



# POLITICS, ULAMA AND NARRATIVES ON NATIONHOOD: Fragmentation of Religious Authority in Indonesian Cities

Noorhaidi Hasan, Suhaidi, Najib Kailani, Munirul Ikhwan,  
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Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta

**POLITICS, ULAMA, AND NARRATIVES OF NATIONHOOD:  
Fragmentation of Religious Authority in Indonesian Cities**

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# TRANSLITERATION

## Konsonan

|   |    |   |    |    |           |
|---|----|---|----|----|-----------|
| ء | '  | ز | z  | ك  | k         |
| ا | a  | س | s  | ل  | l         |
| ب | b  | ش | sy | م  | m         |
| ت | t  | ص | sh | ن  | n         |
| ث | ts | ض | dh | و  | w         |
| ج | j  | ط | th | ه  | h         |
| ح | ḥ  | ظ | zh | ي  | y         |
| خ | kh | ع | '  | ال | al and 'l |
| د | d  | غ | gh | ة  | ah        |
| ذ | dz | ف | f  |    |           |
| ر | r  | ق | q  |    |           |

## Vokal

|         |    |   |       |   |   |
|---------|----|---|-------|---|---|
| Panjang | آ  | ā | Short | ا | a |
|         | إي | ī |       | ي | i |
|         | أو | ū |       | و | u |

|       |    |                |         |    |   |
|-------|----|----------------|---------|----|---|
| Dobel | يـ | iy (akhiran ī) | Diftong | أي | ع |
|       | وـ | uw (akhiran ū) |         | أو | ع |



## PREFACE

Post-1998 democratization provides a platform for new figures from various educational, professional, and ideological backgrounds to participate in contesting the position of Islam in the state and society of Indonesia. These new figures offered new religious discourse and habitus and pushed public welfare issues and interpretations of Islam into a public discussion. They opened the debate about the relation between religion and the state which was considered 'the end' with a variety of alternative offers which were popularized through public spheres, such as schools, campuses, mosques, *taklim* (Islamic forum) assemblies, radio, television, internet, and social media. However, this does not mean that old religious figures withdraw themselves from the public stage. Developments in the public spheres show the contestation of authority between religious figures who compete for public influence, and the state, in this case, follows closely the growing discourse among figures called "*ulama*" to be considered in determining policy and political direction.

This book reviews the dynamics of religious politics and perceptions of the ideas of the modern nation-state and derivative concepts such as tolerance, citizenship, and nonviolence by emphasizing attention to local dynamics. With a focus on research in 15 cities (Medan, Jakarta, Bandung, Surakarta, Makassar - which represent the metropolitan city of Islam - Banda Aceh, Padang, Surabaya, Palangka Raya, Banjarmasin - which represent the city with the tradition of mainstream scholars - Pontianak, Denpasar, Ambon, Manado, and Kupang - which represent cities with distinctive Muslim minority issues), this study wants to see the extent to which local social, political and religious contexts influence the

views of Islamic scholars who are important political agents in a climate of populist democracy related to the relationship between religion and the nation, the politic system, and the relationships among citizens.

The local context of each city presents diverse and interesting dynamics that are not always congruent with the national political and religious context. The imagination, argumentation, and reservation of ulama (Islamic scholars) on the idea of nation-state in each city are influenced by a distinctive intellectual, ideological, political, social, and religious background. The national context naturally influences local dynamics at a certain level, especially in cities where ulama and their communities follow national political and religious issues.

This book is one of the products from surveys and research on the perceptions of ulama about nation-states conducted by researchers from the Center for the Study of Islamic Democracy and Peace (PusPIDeP) and the Postgraduate Program of UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. This research is part of the Indonesian CONVEY Program initiated by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

Before the field research was conducted, several workshops were held to finalize the theory, instruments, and research methods. Qualitative instrument workshops were held in Surakarta in August 2018 by inviting several speakers including Yusuf Rahman, Jajang Jahroni, Ema Marhumah, Jazilus Sakho ‘, and Syamsul Arifin, representatives from Convey-UNDP-PPIM Utami Sandyarani, Dirga Maulana, and Sachiko Kareki. This workshop emphasizes the need to hold a workshop specifically for quantitative instruments which were not actually included in the proposed plan. However, for the success and the smoothness of research, a quantitative instrument workshop was finally held in Yogyakarta by inviting speakers, namely Ismatu Ropi, Miftahun Ni'mah Suseno, and Maria Widagdo. This workshop also emphasized the implementation of a national consolidation workshop by inviting representatives of research assistants from 15 cities. The workshop held in Yogyakarta aims to establish communication and understanding with local assistants regarding the strategies and ways of research work in the field.

The study involved 15 main researchers from diverse fields of Islamic studies and social sciences: Islamic politics, urban Muslim anthropology, inter-faith studies, study of the Koran and hadith, Middle Eastern studies, Salafism, minority studies, Islamic law, social work, and psychology. The

field research took place from September to October 2018. To improve the analysis, the workshop on the results of the research was held in Surakarta by inviting several speakers, including Prof. Al Makin, Saiful Umam, and Jaya Dani Mulyanto. To finalize local reports, one workshop was held in the same city.

Before this book was published, the results of the research were presented in two cities, Makassar and Banda Aceh in November and December 2018 by inviting resource persons Prof. Kadir Ahmad, Wahyuddin Halim, Fuad Jabali, and Reza Indria, before finally being launched in Jakarta in January 2019 by inviting keynote speakers Prof. Jamhari Makruf and Ahmad Suaedy. The seminar results of this research are important not only to share the research findings, but also to get responses and input from experts, scholars, and society in general. This feedback and input are certainly an important consideration for us in writing this book. This book is expected to be able to contribute to reading perceptions, arguments, and reservations of ulama in seeing the ideas of the modern nation-state, especially in the context of populist democracy.

This research is a result from the contribution, hard work, and dedication of the 15 researchers, namely Noorhaidi Hasan (Surakarta), Suhadi (Denpasar), Najib Kailani (Palangka Raya), Munirul Ikhwan (Bandung), Moch Nur Ichwan (Banda Aceh), Muhammad Yunus (Medan), Euis Nurlaelawati (Jakarta), Roma Ulinnuha (Padang), Ibnu Burdah (Surabaya), Sunarwoto (Pontianak), Ahmad Rafiq (Banjarmasin), Rofah Muzakir (Kupang), Nina Mariani Noor (Ambon), Eva Latipah (Manado), and Muhrisun Afandi (Makassar). The success of the research that resulted in the development of this book could not have been conducted if it weren't for the role of the research assistants who have worked hard to help researchers in the field. These assistants are Marzi Afriko, Murni Barus (Banda Aceh), Musdalifah, Rahman Mantu (Manado), Syamsul Arif Galib, Rusdianto R (Makassar), Purjatian Azhar, Muhammad Irfan (Medan), Mhd Yazid, Ujang Wardi (Padang), Muhammad Ihsanul Arief, Nur Qomariyah (Banjarmasin), Muhammad Lutfi Hakim, Rizki Susanto (Pontianak), Supriadi, Muhammad Iqbal (Palangka Raya), Zet A Sandia, Ardiman Kelihu (Ambon), Ahmad Al Amin, Ismaul Fitriyaningsih (Denpasar), Umar Sulaiman, Aziz Marhaban (Kupang), Fahmi Muhammad Ahmadi, Ronni Johan (Jakarta), Cucu Surahman, Mokh. Iman Firmansyah (Bandung), Chafid Wahyudi, Mahbub Ghozali (Surabaya), and Anas Aijudin, Mibtadin (Surakarta).

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Yogyakarta, January 20, 2019



**ULAMA IN ISLAMIC  
METROPOLITAN CITIES:  
Contestation, Media, and Public Conservatism**



# ISLAM AND POWER: Measuring the View of Surakarta Ulama against the Nation

*Noorhaidi Hasan dan Anas Aijudin*

Ulama are important figures that characterize the religious, social, political, and national dynamics of Indonesia from time to time. The trace of their involvement in rolling the national discourse can be seen long before Indonesia's independence. In the *Alim Ulama* National Assembly in 1935 in Banjarmasin, for example, ulama who joined the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) explicitly issued a fatwa that Indonesia would later stand as "Darussalam", a safe and peaceful country. Likewise, when various events occurred before independence, the ulama had become the cornerstone of the teachers and layers of the foundation of Indonesia's national ideology. The role of K.H. Wahid Hasyim (NU), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah) and Kasman Singodimejo (Masyumi), to name a few figures, were very important in encouraging negotiations which eventually led to Pancasila being established as the basis of the Indonesian state.

The success of the ulama in playing the politics of nationality cannot be separated from their ability to spread religious ideas and knowledge through planting habitus. As "a system that is durable, disposable, structures that function in structuring structures", habitus guides a person to act or not to act. It becomes embedded social values and is built through a long-term socialization process (*longue-durée*). Habitus is a principle that "produces and regulates practices and representations that can be adjusted objectively without assuming the ultimate goal and/or revealing the mastery of operations needed to achieve them" (Bourdieu 1995). In other words, habitus is a structure that is accepted through the experience of figures in internalizing the objective structure of the social world.

Ulama produce religious knowledge in a broad sense, not only covering theology, morals, *fiqh* (*Fiqh* is an Islamic jurisprudence. *Fiqh* is often described as the human understanding of the sharia, that is human understanding of the divine Islamic law as revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah), and proposals of *fiqh*, but also all kinds of performative and non-discursive knowledge, as well as other forms of knowledge, including prayer, rituals, and worship practices. Putting religion as discourse (Asad 1986) and the practice of mediation (Meyer 2006; van Bruinessen 2003), it is impossible to separate the discursive and non-discursive dimensions and ignore the reciprocal interactions between the dimensions of discursive and non-discursive knowledge production. Moreover, there is a complex and interrelated relationship between the production of knowledge and power. Michel Foucault (1980) explains how modern society can reduce power from knowledge, and vice versa. The knowledge possessed by individuals can create power like a spreading network. Foucault uses the term genealogy to refer to intellectuality and local memories that allow us to build historical knowledge about the struggle of life and use that knowledge tactically in everyday life.

This article aims to examine how ulama perceive and understand the nation-state. Closely connected with Islamism (Kepel 2006), the perceptions and understanding of ulama about the nation-state, in turn, determine the ways they produce discourses and knowledge that are disseminated to the public and habituated through social practice. This dynamic will be seen specifically in the context of Surakarta, a city that attracts the attention of observers and researchers. In this city, a variety of radical movements and terrorist organizations grew after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. Examples include the Surakarta Islamic Youth Front (FPIS), Solo Islamic Army (LUIS), Laskar Hizbullah, Laskar Jundullah, and the most phenomenal, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which is considered responsible for acts of terrorism in Southeast Asia (Abuza 2003; Pavlova 2007).

As explained by Muhammad Wildan (2013), the combination of historical, sociological, and economic-political factors has an important role in fostering radical movements and organizations in Solo. Wildan specifically points to Solo's peculiarities related to ethnicity, economy, and religion. For him, the intensity of *da'wah* encouraged the instant process of a lower class of *abangan* which was economically, socially, and politically deteriorating amidst the middle-class growth and industrialization. They finally chose Islam as a way out of economic, social, and political agitation that was felt and involved in radical movements.

### ULAMA IN THE DYNAMICS OF SURAKARTA HISTORY

The role of the ulama certainly cannot be ignored in coloring the social and economic dynamics of Surakarta. They grow to become important agents of change who actively respond to various developments and problems that develop in the community, including when facing crucial moments related to the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia which adheres to the nation-state system. Surakarta is one of the kingdoms that has the sovereignty and tradition of independent power before deciding to join the Republic of Indonesia (Djoebagio 2017). The efforts of the ulama to develop nationalistic-style Islamic education in Surakarta seemed to play a significant role in waging a nationalist discourse that strengthened the process of integrating Surakarta Sultanate into the Republic of Indonesia.

In the Surakarta Sultanate constitutional system, the ulama is an important pillar that occupies the position of “*Tafsir Anom*”, the king’s advisor in matters of religion and other matters. *Tafsir Anom* is a respected religious official position. Prof. K.H. Muhammad Adnan, who once held this position, was known as a charismatic ulama who was productive in writing books in various scientific fields, such as interpretations, jurisprudence, Sufism, philosophy, and education and was active in developing religious-based education in Indonesia. In his capacity as an advisor, *Tafsir Anom* certainly gave suggestions that inspired Sunan Pakubuwana X to establish the Mambaul Ulum Madrasah in 1913. The aim was to become the center of Islamic religious education in Surakarta and automatically become a place for ulama candidates. From Mambaul Ulum, there were great ulama like K.H. Ali Darokah (Al-Islam), K.H. Syaifuddin Zuhri, K.H. Masykur, K.H. Munawir Syadzali (Minister of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia), Prof. K.H. Muhammad Adnan (Al-Muayyad), and Prof. Baiquni (Atomic Expert). They are avant-garde ulama who have a large role in the history of Surakarta, and even Indonesia.

The development of the Mambaul Ulum madrasa along with the establishment of the Islamic Trade Union (SDI), led by H. Samanhudi. SDI is an organization that brings together Muslim entrepreneurs who share the ideals of the struggle to strengthen the economy among the natives. Although SDI is an entrepreneur’s organization, the role of the ulama is considered to be vital. The organization later developed into the *Sarekat Islam* (SI) in 1912 under the leadership of HOS. Cokroaminoto (Latif 2006). Following the birth of SI, in 1914 the communist *Sarekat*

People's Movement (SR) emerged. Led by H. Misbach, a famous mubalig (Islamic preacher), the movement tried to pressure the Surakarta Sunanate Palace and the colonial government to take a stand with the welfare of the community (Djoebagio 2017).

Among traditionalist ulama, in 1918 K.H. Mansyur Giri Kusumo founded the Popongan Islamic Boarding School, Tegalgondo Klaten, which developed the *Thariqah Naqsabandiyah Khalidiyah*. In a relatively short period of time, the pesantren had succeeded in printing young *kyais* (Islamic scholar) who later established Islamic boarding schools in various regions in Surakarta. One of them is K.H. Umar Abdul Manan, who founded Al Muayyad Mangkuyudan Islamic Boarding School in 1947. The school grew rapidly and brought forth to a few branches, such as Al-Muayyad Windan Makamhaji Islamic Boarding School, Al-Barokah Juwiring, Siroju Tholibin Brabu Grobogan, Al-Wustho Mangkunegaran, Walisongo Sragen, Miftahul Ulum Karanganyar, and Al Istiqomah Kartasura Sukoharjo.

Modernist ulama also established Islamic boarding schools and colleges, even before their traditionalist counterparts. K.H. Imam Ghozali, for example, founded the Jamsaren Islamic Boarding School and the Al Islam Islamic College Foundation in the 1920s. This college has an education program that combines religious and general knowledge and it still exist until now with 27 branches spread throughout Surakarta and the surrounding districts. The education is organized from kindergarten, junior high school, MTs, MA, high school, and *madrasah diniyah*. The same educational model was also developed by K.H. Naharus Surur in the 1970s who founded the Takmirul Islamic Boarding School, Laweyan Solo. Just like the Jamsaren Madrasah, Takmirul Islam also organized education with a modern pattern, a combination of boarding and modern education.

A new development took place in 1972 when Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who at that time were affiliated with the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), established the Al-Mukmin Ngruki Islamic Boarding School. This Islamic boarding school developed rapidly and soon became known as the center of Islamic activism which actively suggested the discourse about the establishment of an Islamic state while opposing the government and the power system in Indonesia. The thoughts and movements of the two jihadi-style founding ulama resounded, even more, when the narrative of dissatisfaction and resistance to Suharto's rule began to take shape in the late 1970s. Involvement in

NII finally led them to the court. To avoid arrest, they fled to Malaysia, where they began to draw up the power to establish JI. Their progress in Indonesia has again gotten a momentum when the post-reform political structure is open. Together with other Islamists such as Muhammad Thalib, Irfan S. Awwas, and Sobarin Syakur, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) in August 2000, which aimed to encourage the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia (Jamhari 2004). They also did not hesitate to demand the replacement of the nation-state system with the Caliphate.

However, this togetherness did not last long due to different views on the concept of leadership among the congregation inside MMI. The peak occurred in 2007 when some of them separated themselves and formed the Jamaat Ansarul Tauhid (JAT). The emergence of ISIS in 2014 made the JAT once again divided into two: the Ansharu Khilafah (JAK) Jamaah who declared *bai'at* (a term for the appointment or appointment ceremony of a leader) to ISIS, and the Ansaryu Syariah Jamaah (JAS) which refused to support the al-Qaeda terrorist organization (Cf. Jones 2005; Oak 2010; Solahudin 2013). Both followers of JAK and JAS consider Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as an important and respected figure.

Other modernist ulama who are quite important are Abdullah Thufail Saputra, a preacher and batik trader who succeeded in establishing the Qur'anic Interpretation Assembly (MTA) Foundation in 1972. Centered on Jl. Ronggowarsito Mangkunegaran, MTA brings the understanding of Islamic purification with a call back to the Qur'an and Sunnah. At present MTA is led by Ahmad Sukina, Abdullah Thufail's direct student. Until 2018, MTA has grown widely, owning several network media; radio, television, and magazine.

Meanwhile, Abdullah Marzuki, a contemporary ulama with Abdullah Sungkar and Abdullah Thufail, founded the As-Salam Modern Islamic Boarding School and the Tiga Serangkai printing press in Surakarta. This Islamic boarding school has a modern curriculum design that incorporated the Islamic curriculum with a general curriculum while developing a purely Islamic design, but acceptable to local culture and expressing tolerance. Currently Assalam Islamic Boarding School has developed rapidly, successfully establishing Goro Assalam Shopping Center, Tiga Serangkai printing center, health center, pharmacy, and various other modern business branches.

Arab descendant ulama in Solo are equally important in developing Islamic da'wah. In general, Arab descendants were divided into Ar-

Rabithah and Al-Irshad. Ar-Rabithah, which brought together ulama from *alawiyin*, tended to develop traditional patterns, while Al-Ershad, which brought together non-*alawiyin* ulama, was close to the tradition of purification. Both groups of Arab descendants each have Islamic education institutions based in Pasar Kliwon. Ar-Rabithah owned the Ar-Rabithah Al-Alawiyah school under the Diponegoro Educational Foundation, while Al-Ershad established a school called Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah. Some of the prominent Arab ulama in Solo today include Alif Basamol (Chairman of Al-Ershad), Habib Syeh bin Abdul Qodir Assegaf (Majelis Ahbabul Mustafa), and Habib Naufal Alaydrus (Majelis Arraudah).

In the 1980s a map of Islamic activism in Solo developed more complex with the presence of the Tarbawi and Salafi movements. Tarbawi, who was developed by Egyptian alumni with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (IM), entered Solo by building small groups called halaqoh in various universities, especially Sebelas Maret University Surakarta (UNS). While the Salafi was developed by LIPIA alumni and universities and Islamic study institutions in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Divided into haraki, apolitical and jihadi patterns (Wiktorowicz 2006; Muhtadi 2012; Fealy 2012), they built ma'had (an Islamic tertiary institution based on the pesantren) and Islamic teachings around Cemani and other areas in Surakarta. In tertiary institutions, Tarbawi conducted a regeneration process through the Student Association of Indonesian Muslim Student Action Organization (KAMMI) and the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK). High militancy is a factor in their success in developing themselves. The Tarbawi movement is noted to have developed not only at the UNS, but also at the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta (UMS), Surakarta IAIN, Surakarta Mambaul Ulum (IIM) Islamic Institute, Islamic Batik University (UNIBA), Surakarta University (UNSA), Universitas Slamet Riyadi (UNISRI) and other campuses. Many KAMMI and LDK activists became sympathizers and even administrators of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

While the Salafi movement developed through educational institutions and boarding schools. Ahmas Fais Asifudin, Abdul Malik, Muhammad Na'im, Ayip Asifudin, Khalid Syamhudi, and Aris Sugiantoro were important figures behind the establishment of Imam Bukhari Gondangrejo Islamic Boarding School, Al-Ukhuwah Sukoharjo, Ibnu Abas Masaran, Al-Madinah Simo Foundation, Ibnu Foundation Taimiyah Grogol, Ittibaussunnah Klaten, Darussalaf Sumberlawang, and

Al-Ausat Jati Karanganyar. These *pesantren* developed the Salafi ideologies that are centered on the doctrine of *tashfiyah* (self-cleansing) and *tarbiyah* (education). Besides through education, Salafis also developed their ideology through media channels, such as magazines, newsletters, books, radio, and television.

### REFUSING THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM

Based on an understanding of the historical complexity and map of religious movements that developed in Surakarta as described above, and the competition for gaining authority, it is not surprising that almost one-third of Surakarta ulama have a view of rejecting nation-states with varying degrees of resistance, radicals to extremes. They can be referred to as opposition ulama, borrowing the term Zaman (2002, 180) who actively campaigned for the enforcement of sharia and even the Caliphate. Among them, there is a sizeable number, namely 4 out of 30 scholars, rejecting the nation-state to the extreme. While those who reject radically also 4, and exclusively 1 cleric.

Those who reject, extremely justify the path of violence as an alternative to the rejection. Their presence intersected with groups that developed the jihadist understanding. While those who reject radically believe that there is no room at all for Muslims to recognize the system of nation-states even though they do not justify the path of violence. Ulama who refuse exclusively still provide little space for the nation-state even though in principle they could not accept the existence of the system. In the context of social reality, ulama from these three categories interact with each other and often have conflicting views, although at some point disputes in terms of strategy embody their respective ideological views. The boundaries between categories are very thin.

The description above was obtained from surveys and interviews with 30 ulama from various organizations and religious tendencies, including NU and Muhammadiyah, and various organizations affiliated with both, plus MUI, LUIS, *Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang*, *Jamaah Al-Islah Gumuk*, *Laskar Pemuda Ka ' bah Mega Bintang Solo*. Four respondents were women who were active in Muhammadiyah, Muslimat NU, and the Campus Da'wah Institute. Most have bachelor, master, and even doctorate degrees, except for seven respondents who only completed formal education until high school. They all have the capacity to be ulama because they are active in various religious studies or religious movements which are followed by hundreds or even thousands of followers.

Outside of the nine ulama, there are twenty (20) ulama, or two-thirds of ulama, who accept nation-states with varying levels of acceptance. They can be referred to as establishment ulama (Zaman 2002, 180). Three of them accept nation-states with progressive, inclusive-level acceptability, 15 with moderate acceptability and two with conservative acceptability. However, as guards of religious orthodoxy, they generally try to be careful when contextualizing their religious ideas with the present situation. This is certainly inseparable from the atmosphere of rejection of the nation-state which resonates quite widely in Surakarta and is supported by the existence of oppositionist ulama who at the same time try to continually expand their base of influence among the people. One of the remaining respondents was not identified.

### ISLAM AS DĪN WA DAULAH

Ulama who reject the nation-state generally believe in the unity between Islam and power (*din wa daulah*). This view they developed in a more ideological direction, such as the obligation of purely monotheism, *walā' wa barā'*, following the principle of *ḥākimiyyah*, and the obligation to jihad. Voiced in the framework of the struggle to save the ummah from immorality (*al-amr bi 'l-ma'rūf wa 'l-nahy 'ani 'l-munkar*; Jawas 2012), they believe Islam is a religion built on *tauhid*, which includes *rubūbiyyah*, *ulūhiyyah*, and *asmā' wa 'l-ṣifāt*. Tawhid for them means that Allah is the Creator who must be worshiped and glorified. In the sociological realm, this view demands the regulation of life in the world with laws that have been revealed by God, and reject all ideologies of human creation, be they Pancasila, capitalism, communism, socialism, and others, all of which are considered as pagan systems.

In terms of leadership, these ulama wanted a model of Imam leadership, which has absolute authority, as well as the realization of God's will. Accepting the model of Imam leadership is seen as evidence of consistently following the principle of *al-walā' wa al-barā'*. Muslims are forbidden 'to anyone except to Allah, through the implementation of Islam kaffah and reject the existence of *walā'* in the nation-state and other forms of government outside the sharia system. They also want a single interpretation in understanding Islam, leaving aside the reality of diversity that exists in each locality of the Muslim community. This single interpretation then forms a homogeneous religious pattern. For example, when responding to Ahmadis and Shiites, they believe both are heretical and misleading, even seen as a real threat to Islam.

Such a single interpretation also affects the rejection of pluralism that exists in people's lives. As a discourse born in a democratic system, pluralism is seen as a notion taught by the West to destroy the faith of Muslims. This thought encouraged them to believe that there are restrictions on the basic rights of citizens and the rejection of non-Muslim leaders. They consider non-Islamic citizens to be put into two categories; namely the infidel *dzimmī* or the infidel *ḥarbī* who must always be controlled by the Muslim rulers. The totality of the Islamic system for ulama with extreme views must be fought to achieve the glory of Muslims.

As the culmination of the Islamic understanding of the ulama is the obligation of jihad among Muslims. Following the views of Azzam Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda ideology, they believe that jihad is the main practice for Muslims, more than prayer, zakat, fasting or other hajj and worship (Azzam 2016). Jihad in this context is interpreted as a total battle against the enemies of Islam, which allows Muslims to do anything to achieve victory (Ba'asyir 2011; Mahmud 2017). So far there have been two targets for their jihad, namely the West, which has been regarded as always hostile to Muslims, and the Indonesian government which is considered as a pagan and *thagbut* government. These ulama also require the existence of *i'dād* in preparation for real jihad. Still following Azzam's (2016) view, they believe *i'dād* must be carried out thoroughly, starting in schools, mosques, homes to military camps.

#### **VIOLENCE AS A SOCIAL PROTEST**

In the Surakarta city context, the thought of ulama who rejected the nation-state by endorsing the use of violence to actualize ideological and political visions that were built on three main factors, namely, historical, social, and religious activism. Through long dynamics, intertwined with social, economic, and political changes in Surakarta, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has become a symbol of the marginal resistance to the state. Consistency and a strong vision of the obligation to establish an Islamic state as an alternative to a democratic country made Abu Bakar Ba'asyir able to attract many followers from the lower middle class and persevered as the main authority of various jihadist organizations which were transverse in Surakarta. These include *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), *Jamaah Ansharu Taubid* (JAT), and *Jamaah Ansharu Khilafah* (JAK).

The discourse of resistance to the state that resonates among ulama is more akin to the discourse of resonating social protests that are increasingly

widespread precisely when security forces try to roll up terrorist movements. Through *Densus 88* (anti-terrorist Indonesian law enforcement), they actively arrested terrorist suspects. This law enforcement responded due to the radical Surakarta ulama movement. The ulama acted on the notion that there is proof of the state's arbitrariness against Muslims and how the state prioritizes more on non-Muslims concerns. Radical ulama attribute their claims to, for example, education policies that are liberal, excessive facilities to non-Muslim educational institutions, regulation of the use of loudspeakers in mosques, and protection of groups deemed heretical such as Shia and Ahmadiyah. These ulama see most Muslims being ruled out, while non-Muslims, especially Christians, get privileges.

The accumulation of disappointment then relates to the global jihad discourse as developed by Al-Qaeda with its main enemies, the United States, and the West. When contextualized with local issues such as corruption, economic domination by foreigners, marginalization of Muslims, the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the discourse of global jihad can give rise to the image of martyrdom wrapped in images of heroism and heroism. Not surprisingly, Surakarta has always been a knot of acts of terrorism that took place in the last two decades, from the Bali Bombing I and II, the bombing near the Australian Embassy, Marriott Bombs, and Ritz Carlton Bombs Jakarta, to smaller scale actions, such as the Police Bombing in Cirebon (2012), the Bombing in Polresta Surakarta (2016), the Bombing on Jalan Thamrin Jakarta (2016), and finally the Suicide Bombing in Surabaya (2017).

Like an iceberg, a network of jihadist ulama moves more underground through closed cells. On the surface, they are only seen as several organizations, such as LUIS, an Islamic paramilitary organization that is active in voicing the need to adhere to civil society. Active cells below the surface are far more numerous. Jihadist networks are scattered in various organizations, paramilitary groups, and religious groups around Solo, such as the Ansharu Daulah Center (ADC), Jamaah Ansharu Daulah (JAD), Jahbat Nusrat (JN), and Solo Hisbah Team. The ADC is an important network linking Abu Bakar Ba'asir's thoughts with Islamist activists after the JAT was officially divided into two, Jamaah Ansharu Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Ansharu Syariah (JAS) in 2014. The organization was led by Muhammad Sholeh Ibrahim, an Islamist activist who also works as a teacher at Al Mukmin Ngruki Ponpes.

The ADC actively publishes jihad bulletins distributed around the Cemani area, Pasar Kliwon, Grogol, and Surakarta, containing an

invitation to the public to support changes in the system of government, from the democratic system to being a Khilafah Islamiyah, in which life is managed by God's law, not a man-made law, as they claim.

In addition, there is also the Hisbah Team which actively encourages the establishment of Khilafah Islamiyah in Indonesia. Ideologically the Hisbah Team is close to Al-Qaeda's thinking in Afghanistan. Agus Junaidi, the chairman, also became chairman of Jabhat Nusra (JN) Indonesia, an Al-Qaeda wing organization. In its history, the Hisbah Team has a track record of violence and terrorism. The case of shooting the Singosari Police Station and the bombing of the Solo Kepunthon Church are examples. The group was founded by Sigid Qurdowi, a jihadi activist who was shot dead by Densus 88 in 2012. As a paramilitary organization, the group was also active in carrying out sweeping in what they claim to be *amar makruf nahi munkar* (commanding the good and forbidding the evil).

As well as through JN, extremism also developed among JAD followers (Jamaah Ansharu Daulah). The organization led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir originated from a split in the JAT body because of the choice of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who pledged to support ISIS. While still at the JAT, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had the same thought and saw that this country was a *thaghut* country, which had to be replaced with a Khilafah system. JAD grew through recruiting members in a hidden and neat manner. They also foster several *taklim* assemblies which would then contribute potential cadres to the organization.

Through the Daulah Islamiyah Supporting Forum (FPDI) jihadist activists rallied support for ISIS. FPDI actively campaigned for the Caliphate which was founded by Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi as the only major political force that must be followed by all Muslims. For them, pledging to ISIS is a must for every Muslim, and anyone who does not want to worship will not be considered as a Muslim.

#### **TAKING THE PATH OF DIFFERENT REFUSAL**

The rejection of the nation-state system with a slightly lower level than described above is surprisingly prominent among mainstream scholars. At the level of discourse, ulama who are considered to have exclusive views rejected the concept of the nation-state but did not justify the way of violence in the rejection, while accepting the legitimacy of the ruling government in Indonesia. The rejection was based on the understanding that the nation-state is a Western system imposed on Muslims to make them powerless against Western domination and arbitrariness. While

the government in power gets its power through legitimate elections by the people, is considered to have the legitimacy to govern. There is ambivalence and inconsistency in the perspective of exclusive ulama because it does not completely reject the system of nation-states, but at the same time shows a commitment to fight for the realization of a more Islamic system based on Islamic law.

In general, the issues that have become the pressure of exclusive ulama over the past five years have been the issue of the threat of the Shia and the Indonesian Communist Party. Both issues coincide with the “prosperous mosque” program, which is organized by DSKS, with the aim of cleaning up the views that are seen as deviant. Both issues are basically a means to gain support from the wider community, especially from the military. The issue of the rise of the PKI always appeared every September, where exclusive circles held various activities, such as seminars, recitation, and film operations on the atrocities by PKI in Indonesia. In addition, they also printed pamphlets, bulletins and various posters which essentially condemned the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Indonesia. The anti-PKI issue was appointed by Laskar Hisbullah Sunan Bonang who stated that Indonesia is now in a state of emergency to be influenced by communist ideology. They enter the elements of lower society, developing a discourse that the communists will rise again and carry out power struggles in Indonesia. Apart from the PKI issue, what they questioned was the issue of the threat of the Shia and the Ahmadiyah. Among these exclusive ulama say that Shia and Ahmadiyah are not Islam so they must be fought because their teachings are heretical. The true Islam for them is in line with the *Shari'a* of religion as practiced by the Messenger of Allah and the generation of *al-Salaf al-hāliḥ*. Shia is believed to have tarnished Muslims by slandering, stating companions of the Prophet are infidels, and even disuniting Muslims.

Likewise, Ahmadiyah, both Lahore and Qadian groups, are seen as not part of Islam; cannot be accepted as a Muslim. Although claiming to be Muslims, their Shahada (an Islamic creed, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, declaring belief in the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muhammad as God's prophet) was perverted. Their presence is seen as an attempt to divide the unity and integrity of Muslims in Indonesia. It is not surprisingly that the Ahmadiyah has always been the target of anger and violence since the beginning of the Reformation, as happened in Ciekusik Banten, Parung Bogor, Mataram NTB, and Manis Lor Kuningan.

The objection of exclusive ulama to the nation-state is related to their views on the position of Muslims and non-Muslims. For exclusive circles, the existence of non-Muslims must be respected, including their freedom to worship, but with a record that they may not carry out activities that exceed their rights as a minority before many Muslims. The issue of building permits (IMB) for houses of worship is the entry point for violence that they often do. They often monitor unlicensed churches and even disperse worship activities in malls, homes, and shophouses.

Salafi ulama are also considered as exclusive ulama who always weigh current issues by bringing back the thoughts and vision of the past, without criticizing at all. For example, when looking at the position of non-Muslims in the nation-state government system, they still refer to the concept of infidel *dzimmi* and infidel *harbi* (Jawas 2012). The Salafi group developed in three major nodes, namely the Salafi community which networked with Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Boarding School, which consisted of Al-Ukhuwah Islamic Boarding School Sukoharjo, and Ibnu Abbas Assalafy Masaran Sragen. This network has strong resources, both human, financial and network resources. They communicated quite well with local governments such as in matters of licensing and pursuing compulsory education programs for basic education. They also participated in various activities held by the government, such as the Tilawatil Alquran Selection (STQ), Sports and Art Week (*Porseni*), and other activities.

In contrast to the Salafi network that has ties with the Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Boarding School, the Salafi network connected with the Al-Madinah Foundation developed educational institutions, *taklim* assemblies, and media, including radio and bulletins. In addition to the two networks above, there are Salafi networks which claim to be pure *Salafi*, especially those affiliated with the Ibnu Taymiah Islamic Boarding School in Cemani Sukoharjo, with the main character, Ayip Saefudin, former secretary of the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah Communication Forum (FKWJ). Some of these Salafi networks are the Ittibaussunah Klaten Foundation, Al-Ausath Jaten Karanganyar, and Darus Salaf Gemolong Sragen.

Salafi ulama have a political view that rejects the nation-state system but leaves some space to be accommodated. They see that Indonesia will become prosperous if the *Shari'a* is carried out faithfully through the purification of monotheism and daily worship activities. If not, then the result will only enrich corruption, collusion, and injustice. Therefore,

the solution given is to implement Islamic lawfully in the context of *Indonesianness*. The application is as much as possible endeavored to be able to go through legislation so that it has a strong carrying capacity. In addition, along with radical circles, Salafi ulama also object to the existence of Shiites and Ahmadis in Indonesia. On various occasions, it was stated that these two groups were heretical because they considered friends as infidels, idolized Ali bin Abi Talib, validated the marriage *mu'ah*, and hated Sunnis. Therefore, the network of Salafi *pesantren* sometimes establishes alliances with various paramilitary groups in Solo in many activities, especially anti-Shia and Ahmadiyah campaigns.

Outside of nearly 30 percent of ulama who reject the nation-state system with varying rejection as described above, Surakarta has ulama who accept nation-states with varying levels of acceptance. The number reaches 70 percent. They can be categorized as conservative, moderate, and inclusive ulama. Conservative, moderate, and inclusive differentiation based on the level of their reservation on the nation-state system, with high, medium, and low reservation levels, respectively. In this context, reservations can be understood as part of their efforts to negotiate the limits of rejection and contextualize their existence, especially in the face of a group of ulama who reject the nation-state.

Conservative ulama are understood as ulama who accept the national reality today, such as the NKRI as a system of government, Pancasila as an ideology, accepting diversity of citizens as a social reality, and rejecting violence in solving problems in society. The acceptance of this conservative-minded ulama is accompanied by certain conditions, for example, the NKRI without *Ahmadiyah*, sharia NKRI, NKRI without Shia and others. This conservative scholar, on the one hand, wants to maintain Islamic scientific orthodoxy, but on the other hand, they try to adjust to various developments in society. It is this ambiguous outlook that often makes conservatives feel uneasy in giving verdicts on developing social and religious issues, even most returning to orthodoxy in *fiqh*.

Quantitatively the percentage of conservative ulama in Surakarta is far below the moderate ulama, which reaches 50 percent, although there are still some objections to democratic principles that are sourced from the West. Moderate ulama generally accept the reality of the nation-state. National issues such as the ideology of the Pancasila, the system of the NKRI government, the role of women in the public domain, the issue of permits for places of worship, the rights of the minorities including the belief groups get serious attention. These various problems are weighed

with the great interests of the Indonesian people, by promoting outlooks that uphold national unity above the primordial interests of their religious organizations. In the view of moderate ulama NKRI is the final form of agreement of all elements of the Indonesian nation. This departs from the realization that this country is fought not only by Muslims, but also by all components of the nation. Therefore, the country's most suitable ideology is Pancasila. Pancasila was established as a noble treaty of the Indonesian people so that the existence of this ideology must be maintained.

For moderates, Islamic ideology is a utopia. However, they also reminded that the design of Pancasila should be interpreted as open and dynamic. One must use their common sense so that it does not lead to the sacralization of Pancasila. Learning from the New Order era that defined Pancasila with a single interpretation of government, moderates, on the contrary, encouraged people to have a sense of openness and be pluralistic towards Pancasila. Moderates say that the Indonesian nation must develop into a pluralistic nation, but can manage it as an integrative force. Islam as a blessing for every human being must be practiced in real life. Islam in the view of the ulama is centered on efforts to provide good services and progress for the society.

Moderate ulama reject all forms of violence. As a solution to overcome various problems that arise in society, they emphasize the need for productive dialogue. For example, when there are cases of violations of the church's building permit, they reject ways of violence in resolving the issue, instead they prefer taking legal channels in accordance with the applicable rules. In the view of the moderates, the government that is legitimately elected by the society is a government that is legitimate according to Islamic teachings, not an infidel or *thagbut*. Therefore, the position of this government is the same as *ulil amri* in the Islamic jurisprudence concept, where the government must be obeyed and respected. It really does not whether the leaders are Muslims or non-Muslims, because what is most important is the performance of leaders in guaranteeing the freedom of citizens to develop their potential.

In regards to this condition, moderate ulama appreciate the people of Solo who have set a very good example. In the city of Solo, the head of the government is a non-Muslim, FX. Rudi Hardiatmo, who was elected in the Surakarta Mayor's election in 2016. The election of Rudi Hardiyatmo as mayor could not be avoided by the Islamic community, because the mechanism of democracy had produced this decision. Therefore, Muslims

have to accept and respect the existence of this non-Muslim leader. Moreover, moderates have the principle that all citizens must be fully respected, their rights should not be reduced at all, even if they are not Muslims. They can also become public officials, in accordance with the principles of democracy that require equality of all citizens. Moderates believe that Muslims are also obliged to uphold humanity because it is not merely taught by Islam, but it is the foundation what makes a good Muslim. Therefore, whatever the reasons for all the differences that exist in society must not be resolved by means of violence, whether it is through oppression, persecution, or other acts of violence. Islam for them is a religion of mercy, love of peace and strongly supports harmony and dialogue.

The network of moderate ulama is widespread in Islamic boarding schools, socio-religious organizations, academics, educational institutions, independent associations, professionals, traders, and communities that are very broad beyond the boundaries of class, sex, gender, profession, ethnic background, and education. For example, Assalam Solo Islamic Boarding School, Al-Islam Islamic Boarding School, Takmirul Islamic boarding school, Al-Firdaus Education Foundation, Al-Azhar Educational Institution, Nur Hidayah Educational Foundation, Darul Hidayah Foundation and many more institutions that have moderate views. Ulama groups in this category come from various religious ideological affiliations, both Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, MUI, LDII, and others. They communicate well with the government, and they also have a strong ideological network.

Intersecting with moderate viewers, some Surakarta ulama developed a progressive, inclusive mindset. They not only maneuvered in discourse but arrived at the praxis of the humanitarian movement. In the category of ulama the issue of nationality is a matter of warm discussion, in the corridor of *maqāṣid al-syarī'ah*. Various developing national problems were addressed in a dialogical manner, for example, the issue of civil service among the believers. Scholars in this category have a progressive-inclusive perspective. Ulama in this category encourages countries to attend and provide civil services to all citizens, without discrimination. Likewise, with the issue of gender equality, these inclusive scholars have a more advanced perspective. The female ulama in Solo, for example, think that there are equal rights between men and women in the management of shared public spheres. There should be no male domination over women, and vice versa. The differences in gender roles must be positioned in the

context of a shared consensus between men and women so what emerges is justice.

Most female ulama are classified as inclusive-progressive. They strongly criticized religious patterns among Islamists who pushed women into confinement in domestic space. Female ulama like Hj. Khusniatun (PP. Jamsaren), Hj. Kamila Adnani (PP. Istiqomah), Hj. Lilis Agung Suhada (PP. Singoudiro), Hj. Murtafiah (PP. Al Muayyad Windan), and Hj. Sebah wal Afiat (MT. Jamuri) for example, has given an example that women can also be a driving force of various fields, including in matters of religious education. The female ulama in Solo lead *pondok pesantren*, *majelis taklim*, educational institutions, scholars, entrepreneurs, and other common occupations. These female ulama came out of the confines of a religious understanding that has made women isolated to domestic spaces. From this role, it is seen that female ulama are fighting gender injustice caused by stereotype cultural aspects and misogynistic interpretation models.

Inclusive ulama also consider that the NKRI and the 1945 Constitution are the final forms and noble agreements of the Indonesian people. This agreement may not be changed for any reason, including the offer as an Islamic state. For inclusive ulama, Islamic countries must be maintained as Darussalam, a safe and peaceful country, not Darul Islam, a state that is based on Islam. Even progressive-inclusive ulama tend to reject all forms of Islamic formalization in the country because Islam among these circles must be positioned as social ethics in society so that Islamic substance can be felt by every citizen. The demand for the implementation of the formalization of Islamic law for the progressive-inclusive ulama would underestimate the meaning of Islam itself.

Progressive-inclusive ulama view that Islam must be applied in the context of certain localities. Uniformizing the pattern of Islam will only reduce the meaning of Islam itself. They encourage people to set an example of becoming good neighbors with non-Muslims. The meaning of neighbor is that all people can respect each other and work well together with another religious background. There may be occasional problems, but they will be resolved through dialogues. For these ulama, the government must provide the same services, both to Muslims and non-Muslims, to the extent that they are in accordance with applicable law. This condition is in accordance with the basic rights guaranteed for its existence, namely the rights of religion, the right to life, morality, descent, and work. This shows that there is no conflict between human

rights and Islam, so what must be done is to harmonize human rights and Islam in positive legal instruments in Indonesia. Included in this matter is a guarantee of the freedom of the Shiite minority and Ahmadiyah. Minority rights must be fulfilled and may not be violated. This view is widely developed among ulama affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, PP. Al-Muayyad, MT. Jamuro, MT Jamuri, Majelis Ahbabul Mustafa, Ar-Raudah Assembly, Majelis Al-Hidayah, and many other institutions.

### CONTESTATION, NEGOTIATION, AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM

Contestation, negotiation, and acceptance of issues of social and religious life in Surakarta have made this city dynamic. At least this is influenced by the factor of openness of political structure as a result of negotiations between various religious, social, and political forces.

Ulama who reject democracy, the ideology of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia in an evolutionary manner is still growing with patterns that are always changing, such as the pattern of recruitment carried out both through educational institutions and *taklim* assemblies. These ulama also develop discourse through various religious activities such as *tablig akbar*, discussions, demonstrations, and the media. The publications conducted to focus on strengthening the ideology of resistance to the state, for example, the obligation to establish the *Khilafah Islamiyah* as a requirement of the faith and Islam of a believer.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, for example, has since become a part of DI / TII and NII, Amir Jamaah Islamiyah, Amir MMI, then Amir JAT and Jamaah Ansharu Khilafah (JAK) consistently say that it is impossible for Islam to prosper without preaching and jihad. Islam must be fought through confrontation with unbelievers, in this case, the legitimate government. The current deterioration of Muslims is caused by the state system that is wrapped in disbelief and *thaghut*. Therefore, the obligation of all Muslims is to restore the state system to become *Daulah Islamiyah*, where all citizens' rights will be guaranteed in the law which is *syar'i*.

Even so, the openness of the political structure has made the ulama who rejected the idea of this nation-state no longer had the ability to build massive and systematic movements. The pattern of management of government power that is more inclusive and participatory, by involving various elements of society, has encouraged new awareness among ulama to then look back on the principles of their resistance to the state. Although still calling for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate,

rejecting democracy, encouraging the enactment of Sharia-based Regional Regulations, and calling for jihad, their discourse experienced several shifts. They construct this rejection with various current social issues, such as their inadequate economic access, limited network to government, poor education, and poor welfare conditions. In the context of the city of Solo, the involvement of oppositionist ulama in various community development programs such as the development consultation program to determine development priorities in each region has made them take responsibility for the environment around them. These oppositionist ulama then interacted and were involved in negotiations on determining regional development priorities. This process opens the possibility of oppositionists learning from the various patterns of thought and diversity that exist in society.

In addition, the de-radicalization program which was continuously developed by the government, both through state apparatus and civil society, greatly influenced the development of oppositionist ulama. Religious organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI work with the government to carry out various programs to counter radicalism in society, schools, religious organizations, and taklim assemblies. These activities look effective in reaching the people in the lowest domain. Likewise, de-radicalization through the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), which works with various communities, religious leaders, and educational institutions, has changed the pattern of development of opposition groups. In addition, law enforcement efforts by the police through Densus 88 also showed quite good results, although there are still many criticisms of the performance of Densus 88 since they are considered to have violated the human rights.

The condition then made the oppositionist ulama to be more realistic in seeing the problems of social life that continued to develop. On the one hand, they still adhere to their Islamic ideological commitment, but on the other hand, they have also made efforts to adapt to the latest social developments in society. This shift has encouraged opposition groups to become certain groups that seek to strengthen identity on the one hand, but on the other hand, they have adjusted in facing the pressure of the rapid dynamics of global social change.

In addition, the dynamics in Solo also influenced the growth of the Muslim middle-class significantly. The pattern of violence-based movements developed by oppositionists is currently experiencing a decline in support and sympathy from the society, especially the rapidly

growing Muslim middle-class in the city of Solo. The Muslim middle-class society has a logic that is different from what is expected by oppositionists. In some cases, many middle classes are affected by *tarbawi* and *salafi* ideologies, but the models of violence offered by opposition groups in achieving their goals get different judgments. The middle class of Muslims seems to prefer to live in harmony, be able to work, and be comfortable with family, enjoy holidays, go to tourist attractions, eat, and gather with family and many do other things. They choose to refuse to live in the shadow of the suspicions and prejudices of the security forces, fear, and uncertainty about the future.

Many of the middle-class work as professionals, educators, journalists, civilian servants, scholars, and entrepreneurs who have extensive networks, not limited to one or two communities. This broad association and access open up access for them to understand the diversity of society. The acceptance of diversity which in turn makes violent-based jihadist ideology increasingly loses its relevance. Jihadists who reject the existence of a democratic system are no longer seen by the Muslim middle-class as a group that fights for Islam, but on the contrary, they are seen as the main perpetrators of the politicization of religion. In the view of the middle class, Islam is politicized for their own sake.

Likewise, with the idioms of jihad they have spread, they are no longer heard by the public as an effort to fight for a better life for the society, but rather it is considered as an effort to use religion as their political medium. The Solo society understands that jihad is a sincere effort to encourage the creation of a better social, national, and state life. Jihad in this sense is not war, not bombing, not killing, but arranging life so that on the one hand in accordance with Islamic sharia, on the other hand, according to real-life needs. In the end, the idioms of the opposition who allowed violence, rejection of diversity, wanted a single ideology which had been called for through the establishment of the Caliphate state had reached its most critical point, compared to the previous period. This desire is slowly seen shifting into the implementation of Islamic law in the realm of self and family, which negotiates with various issues and societies in Solo. At this time, it is seen that those who believe in the struggle of the opposition are limited to certain societies, whereas the larger Muslim middle-class in quantity seems apathetic, pouting the movement of this model. Practically only a few wings of the opposition movement still maintain the ideology of the jihadists, for example, Tim Hisbah, JAK, JAD, and ADC. Many among the opposition ulama returned to

the mosque, organizing their communities and congregations through various religious and social activities.

Another important factor is the development of counter-radicalism narrative from moderate and inclusive ulama. Various communities included in the category of moderate ulama have contradicted the radical behavior of oppositionists. They carried out movements to build religious patterns that were inclusive and tolerant. Figures like Habib Syech bin Abdul Qadir Assegaf, Habib Naufal Alydrus, K.H. Rozak Safawi, K.H. Dian Nafi, K.H. Abdul Karim and many other ulama tried every opportunity to educate the public about the importance of building harmony, loving this country and nation, and avoiding behaviors that damage religion, such as terrorism and radicalism. In addition, various educational institutions managed by Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, LDII, and government-owned educational institutions consistently carry out activities that can encourage a sense of love for the country. Various educational institutions in Solo apparently networked and collaborated with various groups to voice peace, anti-violence, and anti-radicalism.

## CONCLUSION

The dynamics of ulama in Surakarta have a strong polarization. They are divided into two large groups; oppositionist ulama who reject nation-states and ulama who accept the nation-state. Both with varying degrees of rejection and acceptance. At least there are six variants that can be seen, namely ulama who are extremist, radical, exclusive, conservative, moderate, and inclusive. The variant of the ulama's thoughts still intersect and influence each other. The ulama's viewpoints are extreme, radical, and exclusive, or also called oppositionist ulama, have the same root of thought, namely based on the ideology of Islamism, especially the radical variants and jihadists. This ideology then undergoes translation in a very diverse context of space and time in Solo. Meanwhile, ulama who generally accept the reality of the nation-state are also divided into various variants, such as conservative, moderate to inclusive-progressive.

Basically, ulama have extreme, radical, and exclusive views that move dynamically to follow the existing social and political developments. The direction of their movement increasingly leaves Islamic conservatism in the direction of more post-Islamist patterns and is accepted in the wider community. Gradually the ulama who rejected the government system shifted along with the increasingly open political opportunity structure and the increasing number of Muslim middle classes. This is a sign that

the more open and democratic circles of those who reject the democratic system will be able to move in a more moderate direction, leaving behind the idea of changing the format of the nation-state towards the idea of Islamization from below through *da'wah*.

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