

Islam In Indonesia

(The Politics of Recycling and the Collapse of a Paradigm)*

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ملخص

تبحث هذه المقالة عن تطور السياسة الإسلامية التي تقع في الأوان الأخيرة بإندونيسيا وذلك عن طريق شرح الآراء المختلفة عن تاريخ دخول الإسلام بإندونيسيا. ويؤثر المذهب العقيدى السننى والهيكل الاجتماعى فى اندونيسيا على الفكرة السياسية الاندونيسية الوحد كبير. وفى المجتمع السننى يعتبر العلماء مصدرا ثانويا يحسن اتباع نصيحتهم وقوتهم ولكن ذلك ليس من واجب دينى.

فقد أصابت اندونيسيا أمواج من الاتجاهات السياسية. ففي القرن التاسع عشر رفر العلم الإسلامى ليلهم كفاح الشعب الاندونيسى من الحكام الكافرين. وفى نفس الوقت ظهرت الايديولوجيا الوطنية التى تثير الجدل فى الخلافات بين المسلمين المطيعين (santri) والابنيين (abangan). وفى العهد القديم تتربع الايديولوجيا الشيوعية فى قمة ازدهارها لتتهار مع ظهور العهد الجديد والذى يهتمش ايدولوجيا السياسة الإسلامية.

وفى الانتخابات العامة الأخيرة التى عقدت من يونيو ١٩٩٩ لا تحصل الاحزاب السياسية على الأغلبية. ولذلك فقد انهارت النظرية القديمة التى تقول بأن المسلمين سيقعون فى الحالة أحسن مما سبق ان يخدمهم الأحزاب الإسلامية. وعلى الأقل فإن الانتخابات الأخيرة تشهد بأن الطاعة والانتماء الدينية ليستا موضع الاعتبار الاولى لانتخاب الحزب المنضل.

Abstrak

Makalah ini menyoroti perkembangan politik Islam di Indonesia akhir-akhir ini. Untuk itu, penulis menguraikan asal mula masuknya Islam ke Indonesia menurut berbagai versi. Selain itu, doktrin teologi Sunni dan struktur sosial di Indonesia juga ikut mempengaruhi pemikiran politik Islam Indonesia. Dalam masyarakat Sunni, ulama berfungsi hanya sebagai patron yang nasehat dan teladannya meskipun perlu diikuti tetapi bukan dipandang sebagai kewajiban agama.

Indonesia mengalami terpaan gelombang berbagai ideologi politik. Pada abad ke-19, memang bendera Islam menjadi inspirasi perjuangan bangsa Indonesia melawan para penguasa kafir. Namun, muncul ideologi nasionalisme yang memicu perdebatan dan pertentangan antara umat Islam "santri" dan "abangan". Di era Orde Lama, ideologi Komunis mengalami puncak kejayaan yang kemudian hancur lebur seiring dengan kemunculan Orde Baru yang kemudian juga memarginalkan ideologi politik Islam. Dengan runtuhnya rezim Suharto, kebebasan dibuka kembali sehingga muncul romantisme untuk menghidupkan kembali partai-partai yang pernah aktif di masa Orde Lama termasuk partai-partai Islam.

Umat Islam yang berusaha menghidupkan kembali politik Islam pada pemilu 1955 mempunyai resiko dan bisa kontra-produktif. Masyarakat Muslim Indonesia telah berubah. Mereka kini berpendidikan lebih baik dan memahami hubungan antara Islam dan nasionalisme dengan lebih kritis dan realistis. Pada pemilu 7 Juni 1999, partai-partai Islam tidak mendapat suara mayoritas. Karena itu, paradigma lama bahwa umat Islam akan lebih baik jika dilayani oleh partai-partai Islam nampaknya telah runtuh. Setidaknya pada pemilu terakhir ini, ketaatan dan afiliasi agama tidak lagi menjadi pertimbangan utama pemilihan suatu partai.

Introduction

To say that in Indonesia religion, particularly Islam, is related to the political development of the country is in no sense new. Several studies have indicated this connection.¹ Brian May (1978), one of the most critical commentators on Indonesia's problems, puts it well when he says : "no study of Indonesia's problems is of use unless this significant force (Islam) is taken into account"² The simplest explanation for such a statement would be the fact that the majority of Indonesians are Muslims. In

the 1971 census, some 87,5 percent of the Indonesian population of 119 million were Muslims. In 1980 census the Muslims accounted for more than 128 millions (88%) out of some 145 million total population. In 1990, the number of the Muslims increased to 156 million (87%) out of some 179 million total population.³ The rest were divided among Protestants (around 6 percent), Catholics (around 3 percent), Hindus (around 2 percent), and Buddhists (around 1 percent). In 1999, the number of the Muslims is estimated to be 176 million out of some 200 million Indonesian population. Such an explanation is "superficial", however, for it falsely assumes that all Muslims share a common political outlook. It does not, for example, take into account the profound political antagonism between the orthodox and syncretic Muslims, particularly in the case of Java.⁴ Therefore, to get a better understanding of the complexity of Islam and Muslims in Indonesia, one would have to look at the question from at least four perspectives : historical origin, theological doctrine, social structure, and political ideology.

Historical Origin

Scholars are in disagreement as to when Islam first came to Indonesia. Some say it was as early as the eight century and others say it was in the thirteenth century. With a few exeptions, the proponents of the former view are generally Muslim scholars from Indonesia or Malaysia, while the proponents of the latter view are generally Dutch and other Western scholars.⁵ The former argue that the trade route by sea connecting Siraf in the Persian Gulf, India, and China existed as early as the fourth century and developed into a large scale route of transportation in the seventh century.⁶ The Chinese Annals of the Kwangtung record the coming of the first Muslim into China in the beginning of the T'ang dynasty (618-907 A.D.). The T'ang dynasty received the first envoy of Muslim Arabs, called Ta-shih (Chinese pronunciation for a Persian word : Ta-zi), as early as 651 A.D., the second in 655 A.D., and the third in 681 A.D. During the Umayyad dynasty (661-751 A.D.) some 17 envoys were sent to China. As a result of these frequent diplomatic mission, Arabs and Muslims came to live in China. Some of the Muslims came by sea to the Southeastern part of the country. Chinese sources mention Arab, Persian, and Indian Muslim settlements in Canton, China, in the eighth century. Sulaiman, a Muslim merchant who visited China in 851 A.D., mentions the Muslim community of foreign merchants in Khanfu (Canton).⁷ Mas'udi of the 10th century also mentions the existance in Canton of Muslims, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and others from Basra,

Siraf, Oman, Indian and Srivijayan cities, who enjoyed the protection of the Chinese emperor until 264 A.H. (878 A.D.) when many of them fled or were destroyed by rebellious Chinese troops.⁸

The Siraf-China route was certainly a long one; it took a year and a half for the round trip journey, because of the hindrance of the monsoon season. Therefore, intermediary seaports along the way were important. These were Malabar in India, Perlak in North Sumatra, Indonesia, and Kalah or Kedah on the west coast of the Malaysian peninsula where the sailing merchants had to stay for a period of two weeks to three months before they could continue their journey.⁹ The well-known Chinese traveller, I-Ching, noted the arrival of as many as 35 ships from Persia alone during his six-month stay in Palembang, Sumatra, the port city of the Srivijaya Kingdom, in 671 A.D.¹⁰

It is only logical, therefore, that contacts were made between Indonesian and Malaysian natives and those Muslim sailors as early as the seventh or the eighth century and one or two conversions of the natives to Islam could well be assumed. In 962 A.D. the Srivijaya kingdom sent an envoy with an Arabic name to China, meaning that Muslim merchants already played some role in the kingdom at the time. In fact from that year to 1155 A.D. the Srivijaya kingdom sent envoys to China ten times and fifteen of the envoys had Arabic names.¹¹

Some epigraphic evidence also exists to support the early appearance of Islam in Indonesia or the Malayan archipelago in general. A tombstone with Arabic inscriptions of Fatima bt. Maymun b. Hibatullah was found in Leran in Eastern Java, bearing the date of 1082 A.D.¹²

The early contacts of native Indonesians and Malaysians with Muslims are also confirmed by the familiarity of early Muslim geographers with the areas of the Indonesian archipelago. Ya'qubi (d. 377 A.H./987 A.D.) writes the trading connections between the port of Kalah on the west coast of the Malayan peninsula and Aden, Yemen. Hasan Abu Zayd al-Sirafi (d. 304 A.H./916 A.D.) states that Kalah was the center for trading spices and aromatic essences, where Omani ships came and went. Al-Sirafi even provides a long account of the Maharaja kingdom of Jawaga (Jawa) and its attack on Cambodia (Qimar or Khmer).¹³ Ibn al-Faqih (d. 290 A.H./902 A.D.?) mentions the products of the Srivijaya (zabij) kingdom and the cosmopolitanism of the area with people speaking Arabic Persian and Chinese.

On the questions of from whence and how Islam came to Indonesia, prior to 1883 it was argued by Crawfurd that Indonesian and Malayan

natives received Islam directly from Arabia, but later, this theory was challenged by Snouck Hurgronje who argued that Islam was brought to the Indonesian and Malayan natives from India by Gujarat merchants. Fatimi argues that taking into account the internationalism of Islam, Indonesian Islam developed from the combined influence of southern coastal India, Persia, and the maritime Arabian cities.¹⁴

As to question of how Islam came to the archipelago, it has been partly indicated that commercial relations played an important role; visiting Arab, Persian, and Indian merchants were crucial links. However, their contribution was limited to the introduction of Islam to the region. The actual dissemination of Islam among the local people and their mass conversion to Islam were due to the efforts of Indian, particularly Bengali, Sufi (mystic) preachers who accompanied the merchants on their visits to the local rulers. It was the mystical nature of Islam that constituted the most important factor in the rapid conversion of the Indonesian people to Islam from the thirteenth century onward. The well-known sixteenth century poet and preacher Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1600 A.D.) was a mystic. Also the great seventeenth century preacher who was patronized by Sultan Iskandar Muda of the Acehese court, Shams al Din, was a mystic and belonged to the mystical tradition of Ibn al-'Arabi.¹⁵ In Java, the Nine Muslim Saints (*Wali Sanga*) whose vigorous efforts were considered decisive in converting the Javanese to Islam also belonged to Islamic mysticism or sufism.

In addition to the egalitarian nature of Islam that had attracted Indonesian natives dominated by a Hinduized system,¹⁶ it is this mystical nature of Islam that contributed most to the rapid spread of Islam in the archipelago. Mystical Islam was willing to accommodate old customs and practices and the emergence of syncretic Islam. This later has implications on their political outlook.

Theological doctrines

At the doctrinal level, Indonesian Muslims are the followers of Ash'ari theology and the Shafi'i school of Islamic law. They assert themselves as belonging to the *Ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama'ah*. The Ash'ari influence can be examined in Islamic literature widely used in the country written in both Arabic and Malay. Mohd. Nor bin Ngah, having examined the content of a number of Kitab Jawi, books on Islam in the Malay language but written in Arabic script, confirms that the authors of those Kitab Jawi widely used in Malaysia and many parts of Indonesia are the loyal adherents of the Ash'ari

school of theology. Two features in particular characterize their adherence. First in the introduction of the categories of *wājib* (necessary), *mustahil* (inadmissible), and *jā'iz* (admissible) in the discussion of the attributes of Allah. The second is the acceptance of the concept of *iktisāb* (acquisition) in life while at the same time believing in divine omnipotence.¹⁷ The same feature can be found in the theological texts written in Arabic, for these include such books as *Umm al-Barāhin* by al-Sanusi, *Kifayat al-awamm* by al-Faddali (d. 1821 A.D.), *Jawābir al-kalāmīyya* by Salih al-Jaziri, and others all of which belong to the texts of the Ash'ari school of theology.¹⁸

Little can be found in the Kitab Jawi regarding Islamic law, but much is found in Arabic texts. It is evident that most Arabic texts on Islamic law used in the Islamic educational institutions in Indonesia are the works of the 'ulama' of the Shafi'i school. Even at the tertiary level, at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), the Shafi'i texts are dominant.

While Indonesian Sufism dates back to the thirteenth century, the use of these Malay and Arabic texts by Indonesian Islam dates back only as far as the eighteenth century, or the seventeenth century at most, although many of the texts were written in the Middle East long before the seventeenth century. This would later mark the beginning of the scripturalist movements in Indonesian Islam.¹⁹ This also later led to the formation of the *santri* segment of the Muslim community with certain political outlook. The Malay abridgement of al-Ghazali's *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* is particularly strong evidence for this. In fact, that work is still being published commercially today in Singapore and Malaysia. In the early nineteenth century further scripturalist movements followed, consisting this time not only of native Indonesians going the Arab world but Hijaz 'Ulama' coming to the archipelago. In 1807, an Arab Shaykh from Yemen, Mu'allim Muhyi a-Din, settled and taught fiqh in Aceh upon the request of the local ruler. In 1809 a Patani (present-day South Thailand) scholar who spent most of his life in Mecca, Dawud b. 'Abd Allah b. Idris, compiled a treatise on marriage based on well-known Shafi'i law books such as *Minbāj al-tālibīn*, *Fatḥ al-wabbāb*, *Tubfāt al-tullāb* and *Nibāyat al-muḥtāj*.²⁰

Therefore, when the Padri movement emerged in the Minangkabau area of West Sumatra in the first half of the nineteenth century (Padri War, 1821-1837) led by the pilgrims returning from Mecca with the influence of the Wahhabi movement, it was not the first wave of Islamic scripturalism, although the Padri movement was more organized and more radical than its predecessors. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the wave of Islamic

scripturalism was getting stonger. By this time a community of Indonesian Muslim sholars existed in Mecca and had close contacts with their fellow countrymen. One of the scholars was Nawawi al-Bantani who was born in Banten, West Java, towards the mid-nineteenth century and lived in Mecca his whole life.

Another important scholar of this period was Ahmad Khatib who was born in Bukittinggi, the Minangkabau region, in 1855 and initially went to Mecca in 1876 for pilgrimage and study but remained there his whole life. He achieved the highest rank as an *iman* in teaching of Islamic Law of the Shafi'i school in the Sacred Mosque of Mecca and taught a number of Indonesian students who at the beginning of the century came to Mecca for pilgrimage and studied Islam for several years. Among his discriples were Muhammad Djamil Djambek, Abdul Karim Amrullah, and Abdullah Ahmad, all of them from the Minangkabau area, who upon their return became Islamic reformers. However, another disciple, Sulaiman Rasuli, remained a taditionalist. His two most important disciples of Javanese origin were Ahmad Dahlan and Hasyim Asy'ari who upon their return to Java founded the modernist Muhammadiyah an the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama movements, respectively.²¹

The founding of the Muhammadiyah in 1912 and the Nahdatul Ulama in 1926 marked the recognition of a dichotomy concerning theology and doctrine, between reformism and conservatism in Indonesian Islam. The Muhammadiyah, influenced by the ideas of the Egyptian reformer Muhammad 'Abduh and the Arabian Wahhabi movement, aimed to promote the study of Islam, and to establish modern educational institutions, mosques, orphanages, publish books and brochures about Islam, and hold public meetings to discuss religious issues, to advocate the purification of Islam from all syncretic practices by a return to the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, while competing with Christian missionaries backed by the Dutch colonial government. In terms of Islamic Law, the Muhammadiyah advocated the flexibility to choose one of the four Sunni *madbhabs* rather than conforming strictly only to Shafi'i law. These positions of the Muhammadiyah drew support from urban and merchant Muslims but conflicted with the basic position of the Nahdatul Ulama that tended to draw its support from people of rural areas who generally gathered around local charismatic Sufi leaders with a certain degree of syncretic practices. Many of these Sufi leaders assumed the local leadership of the Nahdlatul Ulama and also ran *pesantrens* as centers for Islamic scripturalist learning.

They thus combined scripturalism and syncretism; the result was conservatism as opposed to the reformism of the Muhammadi-yah.²² Clearly, Indonesian Islam has thus far undergone several changes in relation to scripturalism and reformism. It started with Hinduized syncretism or Indian mysticism and gradually shifted to scripturalism as it had closer contacts with the Arab world. With the penetration of Western culture introduced by the Dutch Indonesian, Islam was later divided into the reformists and the conservatives. This typology is not final yet, for the process of Islamization of the Indonesian archipelago is uneven and still in progress.²³

Social structure

At the socio-structural level, Indonesian Muslims do not have a rigid hierarchical order of religious leadership. Unlike the Shi'is, they believe that political leadership is not an integral part of theology. Sunnis do not have the concept of *imama* (divinely-guided spiritual and temporal leadership) in their theological doctrine and consider '*ulama*', religious leaders and scholars, only as patrons whose advice and exemplary lives are to be followed, but in no way is this seen as religious obligation. Even at the rural level where stricter obedience to the local '*ulama*' is supposed to be higher than in the cities due to the cohesiveness of the society, a Muslim villager can by choice take the religious advice of the neighboring '*ulama*'. These options exist, at least in theory.

In practice, the Muslim masses, especially those in rural areas with local Sufi leadership, demonstrate a relatively strong loyalty to their local '*ulama*', a kind of de facto recognition of a hierarchy. Nevertheless the influence of these rural '*ulama*' on the masses is being eroded by such external factors as the growing power of the government-appointed village heads. While it is true that the Muslims have the councils of '*ulama*' at national, regional, and even district levels, which from time to time issued '*fatwas*' and advices to the general public on various issues including political ones, these councils do not provide a mechanism for hierarchical stratification. The leadership of such religious organizations as the Nahdatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah to some extent may also provide some mechanism of hierarchy, but rarely is this binding.

Political ideology

At the politico-ideological level, it is generally accepted that, in the nineteenth century, it was the banner of Islam that provided the inspiration

to struggle for freedom from foreign rule, as shown by the wars of Padri (1821-1837), Diponegoro (1825-1830), Bone (1835), and Aceh (1871-1908). In the twentieth century, it was also the banner of Islam that caused the emergence of Indonesian national solidarity, starting with the establishment of the Syarekat Islam in 1911, which used Islam as the unifying element in the national awakening. Although the Budi Utomo movement founded in 1908 is now recognized as the official date for the Indonesian nation awakening, it was then primarily Javanese rather than national in character.²⁴ Scholars agree that the most important political contribution of the Syarekat Islam was its explicit principle of Indonesian nationalism and its struggle for national independence.²⁵ By the late 1920s, however, the leadership of the struggle for independence was taken over by Indonesia Nationalist Party (PNI) founded in 1927 by Sukarno who later developed a concept of secular nationalism, as opposed to Islamic nationalism advocated by the Syarekat Islam. For the secular nationalist, love for fatherland superseded all else including religious interests. For the Islamic nationalist, on the other hand, such an elevation of nationalism could jeopardize one's religious belief, and Indonesian nationalism should, therefore, remain based on Islam which in turn should play an important role in the future state of Indonesia.²⁶

The conflict over the issue of Indonesian Nationalism was brought before the meetings of the Japanese-sponsored Committee for the Preparation of Independence called "*Committee of 62*" in late May and early June 1945, in which the Islamic nationalists argued for the creation of an Islamic state, while the secular nationalist and non-Muslims argued for the creation of an Indonesian state based on Pancasila (a word derived from Sanskrit meaning five principles, namely, belief in God Almighty, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice). On June 22, 1945 a compromise was reached in an important document called the *Jakarta Charter* in which it was stated that Islamic laws would be observed among Muslim citizens of the future state of Indonesia. It was also agreed that this document was to be preamble of the constitution. However, when Indonesia was proclaimed independent on August 17, 1945 the newly-born state was based on Pancasila rather than Islam; in a meeting held the day after the proclamation of independence, August 18, 1945, the stipulation about the observation of Islamic laws among the Muslims was removed from the preamble of the constitution at the request of then-Vice President Mohammad Hatta. Hatta stated that, in the afternoon of August 17, 1945, a Japanese officer had come

to him relay the demand of certain Christian leaders in eastern Indonesia that the stipulation be removed. Hatta argued that, if it were not removed, the Christians would not join the newlyborn state of Indonesia. For fear of disunity, Muslim representatives at the meeting agreed to accept Hatta's request, although this was later seen by many as Muslims' political defeat.²⁷

The struggle for an Islamic state was not renounced easily by the Muslims; some in fact took up arms to make their point. As early as 1948, as a result of the disappointment with the Pancasila based state and coupled with some frictions within the army, Kartosuwiryo staged a military rebellion in West Java and proclaimed the creation of an Islamic state called Darul Islam which lasted until 1962. He was soon joined by Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi and Daud Beureuh in Aceh at the northern tip of Sumatra; Muzakar was later captured and killed by the central troops, and Beureuh gave up his rebellious activism because of military pressure from the central government. Thus, these rebellions with Islamic banners eventually failed.²⁸

In the late 1950s, when Indonesia was under the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the question of the Islamic versus the Pancasila-based state was again raised; this time it was in the sessions of the Constituent Assembly produced by the 1955 general elections. As the Assembly discussed the constitution of the state, the Muslims again proposed Islam as the basis of the state while the secular nationalists, joined by the non-Muslims and communists, supported Pancasila. After about two and a half years of debate, the sessions ended without achieving a resolution, because neither side could get the support of the two-third majority of the assembly members necessary for any proposal to pass. The deadlock encouraged Sukarno to issue a Presidential decree of July 5, 1959, by which he dissolved the Constituent Assembly altogether and at the same time declared a return to the 1945 Constitution which has a provision that Indonesia is a unitary state and that Pancasila is the basis of the state. While in its considerations the decree admitted that the 1945 constitution was inspired by the Jakarta Charter, in practice it was argued that the charter had no legal power. Later, this was considered by many as further political defeat upon the Muslims.²⁹

In Suharto's time realizing that the main enemy, the communists, had been suppressed, the Muslims once again attempted to induce the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (M.P.R.S.), which functioned as the Upper House, to legalize the Jakarta Charter. This was bound to fail, for

the opposition was overwhelming; not only the secular nationalists but the alliance of the Army, the Christians, and independent group were against it. Thus, the political defeat of the Muslims was intensifying every day. The Muslims are often suspected by the government of trying to change the Pancasila-based state of Indonesia into an Islamic one. Although officially Suharto's government policy towards Islam was sympathetic, just as towards any other religion, in practice it was sympathetic only towards cultural Islam, and remains suspicious of political Islam.³⁰ In the early eighties Suharto launched the concept of the *Azaz Tunggal Pancasila* where Pancasila should be the sole ideological basis for every social and political organization in Indonesia, a concept which proved to be a factor in the process of further castration of Islam. Later the concept also proved to be an important element in Suharto's authoritarian regime. Therefore, in 1998, after Suharto fell from power, the law on the Pancasila as the sole ideological basis was revoked.

In the meantime, the Muslim majority of the Indonesian population apparently does not express itself in the number of votes gained by Islamic political parties running in various general elections. In the 1955 general elections, six Islamic political parties competed, but altogether won only 116 (45%) out of 257 parliamentary seats contested, far below the proportion of the Indonesian Muslim Population as a whole (88%). The rest of the seats were taken by the Indonesian Nationalists Party (PKI) with 39 seats (15%), and a number of smaller political parties (13%). The largest two of the six Islamic parties were the Masyumi, a Muslim modernist party with 57 seats (22% or equal to that of the PNI) and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a traditionalist Muslim Party, with 45 seats (17,5%).³¹ In the 1971 general elections, four Islamic political parties (the Nahdatul Ulama, the Partai Syarekat Islam, the Partai Tarbiyah Islamiyah, and the Partai Muslimin Indonesia) competed and altogether won only 94 (20%) out of 360 parliamentary seats contested, even farther from forming a majority. Most of the seats (65,5%) were taken by the secular government-championed Golkar. In the 1977 general elections, the four Islamic parties which by then had amalgamated into a single party called the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the PPP) won only 99 out of the 360 seats contested (27,5%). Again most of the seats were taken by the Golkar with 232 seats (64,4%). Although the 1977 achievement of the Islamic party was proportionally 1% higher than that of 1971, it was still far below that of 1955 and far from constituting a majority.³² In the general elections of 1982 and 1987, the

number of seats for the Islamic party, the PPP, continued to decrease to 26 percent and 15 percent, respectively.³³ In the general elections of 1992, the picture remained the same (15 percent) as in 1987 but slightly changed in the general elections of 1997 when the PPP increased their seats in the parliament rather sharply to 22 percent while the PDI's seat number was reduced rather dramatically to 0.02 percent. The majority of the seats was won over by the Golkar; it was true that by then the Golkar had been dominated by the Muslims. The issue of *Ijo Royo-Royo* (meaning: mostly green in color namely Muslims) was already heard and debated in the media on the composition of the Parliament memberships produced by the 1992 general elections. The creation of the ICMI (Association of Indonesia Muslim Intellectuals) in 1991 chaired by B.J. Habibie was thought by some to be a factor in making the *Ijo Royo-Royo* phenomenon possible. Apart from the shifting of the Golkar from being dominated by the secularists to that by the Muslims, the low number of votes gained by Islamic political parties in various general elections over the years was a combined result of antagonism between syncretism VS. scripturalism, conservatism VS. reformism, and between secular nationalism VS. Islamic nationalism.³⁴

The Politics of Recycling

After the resignation of Suharto from Presidency on May 21, 1998, the Muslims were, as any other group, eager to run in the 1999 general elections, scheduled to be held on June 7, 1999. Based on the decision of the Committee of 11 headed by Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, there were 48 political parties recognized to be competing in the 1999 general elections. Prior to selection by the committee, the number was 141, almost trippled. Compared to only 3 political parties competing in every general election since 1971, this was indeed a huge number. On the one hand, the political party flourishing was certainly an indication of the high degree of response of the community towards the new era, the era of reformation. It was also an indication that people felt that they had been silenced by Suharto's government for the last 30 years. On the other hand, the party flourishing would create problems not only in terms of the management of the general elections but more importantly in term of their diversities of outlook and potentialities of conflict.

Some 34 out of those 48 political parties mentioned Pancasila, the ideology of the state, as the bases of their organizations. Seven political parties mentioned both Pancasila and Islam at the same time, and three

political parties mentioned only Pancasila although they were led by wellknown Muslim activists. (Partai Cinta Damai, Partai Daulat Rakyat, and Partai Republik). Some 12 political parties did not mention Pancasila at all. Instead, they explicitly mentioned Islam or Dinul Islam or Qur'an and Hadith as their bases. One political party (the PRD) mentioned social democracy as its basis, and another mentioned religious democracy (the PUDI). Thus, out of those 48 political parties, some 20 to 21 could be identified as Islamic political parties.³⁵

Mention has been made that even in the 1955 general elections, there were only 26 political parties competing and six political parties coming out with votes; in 1971 there were only four Islamic parties out of 10 political parties competing. Thus, by any standard of Indonesian history, the number of 21 Islamic political parties was, indeed, high. It was predicated that because of the high number, no single party would win majority votes. This meant that none of those Islamic political party would, by itself, have important influence on the future politics of Indonesia. Some observers had already suggested that if some sort of coalition mechanism among those Islamic political parties was not worked out some time before the voting date, they would become the spectators of future Indonesian politics just as they had done in the early Suharto's era. At the technical level, this would be exacerbated by the complicated votes computing system of the general elections adopted (half district system) where residual votes could be wasted unless there were coalition arrangements among various political parties as opposed to the old system (proportional system) where the number of the parliament seats gained was based on the aggregate number of votes won over by the competing political parties at the national level.³⁶

More discouraging, still, is the polling by Kompas Daily Newspaper which showed that only 37 percent out of 863 respondents in Jakarta and the surrounding areas who would include the question of religious affiliation in their voting exercise on June 7, 1999 general elections. The rest of the respondents stated that would put more weight on the program of the political parties and their leaders than the question of religious affiliation. According to the poll, this opinion was apparently consistent without distinguishing ages and levels of education. The same was true for various secular ideologies which, according to the poll, would no longer become popular consideration in the voting behavior.³⁷ This means that, the challenge those Islamic political parties would have to face was even greater.³⁸

A few Islamic political parties could be exempted from the worry, especially those which would draw support from their traditional bases, namely the Nahdatul Ulama, the Muhammadiyah, and former Masyumi supporters. Even then, the danger of fragmentation was apparent, because each of the traditional bases of support would have to be distributed to more than one political parties. The Nahdatul Ulama based support would have to be dispersed among at least five Islamic political parties : the PPP, the PKB, the PKU, the Partai SUNI, and the Partai NU. The former Masyumi supporters would have to be distributed among at least five political parties: the Partai Masyumi, the Masyumi Baru, the PBB, the Partai Persatuan, and the PUI. The Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) might want to draw its main support from the Muhammadiyah, but this was not very likely because many of the Muhammadiyah members were also the former supporters of the Masyumi. Even the traditional Syarikat Islam based supporters would have to be divided up among at least two political parties : the PSII and the PSII-1905. Although the names and attributes that most of the newly created Islamic political parties adopted were the same or similar with those of political parties competing in the general elections of 1955 and 1971, their success of winning the votes was questionable. Unless some mechanism of coalition existed, the fragmentation of Islamic political parties would be inevitable. In late April and early May, 1999 incidents of conflict between the supporters of two Islamic parties, the PPP and the PKB, had already taken place in Jepara, Pekalongan, and Semarang, central Java.³⁹

In this context, the *Fatwa* (Legal pronouncement) of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (the MUI), seemed relevant. On April 9, 1999 the MUI issued a *Fatwa* stating that for an Indonesian Muslim registering oneself to vote was religiously obligatory (*fard 'ayn*), a concept which meant that each individual Muslim had to exercise the right to vote in the June 7, 1999 general elections and failure to do so would have religious consequences. The reason being that each Muslim was responsible for the selection of the leadership of a country where he or she lives; and the June 7, 1999 general elections were. according to the MUI, necessary steps towards the selection of Indonesian national leadership. Therefore, to exercise the right to vote in the June 7, 1999 general elections was a religious obligation. The MUI did not forget to remind Muslims to choose correct political parties which would bring them to national unity and prosperity. Although the MUI did not explicitly suggest that the Muslims choose only Islamic political parties, the message was obvious. The MUI seemed aware of the potential danger

of the fragmentation of the Islamic parties.⁴⁰ A similar effort to unite the Muslims was made by the MUI in november 1998 by organizing a National Conference of the Muslims (KUII), but it was not much of a success particularly in political term.⁴¹ In fact, it had done more damage than good, as it failed to reach a consensus on the issue was discussed under the pretext of academic discussion of Islamic Law, the implication was clear. It referred to the emerging leader of the secular Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Megawati Sukarnoputri. The MUI's concern for the Islamic political parties could no longer be concealed when a few days prior to June 7, 1999, it announced publicly a recommendation that Muslims should not vote for political parties that had more non-Muslim condidates. Again, although the MUI did not mention the name of the political party, the message was loud and clear, it was referring to the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan led by Megawati Sukarnoputri.⁴²

In the meantime, some encouraging observations were also made. It was argued that the leadership of the new Islamic political parties approximated that of Islamic political parties in 1955. In 1955, many Islamic political party leaders, particularly those of the Masyumi, were wellknown and articulate persons. Prior to their leadership in the political parties, their ideas were widely read in the media and books. They were articulate intellectuals. A similar picture was now observable in various Islamic political party leadership.⁴³ This was the promising aspect of the newly created Islamic political parties. In fact, this was the only promising aspect in the process of the political retrieval.

Concluding remarks

To conclude, Indonesian Islam as represented by those Islamic political parties was playing a game of political recycling. They were trying to revive and increase their political role in the country by rehearsing the show of 1955. However, the old bases of Muslim political support as depicted in the 1955 general elections have undergone many changes in the last 44 years. The Muslims are now better educated, and their understanding of the relationship between Islam and nationalism are more critical and realistic. In the meantime, the influence of religious leaders in the villages has been eroding because of the increasing role of the secular institutions. Thus, the game of political recycling is not without a risk; it could be counter productive.

Some external factors would have some impact on the performance of the Islamic political parties. Firstly the level of the performance of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) Perjuangan, and other secular nationalist parties. The game of political recycling was not only played by the Muslims, but by the secular nationalists. A number of newly created political parties were in existent most likely hoping to win over the voted of the old Indonesian nationalist Party (the PNI) supporters of 1955. Some of these were : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the PDI), Partai Demokrasi Perjuangan (the PDI-P), Partai Nasional Demokrat (PND), Partai Nasional Indonesia-Massa Marhaen (the PNI-Massa Marhaen), Partai Nasional Indonesia-Front Marhaenis (the PNI-Front Marhaenis), and Partai Nasional Indonesia (the PNI Supeni). The higher the votes these secular nationalist political parties would get, the lower the votes for Islamic political parties would be.⁴⁴

Secondly, the military factor. According to the law, after the general elections of 1999 the military would have only 38 seats in the Parliament, half of the number of its previous seats. The military role in such public services as governors and district heads would also be reduced. Its past history of encounters with some Muslim rebellions would also have some bearings on its attitudes towards the Islamic parties.

Thirdly, one might call it the Habibie factor. The present president, B.J. Habibie, is like a coin of two sides. On the one hand he is seen as associated with or even the extension of the former President Suharto's power. On the other hand, as the former chairman of the ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) he is seen as representing the Muslim aspirations. This was one of the difficulties the Golkar had to face, namely to associate or disassociate itself from Habibie. Its continued association with Habibie would mean that the Golkar was still favoring the *status quo*, and failed to be a new independent political party, but its separation from him would mean a risky speculation of losing a devoted Muslim already in power. The Golkar's move to promote Mr. Habibie as its sole candidate for presidency would ignite some Islamic political parties to make a coalition with the Golkar to keep Habibie in power, while others would go away even farther from the Golkar to make sure its defeat in the June 7, 1999 general elections, for it was seen as a political machine of the so-called New Order government under Suharto since 1971 general elections.

This was the picture that might influence the performance of the Islamic political parties in the June 7, 1999 general elections. Whatever the outcome will be, we should have to wait until the general elections are

held.⁴⁵ One thing seemed clear that the formation of Indonesian politics was back to square one.

A Postscriptum : the collapse of a paradigm

As the general elections were held on June 7, 1999, a number of surprises came to surface. First, the general elections were held peacefully. Registered citizens went to the ballots to cast their votes peacefully. No riots or social disturbances occurred on the day of the elections, except in some parts of the Aceh province. In fact, the peaceful atmosphere was also noted during the campaign period from May 19 to June 4, 1999. It was, indeed, a nice surprise to all, for the campaign period had previously been predicated to be full of conflicts and bloodshed. Secondly, the result of the general elections was a surprise to many people, especially the Muslims. The preliminary result of the general elections showed that the secular Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, won over 154 seats of the parliament (34% of the votes). Although it could not again the majority seats of the parliament, its rivals gained even much fewer seats. The Golkar gained 120 seats (22% of the votes), the partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) gained only 51 seats (12% of the votes), the PPP (United Development Party) gained 39 seats (9% of the votes), Partai Amanat Nasional (National Trust Party) with only (about 7 percent of the votes), and the Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Stars Party) with two percent of the votes. These were the six big parties, the rest of the political parties (43 parties) gained votes ranging from 0 to less than 2% of the votes.⁴⁶

Where did the supporters of the secular PDI-P come from? Mention was made in the proceeding section that Muslims constituted some 87% of the total Indonesian population. Therefore, no single party would ever win in any general elections in Indonesia without winning over the votes of the Muslims. The success of the PDI-P on June 7, 1999 was certainly because of the support of the Muslims. How was this possible? This is related to the question of the polarization of the Muslims into the devoted Muslims (Santris or Scripturalist) and the syncretics with their different political tendencies discussed earlier. But this time went further. The support to the secular PDI-P was not only coming from the syncretics but also from the devoted Muslims. Reports said that many devoted Muslims, who used to be the traditional support of Islamic parties in Jawa, has shifted their support to the secular PDIP.⁴⁷ Religious devotion or even religious affiliation seemed

no longer a consideration for the Muslim voters in the general elections. The old paradigm that Muslim would be better served by Islamic political parties seemed to have collapsed. This is indeed a radical shift in the pattern of political affiliations in Indonesia. However, whether this tendency is long term in character or merely an interlude in a process of political recovery after having been squeezed by the Suharto government for nearly three decades, one should wait for the next general elections in the next five years (2004).

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Endnotes

¹Some important and classical studies dealing with the subject of Islam and politics are, for example : Deliar noer, *The modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, (Oxford University Press : Singapore, 1973) dealing with the late period of the Dutch colonialism (1900-1942); Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, (The Hague ; Netherland, 1958) dealing with Islam in the Japanese occupation period (1942-1945); and B.J. Bolland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, (The Hague-Martinus: Nijhoff, 1971) dealing with the period of independent Indonesia.

²Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul : London, Boston, 1978), p. 20.

³For the figures, see Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama, *Perkiraan Penduduk Indonesia Akhir Tahun 1971-1981 Menurut Propinsi dan Agama*, (Departemen Agama RI : Jakarta, 1978). See also *Sensus Penduduk 1971*, Series D, Table 13. For the figures of 1990, see Biro Pusat Statistik, 1990, p. 24.

⁴Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java* (Yale University ; Cultural Report Series No. 12, 1963), pp. 71-72, and 103. Geertz has, in fact, studied how social conflict and integration between the syncretic (abangan) and devoted (santri) Muslims occurred in Java. See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (University of Chicago Press: 1960).

⁵For the works of the Muslim scholars favoring the view of the eighth century as the date for the arrival of Islam in Indonesia, see *Seminar Sejarah Masuknya Islam ke Indonesia* (Seminar on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia), (Medan, Indonesia : 1960); S.Q. Fatimi, *Islam Comes to Malaysia*, (Singapore : Malaysian Sociological Research institute, 1963); Syeid Naquib Alatas, *Preliminary Statement on General Theory of Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian*

Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1969); N.A. Baloch, *The Advent of Islam in Indonesia* (Islamabad National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1980); Syed Farid Alatas, "Notes on Various Theories Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago", in *The Muslim World*, vol. 17 nos. 3-4 (July-October, 1985), pp. 162-175; and Uka Tjandrasasmita, "The Arrival and Expansion of Islam in Indonesia in Relation to Southeast Asia", in *International Seminar on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Jakarta : Lembaga Penelitian IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 1986); pp. 17-30. For the works of the Dutch and other western scholars favoring the thirteenth century see, for example, B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague : W. van Hoven, 1955), pp. 7-37; Brian Harrison, *Southeast Asia : A Short History* (London : Macmillan & Co., 1957), pp. 50-60; A.H. Hill, "The Coming of Islam to North Sumatra", in *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, (vol. 4 no. 1, March, 1963); and D.G.E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia* (London : Macmillan & Co., second edition, 1964), pp. 190-204. These works of the western scholars are primarily based on earlier western sources such as those of Marco Polo and Tome Pires. While Marco Polo gives the impression that by the time of his visit (1258 A.D.) the conversion to Islam of the people of Perlak (Sumatra) had just begun, Tome Pires argues that by the time of his visit (1512 A.D.) the Sumatran Kingdom of Pase had converted to Islam only about 60 to 100 years earlier. See Marco Polo, *Voyages and Travels of Marco Polo* (London : Assel & Company, 1981), p. 148; sir Henry Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo* (London : J. Murray, 1920); and Tome Pires *Suma Oriental*, ed. and trans. from Portuguese into English by Armando Cortesao (London, 1944). Some western scholars, however, favor eighth century. See, for example, W.P. Groeneveldt, *Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya : Compiled from Chinese Sources* (Jakarta : Bhurata, 1960, first published in 1880), pp. 14 and 19; and T.W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam : A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith* (London : Constable & Company, 1913), pp. 363ff.

⁶George F. Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times* (Princeton University Press ; 1951), pp. 46-47, 61-69; C.G.F. Sinkim, *The Traditional Trade of Asia* (London : Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 11-24; and Joseph De Somogyi, *A Short History of Oriental Trade* (Hildesheim : Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhanlung, 1968), pp. 61).

⁷Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, pp. 294-296; and M. Nakahara, "Muslim Merchants in Nan-Hai", in Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. Jones, *Islam in Asia vol. 2 Southeast and East Asia* (Jerusalem The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1984), pp. 1-2. Also an anonymous author *Akbar al-sin wa l-hind, Relation de la chine et de l'inde redigee en 851*, trans. from Arabic into French by Jean Sauvaget (Paris : Societe d'edition d'les belles lettres, 1948), p. 7.

⁸Mas'udi, *Muruj al-dbabab wa mada' in al-fawbar*, vol. 1 (Paris : 1861), pp. 162-164.

⁹On the sailing time, see Hourani, *Arab Seafaring*, pp 74-75.

¹⁰Ibid, p. 62; and D.R. Sar Desai, *Suotbeast Asia : Past and Present* (India : Vicas Publishing House, 1981), p. 46.

¹¹Nakahara, "Muslim Merchants in Nan-Hai" pp. 4-5.

¹²Moquette in 1919 read the date of Fatima's death in the inscription as seventh of Rajab of 495 of the Hijra (*arba'a mi'a a wa khamisa wa tis'in*) which corresponds to 1102 A.D. instead of *arba' mi'a khamisa wa sab'in* (475 A.H.) which corresponds to 1082 A.D. See Fatimi, *Islam Comes to Malaysia*, pp. 38-42; also Baloch, *The advent of Islam*, pp. 29-30.

¹³Hasan Abu Yazd al-Sirafi, *Voyage du marchand arabe Sulayman en indie et en chine*, trans. From Arabic into French by Gabriel Ferrand (Paris : Editions Bassard, 1922), pp. 95-96.

¹⁴Fatimi, *Islam Comes to Malaysia*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵Anthony H. Johns, "Sufism as a Category in Indonesian literature and History:", in *Journal of Southeast Asian History* vol. 2 no. 2 (University of Singapore : July, 1916), pp. 20-23; idem, "Modes of Islamization in Southeast Asia", in David N. Lorenzen (ed.), *The thirtieth International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and Afrika. Religious Change and Cultural Demensions* (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico to Qur'anic Exegeses", in Raphael Israeli and Antony H. Johns (eds.), *Islam in Asia vol. Southeast and East Asia*, (Jerusalem : The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1984), pp. 121-122.

¹⁶It has been argued that the spread of Islam among the strictly stratified Hindu society of India was partly due to the egalitarian nature of Islam giving the converts an instant liberation from the depriving caste system. To a lesser degree the same argument can be applied to the people of Indonesia, for they were influenced, though not strictly, by the Hinduized caste system. For the Indian argument see Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, pp. 287-288.

¹⁷Moh. Nor Bin Ngah, *Kitab Jawa : Islamic Thought of the Malay Muslim Scholars* (Singapore : Research Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983). Pp. 9-10. Rasjidi says that the Ash'ari influence in theology can also be found in Javanese manuscripts such as the *Pati Centini* written at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although some Shi'i terms such as *Shahadat Fatima* and *Shahadat Quraysh* can also be trace in the text. See H.M. Rasjidi, *Documents pour servir a l'histoire de l'Islam a Java* (Paris : Ecole francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1977), pp. 340-35.

¹⁸Those texts are used in Islamic educational institutions throughout Indonesia both in the traditional *pesantrens* and the more modern *madrasas* at either junior or secondary high school levels. Some other texts can be added to the list: *bashyia* by al-Bajuri and that by al-Dsauqi both of which are glosses of the *Umm al-barabih* of al-Sanusi; *Tabqid al-maqam* by Ibrahim al-Bajuri (d. 1861 A.D.). A commentary of the *Kifayat al-a'wamm* by al-Faddadi, which was later glossed upon by Nawawi al-Bantani in the widely read *Tijan al-durari*; *Jawbarat al-taubid* by Ibrahim al-Laqqani (d. 1631 A.D.) and the commentary, *Tuhfat al-murid* by Ibrahim al-Bajuri; *A'qidat al-a'wamm* by Ahmad al-Makki flourishing since 1864 and the commentary, *Nur al-zalam* by Nawawi al-Bantani; and others. For more titles see Departemen Agama, *Buku-Buku yang dipergunakan Pondok Pesantren* (Jakarta : Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Lektur Agama, 1977); Sudjoko, et al, *Profil Pesantren : Laporan Hasil Penelitian Pesantren Al-Falak dan Delapan Pesantren di Bogor* (Jakarta : LP3ES, first publisher in 1974, 1982). Some of the books mentioned above are also used by the Muslims in the Patani region of South Thailand. See Virginia Matheson and M.B. Hooker, "Jawi Literature in Patani : The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition", in *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* no. 61 (Kuala Lumpur, 1988), pp. 1-86.

¹⁹The term scripturalist is borrowed from Geertz who called the movement a "scripturalist interlude". See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed : Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 56ff. Elsewhere the scripturalist movements are generally identified as orthodox movements. Scripturalist movements are here defined as social movements that advocate the use of religious scriptures and are often mixed with political activism. These scriptures include the Qur'an, the Hadith, and works on Islamic law and theology written in Arabic.

²⁰Johns, "Islam in the Malay World", p. 30. As referred to earlier, all of these books are still used today in Indonesia.

²¹Deliar Noer *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 31-32.

²²For a brief account of the early Muhammadiyah see, for example, G.F. Pijper, *Studien over de Geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia 1900-1950* (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1977), pp. 103-109. Some of the Nahdatul Ulama leaders have now begun to advocate flexibility in madhhab affiliation instead of strict attachment to the Shafi'i school, but they are still in the minority. See, for example, K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, "Ijtihad Sebagai Kebutuhan" (Ijtihad as a need) in *Pesantren* vol. 2 no. 2 (Jakarta : P3EM).

²³Some argued that because of its insistence on the Quran and Hadith, the Muhammadiyah was more scriptural than the Nahdatul Ulama, but the fact is that both the Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama have strong scriptural attitudes except that the latter extends its scriptural references to the works of the 'ulama' mostly written in Arabic.

²⁴Lapidus even describes the Budi utomo as a Javanese cultural association dedicated to education and the revival of the Hindu-Buddhist culture of old Java. See Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, p. 759.

²⁵For the role of the Syarekat Islam see, for example, Ruslan Abdulgani, *Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy* (Melbourne: Monash University, 1973), pp. 49-50; and W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Elections", in Oey Hong Lee, ed., *Indonesia After the 1971 Elections* no. 5, Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 90.

²⁶On the takeover of the leadership by the secular nationalists in the struggle for independence see Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, pp. 112, 250-251.

²⁷Latter Hatta said that he could not remember the name of the Japanese Officer. It is not clear whether Hatta, himself educated in the Netherlands, personally supported or opposed the Christian demand. For an account of the Jakarta Charter and its connections with the 1945 constitution see H. Endang Saefuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Republik Nasional Antara Islam dan Nasionalis "Sekuler" Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945-1959* (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986). A note may be added here that as opposed to the Dutch colonial policy of curbing Islam and Indonesian national movements, the Japanese occupation authority promised Indonesian Independence and was more realistic in dealing with Islamic movements probably in the hope to gain the local support in the era of the hectic World War II.

²⁸For a detailed account of the Darul Islam see C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspect of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1958); and C. Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

²⁹Anshari argued that when the Constituent Assembly was dissolved by Sukarno on the pretext of making no progress, the Assembly had actually made a lot of progress on many issues except for the question of basis of the state. For Anshari, the dissolution of the Assembly was motivated, more than anything else, by Sukarno's to proceed with idea of a guided democracy. Some argued that, compared to the provisional constitution of 1950, the 1945 Constitution gave more power to the president. See Anshari *Piagam Jakarta*, pp. 103ff. After resignation of Suharto from Presidency, it has been generally admitted by the supporters of the reformation era that the 1945 Constitution invests too much power on President. The constitution is also vague on the limitation of terms of office of a President. Therefore, some amendments to the constitution are necessary.

³⁰Lapidus has this to say about the policy : "The policy of the Sukarno and Suharto governments towards the Muslim movements was an echo of the policies introduced by the Dutch towards the end of the nineteenth century. The Dutch distinguished between the religious and the political aspects of Islam, tolerating the former and repressing the latter. Following the same line of thought the Javanese and bureaucratic elite has broken the political power of the Muslim parties..." Lapidus, A. *History of Islamic Societies*, p. 773.

³¹Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Ithaca, Interim Report Series, Cornell University, 1957), pp. 58-59.

³²For the figures of the 1971 and 1977 general elections see, for example, Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 262 and 388.

³³The figures are adapted from a number of sources. For the 1955 general elections, Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, pp. 58-69; for 1971 and 1977 Brian May *The Indonesian Tragedy*, pp. 261, 388, for 1982 and 1987, Bachtiar Effendy, *The "Nine Stars" and Politics*, MA thesis, Ohio University, 1988, pp. 188, 260.

³⁴Most of the materials for this and foregoing sections have been adapted from Moltamad Atho Mudzhar, *Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama* (INIS, Jakarta, 1993), pp. 9-26.

³⁵These Islamic political parties were Partai Persatuan Indonesia (PPP), Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Partai Keadilan, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Cinta Damai, Partai Masyumi, Partai Islam Demokrat (PID), Partai Indonesia baru (PIB), Partai Abul Yatama (PAY), PSII-1905, Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (SUNI), Partai Nahdatul Ummat (Partai NU), Partai Umat Islam (PUI), Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI), Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU), Partai Persatuan (PP), Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Partai KAMI) and Partai Masyumi Baru. The classification is by author. For the list of all political parties, see *Kompas Daily*, Jakarta, march 6, 1999. Some counted only 20 Islamic political parties, excluding Partai Indonesia baru. See Affan Gafar, "Keharusan Partai Islam Untuk Berkoalisi" in *Jawa Post Daily* (Surabaya, April 15, 1999). Salim said that prior to selection by committee of 11, the number of Islamic political parties was 35 out of 141, and prior to the registration for the selection the number was 42 out of 148. See Arskal Salim GP, "Partai Islam di Pemilu 1999", in *Kompas Daily* (Jakarta, April 26, 1999).

³⁶Afan Gafar, *Ibid*, in *Jawa Post Daily* (Surabaya, April 15, 1999). In the words of Ahmad Muflih Saefuddin, Islamic political parties should put priority on the *Ukhuwah* over individual interest, or they will be remarginalized by the secularists. See Ahmad Muflih Saefuddin, "Reformasi dan Remarginalisasi Muslim", in *Republika Daily* (Jakarta, March 30, 1999).

³⁷*Kompas Daily*, Jakarta, April 12, 1999 p. 23.

³⁸Lance Castles was one of the observers who was taking seriously the result of pollings. Based on the result of various pollings, he went as far as to predict the outcome of the June, 1999 general elections. He said that five political parties would win over the majority of the parliamentary seats : the PAN with 45 percent, the PDI Perjuangan with 25,5 percent, the PKB with 12,5 percent, the Golkar with 9,5 percent, and the PPP with 8 percent. See *Republika Daily*, (Jakarta, April 21 and 22, 1999). Hartono Mardjono, vice President of the PBB and Ahmad Muflih Saefuddin, one of vice chairmen of the PPP rejected Castles' analysis as having too much weaknesses, mainly because Indonesian pollings were not reliable yet. See Hartono Mardjono, "Getaran Suasana Menjelang Pemilu 1999", and Ahmad Muflih Saefuddin, "Sulitnya

Memetakan kekuatan Parpol Dalam Polling", in *Republika Daily* (Jakarta, April 26, 1999). Indeed, Castles was proven wrong.

³⁹In Addition to the fragmentation of the tradition supporters, the ambition and individual interest of the party leaders would certainly complicate the uncertainty. In late April, 1999 news were circulated in the media that serious efforts of coalition were being made among three political parties with the Nahdatul Ulama (the NU) background : the PPP, the PKU, and the PNU, but the PKB was excluded. More interestingly serious efforts of coalition are also being made among four most popular political parties : the PDI Perjuangan, the PKB, the PKP, and the PAN. The target seemed to make sure that Golkar was not winning in the 1999 general elections. This phenomenon was interesting because it was cross-ideological in nature. See *Yogya Post Daily* (Yogyakarta, April 23, 1999).

⁴⁰For the Fatwa, see *Bernas Daily*, Yogyakarta, April 10, 1999. It is worth noting that although one does not know the reasons and the connections, the officer of the MUI and other Islamic organizations that occupy the first floor of the National Mosque of Istiqlal in Jakarta was blazed by a hand-made bomb as reported by the media of April 20, 1999. See, for example, *Kompas Daily* and *Republika Daily* (Jakarta, April 20, 1999).

⁴¹Khamami Zada, "Problem Empiris Politik Islam", in *Republika Daily* (Jakarta, April 24, 1999).

⁴²Not all Muslims agreed with the MUI's recommendation. Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU leader, criticized the MUI for getting too much involved in practical politics. See *Jateng Pos Daily* (June 4, 1999).

⁴³Hajriyanto Y Thohari, "Daur Ulang Politik Islam", in *Kompas Daily* (Jakarta, January 21, 1999). Although Thohari did not mention the names, he might be referring to such party leaders as Dr. Dellar Noer, Dr. Yusril Mahendra, and Dr. Amien Rais.

⁴⁴See *Kompas Daily* (Jakarta, March 6, 1999). For the Protestants and Catholics, there seemed to be two political parties : Partai Demokrasi Kasih Nangsa (PDKB) and Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (Krisna) whose symbol was almost identical with that of Partai Kristen Indonesia (the Parkindo) created in November, 1945. Some argued, however, that the creation of the two political parties did not represent the mainstream of Indonesian Protestants and Catholic communities, for the majority of them preferred to join other national and open political parties. See *Bernas Daily* (Yogyakarta, April 23, 1999).

⁴⁵President B.J. Habibie insisted that the general elections should be held on June 7, 1999. Some people, however, casted some doubt about it. Suharto, the former President, was one of those who casted such a doubt. In an interview with a Japanese Daily Newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Suharto was quoted to have said that there would be some difficulties to hold the general elections on June 7, 1999. He also doubted if there would be free and fair elections. See *Kedaulatan Rakyat Daily*, (Yogyakarta, April 16, 1999). Later it was circulated in the media that within the KPU itself, the General Elections Committee, there were 12 members who were favoring the postponement of the general elections to a later date, instead of June 7, 1999. See *Jawa Post Daily* (Surabaya, April 24, 1999).

⁴⁶For the distribution of the seats, see *Republika Daily*, (Jakarta, July 26, 1999). By the time of revising this article, July 26, 1999, the final result of the general elections was not yet announced. In fact, some 28 political parties refused to sign the official result of the general elections. The matter was later brought forward to the President for approval.

⁴⁷*Gatra Weekly* (Jakarta, No. 31, June 19, 1999), pp. 64-66.