Islam as a threat and even introduced a number of repressive policies to control Islamic groups – their ideas helped to lay the groundwork for the development of Islamic law in the 1980s (Nurlaelawati 2010).

The idea of formulating a distinct Indonesian school of Islamic law proposed by both Hasbi and Hazairin seems to have taken on new life in the 1980s. It fell within the scope of the re-actualisation of Islamic teachings proposed by a prominent and high-ranking Muslim and statesman, Munawir Sjadjzali (1925-2005). Sjadjzali had served as a long-time senior official in the Department of Foreign Affairs before his appointment as Minister of Religious Affairs in two consecutive cabinets of the New Order (1983-1993). His ideas gained significance in the new wave of Muslim intellectualism during the New Order, born out of the need to deal with the failure of Muslim leaders to realise their political agendas in the early years of the Suharto regime (Effendi 1995).

Looking specifically at the development of Islamic law, Sjadjzali’s proposals can be understood from an examination of his discussion on the principles of Islamic inheritance, particularly in relation to the share received by children of the deceased. The stipulation of the Qur’an that a son should inherit twice as much as a daughter was, according to him, in some circumstances, contradictory to the very notion of justice. Sjadjzali argued that the rule mentioned in the Qur’an – that a female should receive only half of that of a male from an estate – was not a final decision, as giving females and males an equal share would have shocked the Arab society of the time, which had denied women any inheritance prior to the introduction of Islam. It must be pointed out here that one of the principles for completing the establishment of Islamic law is that changes in the law have to take place gradually. Given that reform in the establishment of Islamic law takes place gradually (tashri’), it is argued that the rule that a woman should only inherit half the amount a male gets is not yet the final rule (Saimima 1988; Nurlaelawati 2010) and that it still requires completion.
The above discussion reflects the evolution of the idea of applying Islamic law in Indonesia in relation to the changing attitude of the state towards Islam. Munawir Sjadzali’s plea for a re-actualisation of Islamic law was clearly a continuation of Hazairin’s and Hasbi’s suggestion that a distinctly Indonesian school of Islamic law should be established. Sjadzali attempted to give new resonance to this suggestion after the state had succeeded in reinforcing its domination over Muslims, as proven by the acceptance of Pancasila as the sole national ideology by Muslim organisations in the mid-1980s. These three scholars have provided a basis for the various attempts to ensure that Islamic law is included in the legal system of the state. It is within this context that the idea of putting together the kompilasi has been advanced.

The kompilasi could be realised because of a shift in state policy towards Islam, which coincided with the fact that many Muslim leaders at that time had abandoned the idea of establishing an official Islamic state and were content to pursue a gradual Islamisation of the country. In terms of the realisation of Islamic law, they no longer spoke of a general but only a partial realisation – that is, the application of certain elements, including matters concerning family life. They strove to integrate the principles of Islamic law into national law through regulations issued by the government.

**Legal reforms**

As explained above, the Indonesian government has developed law on the basis of *shari’a* through the Kompilasi Hukum Islam. Although on most issues, the kompilasi generally adopts classical Islamic legal doctrines, especially that of the Shafi’ite fiqh texts, it also introduces a number of reforms. These reflect the inclusion of local customs, state interests and new issues in Islamic discourse in Indonesia. By doing so, the kompilasi is an attempt to achieve an amalgamation of the classical legal doctrines of Islam, state interests and local tradition or adat. There can thus be no doubt that the drafters of the law realised that the plurality of legal norms in Indonesia could not be ignored. By accommodating local customs, giving the state a place and paying due attention to gender equality and other new issues, they apparently sought to demonstrate that these domains can be integrated into the practice of Islamic law and do not stand in isolation from one another (Nurlaelawati 2010).

The influence of adat or local norms is most apparent in a number of rules in the kompilasi concerning inheritance. Although the kompilasi generally adopts the traditional fiqh doctrines and incorporates all relevant Qur’anic texts (Cammack 1999), it applies a system of repre-
sentation of heirs and obligatory bequests that cannot be found in any classical fiqh texts. The system of representation of heirs, for example, was adopted to solve the problem of orphaned grandchildren, whose parents predeceased their own parents. According to the classical Islamic system of inheritance, orphaned grandchildren are excluded from shares in their grandparents’ estates. All schools of Islamic law agree that an orphaned grandchild has no right to a share from his or her grandparents when there are other living children (sons). Following this rule, all Muslim countries, including Indonesia, have denied the predeceased heirs and their heirs or descendants any share of an inheritance as long as there are other living sons. It is believed that there have been a number of victims of this decision (Carol 1998; Mehdi 1999).

As there is a prevailing sense that it is unjust to deprive orphaned grandchildren of their right to the estates of their grandparents simply because their parents have died earlier, some countries, including Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia, have attempted to redress this inequity. Two solutions have been proposed: namely, obligatory bequests and a system of inheritance by right or representation of heirs. The former was first adopted by Middle Eastern countries, the latter by Pakistan (Mehdi 1999) and subsequently by Indonesia.

Besides adopting adat, the kompilasi also includes interests of the state. One example is the rules on marriage registration. According to the classical doctrine of Islamic law, a marriage is considered lawful when it is concluded with an offering by the female guardian and its acceptance by the male (husband) in the presence of witnesses. Two Muslim males or one male and two females are required to witness the contract of marriage (Dawoud 1992). There is no need for a contract of marriage to be registered, but the kompilasi states that a marriage should be concluded in the presence of an official marriage registrar or must be registered. Failure to register a marriage affects its validity, and judicial relief such as divorce and inheritance assessment is denied in the case of an unregistered marriage. This means that the kompilasi allows no room for unregistered marriages.

Keeping pace with the growing demand for gender equality, the kompilasi also strives to heed women’s interests, paying special attention to polygamy and divorce, issues that are still hotly debated by Muslims. This specific attention ties in with the state agenda to empower women via a programme of economic development. In Indonesia, the issue of polygamy has long attracted considerable attention from women activists. Efforts have been made to have it prohibited or, failing that, at least to restrict its arbitrary practice. Various seminars on this issue have been held by Muslim women’s organisations (Nurlaelawati 2010). These protracted struggles only gained a positive response from
the government in the 1970s. With the ratification of the 1974 Marriage Law, the Indonesian government placed limits on the practice of polygamy by laying down a number of conditions for the legal conclusion of polygamous marriages.¹

**Unique features: some examples**

**Registration of marriage**

The kompilasi states that a marriage must be concluded in the presence of an official marriage registrar or that it must be registered. However, it does differentiate between the religious validity and the state legality of marriage and therefore does not deem a marriage religiously invalid if the parties concerned fail to register their marriage (Bowen 2006). In fact, while considered illegal by the state, unregistered marriages are not seen as unlawful by the religious authorities. It seems clear that the kompilasi is anxious not to deviate from the classical doctrine of marriage. This is different from the situation in other Muslim countries, such as Iran: in this country, which follows the Shi‘ite legal school, registration is obligatory and failure to do so invalidates a marriage in terms of religion (Nurlaelawati 2010).

The kompilasi seems to have applied the concept of ‘dual validity’ to preserve the view of classical Muslim scholars that only religious requirements can decide whether or not a marriage contract is valid.² Therefore, the registration of a marriage cannot be considered the main factor in deciding the religious validity of marriage. It is only an administrative requirement. This can be understood from two different articles, one of which states that registration is a necessity and the other that a marriage is considered valid if it meets all requirements defined by religion.

Indeed, this concept emerged as the result of a compromise between the traditionalists and the modernists, and inevitably it still fuels debates among Muslim scholars in Indonesia. Positioning registration as a purely administrative matter, the kompilasi makes no mention of sanctions for those failing to comply. The 1975 regulation elucidating the application of the Marriage Law does so, but only with regard to the registrars. It states that should a registrar fail to register a marriage, he will be fined Rp. 7,500. However, the document is rather vague in specifying under what conditions a registrar failing to register a marriage has to pay a fine.

Although the position taken by the kompilasi is, to some extent, the same as that taken in other Muslim countries, on some points it is quite unique. Malaysia also requires the registration of a marriage but avoids ambiguity and dualism. There, it is clearly stated in law that an
unregistered marriage is considered valid. According to Malaysian legislation, registration functions merely as an administrative requirement and has nothing to do with the religious legality of the marriage. Couples that fail to register their marriage can be punished with a six-month prison sentence or a maximum fine of one thousand ringgit.

The kompilasi is now being amended, and it is proposed that those who fail to fulfil a number of requirements, including the registration of a marriage, are liable for punishment. While some scholars agree with this, many argue against it. Those who do not support it include traditionalist as well as modernist Muslims.

Inheritance: wasiat wajiba and the representation of heirs

In terms of inheritance rules, the kompilasi introduces two novel concepts; namely: obligatory bequest (wasiat wajiba) and the representation of heirs, which are rules that are deployed to resolve the problem of orphaned grandchildren in the Muslim world. While Middle Eastern countries use wasiat wajiba as a solution, Indonesia and Pakistan have adopted the concept of the representation of heirs.

However, unlike Pakistan, Indonesia makes the rule quite complicated and confusing. The relevant article in the Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1965 states that a predeceased son or daughter can be substituted by his or her living children (Mahmood 1987), thereby regulating the problem of inheritance by orphaned grandchildren. The article in the kompilasi is less clear. It states that deceased heirs can be substituted by their children (ahli waris yang meninggal terlebih dahulu dari pewaris dapat digantikan kedudukannya oleh anaknya). The use of the general term ahli waris has resulted in multiple interpretations. It can refer to any person in a family. It can refer to a child, a child of collaterals (nephew) and other relatives of the deceased. Judges have indeed applied these multiple interpretations, resulting in decisions that have awarded a share to nephews, for example. Decision No. 0259/Pdt.G/1992/PA.JP issued by the Central Jakarta Court is an example of such a case (Nurlaelawati 2010).

To add to the confusion, the introduction of these two concepts in the kompilasi is somewhat peculiar in the sense that, in the case of representation, an additional rule has been introduced: namely, a limitation on the share of the representative heir. This is something that Pakistan, which has adopted the same doctrine, has not done. The additional clause mentions that the share of the representative heir may not exceed that of the heirs whose position is equal to that of the representative heir. This clause emanates from the fact that the kompilasi preserves the established ratio of 2:1 with regards to the shares of
males and females. It has therefore been assumed that the application of the representation of heirs may generate complications.\(^3\)

The concept of wasiat wajiba, which is used by countries in the Middle East to solve the problem of predeceased heirs (orphaned grandchildren), is applied by the kompilasi to grant an adopted child a share of his or her adoptive parent’s estate and an adoptive parent a share in that of his or her adopted child. However, this is only possible when a child or parent leaves no will. By using this concept, the kompilasi aims to avoid the ‘pure’ practice of inheritance among adoptive and adopted parties, as practised among Indonesians, especially the Javanese. At the same time, it does not fully ban such practices. Adoption is popular among Indonesian families. In spite of the variations in application from one society to another, several principles are uniformly embraced. These principles rule that the adopted child is automatically included in the circle of the adoptive family, that the relationship of the adopted child to his or her biological parents is severed, and that the status of the adopted child is equal to that of a biological child.

The drafters of the kompilasi sensed that although the full attribution of adopted children to their adoptive parent or vice versa may be disallowed, as it contradicts the Qur’anic text, (which clearly undermines the full attribution of an adopted child to his or her adoptive parents or vice versa), the tradition of inheriting from each other should be retained. They argued that it would not be fair if each of the parties were to be left with nothing when the other party died. However, they thought that the system by which the adoptive parties could give and receive each other’s estate should not be the same as the system of inheritance for biological children. To avoid or eliminate the practice of giving and receiving an estate under the ‘pure’ system of inheritance between adoptive parties, on the one hand, and to grant them a share from each other on the other, they decided that the institution of obligatory bequest be applied (Nurlaelawati 2010).

Why unique? A critical review

It is safe to say that, along with a number of other countries, in Indonesia it is believed that familial affairs are best managed by the state. On certain issues – namely, dealing with a bilateral system and creating justice and equality for women and other vulnerable persons – Indonesia has adopted a unique position. This, in my view, is the result of a number of factors, including the incorporation of local features and the preservation of traditionalism in written law. The uniqueness is strengthened by a biased interpretation of the law and the ambigu-
ous attitude of some judges and Indonesian Muslim organisations, which have resulted in the glorification of the notion of *ijtihad* and the expression of *amr ma’ruf nahy munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil) by some Muslim groups.

**Local features**

Indonesian legal reforms are unique, to a certain degree, because they accommodate elements of adat. The ‘joint property’ rule constitutes one example. The principle of joint property (*harta bersama, harta gono gini*) is not dealt with in any classical Islamic legal doctrine. It is, however, internalised in the social life of Indonesian society. To accommodate this local practice, Indonesian state law administers that a husband and a wife who are bound in a contract of marriage have an equal right to property acquired during their marriage. When the marriage is ended, each of them is entitled to an equal share of that property. Although Malaysian law also deals with this matter, the institution of joint property is to some extent typical of Indonesian culture.

This special feature can be traced back to the fact that in Indonesia, it is common for both the husband and the wife to work outside the home, although it is acknowledged that the husband is the head of the family. In Solo, for example, women generally earn money from multiform activities. In families that run a home industry such as membatik (traditional designing and printing on cloth), for instance, women play an important role. They buy the cloth, design the patterns and even manage the firm (Saimima 1988). Likewise, in other regions, women do not just stay at home but go to farms, markets and other places to earn their own living. In due consideration of this, it would be unreasonable for a wife to be left with nothing when her marriage ended, while her husband had full rights to their property. Aside from gono gini, other popular terms refer to the existence of the institution of joint property, such as *harta papantangan* in Kalimantan and *harta sahareukat* in Aceh, proving the strength and unique character of this rule.

Another issue that demonstrates the uniqueness of Islamic legal reform in Indonesia is the adoption of the rule of representation of heirs, as discussed above. The application of the rule is in accordance with the practice of giving a right of inheritance to orphaned grandchildren, which was established in certain Indonesian Muslims circles through the system of *plaatsvervulling*, a Dutch term meaning inheritance by right of representation. In Medan in 1950, the Appellate General Court even ruled through its decision No. 195/1950 that when a child of a deceased heir has died before the deceased, and the former has left be-
hind a child or children, the children of the child or the grandchildren of the deceased have a right to the deceased’s estate on behalf of their father. The same decision was issued by the Civil Court (Raad van Justitie) of Batavia on 12 December 1932, as recorded in Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht (Nurlaelawati 2010). This means that the system of representation of heirs is not completely new in Indonesia. Although it constitutes a widespread problem in many Muslim countries, it has a local foundation in Indonesian legal practice.

As mentioned above, the limitation rule in the application of the representation of heirs has strengthened the uniqueness of Islamic law in Indonesia. Furthermore, it has given an extra edge to the debate. Coupled with the fact that the issue has been ineluctably practised in Indonesian society, the rule of representation of heirs has turned the debate towards a more principal point – that is, the question of whether it is Islamic or adat law that provides the basis for the maintenance of the practice. Or, in other words, has adat adapted to Islam or vice versa?

Bearing in mind that the majority of Muslim scholars agree in principle with granting a share of the deceased’s estate to orphaned grandchildren and have chosen the institution of wasiat wajiba to deal with this matter, I arrive at the question of why the kompilasi favours the concept of the representation of heirs over the institution of wasiat wajiba to solve the problem of grandchildren? I assume that the drafters of the kompilasi realised that there was yet another problem that needed to be solved – namely, that of adoptive parties. Having decided that the matter of adoption could not be solved by the concept of the representation of heirs, they chose to employ the concept of the representation of heirs to tackle the issue of orphaned grandchildren. At the same time, they preferred to apply one solution to one problem rather than apply one and the same solution to two problems by, for instance, using the legal concept of obligatory bequest to solve the separate problems of orphaned grandchildren and adoption. With their minds firmly set on this path, they insisted on applying the principle of the representation of heirs, despite its lack of rationale in Qur’anic texts, to the problem of orphaned grandchildren, and obligatory bequest to that of adoption.

The persistence of traditionalism: ambiguity on paper and in practice

It is widely acknowledged that Indonesian Muslims have diverse religious backgrounds. When the reforms in family law propagated by the state were to be amended, many felt obliged to contribute their opin-
They included representatives of traditionalist and modernist groups as well as feminists. This is understandable, as the reforms had already been debated for a long time.

The state law introduced a number of reforms. However, most of the articles adopted opinions of the 'ulama, as set out in fiqh books. While some traditionalists state that the reforms are too radical and deviate too far from the fiqh texts, feminists have branded the state law conservative. They claim, for example, that some articles, such as the one that states that a husband can house his two wives in one house, are barbaric and maintain the subordination of women. They also point to the article on wives giving their permission for polygamy. This article discounts the need for permission when wives are unable to give it, either due to their absence or their inability to decide (Mulia 2007).

Some articles are also quite vague. This is illustrated by the rule on the registration of marriage, as mentioned above. It seems that the changes are ambiguous and that the reforms lack clarity. On the one hand, the reformers revelled in the winds of reform and it was their intention to see marriages well managed. On the other hand, they lacked the bravery to deviate from and go beyond the shari'a line. The fact that in Indonesia, modernists and feminists hold different opinions might be one reason for this ambiguity.

The position taken by the Indonesian reformers on this and other issues is quite different from that of their counterparts in Malaysia and Pakistan, who were firmer and clearer in formulating legislation. While pro-reform, they remain on the side of traditionalists by stating that a marriage is considered valid even if it is not registered. Meanwhile, Indonesia tends to side with the modernists, but not wholeheartedly. This has resulted in the blurring of rules and uncertainty in judicial transactions.

Not only are ambiguity and dualism present on paper, they are also evident in the work of judges. In the case of polygamy, such attitudes are very clear. For my recent research, I collected nine judgements on polygamy issued between 2007 and 2009 by the Religious Court of Cianjur. All of them show that the court approved every petition for polygamy. The motivations for this varied, according to the reasons advanced by the petitioners (husbands). They ranged from the inability of the wives to give birth to children and acute illness to high sexual desire on the part of the husband. High sexual desire is the dominant reason for the petitions.

These judgements clearly indicate that the judges of this court are not strict in their application of the rules, a finding that concurs with the results of a survey I carried out for my doctoral thesis. For example, one judgement, No. 290/Pdt.G/2008/PA.Cjr, demonstrates that the judges appear to have supported the husband involved in his bid to
marry more than one wife in order to avoid zina (adultery), as the husband had a high sexual appetite. They endorsed his plea that the wife had to accept the decision taken by her husband. Judgement No 221/Pdt.G/2008/PA.Cjr shows the same judicial adherence to the classical legal doctrine on polygamy and neglect of the codified rules restricting polygamy, and the demand that a request must be based on the appropriate reason specified in the rules. Although in some courts, judges have been found to be receptive (Salim et al. 2009), it seems to me that gender sensitivity has not increased evenly among the judges of religious courts. Their approval of petitions based on other grounds, such as the inability of wives to bear children, seems to strengthen this assumption. Judges frequently fail to consult medical specialists to establish whether or not a woman can give birth, and instead just rely on the information given by the petitioners, which is sometimes supported by their wives. Judgement No.255/Pdt.G/2008/PA.Cjr is a case in point. This is not an exception, however, as many other judges seem to have acted in similar ways. Besides judgements issued by the Religious Court of Cianjur, I also collected judgements issued by two other religious courts, those of Serang and Tangerang in Banten. From the 45 judgements issued by the court of Serang on various cases, five were on polygamy. In four of these, the petition for polygamy was approved on the grounds of the high sexual desire of the petitioners (husbands).

Indonesia has ratified a number of international treaties dealing with gender issues, but many judges seem to be unaware of them. One, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), stresses the protection of women’s rights, and Indonesia concurs with a number of points mentioned in the convention. Nonetheless, it seems that rather than referring to such conventions, judges tend to consult fiqh doctrines and Quranic verses, even though such verses require interpretation. Some researchers conclude that judges have applied the rules of the kompilasi or the state law well, and to some extent, I agree with them (Sabri 2001; Sumner & Lindsey 2010). However, judicial attitudes to international conventions on women’s rights suggest that aspects of the kompilasi are being applied in an ad hoc way. This can be seen, for example, in the responses of those judges who argued that they did not have to investigate whether or not the consent of the wife had been given sincerely. In addition, they did not feel obliged to check whether a husband really had a high level of sexual desire or to verify whether the husband’s current wife was really unable to bear children. Above all, most of the judges emphasised the conditions to be met by husbands when making their judgements rather than examining the reasons why husbands wished to marry more than one wife. Consequently, they often accepted any
reason presented by husbands, even those not included in the laws. The concept of *maslahah* (public good) figured prominently in their legal considerations. Some judges agreed to give permission, stating that denial would result in the husbands having extramarital sex.

**The glorification of the notions of ijtihad and amr ma’ruf nahy munkar**

There is indisputable evidence that the legislated kompilasi text is still considered an ‘open’ text. As is also the case with codes enacted elsewhere, although the open character once attributed to the fiqh texts has been curbed and change is only possible if it is introduced by legislative amendment (Messick 1993), interpretative modification by individual scholars and by official authors of Islamic law, such as judges, is still envisioned. And while, like other codes, the kompilasi also implies replacing the single authorship of the old fiqh texts by a plural legislative voice, the authoritative manual opinion thereby being ousted by the authoritative code article, the fiqh texts and their legal doctrines have become so institutionalised in the Indonesian Muslim community that it is impossible for this new code to replace them entirely. In short, taking all these hurdles into consideration, some judges seem to be preserving traditionalism and conservatism through their ambivalence towards the kompilasi.

The decisions of the judges of a number of religious courts on cases of polygamous marriage clearly demonstrate that judges sometimes dare to take a controversial decision on the basis of performing ijtihad. As mentioned, the kompilasi enumerates the reasons for and conditions under which a man can enter into a polygamous marriage. The judges of one court, however, gave a man permission to enter into such a marriage on grounds not mentioned in the kompilasi — namely, that he was asked by his second wife to protect her and her wealth. The woman was a rich widow who had no relatives to whom she could turn for help. She grew close to the man, who assisted her in dealing with her business affairs. Fearing slander (*fitna*) was inevitable, they decided to legalise the partnership by marriage. Adducing the reason that he would often go and spend much time with her when she needed his help, the man came to the court with the woman to ask permission to marry. The first wife, who was younger than her husband’s prospective second wife, who had given her husband children and who had no physical problems, also appeared in court and stated that she agreed with her husband’s intention to marry the other woman. Concluding that in asking permission to marry the woman, he had the woman’s well-being at heart, the judges decided to acquiesce. Although this rea-
son is mentioned neither in the 1974 Marriage Law nor in the kompilasi, they believed that their decision was legalised by the practice of ijtihad, which they claim commended this course of action (Nurlaelawati 2010).

Besides the notion of ijtihad, judges have also often glorified the expression of amr ma’ruf nahy munkar, which is essential for and accepted collectively by Muslims, stressing that they had to involve themselves in the realisation of the notion. For them, giving permission and approving a husband’s petition for a polygamous marriage constitutes one of their attempts to forbid evil. They believe that unless they give permission or are lenient about the practice, these husbands would commit zina and fall into sin. Some judges interviewed stated frankly that as members of Muslim society, they have to play a role in applying Islamic law perfectly. In doing so, they seem to be forgetting that the Islamic law that they have to apply has been agreed upon, and that it includes the kompilasi.

Conclusion

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion regarding the character of Indonesian Islam, looking specifically at Islamic family law. The first is that, like other Muslim countries, Indonesia has long been motivated to reform Islamic family law in order to bring it into line with present-day conditions and to protect and improve women’s legal rights. The second is that legal reform in Indonesia is unique, to some extent, and has its typical foundations in adat and the legal position of authoritative scholars, including traditionalists, modernists and feminist activists. These three groups are strongly attached to their legal positions, to the extent that it is hardly possible to develop a common line regarding reform. Accordingly, with respect to problems that have also been addressed by other Muslim countries, a number of rules that have been introduced by Indonesian state law are very distinct due to the influence of adat and/or the diverse legal opinions of authoritative scholars or legal thinkers. The third is that this uniqueness is not only evident on paper or in written law but also in legal practice. The adherence to fiqh practice in the name of performing ijtihad and actualising the expression of amr maruf nahy munkar seems relevant here. Therefore, there is evidence of ambiguity and dualism both on paper and in practice.
Notes

1 Permission for such a marriage has to be obtained from the religious court, and this is the one crucial condition for a husband to be allowed to marry more than one wife, if both the parties concerned wish to do so (Art. 3 (2)). A husband can enter into a polygamous marriage only on the grounds that his wife is unable to perform her duties as a wife, because she is suffering from some physical defect or an incurable disease, or when she cannot bear descendants (Art. 4). Furthermore, it stipulates that the marriage can take place if the wife of a husband wishing to resort to polygamy consents, and the husband is financially capable of maintaining co-wives and their descendants. In addition, he has to be prepared to treat the co-wives equally (Art. 5). These regulations are mentioned in Articles 56, 57, and 58 of the kompilasi. The kompilasi insists that a polygamous marriage is only possible when all these conditions are met and reference is made to one of the reasons stated above.

2 Bowen uses this term to describe those attributes of the court system laid down by the 1989 Act in regard to divorce. He also notes that such a position on divorce law reform makes the Indonesian case similar to that of Syria, Morocco and Iraq, but different from that of Tunisia, which has declared divorce out of court to be religiously invalid. See Bowen 2001: 10.

3 One problem is that an aunt will receive a smaller portion than her nephew. When someone dies, leaving behind a daughter (A) and a predeceased son's child (B), A will be given a one-third share, while B, as the representative of his father, will be granted two-thirds. Realising that the aunt (A) receives less than her nephew (B), the kompilasi establishes that the share of substitutive heirs must not exceed the portion of the other heirs who have equal positions. Following this additional rule, the portion of B is not two-thirds but one-third, the same portion as A. The remainder of the estate is equally distributed between A and B.

4 My doctoral thesis, entitled 'Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal Practice of the Indonesian Religious Courts', was about the legal practices of judges of Indonesian religious courts after the kompilasi was issued. I analysed a hundred decisions to see how these judges applied the kompilasi, and found that in some cases, judges continued to refer to classical Islamic legal doctrines and deviated from the kompilasi. In the case of polygamy, some decisions issued in 2002 and 2003 indicated that judges often approved the petitions for polygamous marriages although the petitioners did not base their request on reasons specified in the kompilasi.

5 Research by PUSKUMHAM (Pusat Studi Hukum, Konstitusi dan Hak Asasi, Centre for the Study of Law, Constitution and Human Rights) revealed that there are some judges who have been sensitive towards gender issues, as can be demonstrated by their attitude when resolving cases of divorce, joint property and polygamy. The research reported that some judges of the courts of Padang, Aceh and Makassar have been very concerned with protecting women's rights. For example, cases of polygamy, where judges required husbands to rethink and where they warned husbands of the effect of their unfairness or unequal treatment of their co-wives, illustrate that gender sensitivity has been widespread in the courts of Aceh and Makassar. Another case from Aceh on divorce, where judges awarded a larger portion of joint property to the wife, as the reason for this divorce was the husband's polygamous marriage, clearly demonstrated that these judges are quite sensitive to gender issues. However, it must be mentioned that greater gender sensitivity was not an instantaneous development but rather resulted from continuous training on the strengthening of gender sensitivity run by a number of branches of the Center for Women's Studies, in cooperation with a number of other foundations. Through this training, the principles of equality,
justice and fairness mentioned in international treaties and a number of Indonesian laws ratifying them were introduced.

However, their conclusion is often mainly due to the fact that judges have cited the kompilasi as the legal reference for their judgements. They neglect the fact that the clear citation of the kompilasi does not always mean that the rules of the kompilasi are being followed in full. If the point is the explicit citation of the kompilasi, I must mention that for their judgements on polygamy discussed above, judges also take the kompilasi as the legal basis. When judges see that the consent of the wife(s) is given and they approve the petition, judges mention the relevant article on the necessity of the wife’s (or wives’) consent.
Glossary

1945 Constitution Indonesian constitution proclaimed on 18 August 1945. In force between 1945 and 1950 and from 1959 to date. Pancasila is mentioned in its preamble.

Abangan Syncretistic or nominal (Javanese) Muslims

Abduh, Muhammad Religious reformer from Egypt (b. 1849, d. 1905)

Adat Local traditions/customs

Adhan/azan Call to prayer

al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din Religious reformer from Afghanistan (b. 1838, d. 1897)

Ahlu-sunnah wal-jama'ah People of the sunnah of the Prophet and the Community, those who adhere to Islam in the right way

Ahmadiyah Religious community originating from Pakistan, considered heretical by most mainstream Muslims

Aisyiyah Women's organisation of the Muhammmadaiyah

Akhlq Morals, ethics

Aliran Pillar or stream, often used to differentiate between abangan and santri and between traditionalist and modernist Muslims

Amr ma'ruf nahy munkar Command what is good and restrain what is evil

Ansor Youth organisation of the Nahdlatul Ulama

Aqidah Faith/belief

Asas Tunggal Sole basis. The obligation for associations to declare that Pancasila is their only basic principle

Aurat Parts of the body that should remain covered in public or when guests are received

Ayat Qur'anic verse

Barzanji Poetic text in praise of the Prophet

Bedug Mosque drum

Berhala Idol

Bid'a/bidah Innovation (forbidden by Islam)

Bissu Transgender ritual practitioner in Sulawesi

Bughot Rebel, rebellion
Cewek  Lit. young female. Woman who becomes a feminine partner of a calabai
Dai  A person engaged in dakwah
Dakwah  Missionary activity, also among Muslims
Darul Islam  Islamic rebellion in Indonesia from 1948/9-1965
DDII  Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia. Indonesian Council for Islamic Missionary Activities
Detachment 88  Special police anti-terrorism unit
Dhikr  Repetitive chant of part of the Profession of Faith or other religious phrases
DI/TII  Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army)
Doa/dua  Supplication, prayer
Dukun  Diviner, traditional healer
Fastabiqul khairat  Competing for the betterment of society
Fatwa  Religious legal opinion
Fiqh  Islamic jurisprudence
Fitna(h)  Slander, division
FKASWJ  Forum Komunikasi Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah, Communication Forum of the People of the sunna of the Prophet and the Community; mother organisation of Laskar Jihad
FPI  Front Pembela Islam, Front of the Defenders of Islam. Paramilitary organisation
Gamelan  Javanese/Balinese traditional music
Golkar  Golongan Karya (Functional Groups). Government party in the New Order
Guided Democracy  Period between 1959 and 1965
Haba’ib  Male descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
Hadith  Traditions about the words and the deeds of the Prophet
Halal  Legitimate
Hal(a)qah  Lit. circle (after the semi-circle formed by pupils sitting around their teacher during traditional religious education). Religious study group, usually small
Haram  Forbidden
Hizb al-Tahrir  Party of Liberation
Hizbullah  Party of God, Forces of God
HTI  Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Party of Liberation). Radical, fundamentalist Muslim organisation
IAIN  Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute of Islamic Studies)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibadah</td>
<td>Worship, ritual observance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (All-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idulfitri</td>
<td>Feast at the end of the fasting month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijab</td>
<td>The presenting of the bride by her family at a wedding ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijtihad</td>
<td>The development of new interpretations and judgements by the study of the Qur’an and hadith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikhwan al-Muslimin</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>Leader of prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Imamah</td>
<td>Turban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iman</td>
<td>Faith, belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infaq</td>
<td>Voluntary gift, charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Irsyad</td>
<td>Reformist Islamic association founded by Indonesian Muslim Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isra Mi’raj</td>
<td>Journey of the Prophet to Jerusalem and his ascension to heaven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isbal</td>
<td>Ankle-length trousers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istigathah</td>
<td>Large prayer gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isya prayer</td>
<td>Evening prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITB</td>
<td>Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta Charter</td>
<td>Alternative to Pancasila from which it differs by its mentioning of the obligation of Muslims to follow Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalabiya</td>
<td>Long dress, worn by Arab males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’ah (Jemaah) Islamiyah</td>
<td>Islamic Community. Name of an organisation, some of whose members have been convicted for taking part in the Bali bombings and other terrorist attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimat</td>
<td>Amulet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalam</td>
<td>Word (of God)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMMI</td>
<td>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Action Union of Indonesian Muslim Students), an association of strict Muslim students founded in March 1998 and closely linked to PKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebatinan</td>
<td>Javanese mysticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kecapi</td>
<td>Stringed musical instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kejawen</td>
<td>Javanese mysticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepercayaan</td>
<td>Lit. belief. Javanese mysticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keraton</td>
<td>Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khawarij</td>
<td>Seceders, earliest group of dissenters in Islamic history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khilafah</td>
<td>Caliphate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khurafat</td>
<td>Superstition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuruj</td>
<td>Revolt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiai/kyai</td>
<td>Revered religious leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitab</td>
<td>Lit. book. Religious study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitab kuning</td>
<td>Kitabs (religious books) used in pesantren education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodrat</td>
<td>Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komando Jihad</td>
<td>Jihad Command, active 1976-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langgar</td>
<td>Prayer house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las(y)kar</td>
<td>(Para)military organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Jihad</td>
<td>Founded in 2000 to recruit people to fight in the Moluccas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
<td>Militia of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Pembela Islam</td>
<td>Part of FPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lihyah</td>
<td>(Long) beard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liwath</td>
<td>Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mad(h)hab</td>
<td>School (of thought) of Islamic jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>Modern Islamic primary and secondary school in which most of the curriculum (70%) is usually devoted to secular subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghrib prayer</td>
<td>Prayer at sunset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahram</td>
<td>Close relative, with whom marriage is forbidden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
<td>Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majelis taklim</td>
<td>Islamic study group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</td>
<td>Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars, national fatwa-issuing institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makruh</td>
<td>Unfavoured, disapproved (but not forbidden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manaqib</td>
<td>Narrative in praise of important religious figures, celebrating their lives, merits and miracles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandala</td>
<td>Circle (Sanskrit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjumi/Masyumi</td>
<td>Modernist political party founded in 1943, banned in 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-maslaha al-ammah</td>
<td>Common, public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maulud</td>
<td>Birthday of the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>See: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition/Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubah</td>
<td>Indifferent (legal term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudik</td>
<td>Returning to one’s native village (to celebrate Idulfitri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufti</td>
<td>Person who issues a religious legal opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>Large modernist socio-religious organisation, founded in 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muharram</td>
<td>First month of the Islamic year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUI</td>
<td>See: Majelis Ulama Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukena</td>
<td>White garment worn by women when performing prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musafahah</td>
<td>Shaking hands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushalla</td>
<td>Small prayer house or room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslimah</td>
<td>Muslim woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama</td>
<td>The Awakening of Ulama, large traditionalist socio-religious organisation, which in certain periods was also a political party; founded in 1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahy munkar</td>
<td>See: Amr ma’ruf nahy munkar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasyid</td>
<td>A capella songs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network of Liberal Islam</td>
<td>Jaringan Islam Liberal, network of young Muslim intellectuals founded in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Order</td>
<td>The period between 1965 and 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngaji</td>
<td>Qu’ran recitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NII</td>
<td>Negara Islam Indonesia, Islamic State of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nisa</td>
<td>‘Women’, fourth chapter of the Qur’an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>See: Nahdlatul Ulama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Order</td>
<td>The period before 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party), Islamic political party related to Muhammadiyah. Founded August 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>Five pillars. The ideological foundation of the Indonesian state. The first one, about religion, speaks of the belief in the One and Only God and does not mention a religion by name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parmusi</td>
<td>Partai Muslimin Indonesia, founded in 1968 under strict government supervision to serve as an alternative to Masjumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Demokrat</td>
<td>Political party of the current Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (Star and Crescent Party), strict Islamic political party, founded July 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBUH</td>
<td>Praise be upon Him</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan) (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), secular political party headed by Sukarno’s daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri

Pengajian
1) Qu’ran recitation
2) Islamic study group, religious lecture

Penghulu
Head of religious administration in colonial days

Perda syariah
Peraturan daerah (local by-law) issued to implement aspects of Islamic law or promote an Islamic way of life

Persis
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), modernist religious association founded 1923

Pesantren
Islamic boarding school

PII
Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Students), banned for its refusal to accept asas tunggal

PK
Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), fundamentalist political party. Founded August 1998. See also PKS

PKB
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party), political party related to the Nahdlatul Ulama. Founded July 1998

PKI
Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party). Banned in 1966

PKS
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party). Continuation of PK

PNI
Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party). Secular political party, ‘Sukarno’s party’

Pondok
1) Pesantren
2) Dormitory in pesantren

PPP
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party). In the New Order, the only Islamic political party. Radicalised after 1998

Priyayi
Javanese elite

PT
Perseroan terbatas, limited company

Pulang kampung
Returning to one’s native village (to celebrate Idulfitri)

Q.
Qur’an

Qabul
Acceptance of the bride

Qadi
Islamic judge

Qasidah
Religious poem

Q.S.
Qur’an Surah, chapter of the Qur’an

Rahma li al-‘alamin/rahmatul
lil alamin
Blessings for all creation

Rebab
Stringed instrument
Rebana  Tambourine
Sadaqa  Voluntary charity, alms
Salafi/Salafiyya  Muslims who take as their example the society at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-salih), the first generations of Muslims
Santri  1) Religious, observant Muslim
         2) Pesantren student
Sarekat Islam  Islamic Union, large nationalist association founded in 1912
Sekolah Islam  Islamic school registered under the Ministry of Education and Culture. Its curriculum follows that of other schools supervised by the ministry
Sembahyang  Prayer
Shafi‘i  Dominant school of Islamic jurisprudence in Southeast Asia
Shalat  Prayer
Shalat berjamaah  Communal prayer
Shalawat(an)  Prayers, verses and songs in praise of the Prophet Muhammad and his family
Shalawat Bad(a)r  Song to commemorate the first military victory of Muslim forces at Badar in 624
Shi‘r  Poetry genre
S(h)irk  Polytheism
Silaturrahmi  Goodwill, meetings to promote good relations
Slametan  Communal ritual meal
STAIN  Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (State College of Islamic Studies)
Sufi  Mystic
Suharto  (Acting) president of Indonesia from 1967 until 1998
Sukarno  President of Indonesia from 1945 until 1967
Sunnah  Words and deeds of the Prophet
Surah  Chapter of the Qur’an
Syariah/syariat  Islamic law
Syirik  Polytheism
Tafsir Al-Qur’an  Interpretation, exegesis of the Qur’an
Tahlil  Repeated chanting of the confession of faith
Tahlilan  Tahlil ceremony to commemorate a deceased person on the third, seventh, hundredth and thousandth day after his or her death
Takfir  Declaring another Muslim an unbeliever
Talqin  Reciting the confession of faith to prepare the deceased for his questioning by the angels of death
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taqlid</td>
<td>Following the interpretations of authoritative ulama without questioning them; accepting the interpretations of a school of Islamic jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taqwa</td>
<td>Devotion, piety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarawih</td>
<td>Special evening prayer during the fasting month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarbiyah</td>
<td>Lit. education, used to denote the strict Islam movement at universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasawwuf</td>
<td>Islamic mysticism (Sufism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taushiyah</td>
<td>Religious advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tauhid/Tawhid</td>
<td>Oneness of God, theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuan guru</td>
<td>Religious teacher/leader (used in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIN</td>
<td>Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukhuwah</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulama</td>
<td>Religious scholar(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umma(h)</td>
<td>(Islamic) community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPAD</td>
<td>Universitas Padjadjaran (Bandung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Urf</td>
<td>Local traditions/customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usroh</td>
<td>Lit. family. Religious study groups, usually small. The term is associated with the strict Islam movement at universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustad(z)/ ustadh</td>
<td>Religious teacher/leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali</td>
<td>1) Saint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Closest male relative or guardian of the bride who concludes her marriage contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali Songo</td>
<td>The nine saints who spread Islam in Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waria</td>
<td>Male transvestite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayang</td>
<td>Shadow play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetu telu</td>
<td>Syncretic form of Islam on the island of Lombok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wudhu</td>
<td>Ritual ablution before prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakāh/zaka(t)</td>
<td>Mandatory alms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat al-fitr</td>
<td>Mandatory almsgiving at the end of the fasting month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ziarah</td>
<td>Visit, pilgrimage to graves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zina</td>
<td>Adultery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ISLAM IN INDONESIA**
Taufik Abdullah is chairman of the Social Science Commission of the Indonesian Academy of Science and Research Professor at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI), Jakarta.

Azyumardi Azra is Professor of History and Director of Graduate School, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta. He earned his MA in Middle Eastern Studies and his MPhil and PhD degrees in History from Columbia University, New York. He is a member of the Tripartite Forum [governments, UN offices and civil society organisations] for Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, Development and Human Dignity, launched at the UN in New York on 24 March 2006, and of the Council of Faith, World Economic Forum, Davos. Among his publications are The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia (2004) and (as co-editor) Indonesia, Islam and Democracy (2006).

Ahmad Najib Burhani is a PhD candidate in religious studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, with emphasis on religious minorities with an Islamic origin, such as the Ahmadiyya, Druze, Isma’ili, Yazidi and Baha’i Faith. He is also a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). Among his publications are Muhammadiah Jawa (2010), ‘Tarekat’ tanpa Tarekat (2002), Sufisme Kota (2001), and Islam Dinamis (2001).

Jajat Burhanudin is a lecturer at the History Department of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta. In addition to lecturing, he is engaged in research activities on Islam and Muslim society issues. Until 2011 he was Director of the UIN-based Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, or PPIM), when he was promoted to the position of Director of the University’s Research Bureau.

Kees van Dijk is Emeritus Professor of the History of Modern Islam in Indonesia and a former senior researcher at the Royal Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) in Leiden. Among his

**Pieternella van Doorn-Harder** is Professor of Islamic Studies at Wake Forest University in Winston Salem, North Carolina. She received her PhD from VU University in Amsterdam. Her research straddles issues concerning women and religion and those concerning minorities, minority cultures and human rights in Muslim countries, and the interreligious encounter between Muslims and Christians. She carried out her main fieldwork in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, specialising in the indigenous Christianity of Egypt and Indonesian Islam. Among the books she has authored is *Women Shaping Islam. Indonesian Muslim Women Reading the Qur'an* (2006).

**Andrée Feillard** is a senior researcher at the French Public Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS). She was the representative of the Jakarta bureau of the École Française d’Extéme-Orient. She has specialised in the political history of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama. Since 1999, her attention has turned to the recent emergence of radical Islamist movements (*The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism*, co-authored with Rémy Madinier). She has also worked on gender issues in Indonesia since the early 1990s.

**Robert W. Hefner** is Director of the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs at Boston University and the author or editor of sixteen books on religion and politics, including *Muslims and Modernity: Society and Culture Since 1800* (2010).

**L. Hilman Latief** earned MA degrees from the Center for Religious and Cross Cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia and from the Department of Comparative Religion at Western Michigan University in 2003 and 2005 respectively. He earned his PhD at Utrecht University in 2012 with a dissertation entitled ‘Islamic Charities and Social Activism: Welfare, *Dakwah* and Politics in Indonesia’. He is currently a lecturer at the Department of Islamic Economics and Banking, Faculty of Islamic Studies at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY). His publications include *Melayani Umat: Filantropi Islam dan Ideologi Kesejahteraan Kaum Modernis* (2010).

**Euis Nurlaelawati** is senior lecturer in Islamic law at the Faculty of Sharia and Law at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, and researcher at the Centre for the Study of Law and Human Rights at the

**Nina Nurmila** is a senior lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Bandung, Indonesia. Her first degree was from UIN Bandung (1992), her MA was from Murdoch University (1997) and her PhD was from the University of Melbourne (2007). She was a Fulbright Visiting Researcher at Temple University, Philadelphia (2000-2001), an Endeavour Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Technology Sydney (2008) and a Fulbright Visiting Scholar of Islamic Studies at the University of Redlands, California (2008-9). She is the author of *Women, Islam and Everyday Life: Renegotiating Polygamy in Indonesia* (2009, 2011).

**Didin Nurul Rosidin** studied Qur’anic sciences at IAIN Walisongo in Surakarta, Central Java. From 1998 until 2000, he studied for an MA in Islamic Studies at Leiden University. He obtained a PhD in the History of Islam in Indonesia from the same university in 2007. From 1998 until 2008, he worked as a lecturer on the History of Islamic Civilisation at the Faculty of Islamic Theology, IAIN Walisongo in Semarang, Central Java. He is currently a lecturer at IAIN Syekh Nurjati Cirebon. In 2011, he was appointed vice dean of the faculty of Islamic Theology and Humanities of IAIN Syekh Nurjati Cirebon.

**Dian Maya Safitri** is currently an interpreter for the FAO Indonesia Program. She obtained her MA in religious and cultural anthropological studies from the CRCS (Center of Religious and Cross-cultural Studies) at Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia. She held an Asian Graduate Student Fellowship at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore in 2011, and in 2012 she was a visiting fellow of the Training Indonesian Young Leaders Program, Leiden University.

**Sunarwoto** earned his MA in Islamic studies from Leiden University (2008). He is currently a PhD student at the School of Humanities, Tilburg University, within the framework of the NISIS (Netherlands Interuniversity School for Islamic Studies). The subject of his PhD research is Radio Dakwah in Solo. His academic interests include Qur’anic studies, Islamic history (in Indonesia) and media and Islam.

**Asfa Widiyanto** obtained his MA from Leiden University and his PhD from the University of Bonn. He is a faculty member at the State Insti-
tute for Islamic Studies Salatiga in Indonesia. He is currently undertaking postdoctoral research at the Department of Political Science at the University of Marburg and the Department of Islamic Studies at the University of Bamberg (2011-2013). He recently published *Ritual and Leadership in the Subud Brotherhood and the Tariqa Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya* (2012).


Hara, Abubakar Eby. 2010. 'Pancasila and the Perda Syariah Debates in the Post-Suharto Era: Toward a New Political Consensus'. In: Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki & Ahmad


Hefner, Robert W. 1997b. ‘Print Islam’, Indonesia, 64, pp. 77-103.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Pellet, Ch. DATE ‘Manakil’. In: Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 6, pp. 349-357.


Ufen, Andreas. 2008. ‘From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia’, *South East Asia Research*, 16 (1), pp. 5-41.


Young, Kenneth. 1990. ‘Middle Bureaucrats, Middle Peasants, and Middle Class? The Extra-urban Dimension’. In: Richard Tanter & Kenneth Young (eds.), *The Politics of Middle Class*, pp. 147-166. Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.


Index

Aa Gym see Abdullah Gymnastiar
Abangan 7, 11, 25-26, 49-50, 57, 142, 223, 227-230, 239
Abduh, Muhammad 56
Abshar-Abdalla, Ulil 85-86
Abu Zayd, Nasr Hamid 120-121
Aceh 184-185, 189-190
Ahmadiyah 9, 76, 167-170
Airlangga University 179
Aisyiyah 143-144, 154, 186
ALARM 189, 193
Aliran 50, 56-57, 228-229
Alms giving 34, 180-183
Amidhan, M. 168
AMP (Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila) 22
Anti-pornography law 141, 150-156
Arabic
– culture 28-30, 40, 118-119, 124-126, 155
– language 28-30, 148, 218
Arabs 72, 197, 200, 230
Arkoun, Mohammad 145
Art, Islamic 20-21
Asas tunggal 9, 31-33, 80, 126, 221-223, 229
Assalam pesantren 196
Assegaf, Ciciek Farha 146, 148
Assyaukanie, Luthfi 89, 170
Baasyir, Abu Bakar 72, 171, 197, 199, 212-213, 230
Baasyir, llim 213
Bali 155-156
Baner 10
Barzanji 210, 230
Bedug 22-23
Bellah, Robert 37, 41
Bisri, A Mustofa 162, 167-172
Boas, Franz 29
Borobudur 40
BRR (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi) 190
BSI (Bina Siswa Islami) 221, 224-225
BSMI (Red Crescent) 185, 187
Buddhism 17, 26, 40, 166, 239
By-laws 9, 77, 147-148, 150, 155, 167
Caliphate 72
Charity 173-193
Child marriage 147, 157
Christians 9, 16, 155-156, 166, 183, 188-190, 215, 239
Circumcision, female 147, 157, 159
Cirebon 215-225
Clinton, Hillary 70
Colonialism 32, 36-38, 41
Customs, local 33-34, 43, 65-67, 123-136, 155, 228, 232-235, 238
Dakwah 76, 80-81, 95-96, 100, 142, 153, 169, 179-180, 183, 195-239
Darul Islam 8, 35, 229-230
Dauroh 200, 213
DDII 183, 215-216, 223-225
Democracy 39, 44-45, 57-59, 68-71, 237
Dhikr 211-212
Dompet Dhuafa 181, 185-187
Islam in Indonesia

- Al-Ghazali 43-44
- Geertz, Clifford 17-20, 28-29, 52, 64, 240
- Al-Habsy, Alwi 200
- Hadikusumo, Ki Bagus 39
- Hajj 52, 80
- Halaqah 179, 196, 213, 216
- Hasbullah, Wahab 140
- Hatta, Muhammad 38, 79
- Haz, Hamzah 70
- Hazairin 33-34, 124-126
- Higher education, secular 179
- Hinduism 17, 26, 155-156, 226, 239
- Hizb al-Tahrir 43, 72-73, 85, 111, 113, 165-166, 171, 185, 189, 222
- ICMI 82-83, 178, 181
- Intellectuals, Muslim 77, 86-88, 125
- Internet 199-201, 213-214, 234-239
- India 40, 43-44
- IPB 179
- Iran 49, 68, 128, 177-179, 215
- Al-Irsyad 75, 197, 223, 228
- Islamic education 34, 49-54, 67, 144, 225, 231, 238
- higher education 50, 54, 67, 86, 139-140, 145, 149, 154, 156, 179
- madrasah 53-54
- Pesantren 52-54, 94-98, 146-148, 161, 196-202
- woman 53, 144
- Islamic high school associations 115-225

- Fatayat NU 144-147, 150, 156-157
- Fatwa 7, 98-99, 107, 153, 168-170, 203-204
- Feminists – Muslim 113-115, 139-150, 155
- secular 113, 142-143, 149-151
- Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning 146
- Forum Kajian Kitab Taqrib 147
- Forum Pengkajian Islam 154
- Gadjah Mada University 179, 216, 223
- Geertz, Clifford 17-20, 28-29, 52, 64, 240
- Golkar 156, 229
- Great Britain 70
- Gymnastiar, Abdullah 141, 152-153, 200
- Habibie, B.J. 82-84, 178-179
- Al-Habsy, Alwi 200
- Hadikusumo, Ki Bagus 39
- Hadith interpretation 147, 206-210
- Hajj 52, 80
- Halaqah 179, 196, 213, 216
- Hasbullah, Wahab 140
- Hatta, Muhammad 38, 79
- Haz, Hamzah 70
- Hazairin 33-34, 124-126
- Higher education, secular 179
- Hinduism 17, 26, 155-156, 226, 239
- Hizb al-Tahrir 43, 72-73, 85, 111, 113, 165-166, 171, 185, 189, 222
- HMI 84, 183-184
- Hodgson, Marshall S.S. 18
- Homosexuals 92-103
- Husein, Muhammad 111, 113, 147
- ICMI 82-83, 178, 181
- Ikhwan al-Muslimin 56, 58, 72, 154, 165, 175, 179-180
- India 40, 43-44
- Intellectuals, Muslim 77, 86-88, 125
- IPB 179
- Iran 49, 68, 128, 177-179, 215
- IRM (Ikatan Remaja Mesjid) 217-225
- Al-Irsyad 75, 197, 223, 228
- Islamic education 34, 49-54, 67, 144, 225, 231, 238
- higher education 50, 54, 67, 86, 139-140, 145, 149, 154, 156, 179
- madrasah 53-54
- Pesantren 52-54, 94-98, 146-148, 161, 196-202
- women 53, 144
- Islamic high school associations 115-225

- Egypt 54-58, 127, 175, 177, 179, 206
- Fatayat NU 144-147, 150, 156-157
- Fathullah, Lutfi 147
- Fathullah, Lutfi 147
- Fatwa 7, 98-99, 107, 153, 168-170, 203-204
- Feminists – Muslim 113-115, 139-150, 155
- secular 113, 142-143, 149-151
- Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning 146
- Forum Kajian Kitab Taqrib 147
- Forum Pengkajian Islam 154
- FPI 7, 10, 72-73, 163, 168, 185, 189
- Gadjah Mada University 179, 216, 223
- Geertz, Clifford 17-20, 28-29, 52, 64, 240
- Al-Ghazali 43-44
- Golkar 156, 229
- Great Britain 70
- Gymnastiar, Abdullah 141, 152-153, 200
- Habibie, B.J. 82-84, 178-179
- Al-Habsy, Alwi 200
- Hadikusumo, Ki Bagus 39
- Hadith interpretation 147, 206-210
- Hajj 52, 80
- Halaqah 179, 196, 213, 216
- Hasbullah, Wahab 140
- Hatta, Muhammad 38, 79
- Haz, Hamzah 70
- Hazairin 33-34, 124-126
- Higher education, secular 179
- Hinduism 17, 26, 155-156, 226, 239
- Hizb al-Tahrir 43, 72-73, 85, 111, 113, 165-166, 171, 185, 189, 222
- HMI 84, 183-184
- Hodgson, Marshall S.S. 18
- Homosexuals 92-103
- Husein, Muhammad 111, 113, 147
- ICMI 82-83, 178, 181
- Ikhwan al-Muslimin 56, 58, 72, 154, 165, 175, 179-180
- India 40, 43-44
- Intellectuals, Muslim 77, 86-88, 125
- Internet 199-201, 213-214, 234-239
- IPB 179
- Iran 49, 68, 128, 177-179, 215
- IRM (Ikatan Remaja Mesjid) 217-225
- Al-Irsyad 75, 197, 223, 228
- inferiority complex 28-29, 40, 67
- modernism 8, 27, 35-47, 52-53, 87, 128, 139-140, 145, 177, 226-230
- radicalism 71-73, 76, 85, 139, 152-155, 163, 168, 189, 195-212, 215-239
- traditionalist 8, 27-34, 41-47, 53, 87, 128, 144-145, 151, 157, 200, 204, 210, 226-230, 237
- Islamic culture 40, 43
- Islamic education 34, 49-54, 67, 144, 225, 231, 238
- higher education 50, 54, 67, 86, 139-140, 145, 149, 154, 156, 179
- madrasah 53-54
- Pesantren 52-54, 94-98, 146-148, 161, 196-202
- women 53, 144
- Islamic high school associations 115-225
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic law</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- compilation of Islamic law</td>
<td>123-138, 143, 149, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- courts</td>
<td>124, 133-137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- family planning</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- inheritance</td>
<td>34, 115-122, 124-137, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- jihad</td>
<td>199, 222, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- jurisprudence</td>
<td>31-34, 51, 123-136, 145-147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- marriage</td>
<td>34, 123, 127-136, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- music</td>
<td>202, 205-212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- polygamy</td>
<td>127, 133-138, 141-154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic state</td>
<td>33, 39, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic welfare associations</td>
<td>54-57, 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITB</td>
<td>179, 216, 223-224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta Charter</td>
<td>35, 39, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaah Islamiyah</td>
<td>73, 111, 212, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMI (Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia)</td>
<td>72-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayabaya</td>
<td>43-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal)</td>
<td>89, 168-171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Indonesian Islam</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurnal Perempuan</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMMI</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kartini</td>
<td>142, 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalili, Nasser D.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuntsa</td>
<td>98-100, 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komnas Perempuan</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMPAK</td>
<td>183-184, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lady Gaga</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Hizbullah</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Jihad</td>
<td>7, 72-73, 163, 183-184, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus)</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbians</td>
<td>92-103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limrung, Tamsil</td>
<td>183, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madina</td>
<td>37-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madjid, Nurcholish</td>
<td>27, 34-41, 65, 81, 111, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’had Darussalaf pesantren</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’had al-Ukhuwwah pesantren</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majapahit</td>
<td>43, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majelis Tafsir Al-Qu’ran</td>
<td>196-197, 227-239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majelis taklim</td>
<td>76, 153, 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay language</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>16, 22-23, 128-133, 147, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manji, Irshad</td>
<td>10-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcoes-Natsir, Lies</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariani</td>
<td>95-103, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Law</td>
<td>123, 141, 145, 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marzuki, Abdullah</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masdar, F. Mas’udi</td>
<td>111-112, 116, 119, 146, 150-152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjumi</td>
<td>8-9, 77, 80, 89, 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataram</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medan Moeslimin</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mer-C</td>
<td>184, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class, Islamic</td>
<td>62, 67-68, 174-180, 186, 191-192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau</td>
<td>65, 118-119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>10, 67-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misrawi, Zuhairi</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>7, 72, 85, 153, 163, 185, 189, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moluccas</td>
<td>183-184, 188-189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>18-19, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>21-22, 30, 179, 216-217, 223, 226, 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques, campus</td>
<td>179, 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>8, 10, 55-57, 70-75, 80, 89, 94, 99, 110, 140, 143-144, 153, 185-186, 189-191, 228-229, 233-236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUI</td>
<td>7, 10, 77, 88, 94, 98, 149, 163, 167-170, 193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mujiburrahman 45
Al-Mukmin pesantren 196-197, 212
Mulia, Siti Musdah 111, 113, 146, 150, 154
Muslimat NU 144, 155-156

Nadjib, Emha Ainun 162, 167-172
Nahdlatul Ulama 8, 10, 31-33, 42-43, 55-57, 70-75, 80-81, 94, 99, 110, 139-140, 143-149, 151, 153, 157, 163, 170, 185, 189-190, 204, 210-211, 228-229, 233-236
Nasyid 202-203, 208-209
Nationalism 36-40
Natsir, Mohammad 58, 89
Natural disaster relief 95, 184-192
Nawawi 146-147
New Order 78-83
Nias 184-185, 189-190
Nuriyah, Shinta 146, 152, 155

Osama bin Laden 73
OSIS 216, 220

Pakistan 54, 58, 127-133
Pancasila 8, 27, 31-39, 60, 68-69, 84, 166-167, 170, 223-224, 230
Papua 155
Parmusi 80
Partai Demokrat 156
PBB 197
PDI-P 141, 156
Penders, C.L.M. 25
Pengajian 95-96, 169, 180, 202, 230-236
Penghulu 66-67
Perda syariah see by-laws
Persis 75, 185, 223, 228
Petrus Blumberger 17
PII 223
PKB 156
PKO (People Kampong Organised) 10

PKPU (Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat) 180-182, 185, 187, 193
PKS 9, 110, 113, 140, 147, 152-153, 156, 181-182, 221
Polygamy Award 152
Poso 183-184, 188
PPP 85, 140
P3M 145-146
Prambanan 40
Pribumisasi Islam 27, 34, 45
Puan Amal Hayati 148
Puspita 148
Putrajaya 22
Qu’ran interpretation 111-122, 141, 145, 231-232
Qu’ran recite 80, 202
Radio stations, Christian 199
Radio stations, Islamic 195-212, 237
– Darussalaf FM 198-205
– Al-Madinah 202, 205
– Mentari FM 201
– MTA FM 197-212, 233-237
– Radio ABC 197
– Radio Hizbullah 197
– RADIS 197, 230
– RDS FM 198-205
– Suara Al-Hidayah FM 199-205
– Suara Quran FM 198-212
– As-Sunnah 226
Rahardjo, Dawam 168
Rahima 146, 148
Rahman, Fazlur 46, 111, 145
Reformasi era 9, 83-85, 143, 163, 180
Republika 181
Ridho, Rasyid 199
Rifa’i, Ahmad 66-67
Rifka an-Nisa 150
Rohana, Aan 153
Rohani Islam 216-225
Rumah Zakat Indonesia 180
Rusmanto, Yanni 197
INDEX

Santri 7, 49-50, 142, 177, 227-229
Saputra, Abdullah Thufail 196
Saudi Arabia 223, 226
Shalawat 206-211, 230
Al-Shiddieqy, Hashbi 33-34, 124-126
Shihab, Habib Rizq 72
Shihab, Quraish 154
Sjadjali, Munawir 33-34, 65, 119-121,
124-125, 143, 145, 149
Snouck Hurgronje, C 17-20, 36
Sufism 109-110, 161-162, 204, 239
Suharto 8-9, 78, 223
Sukarno 8, 35, 78, 82, 151
Sukarnoputri, Megawati 69-70, 84,
156
Sukina, Ahmad 203, 230-239
Sulawesi Utara 155-156
Sunan Kalijaga 30-31
Sunan Kudus 30-31
Sungkar, Abdullah 196, 212, 230
As-Sunnah 219-226
Surakarta 195-212, 226-239
Syamsudin, Din 168
Tablighi Jama‘at 165
Tantri 148
Tarbiyah 154, 179, 181-182
Tashwirul Afkar 42
Terrorism 73, 76
Thalib, Ja’far Umar 72, 223, 225
Transgenders 92-103
Tufail, Abdullah 229-230, 236
TV stations 237
Al-Ukhuwah pesantren 200
Ulfa, Maria 146
Umar, Nasaruddin 113
Umma 38-39
Universitas Indonesia 179
Universitas Padjadjaran 224
Usroh 154
Wahid, Abdurrahman 27-34, 43-47,
65-66, 84, 111, 143, 145, 149, 156-
157, 168, 176-177
Wali Songo 21, 30-31, 110
Wardoyo, Puspo 152
Waria 93-105
Women 69-70, 91-139, 204, 237
Woodward, M. 17-18
World Vision 185, 190-191
Yayasan Dana Sosial Al-Falah 180
Yemen 105, 198
Yogyakarta 17, 91-107, 185
Youth Of The Streets 190
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang 234
Yusroh, Yoyoh 152-153
Zainuddin MZ 200
Zakat see alms giving
Hu Ping: *The Thought Remolding Campaign of the Chinese Communist Party-state*

Deborah E. Tooker: *Space and the Production of Cultural Difference Among the Akha Prior to Globalization. Channeling the Flow of Life*
Monographs 6, 2012 (ISBN 978 90 8964 325 4)

Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce: *Rebuilding the Ancestral Village. Singaporeans in China*

Euis Nurlaelawati: *Modernization, Tradition and Identity. The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts*

Diah Ariani Arimbi: *Reading Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Women Writers. Representation, Identity and Religion of Muslim Women in Indonesian Fiction*

Sam Wong: *Exploring ‘Unseen’ Social Capital in Community Participation. Everyday Lives of Poor Mainland Chinese Migrants in Hong Kong*

Marleen Dieleman: *The Rhythm of Strategy. A Corporate Biography of the Salim Group of Indonesia*
Monographs 1, 2007 (ISBN 978 90 5356 033 4)
Edited Volumes


Derek Heng and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied (eds.): *Singapore in Global History*

Philip Hirsch and Nicholas Tapp (eds.): *Tracks and Traces. Thailand and the Work of Andrew Turton*

Philip F. Williams (ed.): *Asian Literary Voices. From Marginal to Mainstream*
Edited Volumes 12, 2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 092 5)

M. Parvizi Amineh (ed.): *State, Society and International Relations in Asia. Reality and Challenges*

Huhua Cao (ed.): *Ethnic Minorities and Regional Development in Asia. Reality and Challenges*

Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Gilles Guiheux (eds.): *Social Movements in China and Hong Kong. The Expansion of Protest Space*
Edited Volumes 9, 2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 131 1)

Erich Kolig, Vivienne SM. Angeles and Sam Wong (eds.): *Identity in Crossroad Civilisations. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Globalism in Asia*
Edited Volumes 8, 2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 127 4)

Friederike Assandri and Dora Martins (eds.): *From Early Tang Court Debates to China’s Peaceful Rise*

Derek Heng and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied (eds.): *Reframing Singapore. Memory – Identity – Trans-Regionalism*
Hans Hägerdal (ed.): *Responding to the West. Essays on Colonial Domination and Asian Agency*
Edited Volumes 5, 2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 093 2)

Marianne Hulsbosch, Elizabeth Bedford and Martha Chaiklin (eds.):
*Asian Material Culture*
Edited Volumes 4, 2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 090 1)

Milan J. Titus and Paul P.M. Burgers (eds.): *Rural Livelihoods, Resources and Coping with Crisis in Indonesia. A Comparative Study*
Edited Volumes 3, 2008 (ISBN 978 90 8964 055 0)

Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce (ed.): *Chinese Women and the Cyberspace*

Sebastian Bersick, Wim Stokhof and Paul van der Velde (eds.):
*Multiregionalism and Multilateralism. Asian-European Relations in a Global Context*
Edited Volumes 1, 2006 (ISBN 978 90 5356 929 0)
As elsewhere in the Islamic world a stricter adherence to Islam has gained strength in Indonesia. Does the image of Islam in Indonesia as a model of moderation still hold? It is a topic of debate in Indonesia itself and abroad. This book is a reflection of this discussion. Besides contributions focusing on the specific characteristics of Indonesian Islam others deal with such diverse topics as Salafi groups and their propaganda, radio stations, Muslim transvestites, the pioneering work of Muslim feminists, and the debate about rules of inheritance and divorce.

"This timely book addresses the issue of the moderate nature of Indonesian Islam and presents a picture which confirm as well as contradict this image, thus showing the complexity of Islam in Indonesia."

Dr. Nico J.G. Kaptein, Leiden University