%0 Thesis %9 Skripsi %A Zia Sania Saqiva, NIM.: 22103070056 %B FAKULTAS SYARIAH DAN HUKUM %D 2026 %F digilib:75524 %I UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA %K Koalisi Gemuk, DPR, Fungsi Pengawasan, Prabowo-Gibran, Checks and Balances. %P 111 %T IMPLIKASI KOALISI GEMUK PEMERINTAH PRABOWO-GIBRAN TERHADAP FUNGSI PENGAWASAN DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT (DPR) %U https://digilib.uin-suka.ac.id/id/eprint/75524/ %X The principles of democracy and the presidential system of government in Indonesia require a distribution of power to prevent the concentration of authority. In this system, the House of Representatives (DPR) plays a crucial role in exercising oversight over the executive to ensure the effective functioning of checks and balances. However, post-election political dynamics often give rise to large governing coalitions that dominate parliament, potentially affecting the DPR’s critical capacity in controlling government policies. This phenomeon is evident in the Prabowo-Gibran administration, which formed a board coalition comprising the majority of political parties in the DPR. The dominance of this coalition raises concerns over the weakening of opposition forces and the declining effectiveness of constitutional oversight instruments such as the right of inquiry, the right of interpelation, and the right to express opinions. Consequently, the relationship between the legislative and the executive tends to shift from a supervisory pattern toward an accommodative one, causing oversight to function more as a political formality rather than a matter of legal substance. This research is a juridical-normative legal study employing statutory and conceptual approaches. Data are derived from primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials collected through literature review. The analysis is conducted using a descriptive-qualitative to explain the implications of a large coalition on the DPR’s oversight function within Indonesian’s constitutional system. The findings indicate that the large coalition in the Prabowo-Gibran administration leads to difficulties in activating the DPR’s oversight rights due to coalition parties loyalty to the executive. The legislative-executive relationship tends to be collaborative-pragmatic while neglecting public interests, thereby threatening the principle of the rule of law and democracy as the balancing power in parliament weakens. Therefore, srengthening civil society participation and fostering moral commitment among political parties are necessary to maintain the integrity of the legislative institution and sustain the system of checks and balances. %Z Prof. Dr. Ahmad Yani Anshori, M.Ag.