%A NIM.: 21103040077 Arsyianti Mega Nanda
%O Syaifullahil Maslul, M.H.
%T IUS CONSTITUENDUM PENGATURAN AMBANG BATAS PARLEMEN YANG IDEAL BERDASARKAN PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI NOMOR 116/PUU-XXI/2023
%X General elections (Pemilu) are one form of implementing popular sovereignty in a democratic country like Indonesia. Indonesia adopts a presidential system alongside a multiparty system. This combination poses challenges, as the existence of too many political parties creates an extreme multiparty system, leading to unstable coalitions in parliament and weakening presidential support. To simplify the party system and strengthen the presidential system, a parliamentary threshold was introduced. The Constitutional Court, through Decision No. 116/PUU-XXI/2023, ruled that the 4% threshold is constitutional for the 2024 election but unconstitutional for subsequent elections. This decision highlights the importance of establishing a new parliamentary threshold that not only simplifies the multiparty system but also ensures electoral fairness and proportional representation in accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty.
This research uses a normative juridical method with data collected through library research. The approaches used include statutory, comparative, case, and conceptual approaches. The data consists of secondary materials, such as primary legal materials (laws and Constitutional Court decisions), secondary legal materials (books and journals), and tertiary materials (legal dictionaries, KBBI, and online sources). The data is analyzed qualitatively and presented descriptively.
The findings of this study are divided into two main discussions. First, the application of the parliamentary threshold under Article 414 of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections aims to simplify the party system but contradicts Rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty, which asserts that sovereignty is indivisible. In practice, votes for parties that fail to meet the threshold are not converted into parliamentary seats, resulting in unrepresented and wasted votes. Second, Constitutional Court Decision No. 116/PUU-XXI/2023 shows that the 4% threshold has led to disproportionality between vote counts and seat allocation. Therefore, implementing a 0% threshold is seen as an alternative solution to ensure that all votes are fairly counted and represented, in line with the principle of popular sovereignty. Furthermore, legislators lack a clear grand design for determining an ideal threshold.
%K Kedaulatan Rakyat, Multipartai, Ambang Batas Parlemen
%D 2025
%I UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA
%L digilib71874