%0 Thesis
%9 Masters
%A SJAFRUDDIN, NIM: 18208010023
%B PASCASARJANA
%D 2020
%F digilib:46068
%I UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA
%K Moral Hazard, Coverage Limit, deposit insurance, bank risk
%P 133
%T PENERAPAN COVERAGE LIMIT SISTEM PENJAMINAN  SIMPANAN PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH DI INDONESIA
%U https://digilib.uin-suka.ac.id/id/eprint/46068/
%X The development of the latest financial perspective reveals aspects of the  stability of the financial system is important to put forward. The application of a  Deposit Insurance System in many countries is an effort to achieve this stability.  Risks that are always inherent in the financial and banking sectors, can occur in  times of crisis and result in a collapse of the country's economy. To overcome the  effects of the crisis, the government must spend a significant amount of money  and issue policies that are not easy. This study tries to look at the application of  the Deposit Insurance System in Indonesia through the Indonesia Deposit  Insurance Corporation which was established in 2005 based on Law Number 24  of 2004 concerning the Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation. So far, many  studies have tried to analyze the Deposit Insurance System in conventional banks,  but few have seen the impact on Islamic banking. More specifically, this study  discusses the ability of the Deposit Insurance Agency in the potential moral risks  associated with channeling bank financing.  Moral hazard risk will not be eliminated, but can be reduced. One  parameter that is very influential in maintaining the level of moral hazard risk is to  remain low and be within the tolerance limit of the maximum value of guaranteed  deposits (coverage limit). This thesis also attempts to examine other influential  parameters by including macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, inflation  rates, interest rates guaranteed by LPS, and the development of distribution of  funding funds in Islamic banking. This study proves that the implementation of  DIS by LPS in Islamic banking in Indonesia through the imposition of coverage  limits has not been proven to drive the moral hazard level of Islamic banking  financing in Indonesia. Modeling is done using quarterly data from March 2007 to  September 2019 and produces a coefficient of determination of 95%, which  means that the model is statistically quite good in explaining variations in moral  hazard changes in Islamic banking financing to the independent variables. It is  expected that the Deposit Insurance Corporation will sharpen the analysis of the  amount of deposits guaranteed effectively in order to reduce the risk of moral  hazard both in general and in connection with the distribution of financing of  guarantee banks
%Z Dr, Misnen Ardiansyah SE., M.Si., Akt., CA., ACPA