

## Indonesia's (Future) Civil Society: Examining Its Religio-Cultural Basis<sup>1</sup>

Bahtiar Effendy<sup>2</sup>

### ملخص

لم يزل مصطلح "المجتمع المدني" موضوع النقاش في هذه الأونة الأخيرة. هناك علاقة بينه وبين الديمقراطية، وفي هذا الصدد مفهوم الديمقراطية نفسها. في هذه المقالة يتكلم الكاتب عن مفهوم "المجتمع المدني" و-الأهم من ذلك- عن رفضه بأن الإسلام متعارض مع الديمقراطية، وفي هذا الصدد المجتمع المدني، وأن الديمقراطية متوافقة فقط مع المجتمع الغربي أو الدول الأوروبية ومستعمراتها.

إن فكرة تعارض الإسلام مع الديمقراطية أو المجتمع المدني بصفة خاصة -كما يرى الكاتب- إنما نشأت نتيجة فهم الإسلام من البعد الواحد كما نشأت نتيجة القصور في فهم حقيقة الإسلام نفسه، مع أن الإسلام -كما يرى الكاتب- دين قابل لتعدد التفسير وليس هناك نص صريح يدل على أن الإسلام متعارض مع نظام السياسة الحديث أي الديمقراطية. تحاول هذه المقالة التوفيق بين فكرة المجتمع المدني والقيم الإسلامية كما تحاول البحث عن ظروف اندونيسيا السياسية الراهنة.

## Abstrak

"*Civil Society*" merupakan istilah yang sampai sekarang masih hangat diperdebatkan. Ada relasi antara *civil society* dengan demokrasi, dalam hal ini berkaitan dengan pengertian demokrasi itu sendiri.

Dalam hal ini, disamping uraian tentang apa "*civil society*" itu, yang lebih menarik adalah bantahan penulis terhadap tesis bahwa Islam tidak sesuai bahkan bertentangan dengan ide-ide demokrasi, dalam hal ini dengan *civil society*. Demokrasi hanya cocok untuk masyarakat Barat atau negara-negara Eropa dengan koloninya.

Menurut penulis, pendapat ini muncul karena pandangan mereka yang monolitik dalam memahami Islam. Hal ini disebabkan oleh keterbatasan pengetahuan mereka tentang hakekat Islam yang sebenarnya.

Sementara dalam pandangan penulis, Islam adalah agama yang *polyinterpretable*. Dan yang pasti tidak ada diktum yang sah dan logis bahwa Islam bertentangan dengan sistem politik modern (demokrasi). Lalu bagaimana affinitas nilai-nilai Islam dengan ide tentang *Civil Society*? Dan bagaimana dengan Indonesia dengan situasi politiknya sendiri? Inilah hal-hal yang juga dicoba diuraikan dalam makalah ini.

## I

**T**he term "civil society" has reemerged rather markedly since the last two decades. As the term may imply, many has argued that its reappearance has anything to do with recent phenomenon of global socio-economic and political liberty, beginning with Southern Europe in the mid-70s (Spain, Portugal, and Greece); Latin and Central America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Equador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mexico) in the early 80s; Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the former German Democratic Republic); and a number of Asian countries (most notably South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines) in the early 90s. Certainly, as such is the rising tide of what Samuel P. Huntington has called "democracy's third wave," where "between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world."<sup>3</sup>

The fact that the revival of the idea of civil society has often been associated, quite closely in fact, with the world-wide trend of democratization is not too difficult a subject to understand. Millions of pages have been written to capture and explain "what democracy is and is not." In spite of the existing differences —whether democracy is understood in term of procedure or substance; whether such dubious adjectives such as "guided," "elitist," "vertical," "popular," "liberal," "bourgeois," "formal," "rational," "direct," "representative," "*polis*," "empirical," and even "Pancasila" are attached to it —there has been a remarkable consensus concerning "what democracy is not." Writing under the guise of political philosophy perspective, Giovanni Sartori has suggested that democracy is not authoritarianism, is not totalitarianism, is not absolutism, is not dictatorship. Elaborating this view, he writes that "democracy is a system in which *no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with power to rule and, therefore, no one can arrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power.*"<sup>4</sup>

In other word, democracy is not despotism. Here where the association of democracy with civil society lies. In essence, as John A. Hall has put it, "civil society was seen as the opposite of despotism." As such is a situation where "a space in which social groups could exist and move — some thing which exemplified and would ensure softer, more tolerable conditions of existence."<sup>5</sup>

Other than the fact that recent "global democratic revolution" has been associated with the resurgence of civil society, it has been equally suggested that a paradigm shift in state-society relation has also contributed to the rebirth of the idea of civil society. In this regard, there is no better case to present other than the experience of peoples of Eastern Europe in their attempt to —borrowing John A. Hall's term— "establish decency in societies where it had most conspicuously been absent" in the midst of hegemonic states of the region. The legendary movement of Lech Walesa's Solidarity, for instance, which spear-headed the course of action against the hegemonic Polish state under the military-communist regime of Jaruzelski, worked under the spirit of civil society perspective. In fact the term civil society had been used as Solidarity's main relaying point.<sup>6</sup> In their view, civil society is vital to democracy —"that there can be no democracy without a civil society."<sup>7</sup>

As widely understood, state-society relation in a hegemonic state is undoubtedly skewed. This is in the sense that the former dominates the latter not only in a socio-economic, cultural, and political sense, but virtually in all aspects of life. In such a situation, the chances of society to having its own sphere is bleak —at best extremely limited! It is against this odd that, as quoted earlier, sociologist like John A. Hall sees civil society as "the opposite of despotism"; that the crux of the matter in civil society discourse is to create "a space in which social groups could *exist* and move." If this is the case, then the problem of civil society could be very *existential* in nature.

## II

Having established the relationship between democracy and civil society, let us now turn to the question of what this "creature" (i.e. civil society) is really all about. Comparable to the case of discourse on democracy, literatures on this subject do not offer a single, unified accepted definition of civil society. In their 771-pages work on civil society —the most comprehensive book on the subject so far— Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato define civil society "as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication." Furthermore, "modern civil society is created through forms of self-constitution and self-mobilization. It is institutionalized and generalized through laws, and especially subjective rights, that stabilizes social differentiation. While the self-creative and institutionalized dimensions can exist separately, in the long term both independent action and institutionalization are necessary for the reproduction of civil society.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, using Solidarity as a reference to explain the case of Poland, Cohen and Arato magnify the importance of being not only an outsider, but also a rival of the state. In this regard, they state: "the opposition of civil society and state made its most dramatic return in East Europe, particularly in the ideology of the Polish opposition from 1976 to the advent of the early Solidarity and beyond. The juxtapositions are well known: society *against* the state, nation *against* state, social order *against* political system, *pays reel against pays legal* or *officiel*, public life *against* the state, private life *against* public power, etc."<sup>9</sup>

In somewhat different perspective, civil society has been identified chiefly with "associational revolution." This refers to the development of "a massive array of self-governing private organizations, not dedicated to distributing profits to shareholders or directors, pursuing public purposes outside the formal apparatus of the state. The proliferations of these groups may be permanently altering the relationship between states and citizens." In the context of Asia and the Pacific, as such has been seen as an indicator that civil society is emerging.<sup>10</sup> This is notwithstanding the fact that some of the existing non-governmental organizations do not always share the ideological ethos of Lech Walesa's Solidarity. In fact, they do not necessarily represent a threat as far as their relationship to the state is concerned.<sup>11</sup>

In spite of this, the tendency has been to develop the notion of civil society in term of non-governmental institutions. In line with the need and perhaps even the necessity to create free public or societal space other than those traditionally regulated by the state, Earnest Gellner's definition of civil society might contribute to our understanding of the concept. For him, "civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society."<sup>12</sup>

Taking all the definitions presented above into consideration, it is clear that there are different ideas with regard to what constitutes civil society. However, there has been a remarkable consensus in how the term should be understood. As the term may indicate, it is the idea of "civility" that makes up the essence of the concept. This central claim does not refer to only, as Robert W. Hefner has correctly put it, "material prosperity but for tolerance of dissenting viewpoints, limits on state power, and the freedom to express their views and choose their own way of life."<sup>13</sup> This is what civil society is really all about.

If what constitutes civil society may have sparked some differences, this has not been the case with the question of its origin. Civil society was born in Europe. This point of origin is not simply a matter of birth-place. Quite significantly it refers to the socio-economic, cultural, and political circumstances which may have influenced and shaped the contour of the concept of civil society. Thus, as Serif Mardin has suggested "civil society is a Western dream." Furthermore, it is their "historical aspiration; it is also, in

the concrete form this dream has taken, *part of the social history of Western Europe.*"<sup>14</sup>

Being so, civil society is an idea which did not grow out of a vacuum. Instead, it is a product of Western socio-cultural and political fabrics. Whether or not such a dream is exportable or transferable to different socio-cultural, economic, and political background remains an interesting puzzle in today's nearly borderless world. Mardin himself indicates that even with some luck the exportability of civil society is somewhat limited. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the idea of civil society has been shared by non-Western subjects. Joining these groups are portions of the Muslim world that in recent years "are beginning to acquire a skeleton of institutions" compatible to those developed earlier in the West. Even so, "the *dream* of Western societies has not become the dream of Muslim societies."<sup>15</sup>

If this idea of transferability of civil society beyond the Western contexts should be pushed further, then certain caveats are in order. First, John A. Hall is correct in suggesting that the Western tone of civil society should be adjusted to non-Western contexts. This endeavor is meant to increase "the capacity to right and move between—even shop around for— such identities; diversity is valued within certain bounds."<sup>16</sup> Second, like democratic system of governance, the ideal of civil society needs to be placed in certain structural and cultural plateau in order to be able to flourish. It is in this later perspective that the religio-cultural basis of civil society should be examined.

### III

Samuel P. Huntington has provoked an argument that non-Western culture is—quite inherently in fact—inimical to democracy, and therefore to civil society. This is not only because of the central claim of the incompatibility of non-Western cultures to democracy, but also due to a chauvinistic belief that only the West has "attitudes, values, beliefs, and related behavior patterns conducive to the development of democracy."<sup>17</sup> This cultural perspective of democracy has its historical base—unfortunately quite convincing. As suggested by George Kennan, "democracy was a form of government which evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in northwestern Europe, primarily among those countries that border on the English Channel and the North Sea (but with a

certain extension into Central Europe), and which was then carried into other parts of the world, including North America, where peoples from that northwestern European area appeared as original settlers, or as colonialists, and laid down the prevailing patterns of civil government."<sup>18</sup>

Based on such a historical perception, this argument goes on, democracy actually has "a relatively narrow base both in time and in space." And because of that, Samuel P. Huntington —compatible to that of Kennan— concludes that "democracy is appropriate only for northwestern and perhaps central European countries and their settler-colony offshoots."<sup>19</sup> When it comes to the developing nations, confucianism and Islam have been singled out as the main sources of cultural obstacles to democracy or civil society. For Huntington, "'confucian democracy' is clearly a contradiction in terms. It is unclear whether 'Islamic democracy' is."<sup>20</sup>

This viewpoint, I would argue, derived chiefly from a monolithic perception of Islam, with an exclusive reference of militant or radical Islam especially those which develop in the Middle East. As John L. Esposito has pointed out, "actions, however heinous, are attributed to Islam rather than to a twisted or distorted interpretation of Islam by certain individuals or political movements." Thus, the term radical or militant Islam "is used facilely and indiscriminately to encompass a broad and diverse array of leaders, states, and organizations."<sup>21</sup> And largely because of this, for Huntington, Islam does not only contradict the idea of democracy, but represents a threat to Western civilization.<sup>22</sup>

Obviously, the monolithic tendency of many Western observers in understanding Islam is due largely to their limited knowledge on the nature of Islam. While it may be true that secular bias as Esposito contends to believe,<sup>23</sup> has contributed to the failure of many non-Muslim scholars in understanding Islam properly, their major pitfalls lay in their ignorance to the fact that Islam is a polyinterpretable religion.

Religion, as some have argued, may be seen as a divine instrument to understand the world.<sup>24</sup> Islam —in comparison to other religions —is conceivably the one with the least difficulty to accept such a premise. An obvious reason lies in one of Islam's most conspicuous characteristics: its "omnipresence." This is a notion which recognizes that "every where" the presence of Islam should provide "the right moral attitude for human action."<sup>25</sup>

This notion has led many adherents to believe that Islam is a total way of life. The embodiment of this is expressed in the *shari'a* (Islamic law). A sizeable group of Muslims even push it further, asserting that "Islam is an integrated totality that offers a solution to all problems of life." Undoubtedly, they "believe in the complete and holistic nature of revealed Islam so that, according to them, it encompasses the three famous 'Ds' (*din*, religion; *dunya*, life and *dawla*, State). ... [Thus] Islam is an integrated totality that offers a solution to all problems of life. It has to be accepted in its entirety, and to be applied to the family, to the economy and to politics. [For this group of Muslims] the realisation of an Islamic society is predicated on the establishment of an Islamic State, that is, an 'ideological State' based on the comprehensive precepts of Islam."<sup>26</sup>

In its present context, it is not surprising, though it is sometimes alarming, that the contemporary world of Islam witnesses many Muslims who want to base their socio-economic, cultural, and political life exclusively on Islamic teachings, without realizing their limitations and constraints. Their expressions are found in today's popularly symbolic terms such as Islamic revivalism, Islamic resurgence, Islamic revolution, Islamic reassertion, or Islamic fundamentalism. While such expressions are well motivated, they are not well thought out and in fact are rather apologetic in nature. Their central ideas, as Mohammed Arkoun has put it, "remain prisoners of the image of a provincial, ethnographic Islam, locked in its classical formulations inadequately and poorly formulated in contemporary ideological slogans." Furthermore, "[their] presentation [is] still dominated by the ideological need to legitimate the present regimes in Muslim societies."<sup>27</sup>

The holistic view of Islam as described above has its own implications. One of these is that it has excessively encouraged a tendency to understand Islam in its literal sense, emphasizing merely its exterior dimension. And this has been carried out so far at the expense of the contextual and interior dimensions of Islamic principles. Thus, what might lie beyond its textual appearances is almost completely neglected, if not avoided. In the extreme case, this tendency has hindered many Muslims from understanding the message of the Qur'an as a divine instrument which provides the right moral and ethical values for human action. On the question of the holistic nature of Islam, Qamaruddin Khan noticed that: "there is a prevailing misconception in the minds of many Muslims that the



Qur'an contains exposition of all things. This misunderstanding has been created by the following verse of the Qur'an: 'And We have sent down on thee the Book making clear everything and as a guidance and a mercy, and as good tiding to those who surrender' (16:89). The verse is intended to explain that the Qur'an contains information about every aspect of moral guidance, and not that it provides knowledge about every object in creation. The Qur'an is not an inventory of general knowledge."<sup>28</sup>

Recognizing the Islamic *shari'a* as a total way of life is one thing. Understanding it properly is quite another. In fact, it is in the context of "how is the *shari'a* to be known," as noted by Fazlur Rahman, that the crux of the problem is to be found.<sup>29</sup> There are a number of factors which can influence and shape the outcome of Muslims' understanding of the *shari'a*. Sociological, cultural, and intellectual circumstances are significant in determining the forms and substances of interpretation. Different intellectual inclinations in the effort to understand the *shari'a* may lead to different interpretations of a particular doctrine. Thus while accepting the general principles of the *shari'a*, Muslims do not adhere to a single interpretation of it.

The emergence of a number of different schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence or various theological and philosophical streams, for instance, shows that Islamic teachings are polyinterpretable.<sup>30</sup> The interpretive nature of Islam has functioned as the basis of Islamic flexibility in history. In addition, it also confirms the necessity of pluralism in Islamic tradition. Therefore, as many have argued, Islam could not and should not be perceived as monolithic.<sup>31</sup>

Islamic politics (its relation with democratic civility included) cannot escape this history of polyinterpretability. On the other hand, many have generally admitted the important role of Islamic principles in politics. At the same time, because of Islam's potential for differing interpretation, there has been no single unified notion of how Islam and politics should be properly related. In fact, as far as can be deduced from both the intellectual and historical discourses of Islamic political ideas and practices, there has been a wide range of different or contradictory opinions regarding the proper relationship between Islam and modern political system (democracy).

By and large, there are two different intellectual currents in contemporary Islamic political thinking. While both recognize the importance of Islamic principles in all spheres of life, they differ greatly in

their interpretation, their congeniality to the modern situation and their applicability in the real world.

On one end of the spectrum, there are those who argue that Islam should be the basis of the state; that *shari'a* ought to be adopted as the state constitution; that political sovereignty rests in the hands of the Divine; that the idea of the modern nation-state is contradictory to the concept of *umma* (Islamic community) which recognizes no political boundary; and while recognizing the principle of *shura* (consultation), its realization is different from the contemporary notion of democracy. Put differently, within such a perspective, the modern (Western) political system is placed in a contradictory position to Islamic teachings.

On the other end of the spectrum, there are those who believe that Islam does not "lay down any clear cut and dried pattern of state theory [or political theory] to be followed by the *umma*."<sup>32</sup> In the words of Muhammad 'Imara, an Egyptian Muslim thinker, "Islam as a religion has not specified a particular system of government for Muslims, for the logic of this religion's suitability for all times and places requires that matters which will always be changing by the force of evolution should be left to the rational human mind, to be shaped according to the public interest and within the framework of the general precepts that this religion has dictated."<sup>33</sup>

According to this theoretical stream, even the term state (*dawla*) cannot be found in the Qur'an. Although "there are numerous expressions in the Qur'an which refer or seem to refer to political power and authority, [these expressions are, however, incidental remarks and have no bearing on political theory." Indeed, they argue, "the Qur'an is not a treatise on political science."<sup>34</sup>

Nonetheless, it is important to note that this position recognizes the fact that the Qur'an does contain "ethical values and injunctions on human socio-political activities." These include the principles of "justice, equality, brotherhood, and freedom."<sup>35</sup> For them, therefore, as long as the state and its system of governance adhere to such principles it conforms to Islamic teachings.

In this line of argument, the establishment of an Islamic state in its formal-ideological terms is not terribly significant. What is important is that the state guarantees the existence of those basic values. As long as this is the case, there is no theological/religious reason to reject the idea of popular sovereignty, the nation-state as the legitimate territorial modern

political unit, and other general principles of modern political theory. In other words, there is no legitimate basis to put Islam in a contradictory position to the modern political system (democracy).

Having argued this far, where does the affinity of Islamic values and the idea of civil society lie? Briefly reiterated, the above expose suggests the existence of two different modes of political Islam or Islamic political theorizing. There is a sizeable number of Muslims who believe that Islam should be formally and legally linked to politics. In this regard, several implications are in order. Most notably, it will pose "obstacles to plural politics and a pluralist polity in Islam," especially in a country where its religious and cultural contours are heterogenous. In the context of Indonesian experience, it has contributed to the decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia in the 1950s.<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, there are those who argue that the Qur'an and Sunnah do not set forth a detail model of how a political system should be actually formulated. Yet, because of their deep conviction on the holistic nature of Islam they believe that Islam does provide a set of ethical principles relevant to administering politics and its governing mechanism. They point out that Qur'an repeatedly mentions the normative ideas of *syura* (consultation), *'adl* (justice), and *musawab* (egalitarianism).<sup>37</sup>

Because of this, they believe that the relationship between Islam and politics should be substantialist in nature. As long as a political system is based on the principles of consultation, justice, and egalitarianism, it is sufficient to consider it as congruent to Islamic teachings.<sup>38</sup> Given the democratic perspective presented above, it can be said that those normative ideas of Islamic political principles are compatible with the ideal of civil society. At this point, even Huntington (in spite of his negative perception with regard to the relationship between Islam and democracy) actually believes that Islamic values "are also generally congruent with the requirements of democracy."<sup>39</sup> It is the lack of democratic experience in many of the so-called Islamic countries which has led him to believe in the incompatibility of Islam with democracy. But there actually lies his blunder as if the development of democratic practices is determined by a single factor, that is religion as a cultural basis of democracy.

All Muslims virtually believe in the normative ideas of consultation, justice, or egalitarianism. The realization of those values, however, depends largely on how Islam is conceived. The legalistic and formalistic viewpoint

of Islam, a position which, among other thing, necessitates the elevation of *shari'a* (Islamic jurisprudence) as the law of the land, tends to hinder the realization of the principle of egalitarianism. It poses obstacles to religious as well as political pluralism, not necessarily in the context of Muslims-non-Muslims relationship, but also within the Muslim community itself. On the other hand, the substantialist mode of Islam, a standpoint which stresses more on the importance of substances than forms, values than symbols, would contribute greatly to the development of democratic practices.

In spite of this, however, this does not imply the idea of automaticity, in the sense that a substantialist perception of Islam alone would automatically lead to the enhancement of democratic values. In fact, like in any other areas, it has been strongly suggested that the emergence and consolidation of democratic regimes are very much dependent on wider aspects of socio-economic and cultural requisites.<sup>40</sup>

#### IV

What have been suggested are normative in nature. Even so it is necessary, as what has been portrayed with regard to the incompatibility of Islam with the idea of civil society is theologically driven; that the norm-governing Islam is essentially incongruent with democratic or civic ideals. The fact that Muslims do not have substantial basis of experience for democracy (and sharing the Western dream of civil society for that matter) bears some portions of responsibility with regard to the difficulty (not to say near impossibility) to establish democratic civility in the Islamic world. But, factors which led to such a situation could not always be directed at their religious precepts. If crafting democratic civility requires some kind of socio-cultural foundations, it is the availability of social capital (values related to trust, being sportive, and so forth) that needs to be developed.

Indonesia's recent political situation provides a valuable ground to support that argument. A massive campaign launched by both party elites and intellectuals regarding the necessity to accept the outcome of the general election, regardless who will come out as the "winner," is an indication that democratic civility which Indonesians are about to craft faces severe socio-cultural threats. In this case, the unpreparedness of many political activists and their supporters to accept defeat and recognize others' victory represents a large portion of this cultural impediments. Without serious endeavors to reenforce those socio-cultural values, the already

existing associational precursors of civil society such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama could not play their three interlocking roles — supplementing, complementing, and counterbalancing the state.<sup>\*\*\*</sup>

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Presented at an international symposium, "In Search of Asian Civil Society in the Third Millennium: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Civil Society in Japan and Indonesia," organized by Center for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia, in cooperation with the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, and the Japan Foundation. Depok, June 28-29, 1999.

<sup>2</sup>Lecturer at the Post Graduate Studies Program, State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Jakarta; Deputy Director, LSPEU Indonesia (Institute for the Study and Advancement of Business Ethics).

<sup>3</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, Baltimore and London (eds.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Part One: The Contemporary Debate, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1987, p. 206.

<sup>5</sup>John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>See, for instance, Włodzimierz Wesolowski, "The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: Poland after Solidarity," John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, pp. 110-135.

<sup>7</sup>Giuseppe Di Palma, "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, p. 264.

<sup>8</sup>Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992, p. ix.

<sup>9</sup>Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992, p. 31.

<sup>10</sup>Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.), *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996.

<sup>11</sup>See, for instance, Philip J. Eldridge, *Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995.

<sup>12</sup>Ernest Gellner, "The Importance of Being Modular," John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, p. 32.

<sup>13</sup>Robert W. Hefner, "A Muslim Civil Society?: Indonesian Reflections on the Conditions of Its Possibility," in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), *Democratic Civility*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1998, p. 285.

<sup>14</sup>Serif Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam," John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, p. 278. Italics are mine.

<sup>15</sup>Serif Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam," John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, p. 295.

<sup>16</sup>John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, p. 26.

<sup>17</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 298.

<sup>18</sup>George F. Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977, pp. 41-43. Cited from Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 298-299.

<sup>19</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 299.

<sup>20</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 307.

<sup>21</sup>John L. Esposito, "Secular Bias and Islamic Revivalism," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 26, 1993, p. A44.

<sup>22</sup>Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Agenda 1994: Critical Issues in Foreign Policy*, New York: Foreign Affairs, 1994, pp. 120-147.

<sup>23</sup>John Esposito, "Secular Bias and Islamic Revivalism."

<sup>24</sup>This argument is advocated by Robert N. Bellah. See, "Islamic Tradition and the Problems of Modernization," Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditionalist World*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991, p. 146.

<sup>25</sup>Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966, p. 241.

<sup>26</sup>Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London and New York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 63-64.

<sup>27</sup>Mohammed Arkoun, "The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought," in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), *Islam: State and Society*, London: Curzon Press, 1988, pp. 72-73.

<sup>28</sup>Qamaruddin Khan, *Political Concepts in the Qur'an*, Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1982, pp. 75-76.

<sup>29</sup>Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, p. 101.

<sup>30</sup>A lengthy socio-historical discussion on this issue is found in, among other, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, Volume I-III, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

<sup>31</sup>On the tendency to perceive Islam in a monolithic way, see Mohammed Ayooob's introductory remarks in *Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, pp. 1-6.

<sup>32</sup>Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1983. p. 23.

<sup>33</sup>Muhammad 'Imara, *Al-Islam wa al-Sultab al-Dinyab*, Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1979, pp. 76-77. Cited from Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, p. 64.

<sup>34</sup>Quotations are from Qamaruddin Khan, *Political Concepts in the Qur'an*, p. 3.

<sup>35</sup>Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of State," p. 23. Upon a closer look to the earliest political document in the history of Islam, those principles are also mentioned in the Constitution of Medina (*al-Mitsaq al-Madinab*). It contained, among other things, the principles of equality, participation, and justice. On the Constitution of Medina, see Muhammad Husayn Haykal, *The Life of Mubammad*, Translated by Isma'il Ragi al-Faruqi, North American Publications, 1976, pp. 180-1983.

<sup>36</sup>A similar argument has been made, among others, by Djohan Effendi. See his "The Contribution of Islamic Parties to the Decline of Democracy in the 1950s." Unpublished paper, n. d.

<sup>37</sup>See, for instance, Qur'an 3:159; 42:38; 6:115; and 42:15.

<sup>38</sup> In the context of Indonesian politics, I have discussed this issue further in my "Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia," Ph.D dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1994.

<sup>39</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 307.

<sup>40</sup> See, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." See also Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, pp. 48-80.