

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN INDONESIA AN OVERVIEW*

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I. Introduction

Indonesians, like other people in different parts of the world, are religious people. Different religions and beliefs, whether revealed or non-revealed, have been embraced and practised with full conviction from time immemorial. This is because, on the one hand, being religious is a particular characteristic of man and, on the other hand, man needs religion.

Men live in this world in uncertainty and dependency. This is true not only of primitive and developing societies, but of developed societies as well. In addition, there always emerge problems of destiny, suffering, and death. This fact is further aggravated by the fact that the discrepancy between expectation and actual happenings in society is quite significant. It is too frequent that not good but bad men succeed. In this situation, religion is considered a way of making sense of the world which is increasingly difficult to make sense of. With religion men can patiently bear suffering and misfortune; with religion men can legitimate the good fortunes they have. Indeed, "religion has been the historically most widespread and effective instrumentality of legitimation (because) ... it relates the precarious reality constructions of empirical societies with ultimate reality,"¹ With religion men can resolutely accept their failure; and with religion men can enjoy their victories the way they should.

In sum, religion is able to create power in men. Men who have just communicated with God will feel stronger both in bearing suffering and in conquering it. In other words, religion is a means of coping with the world.

The importance of religion has officially been recognized by the Indonesian Government since the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia as shown in the first principle of *Pancasila* (Five Principles)², the national ideology.

This paper will discuss the Indonesian Government's view on religion, the general views of Muslims on religion and politics, and the Qur'ān's view on religion.

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II. Indonesian Government's View on Religion

It was said above that the existence of religions in Indonesia has been recognized by the Indonesian Government since the independence of Indonesia. The "secular" nationalists,³ however, unlike the Muslim nationalists who demanded that Islam be the only religion to be officially recognized in Indonesia, proposed that all religions had to be officially recognized, as shown by Sukarno's explanation on the first principle of *Pancasila*.

Sukarno asserts that not only should the Indonesian people believe in God, but every Indonesian should believe in his own God. The Christian should worship God according to the teachings of Jesus Christ, Muslims according to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad; Buddhists should perform their religious ceremonies in accordance with the books they have. But let us believe in God. The Indonesian State should be a state where every person can worship God as he likes.

From this explanation it follows that every belief in something which is considered God is a religion and therefore it should be recognized by the State. The Indonesian Government, however, recognizes only "great" religions, namely, Islam, Christianity (Catholic and Protestants), Buddhism, and Hinduism.

It is admitted that the first *sila* is the source of considerable controversy. People can claim that what they believe in is also God and therefore the State has to recognize it like other religions. This sort of claim has occurred in Indonesia.

This problem is, in fact, more theological than religious definition. For example, the Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) is the last prophet sent down by God to mankind and therefore the religion (Islam) he brought is the last religion.

To understand the concept of religion propounded by Sukarno and later on by the Indonesian Government, it is necessary for us to employ a working definition of religion. One of the definitions of religion which is frequently used by scholars, especially by sociologists and anthropologists, is the definition put forward by Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), a well-known French sociologist. Durkheim asserts that.

a religion is a unified system of belief and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practises which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.⁴

Durkheim's definition mentions two main elements of religion, namely, beliefs and rites which are related to sacred things. These sacred things are, Durkheim contends, not only gods [God] or spirits but also a rock, a tree, a spring, a house, etc. In a word, anything can be sacred.⁵ This is primarily due to the fact that the sacred character assumed by an object is not an inherent character of a thing, but it is something added to it.⁶ Durkheim then gives

general characteristics of the sacred: 1) it is naturally considered superior in dignity and power to profane things,⁷ 2) it gives force and power,⁸ and 3) it is ambiguous, namely, it is feared and respected, propitious and unpropitious, helpful and hazardous.⁹

Based on Durkheim's definition, it can be stated that *Aliran Kepercayaan/Aliran Kebatinan* (the Javanese mystical belief) which is flowering in Java is a religion, a non-revealed religion to be precise. This is due to the fact that the followers of this *Aliran Kepercayaan* believe in something which is considered God, they perform certain rites, and they are united in a group which is, in Durkheim's term, called Church.

Because of their conviction that their belief is also a religion in accordance with the first *sila* of *Pancasila*, it is not surprising that in 1979 the followers of *Aliran Kepercayaan*, some of them Government officials of high rank, demanded that their "religion" be officially recognized by the Government as a religion like those religions previously recognized. This demand created a very strong reaction among the disciples of religions in Indonesia, particularly among Muslims. This objection is partly aimed at many of the traditional and pre-Islamic beliefs of the Javanese which are seen as corruptions or denials of the true faith of Islam. Due to this opposition, the Indonesian Government adopted a compromising attitude by recognizing *Aliran Kepercayaan* not as a religion but as a form of (Javanese) culture and put it under the supervision of the Department of Education and Culture.

Like *Aliran Kepercayaan*, based on Durkheim's definition, nationalism, socialism, communism are also religions. This is owing to the fact that each of these isms has certain values, ideals, and goals which are believed to be superior to the others'; they also have practises (rites) which are employed by their followers in their attempt to obtain the goal they cherish. This kind of religion is called by Elizabeth K. Nottingham as nonsupernatural or secular religion.¹⁰

With regard to the function of religion, Durkheim holds that the real function of religion is not to make us think, to enrich our knowledge, nor to add to the conceptions which we owe to science ..., but rather, it is to make us act, to aid us to live. The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man who sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant; he is a man who is *stronger*. He feels within him more force, either to endure the trials of existence, or to conquer them.¹¹

In addition, religion can, according to Durkheim, maintain social cohesion.¹² Many people, however, have doubted the unifying function of religion in the modern world. This is not only due to the religious divisions and diversification of society which has destroyed the dominance of religion and redistributed its function, but also due to the involvement of secularization.

The secular nationalists in Indonesia have shown doubt and even disbelief in religion as a unifying agent in society since the independence of Indonesia. The present Government has also adopted the same attitude. This is due

to the fact that Indonesian people consists of many different ethnic groups who profess different religions and beliefs. It is, therefore, quite understandable that the Indonesian Government, both the Old Order and particularly the New Order regimes, emphasizes *Pancasila* as the national ideology in its effort to unite these different groups. This effort reached its climax when the Indonesian Government succeeded in making *Pancasila* the Sole Philosophy (*Asas Tunggal*) or the one and only ideology of Indonesians and all social and political organizations, although it met some resistance from several groups during its process of acceptance.

Pancasila, judged on Durkheim's definition of religion, is also a religion, a nonsupernatural religion according to Nottingham, or a "civil religion", a term coined by J. Rosseau and then developed by Robert N. Bellah.

Pancasila can be called a "civil religion" because the concept of God in civil religion, like in *Pancasila*, does not refer to any specific God and civil religion, like *Pancasila*, claims authority over the political affairs of society.¹³

Pancasila can also be called, to use Frank E. Reynold's term, a "civic religion." One of the characteristics of civic religion is that it emphasizes a high degree of continuity between the religious forms of the past and the present.¹⁴ *Pancasila* is a mixture of doctrines and values taken from the Hindu and pre-Hindu periods.¹⁵ The word "*Pancasila*" itself, which was adopted and given a new content and meaning by Sukarno, is found in *Negarakertagama*, a historical record of the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit (1296-1478 C.E.) of East Java written by Prapanca.¹⁶

Pancasila is best called a "political religion", to use Christel Lane's term. The characteristics of political religion are that it contains religious elements which are found in the sacralization of the existing political order, and it claims authority not only over the political affairs of a society but over all of social life; therefore, political religion has a system of specific values and norms.¹⁷ *Pancasila* possesses all of the above characteristics.

With the acceptance of *Pancasila* as the one and only ideology of the Indonesian people, the process of secularization in Indonesia marched one step further. By the word secularization, I mean "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols."¹⁸ In addition to the secularization of society and culture, there is also a secularization of consciousness, meaning that people become more and more interested in "this world" and turn their attention from religious interpretations or from "other world".¹⁹ In conjunction with this, there is an increasing tendency in society to adopt an ethic adapted to the present exigencies. Furthermore, the secularization thesis implies the privatization of religion. This means that religion or religiosity is limited to the sphere of private life. Public life tends to be regarded as a religiously neutral sphere. As a result, different norms of behavior and belief are assigned to the two spheres.²⁰ This compartmentalization is seen by some people as an adaptive process working to reduce the conflict between tradition and modernity.

To sum up, secularization does not mean the abrogation of religion. In a functionally differentiated system where each functional sphere gains greater self-reliance and autonomy, religion still persists but ceases to be the sole determinant of social action. Also, by the explanation of secularization given above, I do not mean that all Indonesian people have acquired a secularized consciousness, nor do I suggest that all of them have a compartmentalized system of value. To state otherwise is tantamount to deny the piety and religious fervor shown by many Indonesian people. In spite of this, there is no denying that the process of secularization has been taking place in Indonesia. This process was, in fact, triggered by the Indonesian Government from its very inception with its dichotomy of attitude towards religion and particularly Islam as the religion of the majority of the population in Indonesia. Islam has long been seen as a divisive political factor in need of taming. Accordingly, the Government's policy towards Islam has been, like the Dutch's policy as suggested by C. Snouck Hurgronje, tolerant to religious or devotional and social activities of the Muslims but very severe in dealing with Muslim's political activities. These latter activities were always nipped in the bud.

However, there is an encouraging trend that has been taking place for about a decade or so in Indonesia. The most interesting phenomenon is that *Islamophobia* has declined in society, particularly in the government circle. Government officials, who are Muslims, are no longer afraid of expressing their faith. They perform the daily prayers at the mosques or *langgars* which they helped to build in their departments. They regularly attend lectures on Islam at "*Kelompok Pengajian*", a religious group that has mushroomed all over the places in Indonesia. Many of them have gone to Mecca to perform *hajj*. Like many government officials, several prominent members of society, actors and actresses have also shown a great deal of interest in Islam. On campuses, professors and students are engaged in religious (Islam) activities. Some professors, who never talked about Islam before, are now involving in propagating Islam. Among this circle and the educated in general, mostly due to their academic background, there have arisen religious attitudes, which I call "Islamic positivism"²¹ and the "demystification of Islam." This group emphasizes this worldly aspect of Islam in carrying out God's commands. For them obedience to God is primarily for its own sake and not for the sake of avoiding hell or gaining paradise. They are also very active in seeking (Islamic) solutions to the problems whether economic, social, cultural, or politics. It is, therefore, not surprising that among this group, in their effort to meet the challenge of modern world, there is a constant endeavor to reformulate and reinterpret the teachings of Islam. This is due to the fact that the Qur'ān, that is primarily a book of religious and moral principles and exhortations, and not a legal document, contains only a few verses which pronounce clear-cut laws and regulations. Moreover, the majority of the laws and regulations in Islam are obtained from the interpretations of the verses of the Qur'ān done by the 'ulamā' more than 700 years ago. Therefore, the laws, the-

ological doctrines, and so forth derived from the interpretations of the Qur'ān made by the 'ulama' and written in many books hundreds of years ago must not be treated as the Qur'ān itself as many people do. These 'ulama' and their opinions are not sacrosanct. In fact, tradition, including religious belief, by its nature, needs changes. It instigates human beings to change it. Traditions change because people who receive them do not feel satisfied with them. The changes (*endogenous changes*), which originate within the tradition and carried out by persons who have accepted them, are meant to improve those traditions.²² In other words, changes are necessary for a tradition to work. And "a tradition has to "work" (or be relevant to the modern world) if it is to persist."²³ It should also be noted that.

In the field of religious knowledge, the revisions of the understanding of the sacred text are not understood as innovations; they are byproducts of the quest for better understanding. The truth is already present in the sacred text and it is the task of the student to elicit it by interpretation. An innovation in interpretation does not imply an innovation in the sacred text; it is a better disclosure of what was there already.²⁴

Furthermore, the group described above, owing to the influence of the modern education they got, they tend to reject the superstitious elements, saint-worship, the belief that some 'ulama' are infallible and can function as mediator between God and men, and other unIslamic accretions to Islam, which are prevalent among the masses. Besides this group there also emerged another group within the academic circle who is in favor of the concept of *the Islamization of knowledge* ²⁵ and other aspects of life.

Along with this Islamic resurgence, however, the Arabization of culture has also been taking place in Indonesia. Arabic words are more frequently heard in conversation than before. In certain newspapers, magazines, and books, Arabic words, which are mostly taken from the verses of the Qur'ān and Hadith, are not difficult to find. Many people wear loose garb *a la* the Arab's clothes as if these particular clothes were more Islamic than the ones they are used to wear, or worse yet, they are the only kinds of clothes which Muslims have to wear. In spite of this, and irrespective of the motives of those individuals who show great interest in Islam, with the process of Islamization is going on, I believe, in a right direction, Islam in Indonesia, God willing, has a bright future.

III The Muslim's Views on Religion and Politics

Muslim nationalists at the time of the creation of the Republic of Indonesia were convinced that Islam, as a religion, is a way of life and, therefore, it deals with all aspects of life whether social or political. Consequently, they unanimously demanded that Islam be the national ideology. In other words, they wanted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Hadikusumo, one of the Muslim nationalists, in his effort to show Islam as a comprehensive system of human life, asserts that most of the verses of the Qur'ān deal with

worldly affairs, including politics, and that there are only about 600 verses which deal with the questions of the religious ritual duties and hereafter.²⁶

This nature of Islam was also acknowledged by Supomo, a nationalist lawyer who is against the idea of an Islamic state, asserting that "Islam ... is a religious, social and political system based on the Qur'an which is the source of all precepts for the life of a Muslim."²⁷

The idea of an Islamic state proposed by the Muslim nationalists was rejected by the majority of the members of PPUUPK (Panitia Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, Investigating Committee for the Efforts for the Preparation of Independence) who proposed *Pancasila* as the national ideology.

Despite the fact that their proposal in favor of an Islamic state was rejected, the Muslim nationalists were convinced of the inseparability of religion from state. This can be seen from the goals, programs, and activities of the Islamic Parties and from the writings of Muslim nationalists. Masyumi, an Islamic organization created in 1943 and transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945, clearly stated that it wanted to establish an Islamic society and an Islamic state although its leaders preferred a democratic way to achieve their goals.²⁸ Later on, however, the idea of establishing an Islamic state espoused by Masyumi became more implicit than explicit. This is obvious from the goal of this party, namely, "the realization of the doctrine and law of Islam in the life of the individual, in society and in the Republic of Indonesia as a State, directed toward that which pleases God."²⁹ M. Natsir, one of the leaders of Masyumi and once of Prime Minister, also espoused the idea of an Islamic state as an idea is to be achieved in a democratic and evolutionary way.³⁰ N.U. (The Nahdatul Ulama), which was set up in 1926 and entered politics in 1952, also stated that it wanted "a National State based on Islam, a State which guarantees and protects the fundamental rights of man ..."³¹

Apart from Islamic political parties and individuals who wanted to create an Islamic state in a democratic and evolutionary way, there also emerged a group called "Darul Islam" led by Kartosuwiryo who wanted to create an Islamic state in a revolutionary way. On August 7, 1949 Kartosuwiryo officially proclaimed the existence of the Islamic State of Indonesia as the alternative to the Republic of Indonesia.³² This rebellious group, however, was destroyed by the Government and its leader, Kartosuwiryo, was captured on June 4, 1962.³³

The first General Election resulted in great disappointment for the Islamic Parties because they obtained only 43.5% of the total number of votes in the elections for Parliament.³⁴ With this figure, they could not carry out their demand to put Islamic law into practice and, therefore, it can be said that the political struggle of Islam in Indonesia for the time being had failed.

With the emergence of the New Order in 1965, Muslims hoped that they could play an important role in the shaping of Indonesian politics. This new

hope, however, ended in a new disappointment. The new Order regime under President Suharto adopted an unfavorable policy and attitude towards Islam, which aimed at thwarting Muslim efforts to rule. In spite of this, the Government sometimes had to make some concessions to Muslims for security reasons.

In the 1970's, the balance of power shifted more decisively against Islam. In the 1971, 1977, and 1982 elections, the Islamic Party progressively obtained fewer and fewer votes and seats in the Parliament. Realizing the small chance of creating an Islamic state and an Islamic society by way of politics, a shift has taken place in recent years in the opinion of many Muslims. They have aims at beginning from below, not by proclaiming a theoretical Islamic state but by striving for a practical application of certain precepts of the shari'ah in society. This move was coupled with the willingness of Muslim scholars and 'ulamā' to participate in the New Order regime so as to be able to exert some influence on the Government's policy.

This tendency prompted several Muslim scholars to reformulate the teaching of Islam concerning the relation between religion (Islam) and state or between religion (Islam) and politics. Professor Dr. Harun Nasution, who received his Ph.D from McGill University, is against the idea of establishing an Islamic state, asserting not only that the Qur'ān and Hadith do not mention anything about an Islamic state, but the fact that the Prophet emerged as a Head of a Government and that Islam produced a sort of state just because conditions necessitated it.³⁵ Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, who received a Ph.D in Islamic Studies from the University of Chicago in 1984, puts forward his opinion on this matter prior to 1970. He asserts that.

Islam does not recognize any separation between religion and politics, because Islam - as explained by Islamic savants - is *Aqidah* [Ar. *'aqīdah*, creed]; *Shari'ah* [Ar. *Shari'ah*, Divine Law or Code of Life] and *Nizam* [Ar. *nizām*, system, organization] at one and the same time In short, anyone who has a deep knowledge of Islam will discover that Islam does not recognize a separation between mundane affairs and other worldly matters.³⁶

However, he rejects Islamic Parties and the idea of establishing an Islamic state. He puts forward a slogan "Islam, Yes. Islamic Party, No." By this slogan, he means that there is no being or thing that is sacred save God. Therefore, the Islamic Parties are not sacred and, consequently, Muslims who do not vote for an Islamic Party in the General Election are still Muslim.³⁷ This statement was originally meant to repudiate the claim of some Islamic leaders and 'ulama' that Muslims must vote for Islamic Parties; otherwise, they have abandoned their religion.

After returning from Chicago, he still subscribes to the above opinions. He maintains that it is not incumbent upon Muslim to establish an Islamic state. What is more important for Muslims to do, he asserts, is to implement Islamic teachings and values in everyday life, including in matters pertaining to government. He is also of the opinion that state for Muslims is only an instrument to realize an Islamic society, and not the goal in itself. Dr. Madjid

also puts forward his viewpoint concerning the concept of Islam, which is universal and inclusive. He states that the word "Islam" that means "surrender to God" is not merely the name of a certain community. All true religions are, in fact, Islam, meaning that all of these religions teach their followers to surrender to God. It is true, he contends, that Islam has become the name of the religion which the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) brought, but this name grew out of the essence of this religion, namely "surrender to God".³⁸

This universal and inclusive concept of Islam which implies that there is salvation outside "Islam" (to use the term employed by the Roman Catholics) is, of course, contrary to the common belief accepted by the majority of Muslims, that the true religion in God's sight is Islam and, therefore, only Muslims can enter paradise. It is, therefore, not surprising that this particular concept of Islam was strongly criticized. However, Dr. Nurcholish Madjid's concept of Islam is not without champions. The late Professor Dr. Fazlur Rahman, who was Dr. Madjid's professor and academic adviser when the latter studied at the University of Chicago, espouses the same viewpoint, that paradise does not belong to Muslims only. Professor Rahman's understanding of the Qur'anic verses about religion, which is an *ijtihad* to seek "a better disclosure of what was there [in the Qur'an] already," to use Edward Shils' phrase, will be presented in the next pages.

IV. The Qur'ān's View on Religion

It was said in the account given above that the Indonesia Government acknowledged several religions based on the first *silā* of *Pancasila*, namely, "Belief in one God." This is, in fact, to a certain extent reflected in the teachings of the Qur'ān.³⁹ The Qur'ān states that before Muhammad, God sent His messengers or prophets to their peoples, some of whom were mentioned in the Qur'ān and some were not. (40:78; 4:164) The Qur'ān also acknowledges the Books and their truths which were sent down to peoples before Muhammad. (5:44 and 48)

Since all guidance is from God, it means that the messages preached by all prophets are essentially the same that there is one, unique God to whom alone service and worship are due. In other words, all prophets preached monotheism. As a corollary, the messages they brought have universal import and, therefore, must be believed in and followed by all humanity. Although prophecy is indivisible, not all prophets are equal because God has caused some to excel others. (2:253)

The Qur'ān, the last Book sent down by God, completes and perfects all revelations previously sent down by Him and does not abrogate them. The Qur'an was sent down to bless and confirm that which was revealed before it. (6:93) In other words, the Qur'ān, on the one hand, acknowledges other religions, but on the other hand, it claims that they do not have the total truth

due to the distortion committed at some point by their followers.

The Qur'ān also recognizes the existence of good people in other communities, just as it recognizes the people of faith in Islam:

Those who believe [Muslims], the Jews, the Christians, and the Sabeans--whosoever believe in God and the Last Day and do good deeds, they shall have their reward from their Lord, shall have nothing to fear, nor shall they come to grief. (2:62)

The Qur'ān also asserts that God will give reward to those people who surrender to God and do good deeds. (2:112) This verse is a reply to the Jews' and Christians' claim that only they can enter Paradise. (2:111)

The final answer of the Qur'ān to the problem of a multireligion and a multi-community world is given in the following verse:

And We have sent down to you the Book in truth, confirming the Book that existed already before it and protecting it. ... For each of you [several communities] We have appointed a Law and a Way of Conduct [While the essence of religion is identical]. If God had so willed, He would have made all of you one community, but [He has not done so] that He may test you in what He has given you; *so compete in goodness*. To God shall you return and He will tell you [the truth] about what you have been disputing. (5:48)

It is obvious from the above verse that the Qur'ān advises people of different faiths to live up to their respective faiths and asks them to compete with each other in goodness. The Muslim community itself has to establish prayers, provide welfare for the poor, command good, and prohibit evil (22:41) if it wants to become God's darling.

V. Concluding Remarks

The Indonesian Government's success in making *Pancasila* the one and only ideology of the Indonesian people and all social and political organizations is, in fact, a blessing in disguise for Muslims. It is true that the Indonesian Muslims are deprived of their long ingrained identity but, on the other hand, they possess a better chance in participating in the Government due to the loss of the old barrier which used to bring about suspicion.

With the acceptance of *Pancasila* as the sole philosophy, the Muslims should fully participate in the development process to make Indonesia a strong, prosperous, and democratic country. The first step they have to take is to exert more effort in educating the masses, and the second is to resuscitate the unifying function of Islam.

The unity among Indonesia Muslims can, I believe, be achieved partly through tolerance. It is a fact that Indonesian Muslims (and all Muslims in the world) live in religiously pluralistic understandings, a situation that gives rise to an intolerance attitude where the proponents of each of these understandings claim that the truth belongs to them only. As a result, each group can easily brand other groups unorthodox. This self-righteousness is, in fact,

one form of polytheism (Q. 30:31-32). In addition, the Qur'ān warns people not to deride other people who may be better than they are (Q. 49:11). These two verses, that confirm pluralism, imply that since men's knowledge is limited, they do not know exactly which understanding is the true or orthodox one. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, people can claim that only their beliefs or understandings are the true ones, because it is absurd to hold a belief, especially a religious one, without being sure of its absolute truth. But this belief should be tempered with tolerance as the two verses mentioned above suggest. Moreover, people must have the benefit of the doubt. It is, therefore, better to adopt tolerant attitude towards other brothers subscribing to different beliefs or understandings and to compete with each other in goodness than to quarrel or to argue with each other about something which only God knows its final answer. The Qur'ān states that since the believers are brothers, they have to make peace between themselves and observe their duties to God (Q. 49:10). The same teaching is also found in a Hadith where the Prophet asserts that the Muslims are brothers. Therefore, he continues, they must not hate with each other, they must not turn their backs to each other, they must not envy with each other, they must not boycott with each other/they must not cut off their mutual relations. Unfortunately, these very actions which the Prophet warns us against are prevalent among Muslims.

The Muslims in Indonesia should also extend the spirit of tolerance to the disciples of other religions and act accordingly. But it should be noted that tolerating a religious belief does not involve a half-hearted acceptance or endurance of the belief in itself, nor does it involve respecting it, but rather it involves acceptance or endurance of someone's holding that belief. For example, the Roman Catholics believe in Trinity, that there is one God who exists in three eternal Persons (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit). It is not this proposition that the Muslims tolerate, because for the Muslims this proposition is utterly false and those who believe in it are seriously mistaken. So what the Muslims should tolerate is the Catholic's believing of it. Therefore, one does not have to be a relativist to be tolerant.

Along with the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia, Islamic thought has also flourished. Many new opinions or interpretations have been put forward by Islamic scholars, some of which, because contrary to the long accepted traditions, created a very strong reaction among Indonesian Muslims. These opinions or interpretations are the revisions of the understanding of the Qur'ān due to the change of circumstances to which they refer. It occurs in the process of improving the interpretation or understanding of the Qur'ān and of making them work or pertinent to the modern world in order to persist. This is an *ijtihad* meant to make the teachings of the Qur'ān viable. Since it is an *ijtihad*, it is subject to discussion and criticism. In this process selfrighteousness should be avoided, and so should prejudice against the innovations. The Muslimat in Indonesia should bear these things in mind if they want to see Is-

lam function well in modern world (Post-Industrial Society), an era where religion is treated as a consumer item, to be acquired and disposed of based on the efficacy of the teachings of it in solving human being's problems in this world, and also according to the tastes and whims of shoppers in the religious marketplace.

NOTES

¹Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967; Anchor Books, 1969)), p. 32.

²The Five (Basic) Principles are: Belief in the One, Supreme God; Just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; Democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out deliberation amongst representatives; social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

³Many of them are personally devout Muslims who regularly pray and keep the fast. They believe that Indonesia - the home of such diverse histories, peoples, and cultures - cannot survive as a unitary state if the state is based on one religious Confession that has its own diverse histories, even if that religion is professed by the majority of the population. The *Pancasila* is the answer to such diversity. Anthony H. Johns, "Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism" in *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society*, edited by John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 224)

⁴Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 62.

I employ this definition for its generality and inclusiveness in spite of the fact that several scholars, one of them is Roland Robertson, have criticized it for this very reason. However, in writing this paper, I agree with Peter Berger's contention that "definitions cannot by their very nature be either "true" or "false," only more useful or less so. For this reason it makes relatively little sense to argue over definitions." (Berger, *The Sacred*, p. 175). I use Durkheim's definition of religion because I regard it very useful in understanding and explaining the religious life in Indonesia.

For Roland Robertson's critique of Durkheim's definition of religion, see Roland Robertson, *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 37.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 261 and 469.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 455-61.

¹⁰Elizabeth K. Nottingham, *Religion and Society* (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 10.

¹¹Durkheim, *Elementary*, pp. 463-64.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 257-58.

The two functions of religion mentioned by Durkheim above are called *latent functions*, i.e., "the functions that arise unseen or unintended by men in the practice of their religion." See Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 32. "These functions were latent in the sense that believers did not themselves know of them; for them religion was an obligation, a necessity, the 'given' means of coping with the world." *Ibid.* As for the *manifest function* of religion is, according to Bryan Wilson, "to offer men the prospect of salvation and to provide them with appropriate guidance for its attainment." *Ibid.*, p.27

¹³Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post Traditional World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 168-86.

¹⁴Frank E. Reynolds, "Civic Religion and National Community in Thailand," *Journal of Asian Studies* 36 (February 1977): p. 281.

¹⁵Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia* (Chicago: Unpublished Dissertation, 1977), p. 223.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 222-23.

¹⁷Christel Lane, *The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 42.

¹⁸Berger, *The Sacred*, p. 107.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 107-8; Wilson, *Religion*, pp. 149-50.

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 133-34; Bryan Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," in *The Sacred in a Secular Age*, ed. Phillip E. Hammond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 19-20; Larry E. Shiner, "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research," in *The Social Meanings of Religion: An Integrated Anthology*, comp. William M. Newman (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 311-12.

²¹This term, which is coined by Professor Fazlur Rahman, is used in this paper with the same meaning as the one he proposes, except that this group is not thoroughly transcendentalist. See Fazlur Rahman, "Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism," in *Change and the Muslim World*, eds. Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell, and Margaret W. Sullivan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 25-6.

²²Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 213.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 108.

²⁵The concept of Islamization of knowledge, along with the concept of Islamic social sciences, was first presented by 'AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, currently Rector of International Islamic University, Malaysia, in his early works on reforming Muslim thought and methodology in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Then Dr. Isma'il al Faruqi developed this concept.

²⁶Maarif, *Islam*, p. 165.

²⁷ B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 19.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 43.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰Maarif, *Islam*, pp. 202-3.

³¹Boland, *Struggle*, p. 51.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 59. According to Alers, on August 14, 1945 Kartosuwirjo had already proclaimed an independent Darul Islam State. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 62.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 52.

³⁵*Tempo* (June 14, 1986), p. 58.

³⁶Quoted in Muhammad Kamal Hassan, "Muslim Ideological Responses to the Issue of Modernization in Indonesia," in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, comps. Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Husain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 367.

³⁷*Tempo* (June 14, 1986), p. 61.

³⁸The information on this paragraph is from *Tempo* (June 14, 1986), pp. 61-2, and from several Indonesian students currently studying at several universities in the U.S.A. and Canada.

³⁹The accounts in this part are taken from Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), and Fazlur Rahman's "Reading in the Qur'an 1 and 2", Fall 1986 and Winter 1987).

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