



# POLITICS, ULAMA AND NARRATIVES ON NATIONHOOD:

**Fragmentation of Religious Authority  
in Indonesian Cities**

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Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) UIN Jakarta

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Fragmentation of Religious Authority in Indonesian Cities**

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# GURUTTA AND RELIGIOUS OTORITY CONTESTATION IN MAKASSAR

*Muhrisun Afandi*

Some studies underline that the narrative of Islamism has historically been strongly developed in the communities of Makassar and South Sulawesi in general. Makassar is known in history as one of the centers of the hardline Islamic movement in Indonesia since the Old Order with the emergence of the Darul Islam Kahar Muzakkar (DI-TII) movement. DI / TII historical record reinforces the perception that Makassar is one of the cities in Indonesia that has strong roots in the tradition of Islamism.

People are very worried about the growth of Islamism since Makassar's geographical proximity with several regions is often indicated as centers of terrorism, such as Poso and Ambon. Some cases of religious radicalism that took place in Makassar itself show that the development of the tradition of Islamism in this region is not solely due to the influence of similar movements at the national level, but rather an expression of the dynamics of Islamism at the local level. Therefore, the suspicion that the tradition of hardline Islamism continues to resonate in this region is difficult to avoid, where the acceptance of Muslim communities in this region against the concept of the nation-state (NKRI) is not questioned. One of the important things that became the focus of the questions in this study was the mapping of perceptions and views of the ulama (*gurutta*) from various backgrounds of social, political, and religious affiliation in Makassar about the format of nation-states, along with the basic concepts that supported them. Furthermore, this study intends to map the position of the members in the context of the contestation of religious authorities in Makassar to further analyze the social resilience of the ulama in Makassar against the threat of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism that threatens the nation's future.

The strengthening of the Islamist movement in Indonesia itself, especially in recent years, is inseparable from the global geopolitical context, where the emergence of right-wing groups has become a global phenomenon that occurs in almost all countries. The phenomenon of Islamophobia, especially in Western countries, has indirectly opened opportunities for Islamist groups to exploit the religious sentiments of the Muslim community in Indonesia so that they support the ideology they are carrying out. By portraying themselves as fighters for the defense of Islam, Islamist groups in Indonesia easily gain sympathy from the public. Several studies have shown that the strong influence of the ideological Islamic movement does not only occur among ordinary people but allegedly has occurred among Islamic leaders who in turn will have a significant impact on the development of Indonesia's political conditions in the future.

As explained earlier, this paper is part of national research that aims to map the perceptions and views of ulama from various backgrounds of social, political, and religious affiliation about the format of nation-states, along with the basic concepts that support them. The diversity of sample locations in this study nationally (15 cities) is expected to map not only the perceptions and views of ulama regarding nation-states on a national scale but also illustrate the dynamics of locality in various regions in Indonesia. One of the questions that are the focus of this study relates to the extent to which the ulama's perceptions and views are in harmony with the idea of the relationship between religion and the state as formulated in the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

As in other cities, research in Makassar was carried out with a combination of surveys and interviews. Group-based surveys were conducted involving 30 respondents consisting of Islamic ulama and religious leaders from various backgrounds, social affiliation, politics, and religious organizations in Makassar, such as the MUI, mainstream organizations (such as NU and Muhammadiyah), scholars based on pesantren, ulama affiliated with universities, ulama from minority groups (such as Syiah and Ahmadiyah), scholars from Salafi and Tarbawi groups, as well as scholars from other groups. In-depth interviews (in-depth interviews) are carried out to explore the results of the survey and explore further data related to things that have not been answered in the survey. Interviews were conducted between 13 to 23 October 2018 involving 12 key informants consisting of nine male ulama and three female ulama.

So far, the findings of previous studies related to the narrative of Islamism in Makassar, including the results of the BNPT study in

South Sulawesi, show that the culture of extremism and terrorism is not seriously developing in Makassar, where the Islamist movement in this region is believed to only grow to the level of militancy and radicalism. It is actually confirmed by the results of the quantitative survey of this study, of which all samples of Makassar ulama (30 people) who participated in this research survey<sup>1</sup> nearly 70 percent or 20 of them were in the progressive, inclusive and moderate spectrum, two ulama with conservative views, three people with exclusive views, and two people identified as having radical views, while the views of three other ulama were not identified. The survey results show that none of the ulama in Makassar who participated in this study were identified as having extreme views. However, the interview data shows slightly different results from the survey data, in which there are variations in findings related to the characteristics and views of more diverse ulama who were not identified in the survey results.

#### **NARRATIVES OF ISLAMISM: HISTORICAL RECORDS OR REAL THREATS IN MAKASSAR?**

Unlike the Islamic characteristic in Java, for example, the spread of Islam in Sulawesi is dominated by the legalistic character of Islam that does not accommodate the diversity of religious views (Ali 2011, 28). The Islamism movement in the context of South Sulawesi itself can be identified in several patterns. First, the pattern of the aristocratic elite who succeeded in Islamizing the kings of South Sulawesi, as was done by Sheikh Yusuf, in which efforts to Islamize the kingdom became a strategic step in spreading Islam more widely in the community. Second, the pattern of Kahar Muzakkar who carried out the movement of Islamism by means of rebellion against the government. Third, the pattern of the Islamic Syaria Enforcement Preparation Committee (KPPSI) that uses structural channels to implement Islamic law (Ali 2011).

Concerns about the strengthening of the Islamist movement in South Sulawesi itself have long been a concern of various groups, including the regional government. In 2002, for example, the Government of South Sulawesi Province held a poll on the implementation of Islamic Law in this region. The poll was conducted by a team formed by the provincial government, namely the Concept Study Team for the Implementation of

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<sup>1</sup> The characteristics of the ulama used in the survey are 7 (seven), among others: progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical, and extreme. For more details, see the introduction in this book.



Islamic Law in South Sulawesi (PKPSI Sulsel) involving respondents from various groups, including 24 regents, 60 Regional People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) members, 81 religious leaders, and 60 community leaders. The results of the poll at the time showed that most of the people (91.11%) agreed to the discourse on the application of Islamic Syariah in South Sulawesi, even though they differed in their opinion regarding the format and form of implementation of Islamic Syariah itself. The results of the polls showed that 59 percent of the people wanted the structural application of Islamic Syariah through legislation, 32 percent agreed to the implementation of Islamic Syariah culturally without having to go through the establishment of legislation, while the other nine percent did not provide firmness (Juhanis 2006; Mujiburrahman 2013).

However, the findings of studies related to Islamism in South Sulawesi tend to present positive results, in which it is believed that the Islamist movement that developed on a national scale in Indonesia did not have a significant impact on the formation of a similar movement in South Sulawesi. Some studies have even concluded that the pattern of movements that developed in South Sulawesi tended to be in the form of post-Islamism which was more inclined to an accommodative pattern of the government system. There is no indication of a problem related to the acceptance of Muslim communities in South Sulawesi towards the concept of nations (Karim 2011). The BNPT study itself does not show data that the actions of extremism or terrorism developed in Makassar. The Islamism movement in Makassar is believed to only develop to the level of militancy and radicalism (Hidayah 2013).

A high level of optimism regarding nationalism of Muslim communities in South Sulawesi, especially Makassar, was also shown by several scholars who participated in this study. As explained above, the survey results do not indicate an outlook of refusal of ulama to the concept of nation-states, in which 70% of ulama are in a progressive, inclusive, and moderate spectrum. In this case, many ulama even convey a priori outlook that this research will produce findings that are different from previous studies. Most of them were convinced that there was no problem regarding the acceptance of the Makassar clerics against the concept of the nation-state. Some of these a priori outlooks can be seen from the statements of several ulama from influential organizations in Makassar as follows.

“If the focus of this research is on ulama, then in Makassar this is the context of Gurutta. I am sure that none of the Gurutta in Makassar rejected the Pancasila. Therefore, they certainly have no problem if asked about their acceptance of the nation-state concept. “

“... Before this research was completed, I thought I could conclude what the Makassar ulama’s answer was about the nation-state. They certainly accept and don’t have problems. I guarantee it. “

However, some recent research shows data that is different from the previous one. The BNPT research related to radicalism in universities, for example, clearly shows that universities are alleged to be one of the most strategic new arenas for the development of the Islamism movement organized through halaqah activities, discussions, and other related student activities. The BNPT indicated that all state campuses in Java and Sulawesi were exposed to religious-based radicalism, although with varying degrees. This BNPT claim is supported by the results of the BIN survey of 20 universities in 15 provinces during 2017, which stated that 39 percent of students in the 20 universities rejected Pancasila and anti-democracy (Tempo, June 3, 2018: 43-4).

In the case of Makassar, further coverage of Tempo Magazine shows clearly that on the campuses of state universities in Makassar, such as UIN Alauddin, activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) no longer use hidden patterns of UKM activities to spread their teachings. HTI studies have been conducted with an open forum format with HTI speakers brought to campus. The discourse of rejecting Pancasila was delivered openly in forums facilitated by the campus. Although the campus management claimed not to know about the existence of the HTI forums, some students admitted that it was precisely their lecturers who introduced and invited them to join HTI studies on the campus of UIN Alauddin. These discussion forums diminished after the dissolution of HTI, where the spread of HTI teachings has now returned to its initial format through limited and clandestine methods (Tempo, 3 June 2018: 42-3).

The influence and relevance of the development of the Islamist movement in Makassar, and Indonesia in general, with global movements and organizations, have been alluded to by previous studies. The emergence of various organizations such as Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and the like is one proof

of the strong linkages between the movements of Islamism in Indonesia and similar movements that occur in parts of the world (Gunaratna 2002; Mujani 2007).

Some experts view that compared to other Muslim countries in the world, the emergence of the Islamist movement in Indonesia is arguably late (Elson 2010, 328). However, some other experts witnessed the delay in the emergence of the Islamist movement in Indonesian political circles showed more marginalization and strong pressure on this movement in the history of politics in Indonesia (Formichi 2010). The roots of the Islamism movement are clearly visible in Indonesian history from the era before independence to the present with different variations in scale and influence. The Islamism movement found its momentum post-Reformation, in which the democratic system had opened wide opportunities for the emergence of Islamic political power, as seen in the emergence of various Islamic parties only within a few months after the reform began.

The Islamic group which reiterated the Jakarta Charter and the formalization of Islamic Syariah had a stronger influence with the emergence of hardline groups, such as the Majelis Mujahidin, Hizb ut-Tahrir, KPPSI, and the like. Although the struggle of Islamic political power to include the Jakarta Charter in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution at the 2002 People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Session failed, the Islamic movement did not seem to recede.

#### **GRAY AREAS IN CATEGORIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MAKASSAR ULAMA**

Among the important things from the findings of this study, especially the qualitative data from the interview, is the fact that on the one hand, this study confirms some of the previous research findings regarding scholars and their perceptions of nation-states. However, on the other hand, the results of this study also refute some of the results of previous studies and theories that have generally developed about the characteristics of ulama, views, and political outlooks.

In general, research related to the characteristics of ulama tends to classify ulama in binary categories which simplistically tend to contrast one category of ulama with other categories. So is the case with the research that uses the category of ulama such as progressive, inclusive, moderate, conservative, exclusive, radical, and extreme ulama. The results of the interview show that efforts to categorize ulama in Makassar

in seven categories are difficult to do, and even tend to be trapped in labeling errors because the category of ulama described does not reflect the views of actual ulama.

Furthermore, this study shows that the ulama category should not be understood as a static character label like boxes that can clearly separate groups of ulama from one group to another. In reality, the ulama's views tend to be fluid, where ulama in one category in certain cases can have a view that is contrary to the views of other ulama in the same category. Ulama W (male), for example, in which the response to the survey variable of this study shows that he is in the category of progressive or inclusive ulama, there is no indication that he is radical or extreme. However, his view of jihad, for example, shows that he has a view that tends to be extreme.

“... that *rohmatan lil alamin* Islam (Islam is a religion of Blessing) is certain. But do not interpret it as an excuse that we are weak without resistance. The Prophet ordered us to fight too, don't forget that. The current condition is no longer appropriate if we only lecture *mauidhotul hasanah* (good message). It must be forced, Islamic law must be forced. If you are asked to be offered, no one will implement it. Must be forced, those who oppose must be fought ... “

The same thing was conveyed by ulama B (male), even though he was affiliated with mainstream Islamic organizations and had a fairly open view of the principle of tolerance among religious believers, but in other religious aspects, his perspective tended to be under the radical and even extreme spectrum. Regarding *jinayat* law, for example, he is inclined towards a strict stance on criminal law in force in Indonesia today.

“In the concept of the highest state of the essence and its weight is the law of God, whether it concerns civil or criminal. As the law of theft does not need to be interpreted again, cutting off one's hands means cutting one's hands. The effect of the snare is clearly going to be very high ... And it can enter our system through the first principle of Pancasila. The inheritance law must also be the same (it does not need to be interpreted again) it must be carried out according to the provisions in the Quran. “

**RECEIVING DEMOCRACY WITH HALF A HEART**

Rejection of democracy and the system of the nation-state itself cannot be seen solely from expressions and movements which blatantly blaspheme and reject democracy in the public sphere (Hilmy 2015, 441). The strength of the democratic system in Indonesia and the broad acceptance of the people of the nation-state system make the movement of individuals and groups who reject the democratic system very narrow. Even though the discourse related to alternative systems besides democracy, including the Khilafah system, is suspected to continue to be fought by certain groups, but until now the discourse of rejecting democracy campaign in this country is not popular enough.

Furthermore, some cases show that rejecting a democratic system can be interpreted as an attempt to commit suicide because it will bring individuals to the state's enemy status. The case of the dissolution of HTI, for example, is an example that the campaign blatantly rejects the democratic system is a counterproductive step for a movement in Indonesia. Therefore, many groups substantially have an anti-system platform, but in the public sphere they actively use democratic arguments, solely as tactics to gain sympathy and public support or as an attempt to circumvent accusations as enemies of the state (Hilmy 2015, 414).

In general, the views of Makassar ulama regarding democracy and nation-states do not indicate a rejection of the existing system. Most of them are even actively involved in efforts to uphold the democratic system in society. Ulama G (male), for example, where his involvement in the MUI activities seemed to really color his views, expressed the following statement.

“... What is more real is our national state. What we have to guard is the national state with all its diversity, so that there are two things that I underline, namely becoming good citizens and at the same time becoming good religious people. And we can synergize at the same time in the context of the national state that we have in Indonesia today ... Those who feel that they are not accommodated it's because of the euphoria of the past. They are trapped in the past's utopia, that we once had a Khilafah and then were sad because it was lost. But if we look at history, which is the most ideal from the post-Prophet Muhammad? Ottoman is not an Islamic state either, there is Safawi, and other small

countries. So, it's very utopian if dreams have one caliphate for Indonesia and the world. The system should be made so that there is synergy among systems. The system can be different but, in each country, it does not have to be contradicted by the variations. And I think the nation-state system in Indonesia today is the most realistic one.”

Although survey data and interview results indicate that there are no ulama in Makassar from all categories that openly reject Pancasila, both as the basis of the state and the democratic government system, the results of the interviews indicate that there are indications of ambiguity in the understanding of several ulama regarding the democratic system. Although ulama clearly state that they accept a democratic system, for example they define democracy differently from what is understood in the constitution.

Ulama S (male), for example, despite his response to survey questions and interviews, confirms that he belongs to the pro-system category of ulama, but some of his statements show the opposite.

“There is no problem with democracy, (democracy) is Islamic, there is nothing that contradicts with the Islamic values ... but the democracy that we carry out in our (state) today is not a true democracy. This democracy has tyrannized Muslims. Unfortunately, there is no awareness of the people (of Islam) to fight, they are all are silent. Those who try to fight are actually hostile.”

In line with ulama S, a similar statement was also raised by ulama H (male) who emphasized his rejection of the nation-state system and democracy, although his response to the survey did not indicate he was in the category of rejecting the system.

“So, if the Islamic state system is clear and standard. You cannot ask whether you agree or not. Just like sholat it must not be discussed because everything is clear. If you disagree with the system (the Islamic state system) it means you disagree with sholat, which means you are a polytheist ... The format of the country refers to what the Prophet exemplified. Our secularization has gone too far... The size and dosage of zakat may be discussed because of the different contexts, but there is no discussion that zakat is obligatory or not, because it is definite. “

This is even seen from the statement of the ulama from Islamic organizations which had been categorized as part of a support group of democracy, as stated by ulama R (male) who was also active in the MUI.

“In theory, the concept of Khilafah is valid, right? There is nothing wrong with it because the chapter and verse are in the Holy Koran. But for now, because of strong resistance, I am more inclined to the ideals of upholding Islamic Law. Upholding Islamic law is the same as Khilafah. We don't have to use the term Khilafah because there might be a large portion of rejection. “

The responses of several other ulama indicate a form of fragmentation in their acceptance of a democratic system, where they accept the system in certain aspects but they reject other aspects of the existing system. Others accept the system conditionally. Some of the ulama's responses even indicated that they were in fact substantially anti-system, but they accepted it solely because there was no possibility of refusing. The fact that democracy is the only system that is accepted makes the discourse offer another system, including Khilafah, it is illogical to be offered at the national level. The political system that developed in Indonesia today makes the discourse of rejecting democracy not getting much support from the public. In some cases, rejecting democracy can be interpreted as a suicide attempt that is counterproductive for campaigning.

In this case, the antisystem understanding of some ulama is more of a hidden agenda, where the possibility of resonance is determined by the presence or absence of the opportunity to articulate it in the future.

#### **SHIFT FROM NATIONAL TO LOCAL**

Interview data show that there are strong indications that counterterrorism campaigns and counters in Indonesia in recent years have had a significant impact on changes in the views of the people of Makassar, including ulama, regarding Islam and the nation-state. In general, regardless of the character of their political views and thoughts, the ulama in Makassar expressed their disappointment in the democratic regime which did not provide enough space for Muslims as the majority group in this country to freely articulate their various interests. However, the discourse of rejection of democracy and the system of government, as explained above, does not clearly emerge. The dissolution of HTI, for example, was referred to by several scholars as a justification that the Khilafah discourse had no prospects to be offered in this country.

However, this does not mean that the Khilafah discourse and changes in state form are completely perish. The discourse is still developing in Makassar with different formats and tones. The response of some ulama shows that they refrain from the discourse on Khilafah more because of their despair because discussions about changes in the shape of the state and its kind have reached a dead end. Ulama S (male), for example, states the following.

“... What is wrong with Khilafah? Is it against the rules of the Holy Koran if I speak about Khilafah. It is stated in the Holy Koran ... The problem is that people are already negatively affected by the words of Khilafah “

The difficulty of developing the discourse of formalizing the system of Islamic government at the national level makes pro-Khilafah ulama seem to take the momentum of strengthening the issue of regional autonomy as momentum to influence the political and governmental system at the local level through the implementation of Syariah regulations. It can be seen in the response of the Makassar ulama, where they rejected the idea of the Darul Islam which openly tried to uphold Islamic law through separation from the state by establishing an Islamic State. In this case, they are no longer interested in the discourse on the Khilafah system at the national level. However, some ulama who became informants in this study supported the Islamic Syariah Enforcement Preparation Committee (KPPSI) in South Sulawesi. Ulama S (male), for example, who openly supported the KPPSI and the application of Syariah Perda, but he refused to be associated with the Darul Islam movement and the like.

“... KPPSI is different from DI-TII. People misunderstood the KPPSI because his son Kahar Mudzakkar was part of it. We don't reject Pancasila or NKRI. We encourage the application of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. What is wrong with it? If Muslims want to implement Islamic law, why is it wrong? “

Therefore, it is understandable if the magnitude of support for the KPPSI raises increasingly strong concerns that the prospect of the emergence of the Islamism movement in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general, needs to be watched out (Mujiburrahman 2013). The success of KPPSI in promoting Islamism in Makassar itself can be seen from the success of the establishment of several Syariah Regional Regulations, such as the City Regulation No.2 / 2003 concerning Professional, Infaq, and



Sadaqah Zakat, Makassar City Regulation No. 5/2006 concerning Zakat and other related local regulations. It confirms that the strengthening of the Islamist movement in Makassar is truly obvious.

Data from the interviews show that the dream of making South Sulawesi as the Medina Veranda still resonated not only among ordinary people but also among ulama. However, the statements of some ulama suggest that they are aware that these ideals require collective work by involving various elements of society. Ulama H (male), for example, expressed his following suggestion.

“South Sulawesi is indeed the Medina’s porch, it is also recognized by the government. It is the vision of the general public here actually. But you really need to work hard to achieve it. The political situation sometimes does not support us to discuss it, especially during the current presidential election period. “

The leaders of KPPSI are also fully aware, in which they needed strong political support at both local and national levels in order to implement their political agenda. Therefore, pragmatic steps were taken by KPPSI leaders to obtain support. Aziz Kahar, for example, felt the need to emphasize that the KPPSI took a different path from his father, Kahar Muzakkar, who would not take the path of military force to implement Islamic Syariah in South Sulawesi (Mujiburrahman 2008).

These pragmatic steps were also taken by Islamist groups in almost all regions in Indonesia. As explained by Bush (2008) that the discourse on the implementation of Syariah in Indonesia itself is not always identical with Islamic parties or Islamist groups. Some studies underline that the reality of the strong discourse of Islamism among Indonesian Muslim communities has long been used as a political commodity to gain power. Caliphate discourse and the application of Islamic Shari’a are important issues used by political parties, including Islamic political parties, to fight for the voice of the Muslim community in Indonesia. Many politicians from the secular party carry the platform for implementing Islamic Sharia for various reasons. Some of them saw the discourse of Islamic Sharia implementation as strategic enough to attract supporters’ sympathies, while some of them discussed the implementation of Sharia-based regulations solely to divert people’s attention from several other issues, including corruption issues that involved them (Bush 2008, 187; Mujiburrahman 2013, 166).

### FROM FORMALIZATION TO SUBSTANCE

Some studies suggest that in the case of Indonesia Islamic radical groups tend not to choose the path of political parties to fight for their ideas and views, because of the perception that their involvement in political parties is the same as legitimizing the democratic system they are about (Hilmy 2010). In this case, they prefer social media channels, leaflets, halaqah, and other alternative approaches. For this reason, the radical group was not enthusiastic enough to participate in supporting the establishment of Syariah regulations and the like (Crouch 2009).

This pattern is not fully confirmed by the data of ulama perceptions in Makassar, where some ulama who are inclined towards anti-system views do not indicate their reluctance or refusal to fight through political parties and parliament. Some of them even viewed the struggle for ‘intra-parliamentary’ (Hilmy 2015) as the most strategic choice, as shown in the following excerpt from an interview with ulama S (male).

*Informant:* If people are still insistent on creating Khilafah or changing Pancasila and the Constitution, it means they are not smart. Just like HTI, who committed suicide and died, right? In the current political system, the social system that we see today is impossible to fight for the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia by replacing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD 45). Honestly, I want Islamic law to be applied in Indonesia. How about you, do you want Islamic law? But I will not join in a demonstration demand Pancasila to be replaced. It is not a clever move. But if there is a demonstration to replace the president, I will participate.

*Researcher :* But sorry in the contents of the survey yesterday, you said you agreed that Pancasila is the most appropriate ideology in Indonesia (questions No. 9 and 15).

*Informant :* Yes, because in my opinion Pancasila cannot be replaced at this time.

*Informant :* Pancasila is not the Holy Koran, so it can be replaced, right? But like I said earlier I don't see that replacing Pancasila is the smart idea for the moment.

*Researcher :* Then what do you think is the smart move to actualize the Islamic law?

*Informant :* Enter and control the House of Representatives (DPR) who makes the rules and regulations. The Pancasila can be translated to anything. If Soekarno can make Pancasila as part of communism, why can't Muslims make Pancasila as an Islamic law? “

However, despair over the failure of struggle through politics and parliament in the form of formalization of Islamic law made some groups choose alternative paths by avoiding friction with the political and state system. They believe that the Islamic state system will automatically be realized if the Muslim community has realized and agreed to want a system of Islamic national life. In this case, the persuasive way of 'Islamizing' in a manner that Muslim society is the most effective way to be taken, namely by influencing the thoughts and ideologies of each member of the community without having to rub against the political apparatus/state.

In this case, some ulama took other means in their efforts to discuss Islamic systems of government, namely by focusing more on the substantial aspects of the enforcement of Islamic law in society than the formalization of Islamic law through state instruments. Changes in Islamic character and lifestyle are more important in the framework of enforcing Islamic law than system changes.

“If Muslims live Islamically, are an enthusiast of Islam, want to fight for Islam, then automatically Islamic Syariah will be established in South Sulawesi. It's useless to insist on making a Syariah law if the community lives far from the values and teachings of Islam.”

Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) is one of the organizations in Makassar that seems to have chosen this alternative route. Allegations that have hit this organization as part of the ISIS network have made this group to carefully carry out their missionary movements by avoiding friction with the political apparatus.

“Wahdah Islamiyah actually teaches a very narrow Wahabi view. They think those who are different from them are considered infidel. Then takfir emerged and flourished ... Wahdah [Islamiyah] was indicated as part of having a relationship with the terrorist network. Metro TV broadcasts, for example, clearly link Wahdah Islamiyah with terrorist networks ... We do *tabayun*, we give them the right to answer ... “

Although the WI did not seem to involve themselves in political discussions in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general, the political influence of this movement seemed very real, in which the militancy

of followers and sympathizers of WI was seen in almost all levels of society. WI chooses preaching and education in the society which indirectly become a forum for the regeneration of their movements in the community. Although this step of *da'wah* taken by WI cannot be automatically concluded as a form of 'democracy trap' (Fuller 1992), the indication towards that direction is quite strong.

Institutionally, WI does not have a program or policy related to efforts to formalize Islamic law in South Sulawesi. However, the involvement of WI figures and members in KPPSI indicates that the agenda towards the formalization of Islamic syariah is quite strong in this organization (Tajuddin 2013, 221). It does not rule out the possibility that in the end when the foundation of Islamism is strong, they can seize power easily because, in the current democratic context, state policy follows more the aspirations or desires of the majority of the public.

In this case, WI uses the opportunities opened by the democratic system to spread the ideology of Islamism that they are carrying out. The attempt to seize the influence of religious references in Makassar society is a serious step seen in the WI movement. The influence WI *da'wah* is widely spread through various media both print and online. WI *da'wah* cadres are also actively assigned to the field through forums at schools, campuses, and other forums (Tajuddin 2013). The influence of WI *da'wah* references is felt, especially among young age groups, as indicated by one of the following young ulama A (male).

“... The influence of the teachings of Wahdah [Islamiyah] and the like is very evident among teenagers especially. They usually look for information on the internet and the media that great ulama cannot provide. They would browse without any control and have no idea whether it is Wahdah media or not.”

#### ***ANTAGONIST BRANDING BECOMES THE PROTAGONIST***

As explained above, there are indications that the difficulty of rejecting the strong connotation between the Islamist movement in Makassar and the terrorist network has made ulama supporters of radicalism feel the need to take a more productive alternative way to express their ideas in the public sphere. Some ulama expressed their objections to being labeled as a radical and exclusive group, although they openly expressed their discriminative outlook towards other groups, especially minority groups.

Some ulama openly denounce their discriminatory outlooks towards

minority groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim. However, they realize that labeling as a radical organization cannot be avoided, where it tends to harm their understanding and movements. Therefore, they realize the need to re-branding their understanding and organizational image to avoid a bad stigma. Ulama S (male) who is often categorized as part of radical groups is aware of this.

“We need to eliminate the notion of people that we are radical and discriminatory. What we are doing is a form of real *ijtihad* defending Islam from unaware attacks coming from several areas. We have been labeled as a bad person, as a troublemaker and other labels, but eventually, people understand, we explain that we are the ones who defend Islam with substantive action.”

On the other hand, the fear of labeling as a public or state enemy because it rejects the system encourages certain groups to construct their anti-system and violent campaigns with a more refined approach. The general patterns used include efforts to identify human rights with America, Israel, and other Western countries that are hostile to Islam, expose discrimination against Muslim minorities in various countries, or attempt to associate democracy with morality issues such as free sex, liquor, and drugs, etc. (Hilmy 2015, 414).

#### **SHIFTING THE ROLE AND ACCESS OF FEMALE ULAMA**

Unlike the results of this study in several other cities, in the Makassar context, the issue of gender equality in the context of social and political life did not appear as a significant issue to be discussed. The data from the survey and interviews have no indication of discriminatory outlooks among ulama regarding the role of women in the social and political realm. The discourse of the rejection of women's leadership is not a central issue. However, it becomes interesting to discuss because indications of rejection of the role of women appear in the context of their participation in religious life in the community, more specifically their role as leaders in religious activities in the community. The interview data illustrates the emergence of new, more rigid constraints on women's access and role as ulama or religious leaders in the Makassar community.

Of the three female informants in this study, all saw the issue of restricting access and the role of female ulama to be taken seriously. Although this issue has not yet reached a worrying level, there is the

potential for this issue to escalate, as stated by the ulama Z (female) as follows.

“It is increasingly difficult for women to lecture in mosques and public Islamic studies. Many mosques whose takmir are now dominated by XX people ... I am a regular speaker at a provincial mosque, I have been a woman in a mosque for years, there has never been a problem ... Now it has become a problem because I am a woman and the worshipers consist of men and women. I think there should be an effort so that the prohibition from women does not come into force, but we don't know what Makassar looks like in the future. “

The same thing was also conveyed by ulama D (female).

“... I have regular lectures in several mosques, recitation of actual mothers, but many of the gentlemen participated. I once lectured at a small mosque near my place, a routine of recitation of mothers. I was shocked when I was asked by the MC to go on stage and suddenly there was a takmir man who took the mic and told the committee to put a curtain behind me, because I had to lecture from behind the curtain. I said why should I use curtains? He said because there were men currently present and I was lecturing in an open place and not wearing a veil ... I was surprised that the mosque had been controlled by Wahdah now, the takmir. “

So far, there is not enough data that can explain the factors that led to the role of women as religious leaders in Makassar being more questionable than their roles in other fields, including their role in the political sphere. However, this condition implies that religious authority among the Makassar community is very important. Being a figure who has the authority and theological legitimacy can be more important than the position as a leader who only has political and territorial authority.

The term *gurutta* itself is not commonly given to female ulama in South Sulawesi, regardless of the capacity and competence of the female ulama. As far as the researchers have searched, there was only one female figure who was called as the *gurutta*, namely Sitti Aminah Adnan from the As'adiyah Pesantren. However, the status of *gurutta* was only recognized by her students, not by the wider community (Halim 2015, 235).

**INTRA-RELIGIOUS AND INTERFAITH TOLERANCE**

In the Indonesian context, it is important to separate between values and principles of tolerance and liberal values (Menchik 2016). The fact that being a tolerant Muslim in Indonesia is not identical to the form of acceptance of liberal values. It has become a distinctive character for Muslims and Islamic organizations in Indonesia that the theological views they hold cannot determine their views and behavior regarding tolerance. They may be tolerant towards certain minority groups, but not with other groups, or they are tolerant in a certain context, but not in other contexts (Menchik 2016, 32).

Tolerance in this study is defined as limited in the context of religious tolerance, in which tolerance is defined simply as a form of outlooks and behavior in accepting differences in religion and belief in the context of social life. Tolerance itself emphasizes the form of acceptance of other beliefs, including differences in intra-religion understanding or between groups in a religious group (Woolf & Hulsizer 2002). Tolerance emphasizes the existence of a level (degree), in which a person arrives at a position to accept something that is fundamentally different from his belief or level in which someone understands and accepts that he is different from other parties without being trapped in evaluating and which attributes are better, his own beliefs or other people's beliefs (Walt 2014).

The tolerance outlook shown by most Makassar ulama is more inclined towards pragmatic tolerance, in which the outlook of accepting these differences is solely for the sake of maintaining stability (Menchik 2016, 130). In general, both survey data and interviews show a fairly high level of tolerance among Makassar ulama, both tolerance towards non-Islamic groups and Islamic groups who have different views. However, specifically regarding the existence of Syiah groups, there are generally negative views and outlooks among the Makassar ulama, regardless of the background of the religious organization and the characteristics of the thought of the ulama. Compared to other regions, there are indications that the rejection of Syiah groups in Makassar is stronger than in other regions. The existence of organizations that specifically reject the Syiah, such as the Laskar Pemburu Aliran Sesat (LPAS) or the Makassar Anti-Syiah National Alliance, shows that the rejection of this group is harder than the refusal of ulama to other minority groups such as the Ahmadiyah. The statement of ulama S (male) below describes the outlook mentioned.

“We only focus on Syiah because it is a massive international movement. It has already penetrated local colleges. Books and forums on Syiah are available, ... Some say Shia is like a frog, it always jumps, if it's not jumping it's because it's only observing the current situation. If they do not preach, it is only taqiyyah ... We strongly oppose Syiah because they consider friends to be infidels ... It is the opposite with Ahmadiyah, they do not open a Syiah-like front.”

Some ulama who belong to progressive and inclusive groups do not show their inclusive outlook when talking about Syiah, in which they are clearly discriminatory towards this group. However, data relating to this matter obtained from surveys and interviews is very limited so research is needed.

## CONCLUSION

In general, there is little difference in data regarding the perceptions and views of Makassar ulama regarding the format of nation-states between survey data and interview data for this study. The survey results show that none of the ulama in Makassar who participated in this study were identified as having anti-system views or rejecting the nation-state system. However, the interview data shows slightly different results, in which there are variations in findings regarding the characteristics and views of more diverse ulama who are not identified in the survey results.

The interview results indicate a form of fragmentation in the acceptance of ulama to the nation-state system, in which they accept the system in certain aspects, but they reject other aspects of the existing system, while others accept the conditional acceptance system. Some ulama even indicated in the interview that they were substantially anti-system, but they accepted the nation-state system and democracy simply because they did not see any possibility and opportunity to resist or fight. In other words, some ulama show an outlook of refraining from the discourse on different state systems, including the Caliphate, more due to their despair because they see that discussions about changes in the shape of the state and its kind have reached a dead end.

The difficulty of the development of the discourse on the formalization of the Islamic government system at the national level has made the pro-Khilafah ulama seem to take the momentum of strengthening the issue of regional autonomy by influencing the political and governmental systems at the local level through the implementation of Syariah regulations. The



dream of making South Sulawesi as the Serambi Madinah continued to resonate not only among ordinary people but also among ulama. Therefore, the magnitude of support for the KPPSI indirectly raises growing concern that the prospect of the emergence of the Islamist movement in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general, needs to be watched out for.

Discrimination issues arise among Makassar ulama not in non-Muslim minority groups, but in minority Islamic groups such as Syiah and Ahmadiyah. In this case, the data shows that discrimination against Syiah tends to be more violent when compared to the discrimination received by other minority Islamic groups. Related to gender issues, it is very interesting to discuss because indications of rejection of women's roles do not arise in the context of the role of women in the political sphere, as happened in other regions. Discrimination against women emerges in the context of their participation as religious leaders and figures. Restrictions began to be felt by several female ulama who participated in this study. The term Gurutta itself is not uncommon given to female ulama in Makassar.

The condition of the acceptance of ulama against the system of nation-states in Makassar further confirms that, the debate regarding the relationship between Islam (*din*) and the state (*daulah*) among the Muslim community in Indonesia is still unresolved. Dialectics related to the issue is constantly evolving and will never stop. The discourse that the Caliphate and Islamic Shariah are increasingly popular solutions along with the rise of criticism that the Western political system is seen as failing to offer prosperity in the socio-political order of Indonesia and the world in general.

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