<mods:mods version="3.3" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>TINJAUAN HUKUM EKONOMI SYARIAH TERHADAP PRAKTIK SEWA MENYEWA SAWAH DENGAN SISTEM BAYAR MUSIM PANEN (STUDI KASUS DI DESA KEDUNGSARI-SRUMBUNG-MAGELANG)</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">NIM.: 22103080071</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Naila Tammi Maulidia</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:abstract>The practice of leasing rice fields using a harvest-season payment system in&#13;
Kedungsari Village, Srumbung District, Magelang Regency, is generally conducted&#13;
verbally based on mutual trust. However, the exact nominal of the rental fee (ujrah)&#13;
is often determined only after the harvest is sold. This situation potentially causes&#13;
losses among the parties and contradicts the principle of clarity (al-wuḍūḥ) in&#13;
Islamic transactions (muamalah). This study aims to analyze the forms of losses&#13;
borne by the parties and review the validity of this practice based on Sharia&#13;
Economic Law and the Compilation of Sharia Economic Law (KHES). This study&#13;
addresses two concise questions: (1) what losses are borne by the parties? and (2)&#13;
how is the practice assessed under Sharia Economic Law?&#13;
This is a field research with an empirical-juridical approach. Primary data&#13;
were collected through observation, documentation, and interviews with 20&#13;
informants consisting of landowners, tenant farmers, traditional leaders, and&#13;
religious figures. Data analysis was conducted using an inductive-qualitative&#13;
method applying the theories of Ijarah, KHES, Muzara’ah/Mukhabarah, ‘urf, and&#13;
Default (Wanprestasi).&#13;
The results indicate that: 1) Both parties suffer losses due to the uncertainty&#13;
of the contract. Landowners (mu’jir) experience material losses in the form of&#13;
delayed cash flow and income uncertainty, along with immaterial losses such as the&#13;
psychological burden of debt collection. Conversely, tenant farmers (musta’jir)&#13;
suffer material losses from lost capital and labor during crop failure, accompanied&#13;
by anxiety due to lingering rental debt. 2) The Sharia Economic Law review shows&#13;
that while delaying rental payments until after the harvest is permissible,&#13;
determining the rental amount based on harvest fluctuations contains elements of&#13;
gharar (uncertainty) that invalidate the Ijarah contract. The community's tolerance&#13;
is considered ‘urf sahih (valid custom), but leaving the nominal unclear is ‘urf fasid&#13;
(invalid custom). The sharia-compliant solution is to clarify the type of contract&#13;
from the beginning, supported by a written agreement: establishing a fixed nominal&#13;
upfront for an Ijarah contract, or switching to a profit-sharing contract&#13;
(Muzara’ah/Mukhabarah) with a clear distribution ratio.</mods:abstract><mods:classification authority="lcc">297.273 Ekonomi Islam / Fiqih Muamalah</mods:classification><mods:originInfo><mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8061">2026-08-31</mods:dateIssued></mods:originInfo><mods:originInfo><mods:publisher>UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA;FAKULTAS SYARI’AH DAN HUKUM</mods:publisher></mods:originInfo><mods:genre>Thesis</mods:genre></mods:mods>