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Pengantar Redaksi

Meskipun masih dalam hitungan bulan, rasanya sudah sekian lama Hermeneia tidak menyapa para pembaca yang arif. Kini, Hermeneia kembali dapat menyapa para pembaca yang budiman dengan sajian-sajian khasnya. Pada edisi kali ini, Hermeneia terbit dengan menyajikan enam artikel dan satu *book review*. Artikel pertama ditulis oleh Inayah Rohmaniyah (dkk.) dengan judul "The Social Origins of Fundamentalism and its Contextualization in Indonesia". Dalam artikel ini, Inayah mengeksplorasi tentang sejarah, situs, dan orientasi dari gerakan fundamentalisme di Indonesia. Inayah menyimpulkan bahwa jilbabisasi menandai munculnya gerakan fundamentalisme di tahun 80-an. Orientasi politik dan sosial dari gerakan ini menurutnya beragam, ada yang cenderung damai, ada juga yang cenderung anarkis. Fundamentalisme Islam, menurutnya, berbasis pada ajaran agama yang sederhana sebagai respon terhadap perubahan sosial dan ancaman terhadap nilai-nilai tradisional, demi mempertahankan nilai-nilai tradisional.

Artikel kedua berjudul "Antara *Civil Society* dan *Ummah*: Pluralisme dan Demokrasi sebagai Pilar Peradaban". Artikel yang ditulis oleh Cipto Sembodo ini menekankan pada relevansi antara konsep *ummah* dan *civil society*. Dalam kesimpulannya, Cipto mengungkapkan bahwa *civil society* dan *ummah* mewakili cara pandang serta nilai masing-masing kultur yang dibawanya. Namun demikian, pertautan keduanya dapat menjadi titik masuk dialog yang *visible*. Lebih dari itu, sintesa pertautan keduanya bahkan memungkinkan hubungan simbiosis mutualisme yang bersifat komplementer dan saling memperkaya. Cipto berharap jika simpulan tentatifnya bisa diterima, maka hal itu

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sesungguhnya membawa perubahan orientasi kultural dunia yang sangat signifikan bahwa tiap-tiap entitas peradaban di muka bumi ini memiliki kearifannya masing-masing. Dalam kerangka seperti itulah, dialog—bukan benturan—peradaban dapat berlangsung di muka bumi ini.

Artikel ketiga adalah karya Munawir Aziz dengan judul “The Harmony Formation in Coastal Java: Tolerant Negotiation between Tionghoa and Pesantren Community in Lasem, Central Java”. Artikel ini menguji negosiasi identitas komunitas Tionghoa dengan teori harmoni dari Robert Putnam beserta penduduk lokal, terutama komunitas pesantren di Lasem. Dalam kasimpulannya, Munawir mengatakan bahwa orang Tionghoa secara dinamis telah aktif dalam merekonstruksi identitasnya dengan merespon dan bekerjasama dengan komunitas lain, dalam hal ini komunitas pesantren sebagai subyek mayoritas di Lasem, melampaui sebuah praktik yang bisa disebut formasi harmoni. Sehingga, yang terkonstruksi adalah nilai-nilai toleransi, kepekaan humanis, dan pemahaman dengan yang lain.

“Melacak Akar-akar Filsafat Ilmu dalam Pendekatan Integrasi-Interkoneksi: Perspektif *Inter-subjective Testability* Ian. G. Barbour dan *Semipermeable* Holmes Rolston III” adalah judul dari artikel keempat yang ditulis oleh Waryani Fajar Riyanto. Hasil lacakan waryani menunjukkan bahwa pendekatan *interconnected*, *intersubjective testability*, *semipermeable*, sama-sama menghendaki adanya hubungan trialektis antara pilar subjektif, objektif, dan intersubjektif. Hubungan trialektis seperti ini semakin meneguhkan posisi *interconnected* dalam wilayah (teo)-humanistik, bukan hanya naturalistik. Baginya, pilar *intersubjective testability* dalam integrasi-interkoneksi tampak dalam keterbukaan horizon keilmuan lewat pendekatan abduktif. Sedangkan prinsip semipermeabilitasnya, ditunjukkan oleh garis pori-pori basah (ventilasi), yang menunjukkan hubungan interkoneksi antar-disiplin ilmu.

Pada sajian kelima, artikel yang dimuat berjudul “*Mudhârabah* dalam Kajian Ekonomi Islam dan Aplikasi Perbankan Syari’ah”. Artikel

yang ditulis oleh Hendra Cipta ini berkesimpulan bahwa *mudhârabah* adalah suatu bentuk *equity financing*. Dalam *mudhârabah* hubungan antara *shâhibul mâl* dan *mudhârib* adalah hubungan kemitraan, bukan hubungan antara debitor dan kreditor. Sistem bagi hasil dalam produk pembiayaan *mudhârabah* yang dikeluarkan oleh bank syari'ah ditentukan berdasarkan kesepakatan yang dilakukan dalam bentuk *nisbah* (prosentase) bagi hasil yang tertera dalam kontrak. Akan tetapi, *nisbah* ini tidak boleh atau menjadi tidak sah apabila *shâhibul mâl* dan *mudhârib* membuat syarat agar keuntungan hanya untuk salah satu pihak saja.

Sedangkan artikel terakhir adalah karya Ali Sodiqin dengan judul "Inkulturası al-Qur'an dalam Tradisi Arab: Studi tentang Pelaksanaan *Qishash-Diyat*". Dalam artikel tersebut Ali Sodiqin menyimpulkan bahwa tradisi *qishash-diyat* termasuk dalam tradisi yang terkena inkulturası al-Qur'an dengan model *tagyîr*. Secara historis tradisi ini sudah berlaku dalam masyarakat Arab pra-Islam dan berfungsi sebagai alat penyelesaian bagi kasus pembunuhan. Al-Qur'an kemudian mengadopsi tradisi ini, mengadaptasikan nilai-nilai baru, serta memodifikasi aturannya. Nilai-nilai yang ditransformasikan ke dalam tradisi ini adalah keadilan, moralitas, kesetaraan, dan pertanggungjawaban individu. Inkulturası dalam *qishash-diyat* menghasilkan sebuah perpaduan, di mana secara simbolik tetap menggunakan tradisi lama, tetapi aturannya telah dimodifikasi dengan nilai-nilai al-Qur'an. Implikasi adopsi *qishash-diyat* oleh al-Qur'an adalah perlunya memilah antara yang lokalitas dengan yang universal.

Pada edisi kali ini Hermeneia ditutup dengan kajian atas buku terjemahan al-Qur'an dengan judul *Qur'an: A Reformist Translation* karya Edip Yuksel (dkk.). Bagi Hasan Mahfudh, sebagai pengkaji, karya Yuksel (dkk.) perlu mendapatkan ruang di kalangan umat Islam, khususnya pemerhati tafsir. Walaupun secara epistemologis karya ini cenderung subjektif, perlu diakui bahwa setidaknya karya ini mampu menggugah dan menyadarkan akan pentingnya kesadaran bahwa penerjemahan atas al-Qur'an tidaklah monolitik. Artinya, proses

penerjemahan sama dengan proses penafsiran, di mana ia selalu membuka ruang untuk perbedaan sesuai dengan metode, pendekatan, dan disiplin keilmuan penafsir.

Semoga sajian Hermeneia pada edisi kali ini dapat menginspirasi para pembaca yang budiman untuk dapat menggali dan mengkaji beragam hal, khususnya Islam, dan mewujudkannya dalam bentuk karya tulis lain, baik artikel, buku, maupun bentuk karya yang lain. Betapapun sebuah karya artikel, di dalamnya pasti mengandung sesuatu yang kemudian dapat dikembangkan menjadi lebih dalam dan kritis. Selamat membaca! (MY)

Redaktur

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THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS CONTEXTUALIZATION IN INDONESIA

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Abstrak

Makalah ini mengeksplorasi sejarah, situs, dan orientasi dari gerakan fundamentalisme di Indonesia. Fundamentalisme berawal dari reaksi massa terhadap guncangan sosial yang terjadi di Eropa Barat dan Amerika Utara. Fundamentalisme adalah gerakan rakyat yang diprakarsai oleh orang-orang yang memiliki kepedulian terhadap nilai-nilai tradisional dan dengan pengetahuan teologis yang terbatas. Fundamentalisme juga merupakan reaksi kalangan konservatif untuk membela ajaran Kristen tradisional. Fundamentalisme akhir-akhir ini dikaitkan dengan Islam dan kekerasan. Ikhwanul Muslimin di Indonesia berkembang terutama di Universitas sekuler dengan anggota yang berlatarbelakang non-agama. Salafi-Wahhabi menarik bagi umumnya orang awam, pesantren tertentu, serta kelompok-kelompok pengajian. Jilbabisasi menandai munculnya gerakan fundamentalisme di tahun 80-an. Orientasi politik dan sosial dari gerakan fundamentalisme beragam, ada yang merupakan gerakan damai, ada juga yang mendukung kekerasan. Dalam konteks Islam dan Kristen, fundamentalisme berbasis pada ajaran agama yang sederhana sebagai respon terhadap perubahan sosial dan ancaman terhadap nilai-nilai tradisional, demi mempertahankan nilai-nilai tradisional.

Kata Kunci: *Fundamentalisme, reaksi sosial, teologi, Islam, dan nilai-nilai tradisional*

A. Introduction

Many scholars agree that fundamentalisms are religious movements that emerged as reactions against modernism.¹ Some argue that fundamentalisms direct the actors to carry out violent actions. The paper will explore the history of fundamentalism which not merely was rooted in theological reason. I would argue that the site of fundamentalist movements in Indonesia has been in secular Universities with the members from non-religious background. The new phenomenon of *jilbabisasi* marked the emergence of fundamentalist movement in 80s. It will also explore how the political orientations of fundamentalist movement in Indonesia are diverse, some are peaceful movements, others advocate and sponsor violence.

The analysis fundamentalist discourse and discourse about fundamentalisms entails several problems. The first concerns the definition of fundamentalism itself as there has been no fixed or agreed upon definition among scholars. The second problem relates to the fact that the word fundamentalism historically originates in Western Christian contexts, but is now often employed to label certain Muslim movements. Islamic fundamentalism very often becomes the main object of the attention and discussion in the scholarly literature about fundamentalism particularly since the tragedy of September 11th, 2001.

Fundamentalisms as social movements are, in fact are not related merely to theological or intellectual issues. It has roots in the drastic social changes occurred in Western Europe and North America between 1880 and 1930,² which have no direct relationship with theological or intellectual debate. The changes and disruptions in the late nineteenth century resulted from industrialization and urbanization,

¹ See for example Sandeen George Marsden, *The Fundamentals: Fundamentalism and American Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Nancy T. Ammerman, "North American Protestant Fundamentalism", in *Fundamentalism Observed*, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.) (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 1., Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Berent, *Fundamentalism: Hazard and Heartbreaks* (Illinois: Open Court, 1988), Bruce B. Lawrence, *Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper & Row publisher, 1989).

² Betty A. DeBerg, *Ungodly Women Gender and the First Wave of American Fundamentalism* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press Minneapolis), p. 4.

professionalization and specialization of labor and knowledge, the militarism and chaos of World War I, a new consumer economy, the rise of secular public education, immigration, the labor movement, the decay of traditional moral values, Bolshevism, abroad and Communism and socialism at home.

B. Fundamentalism and Its Discourse

1. The Origin of Fundamentalism

Fundamentalist social movements emerged primarily in middle-class settings in part as reactions against drastic social and economic change. It was a by product of the middle-class white urban culture of the Northeast, Middle-Atlantic, east North-Central and Western regions of the United States.³ In this period, fundamentalism was a popular, but not official, movement that reacted against current socio-economic situation. It was a movement among general public who knew little about Christian doctrines or scientific theories,⁴ as most American Protestants had no ideological orientation or limited theological knowledge at that time.⁵ This argument explains how fundamentalist movement began as mass reaction against social unease and disruption resulting from urbanization and industrialization.

In terms of gender issues, during this initial period there were serious clashed between groups representing the dominant Victorian gender ideology on the one hand, and social movements advocating radical changes in many spheres of human life, including gender relations on the other. Traditional Victorian thinking about gender roles was patriarchal and inflexible, emphasizing male dominance and a clear cut division of labor. Men were the heads of family, and controlled the continuity of economic security through

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵ George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 4.

the sons and the daughters through arranged marriages. Men's masculine identity was patriarch within the family combined with socio-economic identities including landowner, skilled laborer and warrior.⁶ In order to maintain the obedience of the family members, men usually worked near their homes and families.⁷ Meanwhile, women's place and domain was home and their activities included primarily domestic work.

Industrialization and urbanization in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries brought about significant social and economic changes including the transformation of the traditional gender ideology. More men worked in the factories and decrease their control over the family and the land, which then gave the wife more responsibility and power within the household.⁸ Women and children entered to formal sector industrial labor force in increasing numbers. In this context, fundamentalism served to reinforce the traditional gender ideology and roles.

Some, however, argue that the first wave of the Fundamentalist movement was theologically oriented. It was a conservative reaction against historical criticism and contextual interpretation of the Biblical text and a defense of traditional Christian teachings include the Virgin Birth of Jesus.⁹ Asserting that there were certain fundamental beliefs that have to be maintained and defended, those who named themselves fundamentalists employed diverse strategies including attempting to expel modernist thinkers from their churches. It began as a theological movement at Princeton Theological Seminary with the Publication of a book called "The Fundamentals." This gave a voice to and helped to inspire a social movement. The concept of the Moral Majority was much later.

⁶ Betty A. De Berg, *Ungodly Women Gender*, p. 14.

⁷ Barbara J. Berg, *The Remembered Gate: Origins of American Feminism: The Woman and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 49.

⁸ Betty A. DeBerg, *Ungodly Women Gender*, p. 16.

⁹ See for example Nancy T. Ammerman, "North American...", pp. 1; Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Berent, *Fundamentalism*.

The theologically oriented fundamentalist movement took its name from a series of pamphlets titled *The Fundamentals: A Testimony To The Truth* edited by A. C. Dixon and Reuben Archer Torrey published between 1910 and 1915 by the Bible Institute of Los Angeles, that affirmed conservative Protestant Christian teachings including literalist approaches to understanding scripture.¹⁰ The term "fundamentalist" in this publication referred to Christians, who followed the creed of Christian faith as illustrated in the publication.¹¹ They reacted against the movement of twentieth-century modernism,¹² whose Biblical criticism, religious liberalism, rationalism and theory of evolution¹³ were regarded as an enemy of truthful Christianity.¹⁴ It was committed to the militant purification of religious doctrines and institutions and the reshaping of personal, social, and public behavior in accordance with religious tenets.¹⁵ Fundamentalism according to these theories is a conservative, scriptural and religiously oriented movement that emerges to resist the spread of modern values and culture.

Fundamentalism *reemerged* in the United States of America in late twentieth century as an attempt by political and social conservatives to restore the dominance of the so called "Moral Majority" in the public sphere and politics.¹⁶ "In 1979 independent Baptist Pastor Jerry Falwell declared that people who were concerned

¹⁰ George Marsden, *The Fundamentals: Fundamentalism and American Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 118-123.

¹¹ Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Berent, *Fundamentalism: Hazard and Heartbreaks* (Illinois : Open Court, 1988), p. 1.

¹² See Bruce B. Lawrence, *Fundamentalist Revolt Against*, p. 2-3; George Marsden, *Reforming Fundamentalism* (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987), p. 4.

¹³ Norman F. Furniss, *The Fundamentalist Controversy* (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1963), p. 35.

¹⁴ Rod L. Evans, *Fundamentalism*, p. 1; Michael Barkun, "Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism", in *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*, Leonard Weinberg & Ami Pedahzur (eds.) (London : Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 57.

¹⁵ Samuel. P Huntington, *The clash of Civilization and The Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 96.

¹⁶ Nancy T. Ammerman, "North American Protestant...", pp. 1.

about the moral decline of America were waiting to be mobilized. Taking on that mission, he made an effort to engage in politics and work for social change. He used fundamentalist teachings to establish an anti-modern revivalist social movement linked to the political and economic agendas of economic and political conservatives. This was not the original strategy of fundamentalist Christians because prior to the 1980s most American Christian Fundamentalists were not politically active and, indeed, avoided participation in politics and other "worldly" and "un-Godly" activities.

The term Fundamentalism has been employed in academic and religious discourse concerning the sources and nature of truth. When science replaced religion as the dominant system of knowledge in western cultures in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the quest for symbolic meaning and values, as opposed to literal truth, began to emerge as important themes in religious thought. In the late twentieth century, following the so-call modern era and the impacts of industrialization and later globalization, people began to search for religious "fundamentals" in many different ways.

In this context, fundamentalists are not among those who are searching for fundamentals.¹⁷ They consider themselves to be the upholders of timeless fundamental truths. They believe that modernity has led people away from the true path and call for spiritual and political revival to enable people to restore traditional beliefs and practices that make life meaningful. Fundamentalism provides a sense of security in a world characterized by change and uncertainty.

Fundamentalism is a byproduct of modernity. Bruce Lawrence referred to fundamentalist groups as "defenders of God" as is illustrated in the title of his book *"Defenders of God the Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age."* They are God's

¹⁷ Frank J. Lechner, "Fundamentalism: Origin and Influence", in *The Search for Fundamentals The Process of Modernization and The Quest for Meaning* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1992), pp. 95.

defenders as they are religiously motivated individuals who promote a vision of divine restoration.¹⁸ Modernity produced fundamentalism as well as modernism. They are apparently permanent elements of a religious discourse about what religion is, and what role it should play in social life. Hence, the fundamentalist's mindset and identity are shaped and constructed by the modern world.

2. Fundamentalism: the Background and Orientation

Many scholars identified the influence of Christian beliefs in the study of religion including religious fundamentalism, based on the argument that fundamentalism emerged initially as a theological movement. Jean Holm argues that the characteristics of scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included: 1) the attitude of Christians to other faiths which remained implacably hostile, 2) the assumption that the Christian faith resided at the peak of the development of religions, and 3) concern with explanations of religion.¹⁹

The influence of Christianity and Western outlook in the study of religion and also fundamentalism is for instance illustrated in Huntington's "*The Clash of Civilization*", as he declares that:

"We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a class of civilizations the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present and the world-wide expansion of both."²⁰

Huntington's statement exemplifies his contention on the distinction between West and East, as well as between self and the other with a clear cut binary opposition judgment: the Christian West as civilized and the other as uncivilized world. Mark Juergensmeyer however shows that the fundamentalist movements are not unique

¹⁸ Bruce B. Lawrence, *Fundamentalist Revolt Against*, p. 1.

¹⁹ Jean Holm, *Key Guide to Information Sources on World Religions* (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1991), p. 3-5.

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization.*, p. 40.

to any single religion or civilization and that they can lead to violence in diverse cultural and religious settings. Based on his studies of fundamentalists from differing geographic areas and religions, he concludes:

“In recent year, religious violence has erupted among right wing Christian in the United States, angry Muslim in South Asia, and indigenous religious communities in Africa and Indonesia.”²¹

Fundamentalism is originally not a political maneuver, economic ploy or a social strategy. Yet, it does care about political power, in terms of establishing the state of God, economic justice and social status.²² Fundamentalism is a second level social movement established to pursue better life by returning the role of religion in the history of human life. As a reaction again modernity, fundamentalism do not entirely reject the project of modernity. It accepts the instrumental benefits of modernity but not its value orientations.²³ They might technologically and institutionally modernized but reject modern values, culture and principles.

The shifting of fundamentalist agenda from social and theological revivalism to political reformation occurred in the late 1970s.²⁴ The growth of the new religious right in this period invited the most evangelical, the religious conservative or “fundamentalist”, to rejoin the political system in American politics, after being marginalized by secular issues and social reforms.

All fundamentalists, whether Jews, Christians, or Muslims, embrace the canon of scriptural authority as self-conscious

²¹ Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. xi.

²² Bruce B. Lawrence, *Fundamentalist Revolt Against*, p. 1.

²³ Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, *Fundamentalism Observed* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. vii; Bruce B. Lawrence, *Fundamentalist Revolt Against*, p. 6.

²⁴ Michael Barkun, “Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism”, in *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*, Leonard Weinberg & Ami Pedahzur (eds.) (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 58.

advocates of anti modernist values. The most consistent denominator is opposition to all individuals or institutions that advocate Enlightenment values and promote secularism or modernism. Lawrence highlights five important characteristics of fundamentalism include:²⁵ *first*, they are advocates of a minority viewpoint against a majority or dominant group, as they continue to perceive themselves as a minority; *second*, they disagree and at the same time confront their enemies; *third*, they claim to derive authority from a direct, unmediated appeal to scripture and rely on male charismatic leaders' interpretation; *fourth*, they use special terms or technical vocabulary that bind insiders to one another, and, *fifth*, fundamentalism has historical antecedents but no ideological predecessors. This is because religious fundamentalism is recent phenomenon. This article will show that fundamentalism in the context of Indonesia has both historical and ideological antecedent. Fundamentalism is not purely a recent phenomenon.

3. The Shift of Meaning: Fundamentalism and Violence

The discourse and concern about fundamentalism issue in relation to violence has escalated since 1990, especially when people have seen that religion based violence threatens liberal democracy. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi quotes Richard Dawkins' assertion that "while before 11th September 2001, religion had been viewed by many as harmless nonsense, it now be viewed as dangerous."²⁶ Hence, if secularization as the consequence of modernity means the privatization of religious beliefs and actions, which is considered dangerous by fundamentalist followers, religious beliefs could also entail hazardous actions and serious consequences against human rights. Fundamentalism after 11th September 2001 immediately turned out to be the accused. The massive outpouring of anti-Islamic

²⁵ Bruce B. Lawrence, *Fundamentalist Revolt Against*, p. 100.

²⁶ Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "The Return of Martyrdom: Honor, Death, and Immortality", in *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism*, Leonard Weinberg & Ami Pedahzur (eds.) (London : Frank Cass, 2004), p. 11.

reaction immediately followed the event, and Islamic movement adherents' "almost taken-for-granted association with terrorism has served to further reaffirm their status as agents of a dangerous irrationality."²⁷

The discourse of the association of fundamentalism with violence or terrorism and with Islam recently became a benchmark for many Western scholars. Even when they are actually only nonviolent religious movements calling people to God's path in its early historical forms, fundamentalisms are often linked to terrorism. These shifting meanings of fundamentalism imply that the conception and the idea of fundamentalism do not merely rely on every single actual fact, but on theorists' interpretations of the facts. The 9/11 tragedy led many scholars to relate fundamentalism immediately with extremism and terrorism, and more particularly with Islam.

Douglas Long differentiates fundamentalism from extremism in terms of their epistemological grounds: fundamentalism is mainly belief in the literal interpretation of holy writings, while extremism is a political philosophy that deviates drastically from mainstream views.²⁸ According to him, both have the same characteristics: intolerance to opposing points of view and often lead to exhibit fanatical behavior and to do violence to achieve their aims. In this sense, he perceives fundamentalism as having textual approach to religious texts which are presumed to justify violence. Religious texts then are perceived to literally embody violence.

Different from Long, Barkun argues that identifying fundamentalism as merely brutal, a combination of malevolent leaders, brainwashed followers and poisonous belief systems lead such group to engage in violence, is merely simplification and has

²⁷ Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and The Feminist Subject* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 1.

²⁸ Douglas Long, *Fundamentalist and Extremists* (New York: Facts On File, 2002), p. 3.

no adequate supportive data.²⁹ Researches on fundamentalism in Indonesia strengthen Barkun's contention and show that Long's interpretation on fundamentalism is more reductionistic rather than empathetic in interpreting the phenomena.³⁰

Fundamentalism very often is discussed and used to point out Muslim groups or movements. The Western image of fundamentalism may reflect an understanding of Western conception of truth, modernity, political fears and cultural unease. Here, Roxane Euben suggests that the possible way Western rational thinkers, with their limit of rationalist scientific analysis, might better take to fully understand the fundamentalist movement, or religion of other, is through "dialog." Euben offers a view of understanding fundamentalism as a reciprocal, transformative, and ongoing process.³¹ By hearing and letting fundamentalists explain themselves, and understanding comprehensively their values or meanings, one might be able to reduce her or his intervention in whatever study she or he does. Juergensmeyer illustrates of the process of an insightful dialogue in attempt to understand fundamentalists' mind by patiently sitting and hearing their confession.³² Approach and method that include fundamentalists' voices in the process of analysis and understanding therefore will determine the quality and accuracy of someone's work, at least it helps to understand what fundamentalist think and how they see the world.

4. Islamism and Islamists

Fundamentalisms as both religious ideologies and social movements are committed to the militant purification of religious

²⁹ Michael Barkun, "Religious Violence...", p. 55.

³⁰ See Mark Woodward, M. Amin Ali, and Inayah Rohmaniyah, "Muslim Education, 'Celebrating Islam and Having Fun as Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia': Perspectives on Terrorism", October 2010.

³¹ Roxanne Leslie Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 13.

³² Mark Juergensmeyer, "From Bhindranwale to Bin Laden: The Global Rise of Religious Violence" paper prepared for the *Conference on Religion and Conflict in Asia: Disrupting Violence*, October 14-15, 2004, Arizona State University.

doctrine and institutions and the reshaping of personal, social, and public behaviors in accordance with their particular understanding of religious tenets.³³ Some scholars concerned with Muslim movements prefer to use the term Islamist rather than fundamentalist. While the two terms have similar meanings, Islamist has come to be associated with politically oriented movements.

The term Islamism originated in both Arabic and French, in North Africa. It refers to twentieth century Muslim political movements aiming at the establishment of an Islamic state that would enforce at least some Islamic laws and customs, sex segregation and *Shari'ah* mandated punishments. Asghar Ali Engineer uses the word "Islamist" to mean religious rigidity, militancy and extremism as well as use of Islam for political ends rather than for spiritual and moral development. Islamism is identified by dogmatic approaches to moral and spiritual questions.³⁴ For Islamists, modern values including human rights, equality and freedom are against Islam and Islamic values in part because these ideas were originally from the West.³⁵ In contrast to modernists who call upon the past in the name of modernity,³⁶ Islamists call upon the modernity in the name of the traditional past. All Islamists in this sense then are fundamentalist but not all fundamentalists are Islamists, because not of them have political concern or goal.

The first principle of fundamentalists' political project is intellectually to annihilate all that stay outside its exclusive, self-referential culture and moral frame. They believe in a total absolute truth that is a universal blueprint for human salvation and reject social and moral ideas and standards associated with the project

³³ Samuel. P Huntington, *The clash of Civilization*, p. 96.

³⁴ Asghar Ali Engineer, "Islam and Fundamentalism", *Jurnal of Islam and Modern Age*, August 2002, pp. 1-2.

³⁵ Azza Karam, *Women, Islamism and the State: Contemporary Feminism in Egypt* (New York: ST. Martin's Press Inc., 1998), p. 10.

³⁶ Charles Kurzman, "Liberal Islam and its Islamic Context", *Liberal Islam*, in Charles Kurzman (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 6.

of modernity. They consider modernism to be the creation of a handful of western nations, and for this reason alone, not applicable to Islamic norms and societies.³⁷ In order to save human being and invite them back to the right path, then, political power is necessary. An Islamic state is the only option. They are exclusivists and do not allow for the possibility of alternative views.

In the context of Asia, Manning Nash argues that there are at least eight features of fundamentalism in Southeast Asia, including³⁸ *first* base their arguments on literalist readings of scripture without much theological debate or interpretation; *second*, glorify and idealize the past, the golden age of purity, as a model; *third*, create an ideal society based on Islamic tenets in the context of contemporary reality; *fourth*, organize into a network with a leader in order to spread their ideology and monitor the behavior of the followers; *fifth*, oppose actively the modern West, particularly its concepts of hedonism, materialism, secularism and self-indulgence, *sixth*, combine anti-modernism with defense of an ethnic identity, *seventh*, depend on a charismatic leader who is capable of mobilizing masses; and *eighth*, carries special inherent theodicy that explains the "unjust suffering" the fundamentalism produces.

Nash mentions ethnic identity as an important characteristic of fundamentalism, but it might be not as important as what they define as Islamic identity or the concept of "*ummah*," for they believe that Islamic norms possess highest position over all what they perceive as humanly rules or laws.

³⁷ Haideh Moghissi, *Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis* (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2002), p. 64.

³⁸ Manning Nash, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia", in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby (eds.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 732-733.

C. Fundamentalism in Indonesia

1. Salafism and Wahhabism and their Contextualization

Salafism, Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood are often mentioned as Islamic fundamentalisms and share many of the traits mentioned above. The term salafism describes an international movement that seeks to return to what is seen to be the purest form of Islam practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and the *Shahabah* the prophet's Companions and the two generations after him, the *Tâbi'în* the Followers and the *Taba' at-Tâbi'în* those after the Followers. The word *salaf* (Arabic) means the past or predecessor.

The concept of *tawhid* (the oneness of God) that entails strong rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire –as those are considered merely human interests and thought and therefore against God's willings- typifies the Salafi followers. This common religious creed provides principles and a method for applying religious beliefs: by strictly following the rules and guidance in the Qur'an and Sunna they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God's commands.³⁹ In this perspective, then, religious plurality or human rights have no space.

Salafis therefore reject any form of innovation (*bid'ah*) in doctrine and practice, idolatry (*syirk*); superstition (*khurafat*) and other deviations.⁴⁰ They share the same ideology of strictly, means textually and a-historically, following the Prophet, yet there are three major factions within this movement, the purists, the politicians, and the *jihadis*.⁴¹ The divisions have emerged due to their distinct interpretation in applying religious principles dealing with contemporary politics and conditions.

³⁹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement", in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 29, No. 3 (London: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2005), pp. 207.

⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Background: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix, *International Crisis Group Southeast Asia/Brussels*, September, 13, 2004, p. 2-3.

⁴¹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement", pp. 207-239.

The purists emphasize primarily on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education, while the politicians focus more on the application of Salafi ideology at the political level. Political Salafism was the product of the coming of Muslim Brotherhood members in 1960s to Saudi Arabia, after the prohibition of the movement in Egypt during Gamal Abdul Nasser's Government. The Saudi government welcomed the well-educated Muslim Brothers to join the State Building project and during 1970s many of them became influential on university campuses.

The *jihadis* support the use of violence to establish Islamic states as they believe that the current situation calls for revolution and violence. The *jihadis* emerged during the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, which facilitated the exposure of Saudi Salafis (and others) to the radical and politicized teachings of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and related splinter groups in a context of military training and warfare. These three different fractions explain how the movement sometime is mixed with Muslim Brotherhood or, in Indonesian context, other local religion based movements.

In addition to the above mentioned categories, I would argue that there is what so call "domesticated Salafism" by which it means organizations and social movements that accept aspects of Wahhabi or other Salafi religious teachings and combine them with local modes of social and cultural practice.⁴² In this respect domesticated Salafisms differ fundamentally from others in Indonesia and elsewhere in the Muslim World that mimic Middle Eastern, and more specifically Saudi Arabian cultural styles and social practices.

In terms of terminology, some use the terms Salafism and Wahhabism interchangeably while others perceive that the two differ in important ways. Ahmad Moussalli, for instance, argues that all Wahhabis are Salafists but not all Salafists are Wahhabis,

⁴² Mark Woodward, M. Amin Ali, and Inayah Rohmaniyah, "Muslim Education, 'Celebrating Islam and Having Fun as Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia': Perspectives on Terrorism", October, 2010.

as Salafism is a very diversified and complicated ideologically and religiously motivated trend.⁴³ In other word, Wahhabism is a variant of *Salafism*. The term Wahhabi is however used in many different ways. Historically, it refers to the Arabian Hanbalî jurist and theologian, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhâb (1703-92), the founder and ideologue of Wahhabism who called for socio-moral reconstruction of his society through greater adherence to *tawhîd* and renewal attention to the Qur'an and Hadith.⁴⁴

Wahhabism is a revivalist current in Sunni Islam rooted in the teachings 13th-14th century jurist Ibn Tamiyyah (1263-1328).⁴⁵ Ibn Tamiyyah advocated literal, rather than metaphorical or contextual, readings of the *Qur'an* and Hadith (traditions concerning the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) and uncompromising interpretation of the core Islamic principle of *tawhîd* (the unity or oneness of God).

Natana De Long Bas located Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb in the context of eighteenth-century reform movements and showed how jihad as holy war was not the primary concern of that era. Jihad in this sense, therefore, was also not Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb's primary goal or purpose of his movement. He did not support violence though he believed that there were times when violence was justified, as in the case of self-defense.⁴⁶ He focused on *da'wah* to win converts though discussion, debate and persuasion, and devoted himself to religious matters rather than to politics.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb believed that the religious practices of Arabia of his day contained polytheism, superstition and other things in contradiction with what he believed to be the truest Islam. Ibn Abd

⁴³ Ahmad Moussalli, "Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is The Enemy?", *Conflicts Forum*, Beirut-London-Washington, 2009, pp. 3.

⁴⁴ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam from Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 13

⁴⁵ Cook M., *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁴⁶ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, p. 17.

al-Wahhâb then concentrated on bringing the people back to *tawhîd* and following the *sunna* of the Prophet Muhammad.⁴⁷ The concept of *tawhîd*, which terminologically means the oneness of God or monotheism, became one of basic teachings of Wahhabism. Through debate and discussion,⁴⁸ Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb began preaching about *tawhîd* and its elaboration in the practical level in order to reform both people's private and public lives.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb is well known for his alliance with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The famous alliance between Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb and Muhammad Ibn Saud occurred in 1744, which led to the formation of first Saudi state.⁴⁹ The important point was the agreement on the division of responsibility between the two. Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb was responsible for religious matters while Muhammad Ibn Saud was in charge of political and military affairs and both will not interfere each other.

Abd al-Wahhâb was not an "Islamist" in the sense that the term is used today. He was an *âlim* (religious scholar), not a political leader. He did not call for the unification of religion and politics, but sought state support for his religious agenda. He understood himself as one of a series of *mujjadid* (renewers of the faith) who seek to purge Islam of religious innovation and restore moral order. He advocated literal readings of Islamic scripture, but also placed himself in well-established theological and juridical traditions, albeit, ones that were neither popular in the eighteenth century nor today. His most important contribution to Muslim thought was an uncompromising understanding of the core Islamic doctrine of *tawhîd* (the unity of God). He also advocated harsh measures to enforce social and ritual provisions of Shari'ah.

Following the thirteenth century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), Abd al-Wahhâb taught that the doctrine of *tawhîd* requires

⁴⁷ Haneef James Oliver, *The Wahhabi Myth: Dispelling Prevalent Fallacies and The Fictions Link with Bin Laden* (Trafford: T.R.O.I.D Publication, 2004), p. 9.

⁴⁸ Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, p. 19.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

uncompromising monotheism and that nothing stands between individual humans and God. He denounced forms of religious devotion based on the idea of intercession with God (*wasīlah*), including the invocation of saints, spiritual beings and powers other than that of God and mystical practice, as *syirk*, the unpardonable sin of polytheism. He also condemned the practice of visiting and praying at tombs (*ziyârah*) and prayers for the dead (*tahlîl*), which are common components of popular Muslim piety the world over.

In Western and Indonesian discourse both *Salafism* and Wahhabism have been described as one of “the most xenophobic (sic) radical Islamic movements.”⁵⁰ Its teachings are referred to as fanatic, full of hatred and misogynistic. Women, according Wahhabi teachings, should be segregated from men, have no access to public space, and they are inferior to men.⁵¹ Some consider Salafism dangerous because it promotes religious based-violence.⁵² Salafism has been renowned “for its negative influence on Islam, mosques, and madrasah globally”.⁵³

The dynamics of International politics from the Iranian revolution, the role of Western and Saudi-funded *madrasah* in Pakistan generated *mujâhidîn*, and Taliban in Afghanistan has led Western media to portray *madrasah* as militant and radical.⁵⁴ (*Madrasah*) “came under even greater suspicion as alleged breeding grounds for ‘terrorists’” in the post 9/11 tragedy and the serial of bombings in Indonesia.

In contemporary Indonesia the term Wahhabi is used to refer to Muslims and Muslim organizations that use contemporary Saudi Arabian Islam as a model for belief and practice and condemn other

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁵² International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder...”, p. i.

⁵³ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, p. 3.

⁵⁴ Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand, and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), *The Madrasa in Asia Political Activism and Transnational Linkages* (Amsterdam: isim/Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 10.

forms of Islam and local cultures as unbelief.⁵⁵ The term "Wahhabi" is often used conjointly with fanatic and exclusive due to its strong concept of *tawhid* and intolerant respond to local culture. Members of Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Muslim organization find Wahhabism as their real enemy as it is against local culture.

To associate Salafi and Wahhabi teachings with violence is an overreaction and gross misperception of the large number of adherents in both camps who reject violence. Research by the International Crisis Group in 2004 in Indonesia shows that in certain cases Salafism may in fact be more of a barrier to violent extremism than a facilitator.⁵⁶ Fata Mukmin, leader of a large Wahhabi *pesantren* in Central Java, says that Wahhabi teachings, especially those concerning the Islamic concept which regards God as one and unique, lead students to develop a stronger faith, embrace forbearance, pray sincerely and partake in other positive, non-violent conduct.⁵⁷ True Wahhabi teachings, Mukmin stresses, forbid the harassment or killing of other Muslims.

Ahmas Faiz, who runs the Imam Buchori Salafi *pesantren* in Solo, says that he disapproves of terrorism and religiously motivated violence, arguing that radicalism and violence are used by those who use Islamic norms to legitimize personal wrongdoing.⁵⁸ Hence, blaming Wahhabi and Salafi teachings for violent acts of terrorism is unfair and goes against the facts found in the contextual Indonesian Wahhabi oriented *pesantren*. Just like in the vast majority of religion-based institutions in Indonesia, students in many Wahhabi-oriented schools are taught the holy texts on peaceful religion, which lead them to respect others, live together in harmony and resist extremist propaganda.

⁵⁵ Mark Woodward, M. Amin Ali, and Inayah Rohmaniyah, "Muslim Education.

⁵⁶ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder..."

⁵⁷ Inayah Rohmaniyah, "Religiously Motivated Violence is Not Religious", *Common Ground News Service Constructive Articles that Foster Dialogue*, available accessed (September 27, 2011) from <http://www.commongroundnewa.org/article.php?id=30443&lan=en&sp=0>

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

A Research on a madrasah in Indonesia, which was firmly rooted in al-Wahhâb's theological vision as any Saudi school, shows that its brand of Wahhabism could not be more different from that practiced in Saudi Arabia. It allows for diversity in ritual practice on controversial issues, readily interacts with other Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities, and teaches that the state does not have the right to establish one religion or a single interpretation of Islam as "official."⁵⁹ It also is equally progressive on gender issues and does not define rigid gender segregation as a component of moral order.

2. Muslim Brotherhood in Secular Universities

In addition to Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood movement has also important role in Islamizing Indonesians. The movement was originally founded in Ismailia, Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banâ (1906-49) who experienced the period of intense political and intellectual ferment which marked the 1920s in Egypt.⁶⁰ His theological and political beliefs represented his reaction to several problems that were to him serious, among them included the disputed control of Egypt between the Wafd and Liberal Constitution, the attacks on tradition and orthodoxy emboldened by the Kemalist revolt in Turkey, and the secularist and libertarian literary and social societies and parties.

Al-Bannâ perceived Egypt's secular culture to be immoral, decadent and atheistic. The Muslim Brotherhood was dedicated to the Islamization of Egyptian society from the grassroots level on up⁶¹ in order to save the country. He perceived that

⁵⁹ Inayah Rohmaniyah and Mark Woodward, "Wahhabi Perspectives on Pluralism and Gender: A Saudi-Indonesian Contrast", *Center for Strategic Communication* Arizona State University, available accessed (May 21, 2012) from <http://csc.asu.edu/2012/05/21/wahhabi-perspectives-on-pluralism-and-gende>.

⁶⁰ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 4.

⁶¹ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, p. 257.

the society and government's adoption of western values and culture while neglecting Islam had brought about poverty, powerlessness and loss of dignity.⁶² Al-Bannâ and his friends came to the conclusion "No one but God knows how many nights we spend reviewing the state of the nation, analyzing the sickness and thinking of the possible remedies."⁶³

Rejecting western imperialism and believing Islam to be the only solution for this critical condition al-Bannâ and his colleagues established *Al-Ikhwân Al-Muslimûn*. They emphasize the notion that a society devoted to salvation produces virtuous citizens willing to relinquish individual gain to better the collective group.⁶⁴ The concept of *umma* therefore is important and has significant role for the movement. The main objective of the Muslim Brotherhood is *Dakwah* (proselytizing) to advocate the implementation of Islamic values and teachings at individual, society and state levels. To realize this objective, Muslim Brothers must, among them:⁶⁵ Islamize society by using media, mosques, public and student organizations, and doing charity; create a Muslim state; restore the Caliphate; and dominate the Muslim world. The Brotherhood' belief in the need to engage political issues in order to achieve social change led the organization to stand against or take over the political power. It also tends to fragment and some groups have used violence when it suites their purposes.

As a Sunni religious and political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood members experienced uneven relation with the

⁶² Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, "Al-Ikhwân Al-Muslimiyyîn: Muslim Brotherhood", *Military Review*, July-August 2003, pp. 26-27, available accessed (March 31, 2010) from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/abo.pdf>.

⁶³ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, p. 5.

⁶⁴ Michelle Païson, "The History of the Muslim Brotherhood: The Political, Social and Economic Transformation of the Arab Republic of Egypt," available accessed (April 1, 2010) from <http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/files/resources/nimep/v4/The%20History%20of%20the%20Muslim%20Brotherhood.pdf>.

⁶⁵ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, "Al-Ikhwân Al-Muslimiyyîn: Muslim Brotherhood".

rulers and governments. Their resistance to the power of the state led many to prison. The founder, Hasan al-Bannâ, was assassinated in 1949 by King Farouk's internal security apparatus. The movement was further officially banned in 1950s under Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser's. Another influential figure within this movement was Sayyid Quthb (1906-1966) who joined the movement in 1945 and is considered to have been the author of its ideology.⁶⁶ He was also arrested and hanged in 1966. Quthb and Wahhabism have similarities in terms of his insistence on direct interpretation to the Qur'an and hadith and his adoption of Ibn Taymiyyah's radical interpretation of Islam through the teachings of Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah.⁶⁷

The 1970s were a pivotal time for the Brotherhood to become politically involved. After the death of Nasser in 1970, the political circumstances changed. His successor, Anwar Sadat released the Brothers from prison and allowed them to informally assist him in utilizing religion as a means to gain support from society in the process of liberalizing Egyptian politics. The Brothers gradually gained legitimated power and that gave them a permanent presence in the Egyptian and pan-Arab media. The Brotherhood then began to disseminate its ideology.⁶⁸ It spread from Egypt throughout the Arabic-speaking East, Islamic Asia including Indonesia, and Islamic Africa.⁶⁹ This is however not the first time Muslim Indonesia had connection with Muslim Brotherhood ideology and movement. Both PAS in Malaysia and Masyumi of Indonesia had established relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Iraq in the 1950s. Masyumi was increasingly tied to PERSIS after NU left in 1952.

⁶⁶ Michelle Paison, "The History of the Muslim Brotherhood.

⁶⁷ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, p. 256.

⁶⁸ Fadwa el Guindi, *Veil, Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance* (Berg: Oxford, New York, 1999), p. 2.

⁶⁹ Fadwa el Guindi, *Veil, Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance*, p. 2.

The Brotherhood ideology in Indonesia was more attractive to fundamentalists functioning in secular universities as can be seen in the choice of books translated into *Bahasa*. The translation of texts in fact has become a special form of intellectual transmission in Asia for centuries.⁷⁰ In the late 70s and early 80s Brotherhood books were translated into *Bahasa* and students were sent to al-Azhar University, Madinah University and Ibn Su'ud University. One of the best known publishers of Brotherhood books was "*Pustaka Salman*." Based in *Institut Teknologi Bandung* (Bandung Technological Institute) it was run by Muhammad Imaduddin 'Abdurrahim⁷¹ and his followers who were linked to Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia.

Imaduddin was a member of a *Tentara Pelajar Muslim* (Muslim Student Soldiers) namely *Hizbullah* (God's Soldiers) and a cadre of the *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia* (DDII or Indonesian Islamic Missionary Board or well known later by LDII) established in 1967 by Muhammad Natsir,⁷² a foremost figure in the Indonesian independence movement, former head of the Masyumi party and militant struggler for the insertion of Jakarta Charter.⁷³ Imaduddin's struggle for the enforcement of Islamic practices and symbols at

⁷⁰ K.S. Nathan & Muhammad Hasyim Kamali, *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 33.

⁷¹ Born in 1931 in North Sumatra, Imaduddin came from an educated family. His father graduated from Al-Azhar University and was a leader of Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), while his mother was a descendent of the Riau Sultanate. Imaduddin graduated the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) which eventually led him to gain his Master and Doctorate degrees on Industrial Technology and Engineering Valuation from Iowa State University, USA.

⁷² International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder...".

⁷³ In the early Indonesian independence in 1945, there was a strong ideological confrontation between the Islamic and Nationalist group. The former insisted to build Indonesian as an Islamic state, while the latter argued that Indonesia should be a national unitary state, separating religious affairs from the state life. The founders of the Republic proclaimed *Pancasila* as the foundation of the state (*Dasar Negara*) as well as the religious and moral principles of the Indonesian. The Islamic group leaders however proposed to add a phrase "with the obligation, for its adherents to practice the *Shari'ah*" (*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Shari'ah bagi pemeluknya*) on the first of principles of Pancasila (Belief in the one and only God). The draft then is called Jakarta Charter. The demand, however, was not accepted as non-Muslims and nominal Muslims felt threatened. Bahtiar Effendi, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 32; Martin Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia", *South East Asia Research*, vol. 10, No. 2, 2002, pp. 117-154.

both society and state levels in the land of Indonesia led him to adopt Brotherhood thoughts and disseminate them from within this secular campus.

Using the Campus Salman mosque, the first Mosque established (1972) within a secular University in Indonesia, as the center of activism, a group of students studied and spread Brotherhood social and political thought. At the same time, *Pustaka Salman* translated and published many books on Brotherhood ideology.⁷⁴ Imâduddîn launched the first student's *halaqah* (group discussion) namely *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah*. These training sessions were attended by Muslim student activists both male and female from all over Indonesia.⁷⁵ The training was conducted in about 5 days and ended up with "bai'at" (oath of obedience). DDII provided many of the training materials.

Women were expected to wear Islamic dress, *jilbab*⁷⁶ and often the *jubah*, and subsequently the *jilbab* started to decorate the ITB campus life. Hasan al-Bannâ's thoughts on women in Islam turned out to be a primary reference for female students' dress and behavior, as he once declared that " ...since women are weak and meek, they are thus the object of men's enjoyment and beauty, hence Allah commands women to wear hijab."⁷⁷

Since then *jilbab* has become the symbol of Islamic symbols and practice in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Activism against the government on that secular campus was inseparable from religious

⁷⁴ "Semangat Populis Partai Dakwah," available accessed (April 1, 2010) from <http://majalah.tempinteraktif.com/id/arsip/2009/03/30/LU/mbm.20090330.LU129923.id.html>.

⁷⁵ Masjid Salman ITB, "Sejarah Masjid Salman ITB", available accessed (March 24, 2010) from <http://salmanitb.com/profil/sejarah/>.

⁷⁶ Women in Java, both in and outside the universities use the term *kerudung*, *kudung*, or *jilbab* interchangeably. When the new veil was introduced in 80s it was called the *jilbab*. This term was then used interchangeably with the previous terms, *kerudung* and *kudung*. Some differentiate between *kerudung/jilbab biasa* (usual jilbab that covers the face, neck and sometime the bosom) and *kerudung/jilbab besar* (large jilbab that covers half of the body). They call the traditional transparent headscarf *kerudung* or *kudung*, but never *jilbab*.

⁷⁷ Hasan al-Bannâ, "Al-Qur'an Menurut Hasan al-Bannâ (6) Wanita dalam Al-Qur'an", available accessed (March 23, 2010) from <http://www.al-ikhwan.net/al-qur%e2%80%99an-menurut-hasan-al-banna-6-wanita-dalam-al-quran-3040/>.

activism, as pointed by International Crisis Group that "not only was the concept adopted by many of the campus groups set up by DDII as a way of organizing Islamic study, but it also became the theoretical basis for the establishment of what amounted to political cells for more explicitly antigovernment activities."⁷⁸ In fact the strongest resistance to the state came from the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB or Bandung Technological Institute) which became an important node in the Muslim Brotherhood network in Indonesia. Although pressures to veil as a symbol of antigovernment solidarity diminished with the collapse of Soeharto in 1998, the number of veiled women in universities and later in the broader society continued to grow. The meaning of veil and motivation however afterward become complex, varied and highly contested".⁷⁹

Soon thereafter other mosques and student *halaqahs* were established in secular campuses all over Indonesia, including Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta. The secular university thus became the site for Islamic activism. Since then Islamic symbols began to appear in public spaces. Mosques became a new focus of political activities and helped fuel an Islamic "awakening"⁸⁰ and transformation. It is important to note that Islamist activities took place more on secular campuses and not on Islamic campuses, such as State Institute for Islamic Studies or Islamic Universities. One of the reasons for the differential reception of Muslim Brotherhood and *Salafi* teachings is their simplicity. Students at secular universities, with only rudimentary religious educations were more likely to accept this simplified version of Islam than are those at Islamic Universities, most of whom come from *pesantren* backgrounds.

⁷⁸ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder, p. 8.

⁷⁹ Nancy J. Smith Hefner, "Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 66, No. 2, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 389.

⁸⁰ Donald J. Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 2.

D. Conclusions

Fundamentalism as an ideology and social movement has its roots in Western middle class contexts which did not relate merely to theological or intellectual issues. It began as mass reaction in response to social unease and disruption resulting from urbanization and industrialization that occurred in Western Europe and North America between 1880 and 1930. Fundamentalism was a popular movement initiated by those who had concern for traditional values but limited theological knowledge. In terms of gender issues, it served to reinforce the traditional gender ideology and roles.

Fundamentalism was also a conservative reaction to defend traditional Christian teachings against historical criticism and contextual interpretation of the Biblical text. The shifting of fundamentalist agenda from social and theological revivalism to political reformation occurred in the late 1970s. After being marginalized by modern secular issues and social reforms, the growth of the new religious right in this period invited the most evangelical, the religious conservative or "fundamentalist", to rejoin the political system in American politics.

The term fundamentalism is recently associated more particularly with Islam and to some degree with violence and terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism frequently become the object of scholarly attention and political concern, particularly since the tragedy of September 11th, 2001. Even when the movements actually were only nonviolent religious movements calling people to God's path in its early historical forms, fundamentalisms nowadays are often linked to terrorism.

Fundamentalist movements in Indonesia are related to both Salafi-Wahhabi of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood ideology operates mostly in secular Universities with the members from non-religious backgrounds. The Salafi-Wahhabi attracts generally lay people from grass roots, some *pesantren*, as well as mass gatherings (*pengajian*). The phenomenon of *jilbabisasi* marked the emergence of fundamentalist movements in 80s. The political as well as social orientations of fundamentalist movement in Indonesia

are diverse, some are peaceful movements, while others advocate and sponsor violence.

In both Islamic and Christian contexts, fundamentalism provides simple religious teachings as responses to social change and threats to traditional values. It is a defense of traditional gender and other values.

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