

The Nahdlatul Ulama Party (1952-1973): The Mobilization of Its Members and the Usage of Its Ideology

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ملخص

كانت نهضة العلماء في بادئ أمرها هيئة اجتماعية دينية تربوية ثم تحولت إلى هيئة سياسية (أي حزب سياسي) طوال أكثر من عشرين سنة حظيت خلالها بأرباح سياسية كبيرة حيث تولى كثير من زعمائها مناصب رفيعة في الدولة، وذلك بعد أن أصبحت إحدى الأحزاب الأربعة الكبرى في الانتخابات العامة سنة ١٩٥٥. كانت هذه الهيئة تندمج في الحزب "الماشومي" (مجلس شورى المسلمين الإندونيسي) وتشكل عنصرا كبيرا من العناصر الموجودة فيه إلا أنها خرجت من هذا الحزب فيما بعد لأسباب، منها أن منصب وزارة الشؤون الدينية - المنصب الوحيد الذي كانت تتولاه - سلبه عنصر آخر من العناصر الموجودة في الحزب "الماشومي" مع أن الأصوات التي أعطتها هذه الهيئة لهذا الحزب تعتبر كبيرة. وما كادت تصبح حزبا مستقلا (أي حزب نهضة العلماء) حتى حصلت على مواقع استراتيجية سواء كانت في الوزارة أم البرلمان، الأمر الذي يضطره إلى جلب غير النهضيين في صفوفه. علاوة على ذلك فإن حزب نهضة العلماء قد لعب دورا هاما في حل قضايا الشعب الإندونيسي بفضل المبدأ الذي يقوم عليه من التوسط والتوازن والتسامح وبفضل نفس المبدأ قد اشترك هذا الحزب في إنقاذ الدولة من التفريق والانقسام نتيجة المنافسة الحادة بين الأيديولوجيات والأديان، وليس فقط مبتعدا عن الانهيار كما أصاب كثيرا من الأحزاب السياسية.

Abstrak

Selama dua puluh tahun lebih, Nahdlatul Ulama, yang semula berbentuk organisasi sosial keagamaan dan pendidikan, merubah diri menjadi partai politik. Banyak keuntungan yang dipetik oleh warga NU terutama kaum elitnya seiring dengan kemenangan Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU) sebagai salah satu empat partai besar di Indonesia sejak Pemilu 1955. Diantara keuntungan tersebut adalah mobilitas vertikal sejumlah anggota PNU. NU keluar dalam Partai Masyumi antara lain dikarenakan satu-satunya jabatan yang dipegang oleh orang NU, Kementerian Agama, "dirampas" oleh fraksi lain dari partai tersebut, padahal NU merasa menyumbang suara yang cukup besar terhadap perolehan suara Masyumi. Segera setelah menjadi partai tersendiri, PNU dapat meraih sejumlah posisi strategis baik di kabinet maupun di parlemen sampai-sampai PNU harus merekrut "orang luar" ke dalam jajarannya. Selain itu, dengan prinsip jalan tengah, akomodasi, dan toleransi PNU turut berperan dalam menyelesaikan persoalan-persoalan bangsa Indonesia. Dengan ideologi politik yang didasarkan pada prinsip-prinsip *usbul fiqh*, PNU tidak hanya dapat terhindar dari kehancuran sebagaimana yang dialami oleh beberapa partai politik, tetapi juga dapat ikut menyelamatkan negara dari perpecahan dikarenakan ancaman disintegrasi bangsa yang disebabkan oleh persaingan ideologi dan agama yang sangat tajam.

1. Introduction

From a Western perspective, which usually regards politics as something separate from religion, it might seem unusual that an organization dominated by religious leaders should enter the political arena. This however was the case of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesia, which became active as a political party during nineteen years of its existence, from 1952 to 1971. Founded in 1926² as a socio-religious organization, it attracted a wide membership through the high profiles of several of its leaders, among them Hasyim Asy'ary (1871-1947) and Wahab Hasbullah (1888-1971).³ A major factor in the NU's success was its popularity with the *ulama* and students of the pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools).⁴

The involvement of the NU in political affairs had in fact begun early in its existence. However, these activities were channeled through

other organizations such as the MIAI (Majlisul Islamil A'laa Indonesia/Federation of Islamic Organizations) formed in 1937, whose chairman was Hasyim Asy'ary. In addition, the NU also participated in the political campaign demanding parliamentary representation for Indonesians in 1939. During the period of the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), the role of the NU in politics expanded. Through the Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia/Advisory Council of Indonesian Muslims) also headed by Hasyim Asy'ary, the NU had the opportunity to govern the proto-Ministry of Religious Affairs.⁵ Later on, in the early period of Indonesia's independence, the NU joined the Masyumi party. However, due to the dissatisfaction of its role in the Masyumi, the NU withdrew from it in 1952 and became an independent party.⁶

This paper attempts to analyze the activities of the NU during the period when it was an independent political party. Using a historical approach, I will concentrate on two of the main features of this phenomenon: 1) how the NU used a vertical approach in mobilizing its membership, and 2) how it justified its new role through appeals to *fiqh* (Islamic Law) and the political theories constructed by medieval Muslim scholars.

II. The Mobilization of NU Members.

One of the aims of the NU in politics was to place its members in key governmental positions. This can be seen from the fact that one of the reasons for the NU's withdrawal from the Masyumi was the fact that the post of minister of Religious Affairs was no longer occupied by an NU member.⁷ Moreover, the younger NU leaders wanted to maximize the role of the NU in political matters, something which could not be fulfilled unless the NU became a political party.⁸ The first attempt to realize this was by recruiting many 'educated' Indonesians to serve as NU representatives in parliament. Two such recruits were Djamaluddin Malik, who was active in film making, and Idham Chalid.⁹

Shortly after becoming a political party, the NU gained more seats in parliament. This came about when certain Masyumi members who were affiliated with the NU broke away to set up an NU Faction.¹⁰ The usual pattern of coalition between the Masyumi and the PNI changed to one of coalition between the NU and the PNI. Consequently, in the first cabinet of

Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953), the NU leaders found themselves seated in central positions.¹¹ As a result of its success in the 1955 election¹² the NU obtained many more seats in parliament.¹³ The NU's 6.955.141 votes made it one of the three biggest parties after the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian National Party) and the Masyumi. The NU increased its share of seats from 8, when it was united with the Masyumi, to 45 (by comparison the Masyumi won 57 seats) in the 1955 elections. Nevertheless, the NU's share of strategic positions in the cabinet of Burhanuddin Harahap (August 1955- March 1956) was limited to only two.¹⁴ This situation was to improve however with the introduction of Ali Sastroamidjojo's second cabinet, also known as Ali-Roem-Idham cabinet, named after Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI, Muhammad Roem of the Masyumi and Idham Chalid of the NU.¹⁵

After the fall of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet,¹⁶ the NU participated in the next cabinet which was formed by President Soekarno on April 9, 1957. At the time, Idham Chalid was chosen as the Second Deputy Prime Minister.¹⁷ After Soekarno dissolved the Konstituante by the Emergency Law in 1959 and formed the Kerja Cabinet, the NU members still participated. KH. Wahib Wahab (who later was replaced by KH. Saifuddin Zuhri)¹⁸ and KH. Fatah Yasin seated the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Cooperation with *ulama* respectively.¹⁹ The NU also prepared to give a counter-attack to the PKI which had prepared to control the government. It initiated to develop the Islamic world solidarity by organizing the Asian African Islamic Conference in March 1965. The NU also initiated to unite the power of religious organizations to prevent the Communist actions.²⁰ Consequently, when the Communist party did a coup d'etat to the government on September 30, 1965, the NU had ready to counter attack along side with other powers. The fourth executive leader of NU, HM. Subhan ZE²¹ united the power of religious organizations in "Komando Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu" (KAP GESTAPU, Action Command to destroy the Communist coup d'etat movement) on October 5, 1965. All branches of NU especially in East Java together with the arm forces destroyed the power of Communist.²² The NU then demanded the dissolution of the Communist party through its power in the cabinet, legislative, and mass.

In the Dwikora cabinet which was formed after the Communist coup d'etat, the NU seated four positions.²³ In the parliament, HM. Subhan

ZE seated the Deputy Chief of MPRS (Majelis Permusyawarata Rakyat Sementara, Temporary People's Advisory Assembly) (1966-1971), and at the same time, KH. A. Sjaichu was the Chief of DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong, People's Representative Council of Mutual Cooperation).²⁴ The Youth NU leaders were also active in destroying the Communist. Yahya Ubaid of NU as the leader of the Barisan Pemuda (Youth Front) and Zamroni of PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, University Students of NU) as the leader of the Union Action of Indonesian Students (KAMI and KAPPI) united the mass power to demand three changes (TRITURA, Tiga Tuntutan Rakyat, Three of People's Demands) namely dissolve the Communist Party, change the Dwikora Cabinet, and reduce the prices.²⁵

After the Communist Party was dissolved in March 11, 1966, the NU still played a big role in stabilizing the country. In the early 1967, H. Nuddin Lubis of NU together with other members of parliament issued a "Memorandum" to dismiss the President Soekarno from his seat, and demanded the Council of Justice to investigate and prosecute the people who involved in the coup d'etat.²⁶ This memorandum was then followed by a resolution which was demanded by H. Djamaluddin Malik of NU together with his parliament colleagues to appoint Soeharto as the Indonesian President. As a result, in March 1967, the parliament dismissed Soekarno from the presidency to be replaced by Soeharto. A year after that, Soeharto formed the Pembangunan Cabinet I. In this cabinet, the NU still seated its two members. Idham Chalid was still as the Coordinator Ministry of People's Prosperity and KH. Moh. Dachlan as the Ministry of Religious Affairs.²⁷

However, the uprising of the President Soeharto with his "New Order" marked the decline of the NU in politics.²⁸ The Soeharto's policy to weaken the political parties vis-à-vis the new supported-government "political" organization, the Golongan Karya, forced the NU to be an opposers of the government. The NU still gained much votes in the 1971 Indonesia's election, although the government treated it unfairly. As a result, it gained 13 more seat in parliament (58 seats) than of the 1955 election. However, the majority of the parliament members was of the "government party". In the cabinet, the NU was also lost its power. In the Pembangunan Cabinet II which was formed in 1971, no cabinet member was from the NU. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was usually

seated by the NU member, was seated by non-NU figure, Mukti Ali of Sunan Kalijaga Institute of Islamic Studies at Yogyakarta. The NU party was then forced to merge with other Islamic parties. On February 5, 1973, the NU party, Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party), PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Association Party), and Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Islamic Education Association) were agreed to form the new party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Union Party).²⁹

III. The Political Ideology of the NU.

When the NU formed the 'Liga Muslimin Indonesia' (the federation of Muslim organizations) whose members were PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslim Party), and Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Islamic Education Association), its political ideology was based on the law and rule of Allah as had been implemented by the Prophet Muhammad. In April 1953, the NU *ulama* decided that "It was obligation for Muslim to take part in the election both for DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, The People's Representative Council) and Konstituante (The People's Representative)." In the early 1954, the NU *ulama* also decided that Soekarno the President got status as '*Waliyyul Amri Dlaruri Bisysyaukati*' (The Emergency Government Representative by strengthening)³⁰ to support the Soekarno President against the DI TII (Darul Islam Tentara Islam Indonesia, House of Indonesian Islamic Army) rebellion.

The NU also used *ushul fiqh* (The Methodology of Islamic Law) consideration to decide whether it supported the Karya Cabinet which was established by Soekarno himself. The consideration was the *fiqh* principle which was usually used by the NU, was *dar' al-mafāsīd muqaddam 'ala jalb al-masalib*, to avoid the danger is preferred that to implement the obligation. This principle was used by the NU to accept the parliament which was formed by the President Soekarno himself after dissolving the parliament in 1959. This is because should the NU opposed this policy although it is not democratic, there would be vacuum of political power which was more dangerous than accepting the formed parliament. This principle was supported by another principle namely *izā ta'ā rada mafsadatāni rū'īya a'zamubā dararan bi irtikāb akhaffihimā*, if there is two bad opposite solving, the worse impact should be abandoned.

Moreover, the NU used the principle *mā lā yudraku kullub lā yutraku kullub* (the goody that cannot be afforded fully, its most important element cannot be abandoned), to force the government to held the election in the 'Guided Democracy'.³¹ This meant that the participation in the cabinet was done to decrease the role of Soekarno's authority who would endangered the democracy, and the role of PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) in the cabinet which would threaten the Muslims. In the contrary, the NU did not take an opposition role because it would endanger the NU itself and the cabinet would be dominated by the non-Muslim elements.³²

In other words, Idham Chalid stated "...The NU always attempted to adapt to the time and event dan did not actively and reactively face something with absolute policy...every action must be considered its benefit and badness as well as the safety of the country....But, in the value system, the NU remained to differentiated between the principle and the technical...." This is obvious that when the NU finally agreed to the "Guided Democracy", it declared that this democracy should not abandon the political parties and the People's representatives.³³ In addition, when there was a debate on the state ideology in the Konstituante in 1959, the NU chose the Islamic state ideology vis-à-vis the secular-nationalist ideology. Moreover, when the NU had to accept the UUD (Undang-undang Dasar, Basic Law) 1945, it still suggested the government that the UUD should be based on the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) which should also be used as the source of law and that Islam still became the basis of the NU party as well as that the result of Konstituante's plenary session was implemented.³⁴

After the power of Soekarno was in the peak and all political parties except the PKI were under pressure, the NU's policy remained calm and careful. It did not want to be martyr by confronting the power frontally; but the NU always sought the opportunity to prevent the worst condition. Because of this policy, the NU could still participate in the Kabinet Kerja (Work Cabinet) in 1959, although Soekarno basically refused the party members. When the DPR was dissolved and was replaced by the DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong, People's Representative Council of Mutual Help) in 1960 which based on Nasakom (Nasionalisme-Agama-Komunisme, Nationalism-Religion-Communism) ideology, the NU decided to participate in the government but by means of counter-balance to the other ideologies. It did not want to sweep away in the political



discourse of the government as suggested by KH. Wahab Hasbullah: "Be like the live fish!...although it lives in the salt water for a hundred year, its meat remains fresh...." ³⁵ This idea was applied in some NU policies. For example, the NU opposed the land reform idea of Communist by suggesting that it could be implemented in the outer island whose lands were still wide and empty. If the land reform was implemented in Java, it would stimulated the social unrest and it was forbidden by Islam to omit the property.³⁶ The NU leaders could suggest the president the "National Planning Board" to develop the economy and to prepare completely before confrontation to the Dutch in the West Irian.³⁷

The NU implemented the *fiqb* principle *akbaffud-darain* (to choose the least risk among many risks) to solve the political problems. For example, the NU had to decide whether to oppose the 'Guided Democracy' or to support it, the NU chose the latter because it was saver for NU and the Muslim people. This is because had the NU opposed the government, it could not limit the power of the Communist Party which supported the 'Guided Democracy'. Besides, the NU was not ready to be opposer.³⁸ The NU also implemented the *Qur'an* and *al-Sunnab* to end the rebellions.³⁹

IV. Conclusion

After transforming into a political party, the NU reactivated all of its under bow organization such as women, youths, students, and boy scouts organizations. It also set up the organization of workers, traders, and peasant unions. Even, the NU organized a shipping company for the transportation of pilgrimage to and from Jeddah.⁴⁰ Although these organizations were formed in order to prepare the election, the NU had served the society to develop their skill and ability. Thus, the members of NU who were mostly villagers could contribute their bargaining power in the national level. Through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the NU could communicate with its members in villages and enlarged its influence.⁴¹ As a result of its popularity, the NU gained condiderable vote which could mobilize the NU members in governmental positions. The NU members could became member of parliament and cabinet. This was not only in the central government but also in the regional governments. They not only became the regional governmental bureaucrats but also the member of regional representatives. This position also led to the development of the NU members in educational and economical fields.

The flexibility of NU policy in facing the problem of the country which was pragmatic oriented could colour the Indonesian political discourse in order to avoid the bigger danger namely clash within the Indonesian society. Its *fiqh*-based problem-solving could not only maintain the Indonesian unity but also destroyed the Communist rebellion. Had not the NU been overshadow the power of the Communist Party and then initiated to unite the anti-Communist power, the condition of Indonesia would be long lasting chaos like the condition of Afghanistan when the Soviet Communist occupied the country. Moreover, the NU successfully maintained the system of belief in God. With the support of grassroots society (especially the Javanese) who was appealed by the NU because of the NU's '*ulama*' who became the villager broker to the government.

Why was the NU, unlike the Masyumi, so easy to adapt the 'Guided Democracy' system? If we look at the categorization which divides the Indonesian political culture into inward-looking and outward-looking, the NU, like the PNI, can be categorized as the former. This meant that the NU appreciated the traditional leadership style rather than the idea of Western democracy.⁴² It did not bother when the governmental system was changed to the 'Guided Democracy' because it was still in accordance with the Indonesian culture, paternalism. In contrast, the Masyumi, as it was more outward-looking, considered the 'Guided Democracy' as deviation of 'democracy' as it is implemented in Western countries. Besides, the NU's political ideology which was based on *fiqh* and its *ablussunab wal jama'ab* doctrine contributed to the political nature of the NU. This *sunni* doctrine tends to support the status quo or the established government.

Furthermore, the development of the NU can be compared to the development of 'al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun' (the Muslim Brethren) in Egypt. Both of them have some similarities, although there are also many differences. Like the NU, this organization was formerly established as socio-religious organization in 1928, two years after the establishment of the NU. In its formative period (1928-36), the program was dominated by religious and social activities. The members of 'al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun' gave preaching in the mosques and other public places. They also founded schools of various grades and hospital as well as undertook various enterprises to raise the standard of living in the villages. Moreover, they built mosques and even launched industrial and commercial enterprises. After strengthening the organization, 'al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun' entered the

political activities (1936-1952). However, unlike the NU political party (1952-1971) whose policy was very flexible, it developed the 'tough' political party by opposing the government policy which was forced to follow the al-Ikhwān al-Muslimun's political thought lines. This might be because 'al-Ikhwān al-Muslimun' based on the Hambali *mazhab* teaching, while the NU mostly depended their teaching on the Shafii *mazhab*, although it also appreciated other *mazhab* teachings. During the time, the 'al-Ikhwān al-Muslimun' movement spread throughout the Middle East and probably organized "secret army." While still continuing its educational and social activities, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimun's influence in Egyptian political life increased. Furthermore, unlike the NU party which could be 'save' in the difficult period i.e. 'Guided Democracy,' the al-Ikhwān al-Muslimun' was dissolved by the government because of their attempt to assassinate the president in 1952. This was because they severely struggled against Western invasion in all its forms and attempted to create an authentically Muslim state in Egypt. They believed that "Islam is dogma and worship, fatherland and nationality, religion and state, al-Qur'ān and sword."⁴³

Endnotes

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²On the early development of the Nahdlatul Ulama, see Achmad Farichin Chumaidy, "The Jam'iyah Nahdlatul 'Ulama," M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1957; Saifuddin Zuhri, *Kyai Haji Abdul Wahab Hasbullah Bapak dan Pendiri NU*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Falakhiyah, 1983); and Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*, (Solo: Jatayu, 1985).

³Wahab Chasbullah was the "real" founder of the NU, son of Kiai Chasbullah of Tambakberas pesantren of Jombang. He studied from various pesantrens in East Java such as the Kiai Kholil's pesantren of Bangkalan, Madura island, and the pesantren of Hasyim Asy'ary's pesantren of Tebuireng, Jombang. He then studied in Mecca (1910-14) from many Indonesian 'ulamā such as Mahfuzh Termas and Ahmad Khatib Minangkabau. After coming back from the Arabia, he founded many organizations which can be considered as the pre-Nahdlatul Ulama. He formerly became the secretary (katib) of the Nahdlatul Ulama then became the Advisor (Mustasyar) and became the leader in 1942. When the NU in the Masyumi, he became a representative of the NU in it. Since 1952, he was the NU representative in the parliament. After KH. Hasyim Asy'ary passed away, he replaced him as the leader of the Advisory Board of the NU till his dead in 1971. He was the great supporter of Soekarno. After the fall of him, KH. Wahab formally remained at his seat in the NU but his influence in the NU had declined. See, Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru*, (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994), p. 298.

⁴On study of the pesantren, see Zamakhsyari Dhoefier, *Tradisi Pesantren, Study tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982).

⁵See, Nourouzzaman Shiddiqi, "The Role of 'ulam_ during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia (1942-45)," M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1975.

⁶Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), pp. 114-121.

⁷Mahrus Irsyam, *Ulama dan Partai Politik, Upaya Mengatasi Krisis*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), pp. 29.

⁸Slamet Effendi Yusuf et al. *Dinamika Kaum Santri, Menelusuri Jejak & Pergolakan Internal NU*, (Jakarta: C.V. Rajawali, 1983), pp.40-42; Khoirul Fathoni and Muhammad Zen, *NU Pasca Khittab*, (Yogyakarta: MW Mandala, 1992), pp. 31-33.

⁹Idham Chalid then became the leader of the NU for a long time (1956-1984). See, Anam, *Pertumbuhan*, pp. 196-7; pp; Einar Martahar Sitompul, *NU dan Pancasila*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989), pp. 160-3.

¹⁰The names of the members of the *Fraksi N.U.* were KH. Wahab Hasbullah, KH. Muhammad Ilyas, Muhammad Saleh Suryaningprojo, Muhammad Ali Pranatakusuma, A.A. Achsin, Idham Chalid, As. Bamid and Zainul Arifin who later was repalced by Saifuddin Zuhri. See Anam, *Pertumbuhan*, pp. 198; Saifuddin Zuhri, *Kaleidoskop Politik III*, (Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1981), p. 642.

¹¹Zainul Arifin seated the Deputy Prime Minister, KH. Masykur as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Muhammad Hanafiah as the Agrarian Ministry. See, Anam, *Pertumbuhan*, p. 198; van Bruinessen, *NU*, p. 68; Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962). pp. 338-9.

¹²The support of the pesantrens which had great number of grassroots followers contributed to the success of the NU in accumulating the vote of 1955 Indonesian election. See, Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party (1952-1955): an enquiry into the origin of its electoral success," M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1960. The strategy of the NU campaign also contributed to this success. See, Irsyam, *Ulama*, pp. 33-34; Sitompul, *NU*, pp. 120.

¹³Most NU leaders can be categorized as "solidarity makers" so that it needed the members who could become "administrators," see van Bruinessen, *NU*, p. 63; Feith, *The Decline*, pp. 113-120.

¹⁴The NU members seated Mr. Sunarjo as a minister of Interior, K.H. Iljas as a minister of Religious Affairs. See Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitution Democracy in Indonesia*, pp. 418-419.

¹⁵M. Rusli Karim, *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia, sebuah Potret Pasang Surut*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1983), pp. 120-122; see also Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Interim report series, Modern Indonesian Project, (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1971), pp. 459-470.

¹⁶On the rise and fall of the cabinets in the "Indonesia's Liberal Democracy" era, see Feith, *The Decline*.

¹⁷The other NU members who seated in the cabinet were Mr Sunarjo as the Ministry of Agrarian who was replaced by Rahmat Mulyoamiseno when he became the Indonesian Ambassador for Brazil, Prof. Drs. Sunarjo as the Ministry of Trade, and KH. M. Wahib Wahab as the Ministry of Cooperation between Civilian and Military which was created later. The Prime Minister of the Cabinet was Ir. Djuanda, the First Deputy Prime Minister was Hardi of the PNI, and the Third one was Leimena of the Christian.

¹⁸Saifuddin Zuhri (1919-1986) grew up in pesantren milieu. His career in the NU started from the NU youth branch (Gerakan Pemuda Anshor). At the age of 19, he appointed as the leader of its southern Central Java (1938-1942). In the revolutionary era, Zuhri became the

commander of *Hizbullah* (the Army of God) division of Central Java. He is also active as a journalist. When becoming a ministry of Religious Affairs (1962-1967), he developed numerous Institute of Islamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN). At 39 years old, he was appointed as a member of the DPA (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, Supreme Advisory Council).

¹⁹ During 1946-1965, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was seated 20 times by the NU members. Only 3 times, it was seated by non-NU people. *Ibid.*, p. 229; See also, Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, p. 340.

²⁰ The fourth leader of the PBNU (Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board), HM. Subhan ZE. attempted to unite the power of HMI (Islamic Student Union), PMII (Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), Pemuda Ansor (The NU Youth Branch), Muhammadiyah, Protestant and Catholics. See, Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan*, p. 241; B.J. Boland, *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1985), translated by Grafiti Pers, p. 116.

²¹ Subhan (1931-1972) is a militant NU. He was born from the Muhammadiyah family of Yogyakarta but adopted by his uncle, H. Zainuri Ehsan, an NU rich merchant of Kudus. He graduated from HIS (Holland Indische School) and Business School in Semarang, Central Java. During the Revolution, he participated in the Army until became a captain of Military Police (CPM) then studied economy in the United States until he got diploma. He led the NU Economic Department in 1956 and the NU Higher Education Department (Lembaga Pendidikan Tinggi NU). He also became a rector of the NU University (UNU) and involved in the Universitas Islam Nusantara. At 23rd NU congress in Surakarta in 1962, he was appointed as one of the Executive Board of NU (PBNU) as the Fourth Vice President. In 1966, he organized the University students and other youth components to oppose the President Soekarno. See, Andree Feillard, *Islam et Armée dans l'Indonésie Contemporaine*, pp. 334-337.

²² Slamet Effendi Yusuf et. all. *Dinamika Kaum Santri, Menelusuri Jejak dan Pergolakan Internal NU*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1983), pp. 48-49; Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan*, p. 245; Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru*, pp. 86-87.

²³ Idham Chalid as the Coordinator Ministry of People's Prosperity, Saifuddin Zuhri as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, KH. Fatah Yasin as the Ministry of Cooperation with 'Ulamā' who later was replaced by KH. Moh. Ilyas, and H. Aminuddin Azis as the State Ministry.

²⁴ Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan*, p. 246.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 248; Mahrus Irsyad, *Ulama dan Partai Politik*, pp. 38-41.

²⁶ Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan*, pp. 249-250.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 252. For the program of the Ministry of Religious Affairs at the time, see B.J. Boland, *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, p. 113.

²⁸ On the feature of Islam and politics under the 'New Order', see Dody S. Truna, "Islam and Politics under the 'New Order' Government in Indonesia 1966-1990," M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1992.

²⁹ See M. Rusli Karim, *Perjalanan Partai Politik di Indonesia*, pp. 167-171; Slamet Effendi Yusuf et. all. *Dinamika Kaum Santri*, pp. 57-60. On the development of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, see Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim, "The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: the political journey of Islam under Indonesia's New Order (1973-1987)," M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1993; Khoirul Fathoni and Muhammad Zen, *NU Pasca Kiblat, Prospek Ukhuvah dengan Muhammadiyah*, (Yogyakarta: MW Mandala, 1992), pp. 48-52.

³⁰Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan*, pp.199-200; Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, p. 342; *wali al-amr al-dharuri bi'l-sya'ukab* formerly was only used to legitimate the Religious Court to choose *wali hakim* (person who acts on behalf of the father of a bride) but then it has political implication to legitimate Soekarno as the right authority vis-à-vis the Muslim rebellions. See, Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru*, p. 72-73.

³¹Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan*, pp. 161-165.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 210; M. Ali Haidar, *Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia, Pendekatan Fiqh dalam Politik*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1994), p.161.

³³Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan*, pp. 211-213.

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 216-217.

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 231; Saifuddin Zuhri, *KH. Wahab Hasbullah*, pp. 37.

³⁶Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru*, pp. 82-87.

³⁷*Ibid.*, pp.233-235; Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, p. 390.

³⁸M. Ali Haidar, *Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indonesia, Pendekatan Fiqh dalam Politik*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1994), p. 159.

³⁹The NU based on the *Qur'_n*, 4:10 and 4:59 to condemned the PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Indonesian revolutionary Republic Government) rebellion in the North and West Sumatra. It stated that if there are two governments in one country and no peace between them, the second government should be dissolved. See, Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, pp. 377.

⁴⁰Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party," p. 35.

⁴¹Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Politik di Indonesia, pada masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965)*, (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga press, 1988), p. 99.

⁴²Lecture by Howard M. Federspiel in Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, on January 10, 1996; Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru*, pp. 70.

⁴³G. Delanoue, "al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun," *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol III, ed. B. Lewis et.al. (Leiden: E.J. Brill; London: Luzac & CO, 1971), pp. 1068-1071.