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THE 2nd ADAB-INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION AND CULTURAL SCIENCE

"Globalization & Humanities : Making Sense of Islamic Culture in The Contemporary World"

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KALLIAC

THAQÃFIYYÃT**' FIHRIS**

FACULTY OF ADAB AND CULTURAL SCIENCES UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA OCTOBER 19TH - 22ND 2020

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Adab-International Conference on Information and Cultural Sciences

"Globalization & Humanities : Making Sense of Islamic Culture in The Contemporary World "

UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA

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PREFACE

Assalamu'alaikum wr.wb.

Alhamdulillah, all praise and gratitude should only go to Allah Almighty, for all the graces and blessings that give us health and wisdom so that this Virtual Aiconics Conference could be accomplished properly as scheduled.

This is the 2nd Adab-International Conference on Information and Cultural Sciences (AICONICS) held by the Faculty of Adab & Cultural Sciences UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the conference would be fully held online. Whereas, the first conference last year was held offline. Hopefully this conference could be continuously organized as a medium for the faculty members to share their knowledge and also improve their academic experiences as well as international exposure.

Different from the 1st conference last year which was only held in one day, this 2020 Aiconics conference is held in 4 days which is divided according to the four study programs at Adab faculty, i.e., Arabic Language and Literature, Islamic History and Civilization, Library and Information Science, and English Literature. Sequentially, the Aiconics conference will be held from 19 to 22 October 2020. Each study program has panels not only for invited speakers, some of whom are from abroad, but also for presenters who have submitted their papers to us.

This booklet consists of schedule and abstracts of all the panels which will be held during this Aiconics conference. The speakers of the first day are about 24 (5 panels), the second day is about 17 speakers (4 panels), the 3rd day is about 12 speakers (3 panels), and the 4th day is about 8 speakers (2 panels). So, all together there would be about 61 speakers. Hopefully all speakers would show up and present their papers satisfactorily. This booklet aims to guide all the speakers and participants to join the panels accordingly. As this booklet is published in PDF format, you can also easily distribute it among your colleagues so that the conference would be more fruitful for all the academicians, the speakers and the participants in particular.

Finally, I would convey my deepest appreciation to all the committee, the speakers and the participants who have contributed greatly to the success of the 2nd Aiconics Conference. Hopefully, we could organize much better event in the future. Regards and best wishes.

Wassalamu'alaikum wr.wb.

Yogyakarta, October 19th, 2020 Dean of Faculty of Adab & Cultural Sciences UIN Sunan Kalijaga

Dr. Muhammad Wildan, M.A.





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KIAI AND ISLAMIC MODERATION (A STUDY OF *KIAI'S* ROLES IN BUILDING ISLAMIC MODERATION AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND *PANCASILA* IN TASIKMALAYA 1945-1950)

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Abstract

This article elaborates the significant roles of two kiai in Tasikmalaya during the Physical Revolution in 1945-1950 to build Islamic moderation and their influences on the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila as State Philosophy of this republic. The two kiai were Kiai Abdullah Mubarok, also known as Abah Sepuh, the leader of the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School and Kiai Rukhiyat, the leader of the Cipasung Islamic Boarding School. They responded to two extreme socio-political movements threatening the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila as the State Philosophy. First, the Military Aggression by the Dutch and their allies to recolonize Indonesia after the Proclamation of Indonesia's Independence in 1945-1948. Second, the DI/TII socio-political movement led by Kartosuwirjo, proclaiming the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) on August 7, 1949 in Tasikmalaya. In terms of the responses to the two movements, both kiai rejected and opposed them for they preferred to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and uphold *Pancasila* as the State Philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia. The rejection of these two kiai is a manifestation of Islamic moderation. In fact, kiai in Tasikmalaya had a significant role in building Islamic moderation and defending the Republic of Indonesia from being recolonized by the Dutch in Indonesia and the integrity of Pancasila from being undermined by DI/TII. Second, the fact that kiai had significant roles and influences has positioned the kiai in Tasikmalaya not only as a leader of Islamic boarding school and a central figure in a society, but also as a leader in national movement who was directly involved in national struggle during the physical revolution.

A. INTRODUCTION

In general, *kiai* is positioned as the leader of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) and community leaders, who only plays a role, as defined by Clifford Geertz, as a cultural broker or charismatic figure, of which the role is predominantly in terms of religious matters. However, *kiai* actually played a significant role in the history of the Indonesian movement, including the era of both pre- and post-independence of Indonesia. Unfortunately, this role has often been distorted in the history of Islam in Indonesia, so it is necessary to reconstruct the role through local historical studies as a part of rectifying recorded history. As a central figure in society and a leader of *pesantren* or *tarekat*, *kiai* often appeared in the history of Indonesian colonialization as an opposition,⁸ who opposed the colonialism. *Kiai* opposed colonialization through non-cooperative attitudes, especially towards the Dutch colonialism, either in silence



⁸ Subhan SD, Ulama-Ulama Oposan, (Bandung : Pustaka Hidayah, 2000).



or by fighting, which Pijper defined *ulama bebas* (*ulama* who was not a part of certain institutions).⁹

However, in the history, *kiai* had a relatively dynamic struggle intensity and varied roles, according to the demands of the era. For example during the Dutch colonial period, *kiai* tended to be non-cooperative and fought against the colonizers. On the other hand, during the Japanese colonialization, *kiai* tended to cooperate and compromise with the Dai Nippon government.¹⁰ After independence, precisely during the Physical Revolution, *kiai* were faced not only with the Dutch colonialism who had the ambition to recolonize Indonesia, but also with internal and external forces which imposed both right-wing and left-wing ideologies.

An example of the *kiai's* involvement in dealing with national problems which is interesting to be a topic of discussion is their roles during the Physical Revolution (1945-1950) in Tasikmalaya, West Java. During this relatively short period, the Indonesian nation in general and Muslims in particular, had to deal with two challenges at the same time, i.e. challenges coming from the external parties and from within the Indonesian society itself. The first challenge was the return of colonial powers and their allies who wanted to recolonize Indonesia after Indonesia's independence. Meanwhile, the second challenge was the emergence of the Darul Islam (DI) separatist movement and the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) founded by Kartosuwirjo in the border area of Garut and Tasikmalaya. The two of them upheld different ideologies which tended to oppose each other. Colonialism had the ideology of capitalism and imperialism, while DI/TII upheld right-wing Islamic ideology, which aimed to enforce the Islamic system by coercing the Muslim community in Tasikmalaya. In fact, *kiai* as an influential figure among traditional society became the main targets to be recruited as DI/TII members.

An interesting thing about *kiai's* involvement in this role is its relation to national integrity and the attitudes of religious moderation or Islamic moderation in facing the challenges coming from both the Dutch and DI/TII in Tasikmalaya. In this context, the history of local Islam in Tasikmalaya had a direct connection with or served as an important part of the national history. Such direct connection lied not only in their roles in facing the two above-mentioned challenges, but also in their implications for the local community in Tasikmalaya in particular and for the Indonesian nation in general.

National integrity is a form of struggle done by the two *kiai* in defending Indonesia's independence, the unity of the Republic of Indonesia, and the ideology of Pancasila as the State Philosophy, manifested in various sacrifices they had to give. Based on these three things, the two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya became two figures of national movement and fighters who, as stated by Taufiq Abdullah, had an external role,¹¹ in the context of both society and nation and state. Or, as mentioned by Muhammad Iskandar, these *kiai* had a unique enabling in dealing with the national problems.

The national integrity of the two above-mentioned *kiai* was built based on a comprehensive understanding of Islam religion, so both of them did not hesitate to fight for the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila against any internal and external challenges and threats: DI/TII and the Dutch who had the ambition to recolonize Indonesia. In fact, this integrity was the reason why Islamic moderation became a part of the fight selected by the two *kiai*.

Islamic moderation in the context of the roles of the two *kiai* and local history in Tasikmalaya showed its own uniqueness. This is because Islamic moderation was able to

¹¹ Taufiq Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat : Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia*, (Jakarta : LP2S, Send Edition, 1996), pp.111-115.



⁹ Pijper, Beberapa Studi tentang Sejarah Islam di Indonesia, 1900 – 1970, translated by Tujimah and Yessi Angustin, (Jakarta : UII Press, 1984), p.72.

¹⁰ Aziz, M.A., Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia, (The Haque : Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 200.



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harmonize the relationship between religion (Islam) and the nation, strengthen the Republic of Indonesia and maintain the ideology of Pancasila. On the other hand, both of them were not trapped by the symbol of the Islamic ideology imposed by DI/TII in Tasikmalaya in the form of the Islamic State of Indonesia.


In relation to some of the explanation above, this article attempts to elaborate two main topics. First, the role of Kiai Abdullah Mubarok and Kiai Rukhiyat in facing the two internal and external forces: the Dutch colonial power who had the ambition to recolonize Indonesia after the proclamation of Indonesia's independence and internal forces from the DI/TII movement led by Kartosuwirjo of which the proclamation was on August 7, 1949. Second, the form of the Islamic moderation promoted by the two *kiai* in facing these two forces during the Physical Revolution (1945 – 1950). Therefore, this study focuses on the following problems. First, what were the roles of the two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya in facing the Dutch colonial power which had the ambition to recolonize Indonesia after its independence proclamation and the DI/TII power led by Kartosuwirjo who had the ambition to establish an Islamic State? What was the form of the Islamic moderation promoted by the two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya in dealing with the Dutch power in the post-independence era (1945 – 1950) and the ideology of DI/TII? Why did the two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya reject the ideology of DI/TII and prefer to uphold the ideology of Pancasila as the state philosophy? What were the socio-political consequences and implications of the form of Islamic moderation promoted by these two *kiai* by rejecting DI/TII?

This study only focuses on Kiai Ruhiyat, the founder and leader of the Cipasung Islamic Boarding School Tasikmalaya and Kiai Shohibul Wafa or known as Abah Sepuh, the founder of the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School and the Qodiriyah Naqsyabandiyah Islamic Boarding School (TQN). The two *kiai* were selected in this study because of some reasons. First, they were directly involved in the fighting for defending the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila against both internal and external forces. Second, both of them were two influential *kiai* among the local community in Tasikmalaya. Third, as *pesantren kiai*, both of them represented the role of Muslims for the nation and state, especially in terms of the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila as the state philosophy, which unfortunately was rarely included in the historical records.

In order to explain and analyze the three above-mentioned research problems, the author used some conceptual and theoretical frameworks related to the problems and focus of the research. First, it is crucial to conceptually and operationally define some key terms used in this study such as *kiai*, Islamic moderation and role. Second, it is also necessary to add a theoretical framework of several key terms considered important, significant, and relevant to this study.

Kiai are the leaders of Islamic boarding schools or traditional religious elite figures who receive informal recognition from the community for their deep religion-related knowledge. As stated by Zamakhsyari Dofier, *kiai* have a close relationship with *pesantren*, the yellow book (*kitab kuning*) and *santri* (students of Islamic boarding houses); all of which are what constitute a *pesantren*.¹² According to Hiroko Horikoshi, the characters of *kiai* are open, straightforward, charismatic, and have broad religious knowledge.¹³ Meanwhile, according to Taufiq Abdullah, *kiai* have three inherent roles, namely internal role (in terms of the internal affairs of *pesantren*), external role (in terms of the affairs of a wider community, including the nation), and the relationship between the central *pesantren* and branch *pesantren*. These three definitions were relevant to this study, even though the definition proposed by Taufiq Abdullah was more relevant to this study. In addition, in relation to the Physical Revolution period (1945-

¹³ Hiroko Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial, (Jakarta : P3M, 1987), p. 1.



¹² Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren : Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kiai* (Jakarta : LP3S, Sixth Edition, 1994), p. 89.



1950) which became the focus of this study, *kiai* also played a role as a national movement figure directly involved in facing and solving the problems of the Indonesian nation. Thus, in this context, *kiai* is not only a leader of *pesantren* and community, but also a part of an agent of change.

Meanwhile, Islamic moderation is the attitude and position of being in the middle ground or moderate, between two different extreme attitudes or positions. Conceptually, moderation has a different definition, for example the concepts of Western and Islamic moderation. In the Western (European) conception, moderation is not only related to the attitude of being in the middle ground (moderation), tolerance and democratic practices, but it is also closely related to individual rights, the notion of freedom (liberal), pluralism and cooperation.¹⁴

In Islamic terminology, moderation refers to the concept of *Wasathiyah* or *wasathan*, as stated in the Koran. In the Koran, Muslims are called as *umatan washathan*.¹⁵ The term *wasathan*, as stated by al-Asfahani, is defined as *sawa* ' which means being in the middle or in between two boundaries (poles), justice, and standards. Being just or promoting justice, as stated by al-Tabari, the earliest *mufassir*, as quoted by Tajul Islam, is the definition of *wasath* itself, so *ummatan wasathan* means a just society.¹⁶ The term *wasathan* is also defined as preventing one's own self from being uncompromising and imposing one's own way.

In this context, according to Prof. Quraisy Syihab, moderation is characterized by justice, balance and tolerance. *Ummatan wasathan* is a moderate people, of which the position is in the middle ground, in order to be fair and just, and can be seen by all people from any directions.¹⁷ Meanwhile, according to Afrizal Nur and Mukhlish, moderation or *wasathiyah* contains nine characteristics, namely 1) *tawasuth* or taking the middle way/path, 2) *tawazun* or balance, 3) *i'tidal* or straight and upright, 4) *tasammuh* or tolerance, 5) *musawah* or being egalitarian, 6) *syura* (deliberation), 7) *islah* or reformation, 8) *aulawiyah* or priority scale, 9) *tathawwur* and *ibtikar* or being dynamic and innovative.¹⁸ In addition of the two abovementioned definitions, the definition of moderation is often contrasted with extreme attitudes and actions. That is, moderation is an attitude and action that is not extreme, so any extreme attitudes and actions are defined as counter-moderation. From the description above, it can be assumed that Islamic moderation is the attitude of being in the middle ground and *tawazun* in implementing Islamic teachings, by considering justice, tolerance, egalitarianism and other characteristics. From the three definitions of moderation explained above, the definition of Islamic moderation used in this study refers to the second and third definition.

To elaborate the roles of the two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya, namely Kiai Abdullah Mubarok and Kiai Rukhiyat, in dealing with the internal and external forces, namely DI/TII and the Dutch, it is necessary to first define role. Role, as explained by Peter Burke, is a pattern or behavior of a person in relation to her/his position in the structure of society. Role is closely related to social relationships and behavior in social interactions, so Burke names it as social role.¹⁹ In this context, the social action theory, as proposed by Max Weber, is relevant to be used as an analytical tool in explaining the behavior of both Kiai Abdullah Mubarok and Kiai Rukhiyat in Tasikmalaya in relation to their roles in maintaining the unity of the Republic of

¹⁹ Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory*, (Oxpord : Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p.47.



¹⁴ Tajul Islam and Amina Khotun, "Islamic Moderation in Perspectives, A Comparison Between Oriental and Occidental Scholarship", in *International Journal of Nusantara Islam*, vol.3, no. 1, 2015.

¹⁵ Read Q.S. al-Baqarah (2) : 143.

¹⁶ Thamem Usama," Is Islam a Religion of Moderation or Ekstremism? A Study of Key Islamic Teachings" in *Jurnal Asian Social Science*, vol.10, no.8, 2014, p. 186-187.

¹⁷ M. Qurasy Shihab, Wawasan al-Qur'an, (Bandung : Mizan, 1996), p. 432

¹⁸ Muhammad Fahri and Ahmad Zaenuri, *Moderasi beragama di Indonesia, dalam Jurnal Intizar*, vol.25, No.2, 2019, p. 99.



Indonesia and Pancasila and in rejecting, opposing and fighting against DI/TII and the Dutch in Tasikmalaya during the Physical Revolution (1945-1950). Because, as stated by Max Weber, individual actions in social interactions are characterized by their oriented movements and the meaning is related to the subjective purposes, goals and motives in society.²⁰

Based on this theory, it can be emphasized that the actions taken by the two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya to refuse to join DI/TII had an implication, i.e. the spread of the Islamic ideology brought by DI/TII as founded by Kartosuwirjo failed due to the fact that the two *kiai* had a significant influence. This is evident from a large number of people who followed the attitude of the two *kiai* although what they did had some risks, i.e. *pesantren* was burned down and the lives of the *kiai* and their *santri* were threatened.

B. DISCUSSION

1. Physical Revolution Era and Three Ideological Powers

The struggle of the Indonesian people in defending Indonesia's independence after the proclamation of its independence on August 17, 1945 and saving the ideology of Pancasila as the state philosophy is known as the period of the Physical Revolution, the National Revolution or the Indonesian Revolution.²¹ This period was marked by two historical phenomena in the history of modern Indonesian. First, the return of the Dutch colonialism and their allies to Indonesia to recolonize this country after Indonesia had proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945. Second, the emergence of right-wing and left-wing ideological forces which undermined Pancasila and threatened the Republic of Indonesia. The right-wing ideology was Islamic ideology, of which the main idea was to implement Islamic system and establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), such as Darul Islam (DI) and the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) led by Kartosoewirjo. On the other hand, the left-wing ideology was communism, marked by the emergence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). These two ideologies both undermined Pancasila as the state philosophy and threatened the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Indonesia, which was fought for by the Indonesian people. In addition to these two internal ideologies which threatened the state ideology, there was also an external ideology which threatened Indonesia's independence, i.e. the Dutch colonial ideology, capitalism and imperialism, with their ambition to recolonize Indonesia.

The established government of the Republic of Indonesia already had its own ideology, namely nationalism, which opposed the right-wing (Islamic) ideology, the left-wing (communism) ideology, and the Dutch colonial (capitalism-imperialism) ideology. Nationalism as an ideology was led by President Soekarno through a political party, i.e. the Indonesian National Party (PNI), representing the majority of the Indonesian people.

In addition to DI/TII, Masyumi also represented Islamic ideology as an Islamic party. Nonetheless, Masyumi fought for the aspirations of the Muslim community constitutionally through a political party. Besides, this party did not rebel against the nation as DI/TII did. This way, this article did not focus on Masyumi but DI/TII, particularly in West Java, led by SM Kartosoewirjo.

In relation to the emergence of some ideologies that threatened Pancasila and the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, including the Islamic ideology by DI/TII, communism by PKI, and capitalism-imperialism by the Dutch colonialism, many Muslim figures from Islamic boarding schools, represented by *kiai*, opposed the three ideologies.

²¹ M.C. Ricklefs, Sejarah Indonesia Modern, (Yogyakarta : Gadjah Mada University Press, 2017), p.317. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Wajah Revolusi Indonesia dipandang dari Perspektif Struktural," in Prisma, 8 Agustus 1981, p. 3. Karool Kresten, Mengislamkan Indonesia, Sejarah Peradaban Islam di Nusantara, translated by Zia Anshor, (Tangerang Selatan : Baca), 2017, p. 237.



²⁰ Tom Campbell, *Tujuh Teori Sosial*, translated by F.Budi Hardiman, (Yogyakarta : Kanisius, 1994), p. 1999-204.



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However, in Tasikmalaya, West Java in particular, the attitude and opposition of *kiai* focused on the Islamic ideology brought by DI/TII led by Kartosoewirjo. This is because this ideology emerged in West Java, especially in Tasikmalaya and Garut, which became the birthplace and center of the DI/TII rebellion. In Tasikmalaya, there were Kiai Ruhiyat, the founder and leader of the Cipasung Islamic Boarding School and Kiai Abdullah Mubarok, or known as Abah Sepuh, the founder and leader of the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School and the leader of the Qodiriyah Naqsyabandiah (TQN) Islamic Boarding School. Their struggle and opposition to DI/TII will be discussed in the following sub-chapter, as the focus of this article. Both were the representation of two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya who openly rejected and opposed the idea of DI/TII led by Kartosuwirjo to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia, based on Islamic law. Such attitude and opposition were the focus of this article, which were linked and elaborated to historically analyze the model of Islamic moderation promoted by the *kiai* in Tasikmalaya. However, the DI/TII movements in Tasikmalaya were firstly elaborated as a socio-historical background of the attitude and opposition carried out by the two *Kiai* in Tasikmalaya.

2. Darul Islam (DI) and Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) Movements in Tasikmalaya

The movements of Darul Islam (DI) and the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) were founded by SM Kartosoewirjo in 1948 as his struggle to establish an Islamic state. This movement arose due to at least three main factors. First, the return of the Dutch colonialism and their allies to Indonesia even after Indonesia had proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945, of which the purpose was to recolonize this country. This was evident from a number of political and military measures taken by the Dutch, for examples violating the Linggar Jati Agreement, carrying out Military Aggression I in 1947 and Military Aggression II in 1948, and establishing a Puppet State particularly in West Java and Tasikmalaya. In this context, the initial struggle of Darul Islam (DI) and the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) was to expel the Dutch or fight against the Dutch in 1948 through warfare against Dutch military aggression.²² Second, as a manifestation of disappointment with the Indonesian government, which was led by a nationalist party, who was considered to fail to prevent the return of the Dutch colonialism to Indonesia. Third, Kartosuwirjo considered that the tendency of Prime Minister Amir Syarifudin, who succeeded Sjahrir, had brought Indonesian politics to have more left-wing ideology or more of socialism-communism.²³

Due to these three factors, Kartosuwirjo established Darul Islam and the Indonesian Islamic Army in Tasikmalaya. He was previously active in Masyumi, one of the post-independence Islamic political parties. During this time, the war among three political ideologies had peaked, involving Islamic ideology, communism and nationalism. The return of the Dutch to Indonesia in fact strengthened Islamic politics because those upholding nationalism, who were a part of the Indonesian National Party (PNI) led by Soekarno were deemed to have failed in anticipating the return of the Dutch and their allies.²⁴ On the other hand, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) also emerged as Indonesia's political force. For this reason, Islamic politics had strengthened and manifested not only as political parties such as Masyumi, but as an Islamic religion-based ideology. "The ideological war, especially between Islamic ideology and communism which were contradictory, had become stronger after independence.

²³ Al-Chaidar, Pengantar Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo, Mengungkap Manipulasi Sejarah Darul Islam/DI-TII Semasa Orde Lama dan Orde Baru, (Darul Falah, 1420 H.), p.68.





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²² Karool Kersten, *Op.Cit.*, p.251.



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The representation of Islamic ideology, apart from Masyumi, in the political movement was shown by the establishment of Darul Islam (DI) and the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII), of which the operations were massive in East Priangan region, between Tasikmalaya and Garut. The DI/TII movement in Tasikmalaya could be divided into two parts. First, the DI/TII movement before the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). Second, the DI/TII movement after the proclamation of NII by SM Kartosoewirjo. Of these two categories, the second type of the DI/TII movement became the focus of this study, while the first was more of a background of its early emergence and continuity after Indonesia's independence in 1945,²⁵ particularly between 1947-1949. In fact, Kartosuwirjo as the leader of Masyumi left the Masyumi Party in 1947 after he gained confidence to struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). He started his guerrilla in 1948 in response to Military Aggression II of the Dutch in the same year. However, the establishment of the NII was officially proclaimed on August 7, 1949.

In addition to the DI/TII Islamic ideology, the Dutch colonialism as a foreign power which upheld capitalism-imperialism had the ambition to return to power in Indonesia after Indonesia's independence in 1945. In Tasikmalaya, West Java, the ambition of the Dutch colonialism to control or recolonize Indonesia was realized by forming the Pasundan State as a puppet state on April 24, 1948.²⁶ By forming such puppet state, the Dutch colonialism still held power in Indonesia, especially in Tasikmalaya by appointing Wali Negara Pasundan, led by Wiranata Kusumah. In fact, the formation of the Pasundan State had even increased the intensity of violence and social rebellion by DI/TII in Tasikmalaya.

Prior to the proclamation of the NII by Kartosuwirjo on August 7, 1949, a year earlier in 1948, DI/TII in East Priangan, Tasikmalaya and Garut had conducted a series of rebellions and murder to individuals, groups and religious institutions who were considered to have betrayed the religion, state and nation. This included any individuals, groups and religious institutions who rejected the idea proposed by DI/TII in relation to Islamic ideology or an Islamic state. *Kiai* and Islamic boarding schools in Tasikmalaya, which had many followers, *santri* (students) and community members were among the targets of rebellion and murder. For this reason, there was a sweeping of *kiai* and *pesantren* in Tasikmalaya.

3. Responses and Rejection of *Kiai* to Puppet State Formed by the Dutch and DI/TII Movement in Tasikmalaya

Some of *kiai* and *pesantren* that became the targets of rebellion and murder by DI/TII were K.H. Ruhiyat, the leader of the Cipasung Islamic Boarding School in Tasikmalaya and K.H. Abdullah Mubarok, also known as Abah Sepuh from the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School. Both of them were influential figures in Tasikmalaya. In addition to being the founder and leader of the Cipasung Islamic Boarding School, K.H. Ruhiyat was a former Rois Syuriah NU in Tasikmalaya Regency and the most respected figure among *kiai* in Tasikmalaya, particularly in Singaparna. He had a network with other *kiai* in Singaparna and Tasikmalaya through regular recitation of the *Ihya Ulumuddin* book held every Wednesday morning. This recitation was attended by *kiai* and *ajengan* (respected figures) from various regions in Singaparna, Leuwisari and Tasikmalaya. Therefore, he had quite deep-rooted influence among the community in Singaparna and its surroundings in Tasikmalaya Regency.

Meanwhile, in addition to being the founder and leader of the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School in Tasikmalaya, K.H. Abdullah Mubarok was also the leader of the Qodiriyah

²⁶ Holk H. Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo "Angan-Angan yang Gagal," (Jakarta : Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), p. 74.



²⁵ C. Van Dijk, *Darul Islam, Sebuah Pemberontakan*, (Jakarta : PT. Utama Grafiti, Fourth Edition, 1955), p. 1.



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wa Naqsyabandiyah (TQN) Islamic Boarding School, which had many followers both from Tasikmalaya and outside Tasikmalaya. The TQN network as *Muktabaroh tarekat* was widespread among the community in Tasikmalaya, Cirebon, West Java.

DI/TII under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo conducted sweeping and death threats against *kiai* and *pesantren* in Tasikmalaya. K.H. Ruhiyat and K.H. Abdullah Mubarok, as two of the most influential *pesantren kiai* at that time, also received death threats because both of them rejected and opposed the idea to establish an Islamic state or Islamic ideology as state ideology. In fact, they rejected the idea diplomatically by giving clear reasons. K.H. Ruhiyat rejected it because he believed that it was not the correct time and context for the Indonesian people to go for *jihad* by establishing an Islamic state, as proposed by DI/TII under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo. According to K.H. Ruhiyat, *jihad* can be done through education by developing Islamic boarding schools and establishing Islamic schools. In addition, Indonesia had become an independent country with Pancasila as the state philosophy, so it was not necessary to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia even though Islamic law was to be used as the ideology.

Meanwhile, the reason why K.H. Abdullah Mubarok refused to join DI/TII and uphold the ideology of Islamic state was because he believed that Pancasila was the result of the consensus of the Indonesian nation, through its founding fathers who represented various groups, backgrounds, religions and ethnicities. In addition, he also believed that the Islamic state proposed by DI/TII which was established by Kartosuwirjo was only the idea imposed by individuals and separatist groups instead of the result of a consensus.²⁷


Due to such rejection and the fact that Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School was pro TNI and NKRI, in 1949, the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School became the target of DI/TII attacks. DII/TII sporadically attacked the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School using heavy and light weapons 38 times. They aimed to kill Kiai Abdullah Mubarok and burn down the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School. To fight against this attack, Kiai Abdullah Mubarok sent and armed his *santri* and ordered them to join the TNI Siliwangi Division.

DI/TII troops in 1950 entered the Cipasung Islamic Boarding School to search for Kiai Rukhiat. Inside the *pesantren*, they surrounded Kiai Rukhiat's house and some of them broke into his house and bedroom. At that time, Kiai Rukhiat was resting in his bedroom. They forced him to go with them to Mount Cupu, the DI/TII hideout in the border between Tasikmalaya and Garut, West Java. In their opinion, joining DI/TII to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia was a part of *Jihad fi Sabilillah*. They also threatened if Kiai Rukhiat was not willing to join DI/TII to go to Mount Cupu, they would burn down the Cipasung Islamic Boarding School. In fact, Kiai Rukhiat refused to join the DI/TII because he still believed that it was not the correct time to go for *jihad*. After receiving this rejection, the DI/TII troops then carried him from his bed. However, they could not carry him because it was as if he was so heavy,²⁸ so they failed to bring Kiai Rukhiat to Mount Cupu.

4. Rejecting DI/TII as Moderation Attitude Shown by Kiai in Tasikmalaya

In the context of *kiai* and *pesantren* in Tasikmalaya, the moderation attitude of Kiai Rukhiyat and Kiai Abdullah Mubarak was shown by rejecting the two extreme ideologies (right-wing and left-wing ideologies): the Islamic ideology proposed by DI/TII which imposed them to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia and the colonial ideology (capitalism and imperialism). As the middle way and moderation attitude, both of them upheld Pancasila as the state philosophy, which had been agreed upon by a consensus as the state philosophy of Indonesia. This is the meaning of how Islamic moderation is a middle way or moderation

²⁸ Nurul Hak, Perubahan Sosial Pesantren di Tasikmalaya Pada Paroh Pertama Abad ke-20 (1905-1950), A Thesis of the Department of History Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2003, p.193.



²⁷ R.H. Untung Sunardjo, *Sejarah Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya*, p. 31.



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attitude, by upholding Pancasila and maintaining the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia based on the consensus of the founding fathers, without being trapped by the Islamic ideology symbols imposed by DI/TII in Tasikmalaya.

Although both the two kiai and Kartosuwirjo as the founder of DI/TII were Muslims and both had organizational backgrounds, namely NU organization for Kiai Rukhivat and Kiai Abdullah Mubarok and they met in the Masjumi political party, in terms of state ideology, it seems that Kiai Rukhiyat and Kiai Abdullah Mubarok, as pesantren kiai, had a strong nationalism. This fact also emphasizes that *pesantren* as an Islamic educational institution and kiai as the central figure of *pesantren* and society serve as a miniature of Islamic moderation in Indonesia. This can be seen from the attitude of these pesantren kiai who showed their Islamic moderation in facing and responding to the two big challenges during the Physical Revolution. As stated by Syamsun Ni'am, the fact that *pesantren* is a miniature of Islamic moderation is relevant to the fact of the struggles of the two above-mentioned kiai in facing the two extreme forces, namely The Dutch whose ambition was to recolonize Indonesia by establishing a puppet state in Tasikmalaya, and DI/TII led by Kartosuwirjo whose ambition was to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia. In fact, there are at least three factors for the moderation attitude of the two *pesantren kiai*. First, the two *kiai* loved the country and had a deep-rooted nationalism which was in line with Islamic teachings. This fact can also be understood from the struggles of kiai and ulama against the Dutch colonialism and their struggle for the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, *pesantren* had heterodoxy traditions and doctrines, reflected in the teaching and learning processes in *pesantren* which used various sources and books. Instead of only using the Koran and hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, they also used the yellow books written by many Islamic scholars in various scientific disciplines. Third, Pancasila as the state philosophy was the result of a consensus of various national figures who represented various religions, cultures, ethnicities and races, in line with Islamic teachings.

5. Impacts of Kiai Rukhiyat and Kiai Abdullah Mubarok's Rejection

The moderation attitude shown by the two kiai by rejecting the Puppet State established by the Dutch and DI/TII led by Kartosuwirjo in Tasikmalaya had brought at least three implications. First, in the context of the local history in Tasikmalaya, the attitudes of the two kiai had an implication where the Islamic community in Tasikmalaya in particular and West Java in general also rejected the ideology introduced by DI/TII, preventing this right-wing ideology from spreading in Tasikmalaya. Further, this ideology gradually disappeared. This is because Kiai Rukhiyat and Kiai Abdullah Mubarok were two pesantren kiai with significant influences among the people in Tasikmalaya, so the fact that kiai were a central figure and the role model of community was still relevant in Tasikmalaya. Second, in the middle of the 20th century, pesantren in Tasikmalaya became a miniature of Islamic moderation in Indonesia. This is in line with a statement by Syamsun Ni'am that pesantren is a miniature of Islamic moderation in Indonesia,²⁹ which had been proven in the history of Islam in Indonesia, for examples in the context of the Cipasung and Suryalaya Islamic Boarding Schools in Tasikmalaya during the Physical Revolution. Third, at the national level, the rejection of the two kiai had also brought a positive implication, i.e. protecting the Republic of Indonesia as a unitary state and Pancasila as the state philosophy from various threats, both from DI/TII who wanted to change the state ideology to Islamic ideology and from the Dutch and their allies who wanted to recolonize Indonesia. Therefore, both of them were a part of Indonesian fighters who had a crucial role in maintaining Indonesia's independence from the Dutch colonialism and their allies and the integrity of Pancasila from being undermined by DI/TII. Based on these

²⁹ Syamsun Ni'am, "Pesantren : The Miniature of Moderate Islam in Indonesia," in Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societes, Vol V, No. 1, Juni 2015, p. 125.





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two roles, it is clear that Islamic moderation in the context of *kiai* and *pesantren* in Tasikmalaya is closely related to the struggle to protect the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila from both internal and external ideological threats, namely the threats brought by the Dutch and DI/TII. In the study of local history of Islam in Tasikmalaya, the roles of the two *kiai* were also closely related to the national history during the Physical Revolution.

C. CONCLUSION

Islamic moderation in the context of local history in Tasikmalaya during the Physical Revolution was unique for two reasons. First, in the context of the two *pesantren kiai* in Tasikmalaya, namely Kiai Abdullah Mubarok and Kiai Rukhiyat, and two internal ideological forces, namely DI/TII founded by Kartosuwirjo and the external ideological forces of the Dutch imperialism whose ambition was to recolonize Indonesia after Indonesia's independence in 1945. In this context, the two *kiai* played a role in rejecting the two forces. Second, in terms of their decision, the fact that both of them preferred to uphold Pancasila as the state philosophy was a manifestation of Islamic moderation.

With the roles of the two *kiai* in Tasikmalaya, during the Physical Revolution *kiai* not only served as the leader of *pesantren* and religious leader of their community, but also served as drivers of national movement who had significant contribution to the socio-politics of the nation in maintaining the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila as the state philosophy. This also indicates that Kiai Abdullah Mubarok and Kiai Rukhiat were able to demonstrate Islamic moderation as a miniature of the life of being a part of the nation and state through socio-political and socio-cultural roles in dealing with the ideological threats brought by DI/TII and the Dutch.

The roles of the two above-mentioned *kiai* had some local implications, i.e. weakening the power of DI/TII and weakening the power of the puppet state established by the Dutch because what they did was followed by the people in Tasikmalaya, i.e. opposing DI/TII and followed by the elite government in Tasikmalaya by separating from the puppet state. In addition, the national implication of the role of these *kiai* was to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila from being undermined and threatened by the Dutch and DI/TII.

