@mastersthesis{digilib71157,
           month = {March},
           title = {THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE JOHN RAWLS  DALAM DISPARITAS PUTUSAN HAKIM PADA PERKARA CERAI MURTAD  (STUDI KASUS DI PENGADILAN AGAMA YOGYAKARTA)},
          school = {UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA},
          author = {NIM.: 23203011195 Irwan Ramadhani, S.H.},
            year = {2025},
            note = {Dr. Sri Wahyuni, S.Ag., M.Ag., M.Hum},
        keywords = {Cerai karena Murtad, Disparitas Putusan, Pertimbangan Hakim, Prinsip Keadilan John Rawls},
             url = {https://digilib.uin-suka.ac.id/id/eprint/71157/},
        abstract = {The disparity of judicial decisions in divorce cases due to apostasy at the Religious Court of Yogyakarta reflects a paradox between the ideals of legal justice and the realities of judicial practice. Although the cases were filed with a similar reason{--}namely, the conversion of one spouse that disrupted the harmony of the household{--}the rulings issued varied, as seen in Decision Numbers 617/Pdt.G/2021/PA.YK, 272/Pdt.G/2023/PA.YK, and 222/Pdt.G/2024/PA.YK. This situation raises academic questions about the consistency of legal reasoning and the extent to which substantive justice is applied by judges in apostasy-related divorce cases.
This study is a field research with a descriptive-analytical nature and an empirical juridical approach. Primary data were obtained through interviews with three judges from the Religious Court of Yogyakarta who adjudicated the cases, namely Marfu?ah, Husniwati, and Nurul Huda, as well as from the official copies of the three court rulings. Secondary data consisted of statutory regulations, the Compilation of Islamic Law, previous research, legal literature, and relevant justice theories. The analysis framework employs John Rawls' theory of justice, focusing on three key principles: equal liberty, the difference principle, and fair equality of opportunity.
The first research finding indicates that all three cases were granted, yet each with a different legal remedy: one was concluded with talak ba?in sughra, one with talak ba?in kubra, and another through fasakh. This variation was influenced by the type of claim submitted and the respective judge's interpretation of the legal consequences of apostasy. In Decision 617/Pdt.G/2021/PA.YK, the judge emphasized disharmony as the main ground. In Decision 272/Pdt.G/2023/PA.YK, apostasy was treated as contextual to marital conflict. Meanwhile, in Decision 222/Pdt.G/2024/PA.YK, religious conversion was interpreted as automatically annulling the marriage contract, leading directly to fasakh.
The second finding reveals that not all judicial considerations in these decisions reflect Rawlsian principles of justice. The principle of equal liberty is not fully protected when apostasy is treated as an automatic ground for annulment without examining the state of the marriage. The difference principle has not been applied as protection for vulnerable parties who convert religion, and fair equality of opportunity has not been fully realized, particularly in cases where the respondent was not given a chance to be heard. These findings suggest that the application of substantive justice in apostasy-related divorce cases remains subject to individual judicial interpretation rather than standardized justice frameworks.}
}