CONTESTING AUTHORITY: THE RISE OF ISLAMIST ACTIVISM OF TRADITIONALIST MUSLIMS IN MADURA

By:
Abdul Jabpar
NIM: 17300016039

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Sunan Kalijaga Postgraduate Program
to Fulfill the requirements to obtain a doctorate in Islamic Studies

YOGYAKARTA
2024

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By	:	Abdul Jabpar
S I D	:	17300016039
Department.	:	Doctor (S3) / Islamic Studies
Specialization	:	*Islamic Thought and Muslim Societies* (ITMS)

To be submitted and defended
As one of the requirements to obtain a Doctoral degree (Dr.)
In Islamic Studies with specialization in *Islamic Thought and Muslim Societies*

Yogyakarta, 29nd Agust 2024

On Behalf of The Rector
Head of the Examining Committee,

Prof. Dr. H. Abdul Mustaqim, S.Ag., M.Ag.
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GRADUATION EXERCISE

BISMILLĀHIRRAHMĀNIRRAHĪM

HAVING OBSERVED AND CONSIDERED THE ANSWERS THE PROMOVENDUS HAS CONVEYED AND THE OBJECTIONS OF THE EXAMINERS IN THE CLOSED DEFENSE ON **24 JULI 2024** AND THE ANSWERS OF THE PROMOVENDUS AND THE OBJECTIONS OF THE EXAMINERS TODAY, WE DECLARE THAT THE PROMOVENDUS,**ABDUL JABPAR.** STUDENT ID **17300016039** BORN IN SAMPANG ON **03ND Agust ~~2024~~,** 1979.

HAS SUCCESSFULLY PASSED THE EXAMINATION WITH:

~~CUM LAUDE~~ / <u>VERY SATIS GOOD</u> / ~~GOOD~~*

ACCORDINGLY HE IS GRANTED A DOCTORAL DEGREE IN ISLAMIC STUDIES WITH SPECIALIZATION IN *ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND MUSLIM SOCIETIES*, WITH ALL THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES ASCRIBED.

ABDUL JABPAR IS THE 988 DOCTORAL GRADUATE

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Venue : AULA 1st floor School of Graduate Studies UIN Sunan Kalijaga
Time : 13.00-end
Result / Grade (GPA) : ....3.77.........
Graduation : (Cum laude)/ Very Good/ Good

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STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICITY

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At this moment, I declare that the dissertation titled "*Contesting Authority: The Rise of Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims in Madura*" and all its contents are my own work and not the work of others, either in whole or in part, except in the form of citations that have been mentioned in the sources. Thus, I made this statement truthfully. I want to reiterate that if later it is found that there is a violation of scientific ethics in my work, or if there are claims from other parties regarding the originality of my work, then I am ready to bear all forms of risks/sanctions that apply. I stand by the integrity and accountability of my work.

Yogyakarta, August 3, 2024
Author,

Abdul Jabpar

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Prof. Noorhaidi, S.Ag., MA., M.Phil., Ph.D.   (   )

Promotor II
Prof. Dr. Moch. Nur Ichwan, MA.   (   )

APPROVAL STATEMENT

To
Director of Postgraduate
Program of UIN Sunan Kalijaga
Yogyakarta

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
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Examiner,

Najib Kailani, M.A., Ph.D

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Dr. Sunarwoto, S.Ag., M.Ag.

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Yogyakarta, August 8th, 2024
Examiner,

Ambar Sari Dewi, M.Si., Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

This research aimed to uncover the multifaceted reasons behind the emergence of Islamism in Madura during the reform era. The strengthening of the Islamist movement in Pamekasan is represented by two community organizations, namely FPI and AUMA, which are considered a blend of traditionalism and Islamism. This study sought to answer questions regarding the background, habitus, identity, networks, and the contestation of FPI and AUMA with other Islamic groups, to provide a thorough understanding of the complex socio-religious dynamics.

This field study employed an ethnographic approach conducted in Pamekasan, Madura. The research objects were analyzed using the Islamic activism theories of Quintan Wictorowicz and Asef Bayat and Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice. In this context, FPI and AUMA were examined as forms of Islamic activism, where the key actors were analyzed based on their habitus and capital in the religious field in Pamekasan, clearly depicting the stance of FPI and AUMA as Islamic activism and their contestation with other Islamic groups in the struggle for authority.

This research highlights several significant findings. The *first* is the dynamics of Islamism's development. Discussions about the relationship between Islam and the state pose challenges. Islamism emerged at the end of the colonial period through organizations like Sarekat Islam (SI), which were influenced by reformist ideas from the Middle East. The momentum of Islamism diminished under the Soekarno and Suharto administrations but resurged during the Reform era after the fall of the New Order regime, with Islamist groups striving to establish an Islamic state or governance based on Islamic law. The *second* finding is the religious field in Pamekasan. Pamekasan has been a deeply Islamic region since the 15th century, influenced by Arab traders and the Walisongo. The Kiai of Bani Itsbat, with their pesantren, played a crucial role in preserving traditional Islam based on the principles of Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah. However, the descendants of Kiai Itsbat have taken different paths in their Islamic activism, with some affiliating with Sarekat Islam and others involving themselves in NU. The *third* is the rise of Islamist activism. Post-1998, Pamekasan saw the emergence of "Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" (IATM), which promoted religious conservatism and the formalization of Islamic law. The result was the implementation of local regulations, such as alcohol bans, mandatory hijabs for government employees, and increased Islamic education. "Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Islami" (Gerbangsalam) initiated by the Pamekasan community, provided a free space for traditionalist-Islamist groups like FPI and AUMA to pursue their agendas through demonstrations and moral patrols. These groups were supported by SI and the Hadrami families in Pamekasan as a network. *Fourth* is their contestation with NU. The rise of FPI and AUMA has sparked competition with moderate-traditionalist

groups like NU. This rivalry extends to the religious field and the political, cultural, and economic spheres. Mass mobilization, often initiated from mosques under the banner of defending Islam and Sharia, distinguishes them from other groups. NU has responded to their presence as competitors in performing good deeds. Overall, this study emphasizes the ongoing interaction and competition between Islamic groups in Madura, particularly in Pamekasan, which has shaped the local socio-religious dynamics.

Keywords: Authority, AUMA, FPI, Islamic Activism, Theory of Practice

ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menyingkap alasan multifaset di balik kemunculan Islamisme di Madura selama era reformasi. Penguatan gerakan Islamis di Pamekasan direpresentasikan oleh dua organisasi masyarakat, yaitu FPI dan AUMA, yang dianggap merupakan perpaduan antara tradisionalisme dan Islamisme. Penelitian ini berupaya menjawab pertanyaan mengenai latar belakang, habitus, identitas, jaringan, dan kontestasi FPI dan AUMA dengan kelompok-kelompok Islam lainnya, yang memberikan pemahaman yang menyeluruh tentang dinamika sosial-keagamaan yang kompleks.

Penelitian lapangan ini menggunakan pendekatan etnografi yang dilakukan di Pamekasan, Madura. Objek penelitian dianalisis dengan menggunakan teori aktivisme Islam dari Quintan Wictorowicz dan Asef Bayat, serta teori praksis dari Pierre Bourdieu. Dalam konteks ini, FPI dan AUMA ditelaah sebagai aktivisme Islam, di mana para aktor kunci ditelaah berdasarkan habitus dan modal mereka di ranah keagamaan di Pamekasan, sehingga dengan jelas menggambarkan postur FPI dan AUMA sebagai aktivisme Islam dan kontestasi mereka dengan kelompok Islam yang lain dalam memperebutkan otoritas.

Penelitian ini menemukan beberapa hal penting. Pertama, dinamika perkembangan Islamisme. Diskusi tentang hubungan Islam dengan negara menimbulkan tantangan. Islamisme muncul pada akhir periode kolonial melalui organisasi seperti Sarekat Islam (SI) yang dipengaruhi oleh gagasan-gagasan pembaharuan dari Timur Tengah. Momentum Islamisme meredup di bawah pemerintahan Soekarno dan Suharto, tetapi bangkit kembali pada era Reformasi setelah jatuhnya rezim Orde Baru, dengan kelompok-kelompok Islamis berjuang mewujudkan negara Islam atau pemerintahan berdasarkan hukum Islam. Kedua, ranah keagamaan di Pamekasan. Pamekasan telah menjadi wilayah yang sangat Islami sejak abad ke-15, dipengaruhi oleh pedagang Arab dan Walisongo. Kiai-kiai dari Bani Itsbat dengan pesantrean yang mereka miliki memiliki peran penting dalam melestarikan Islam tradisi yang berdasar prinsip *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah*. Namun, keturunan Kiai Itsbat telah mengambil jalur yang berbeda dalam aktivisme keislaman mereka, sebagian mereka berafiliasi dengan Sarekat Islam dan yang lainnya melibatkan diri dalam NU. Ketiga, kebangkitan aktivisme Islamis. Pasca 1998 di Pamekasan terlihat kemunculan "Aktivisme Islamis dari Muslim Tradisionalis" (IATM) yang mempromosikan konservatisme agama dan formalisasi hukum Islam. Hasilnya adalah beberapa peraturan daerah seperti larangan minuman beralkohol, kewajiban berhijab bagi pegawai pemerintah, dan peningkatan pendidikan Islam. Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Islami (Gerbangsalam) yang dicanangkan masyarakat Pamekasan memberikan ruang yang bebas bagi kelompok-kelompok tradisionalis-islamis seperti FPI dan AUMA untuk mewujudkan agenda mereka melalui demonstrasi dan patroli moral. Kedua kelompok itu disokong oleh SI dan keluarga Hadrami yang di Pamekasan sebagai sebuah jaringan. Keempat, kontestasi mereka dengan NU. Kebangkitan FPI dan AUMA telah memicu kompetisi dengan

kelompok-kelompok moderat-tradisionalis seperti NU. Persaingan tersebut tidak hanya pada ranah keagamaan tetapi juga merambah pada ranah politik, budaya, dan ekonomi. Mobilisasi massa yang biasa dimulai dari masjid dalam bingkai pembela Islam dan syariat merupakan distingsi diri mereka dengan kelompok yang lain. NU sendiri merespons kehadiran mereka sebagai mitra kompetisi dalam berbuat kebajikan. Secara keseluruhan, studi ini menekankan interaksi dan kompetisi yang sedang berlangsung antara kelompok-kelompok Islam di Madura, khususnya di Pamekasan, yang membentuk dinamika sosial-keagamaan setempat.

Kata kunci: Otoritas, AUMA, FPI, Aktivisme Islam, Teori Praktis

الملخص

كشفت هذه الدراسة عن الأسباب المتعددة الأوجه وراء ظهور الإسلاموية في مادورا Madura خلال عصر الإصلاح. لقد تعززت الحركة الإسلامية في باميكاسان Pamekasan ومثلتها منظمتان مجتمعيتان؛ الجبهة الدفاعية الإسلامية FPI وتحالف العلماء المادوراويين AUMA، وهما تعتبران مزيجا من التقليدية والإسلاموية.أجابت هذه الرسالة على الأسئلة المتعلقة بالخلفية، والهابيتوس أو السمت، والهوية، والشبكة، وتنافسFPI وAUMA مع الجماعات الإسلامية الأخرى، مما يوفر فهما شاملا للديناميكيات الاجتماعية والدينية المعقدة.

اعتمد الباحث في هذه الدراسة الميدانية على منهج إثنوغرافي تم إجراؤه في باميكاسان، مادورا. وكان موضوع الرسالة تم تحليله باستخدام نظرية النشاط الإسلامي لقوينتان فيكتوروفيتش Quintan Wictorowicz وآصف بيات Asef Bayat، وكذلك نظرية الممارسة لبيير بورديو Pierre Bourdieu. فقام الباحث بالإطلاع على الجبهة الدفاعية الإسلامية FPI وتحالف العلماء المادوراويين AUMA كمنظمتين متسمتين بالنشاط الإسلامي، ووضع الجهات الفاعلة الرئيسية في الدراسة على أساس الطبيعة والرأس مال في المجال الديني في باميكاسان، مما يوضح موقف الجبهة الدفاعية الإسلامية FPI وتحالف العلماء المادوراويين AUMA كمنظمتين إسلاميتين ومنافستهما مع الحركات الإسلامية الأخرى في الصراع من أجل السلطة.

وتوصلت هذه الرسالة إلى أمور مهمة. أولا، البحث الديناميكي عن تطور الإسلاموية. وظلت المناقشات حول علاقة الإسلام بالدولة تظهر عدة التحديات. وكانت الحركات الإسلامية تظهر في نهاية الفترة الاستعمارية عن طريق منظمات مثل جمعية شركات الإسلام (SI) التي تأثرت بالأفكار الإصلاحية من الشرق الأوسط. وتلاشى زخم الإسلاموية في ظل حكومتي سوكارنو وسوهارتو، إلا أنها انتعشت في عصر الإصلاح بعد سقوط النظام الجديد، وسعت الجماعات الإسلامية لإنشاء دولة أو حكومة إسلامية تعتمد على الشريعة الإسلامية. ثانيا، المجال الديني في باميكاسان. أصبحت باميكاسان منطقة إسلامية منذ القرن الخامس عشر، متأثرة بالتجار العرب والواليسونغو (الأولياء التسعة). وفعل الكياهي (العلماء المسلمين) من بني اثبات دورا مهما بمدارسهم الداخلية الإسلامية في حماية الإسلام التقليدي القائم على مبادئ أهل السنة والجماعة. غير أنه اتخذ أحفاد بني اثبات مسارات مختلفة في نشاطهم الإسلامي، ينتمي بعضهم إلى شركات الإسلام والبعض الآخر إلى نهضة العلماء. ثالثا، صعود النشاط الإسلامي. شهدت باميكاسان ما بعد عام 1998 ظهور "النشاط الإسلامي من المسلمين التقليديين" (IATM) الذين دعوا إلى المحافظة الدينية وإضفاء الطابع الرسمي على الشريعة الإسلامية. وولدت منها العديد من اللوائح الإقليمية، مثل حظر المشروبات الكحولية، ووجوب ارتداء الحجاب لموظفات الحكومة، وتحسين التعليم

الإسلامي. ثم أطلق مجتمع باميكاسان حركة تنمية المجتمع الإسلامي (Gerbangsalam) التي توفر مساحة حرة للجماعات الإسلامية التقليدية مثل الجبهة الدفاعية الإسلامية FPI وتحالف العلماء المادوراويين AUMA لتحقيق أجندتهما من خلال تنظيم الاحتجاجات الجماهيرية والدوريات ضد الرذائل. وكانت المجموعتان تحظيان بدعم جمعية شركات الإسلام SI وبعض العوائل الحضرمية في باميكاسان. رابعا، تنافسهما مع نهضة العلماء. لقد أثارت الجبهة الدفاعية الإسلامية FPI وتحالف العلماء المادوراويين AUMA بحركاتهما منافسة حامية مع المجموعات التقليدية المعتدلة مثل جمعية نهضة العلماء NU، ولا يقتصر هذا التنافس على المجال الديني فحسب، بل يمتد أيضا إلى المجالات السياسية والثقافية والاقتصادية. إن التعبئة الجماهيرية، التي تبدأ عادة من المساجد للدفاع عن الإسلام والشريعة، تميزهما عن المجموعات الأخرى. لقد استجابت NU لوجودها كشريك منافس في عمل الخير. وأكدت هذه الدراسة بشكل عام، على التفاعلات والمنافسة المستمرة بين الجماعات الإسلامية في باميكاسان مادورا، والتي تشكل الديناميكيات الاجتماعية والدينية المحلية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: السلطة، الجبهة الدفاعية الإسلامية FPI وتحالف العلماء المادوراويين AUMA، النشاط الإسلامي، نظرية الممارسة

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

والحمد لله رب العلمين والصلاة والسلام على سيدنا محمد

All praise is due to Allah, the Almighty, for His abundant blessings and mercy. May blessings and peace be upon the Prophet Muhammad SAW, whose love and compassion for his followers are beyond description.

Alhamdulillah, I have finally completed this dissertation despite the limitations and challenges encountered during the process. This dissertation was prepared as a requirement for obtaining a doctoral degree at the Graduate Program of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta. I hope that this work contributes to the academic world, no matter how small or significant its impact may be.

The completion of this dissertation certainly involved the help of many kind and sincere individuals. My deepest gratitude goes to all the individuals and institutions that assisted me throughout the initiation and completion of my doctoral studies.

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Finally, I want to express my deepest thanks to my family. My mother, Hj. Hamidah, and my mother-in-law, Hj. Homsah, who always prayed for my success in my studies. My wife, Minal Uyun, and my children, Mirza Badar Ramadhan, Dhaifullah Al-Basyir, and Aula Syahriel Romadhoni, who all accompanied me with love. I dedicate this work to all of them.

Yogyakarta, August 3, 2024
The Author

Abdul Jabpar

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI   : Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
ASWAJA   : Ahlussunah wal Jamaah
AUMA   : Aliansi Ulama Madura
BASSRA   : Badan Silaturrahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura
BPUPKI   : Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan
CSI   : Centraal Sarekat Islam (CSI)
DDII   : Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia
DI/NII   : Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia
FKAWJ   : Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah
FKM   : Forum Kiai Muda
FPI   : Front Pembela/Persaudaraan Islam
GAM   : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
Golkar   : Golongan Karya
HAMMAS   : Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus
HMI   : Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia
HTI   : Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
IAIN   : Institut Agama Islam Negeri
IATM   : The Islalmist-Activism of Traditionalist Muslims
IPB   : Institut Pertanian Bogor
IPNU   : Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama
JAT   : Jamaah Ansorut Tauhid
JI   : Jamaah Islamiyah
LIPIA   : Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab
LP2SI   : Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penerapan Syariat Islam
LPI   : Laskar Pembela Islam
Masyumi   : Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia
MIAI   : Majelis Islam 'Ala Indonesia
MMI   : Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
MPR   : Majelis Permusyaratan Rakyat
MTQ   : Musabaqah Tilawah Al-Qur'an
NU   : Nahdlatul Ulama
PAN   : Partai Amanat Nasional
PAS   : Partai Islam Se-Malaysia
PBB   : Partai Bulan Bintang
PDI   : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
Perda   : Peraturan Daerah

Persis	: Persatuan Islam
PK	: Partai Keadilan
PKB	: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
PKI	: Partai Komunisme Indonesia
PKS	: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
PMI/Permi	: Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia
PNI	: Partai Nasional Indonesia
PNU	: Partai Nahdlatul Ulama
PPKI	: Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia
PPP	: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
PSI	: Partai Sarekat Islam
SDI	: Sarekat Dagang Islam
SI	: Sarekat Islam

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

The "Reformation Era," marked by the fall of Soeharto as the central figure of the New Order regime in 1998, brought political changes that impacted all aspects of life. This era introduced greater freedom of the press, allowing citizens to express their rights and engage in protest movements with the protection of civil and political rights. The peak of these changes was the Democratic general election in 1999.[1] Generally speaking, post-New Order democratization opened opportunities for the birth of constitutional Islamic parties, most of which were lacking national networks, organizations, or nationally recognized leaders. Surprisingly, these parties were able to attract attention from society by increasing the religiosity of the public, known also as the "purification" of Islam within society.[2] These parties managed to exploit the public's growing frustration with corruption, economic instability, and declining hopes for a democratic transition in Indonesia, by offering "Islam is the answer" to all these problems. On the other hand, this situation provided opportunities for the emergence of radical Islamist groups that, at their extreme, rejected Pancasila as the state foundation and posed

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[1] M. Zaki Mubarak, *Genealogi Islam Radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran, Prospek Demokrasi,* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2007), 109. See also Sudirman Tebba, *Islam Menuju Era Reformasi,* (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2001), xiii-xxxiii.

[2] Zachari Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia,* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 35.

potential threats to pluralism in Indonesia. These groups included HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia),[3] FPI (Front Pembela Islam), and others.[4]

This situation seemingly affirms Deliar Noer's thesis argument that the relationship between Islam and the state, in the Indonesian context, remains unresolved.[5] Some researchers, such as Antony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, believe that the wave of Islamist movements shifting from the Middle East to Indonesia began in the 1950s when modernist Muslims were influenced by the Ikhwanul Muslimin movement, culminating in the birth of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia) and "Gerakan Tarbiyah" in the late 1980s.[6] Nevertheless, Sarekat Islam (SI) is often considered an early form of Islamism in Indonesia. While SI might not fit the more rigid definitions of contemporary Islamism, which often emphasize the establishment of an Islamic state, it certainly laid the groundwork for later Islamist movements in Indonesia by promoting Islamic principles in socio-political activism.[7]

During the Old Order era, the radical Islamist movement was represented by DI/NII Kartoswiryo, who in the pre-independence era, was an activist of Sarekat

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[3] Based on Perpu No. 2 Tahun 2017, HTI has been officially dissolved because it contradicts the constitution and the Pancasila. See Ihsanudin, "Jalan Panjang Pemerintah membubarkan HTI", in https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/08/10463051/jalan-panjang-pemerintah-bubarkan-hti. Accessed 27 September 2023.

[4] Zachari Abuza, *Political Islam…,* 56-67.

[5] Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942,* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), 5.

[6] Antony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia,* (New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), 66-67. See also M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia,* (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2005), x-xi.

[7] Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam…,* 114-179.

Islam (SI).[8] In the New Order era, radical Islamist movements were still represented by DI/NII sympathizers who fought for the ideals of an Islamic state in the form of "Komando Jihad" in separate cells. Notable figures at the time included Daud Beureueh, Ismail Pranoto, and Warman, amongst others.[9] Finally, in the Reformation era, the spring of radical Islamism found its momentum. Several radical Islamist movements flourished, such as Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Front Pembela Islam (FPI). This is indicative of how the identity problem of some Muslims in Indonesia remains unresolved. Their quest for self-identity continues to this day, suggesting that the issue of Islam and the state is still ongoing and unresolved for some (Muslim) groups, although they are quantitatively a minority group in Indonesia today.

Islam itself, as a religion, has evolved with all the attributes that encompass it, including symbols, ideas, practices, and institutions.[10] Therefore, Islamic discourse is not monolithic but pluralistic because it operates within the realm of history.[11] There is always a dialectic between traditional (turats) and modernizing (tadjid) discourses in Islamic intellectual tradition.[12] In the social-political realm,

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[8] Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam…*, 175-179.

[9] Abdul Jamil Wahab, *Islam Radikal dan Moderat: Diskursus dan Kontestasi Varian Islam Indonesia,* (Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia, 2019), 50.

[10] William Shepard, *Introducing Islam,* (London - New York: Roudledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), 2.

[11] Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, *Naqdu Khitab Al-Diny,* (Kairo: Maktabah Madbuli, 2003), 94-99.

[12] Hassan Hanafi, *Dari Akidah ke Revolusi: Sikap Kita terhadap Tradisi Lama,* (Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadinap, 2003), xix. See also M. Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta,* (Jakarta: Penerbit Mizan, 1987), 116-128.

Islam presents itself in a variety of understandings and diverse movements. Researchers note that debates around Islamic theological discourse essentially started from political debates that developed into theological discussions beginning when the Prophet Muhammad SAW passed away in 632 AD. The discourse on the vacuum of leadership after his death sparked early caliphate discussions. Then, political differences among early Muslims led to the emergence of theological groups, such as the Khawarij, Murjiah, Mu'tazilah, *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah,* and others.[13]

The central and unresolved discourse in the Islamic world regarding Islam and politics is the issue of *Din wa Daulah* (religion and state). Three paradigms of governance concepts mark the relationship between religion and the state: integrative, symbiotic, and secularistic. The integrative paradigm tends to unify religion and the state, viewing religion as encompassing political realms. In other words, the state is both a political and religious institution, governed by divine sovereignty. This paradigm is adhered to by Shia groups, who see the state as having a religious function. The second paradigm, symbiotic, views religion and the state as mutually interdependent. This symbiotic relationship allows both institutions to develop. This paradigm is supported by Sunni intellectuals such as Al-Mawardi and Al-Ghazali. The third paradigm, secularistic, separates religion from the state, with its proponents rejecting Islam—or any religion—as the basis of the state.[14]

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[13] Harun Nasution, *Teologi Islam,* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1986), 3-78.

[14] Din Syamsuddin, "Usaha Pencarian Konsep Negara dalam Sejarah Pemikiran Politik Islam", dalam *Ulumul Qur'an: Jurnal Ilmu dan Kebudayaan,* no. 2. Vol.IV (1993), 5-7.

The integrative view holds that Islam, as a religion, has governance rules and laws. For instance, Imam Khomeini believed that establishing an Islamic state is a duty of Muslims based on the concept of imamah.[15] The symbiotic view suggests that religion and the state strengthen each other. For example, Al-Ghazali believed that the orderliness of religious affairs must always be supported by the presence of a good state leader who is obeyed by the people.[16] Meanwhile, the secularistic view posits that unity between religion and the state cannot be accepted. Proponents of the secularistic paradigm argue against the concept of *Din wa Daulah* with three points: (1) The lack of separation between the state and religious affairs is not unique to Islam. Groups like the Moral Majority in America, Liberation Theology in Latin American countries, Sikh activists in India, and Buddhist monks in Myanmar and Vietnam all believe that religious and state affairs are inseparable; (2) Because religion cannot be separated from politics, all life becomes political. The political content that exists in all activities of Muslims causes them to be unable and unwilling to build political structures; and (3) Islamic politics is considered irrational, emotional, and unpredictable by Western thinkers.[17]

In the Indonesian context, the integrative paradigm became a minority line of thought that flourished during the Reformation era after the end of the New Order regime. This paradigm had a depoliticization approach to Islamic political parties

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[15] Imam Khomeini, *Islamic Government,* (United Kingdom: Alhoda, 2005), 28-30. See also Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State,* (London - New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 103-124.

[16] Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhamma al-Thusi al-Ghazali, *Ihya Ulumuddin,* (Beirut: Dar Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1975), 151.

[17] Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Islam dan Pluralisme: Akhlak Qura'an Menyikapi Perbedaan,* (Jakarta: Serambi, 2006), 214-216.

and religious organizations with the so-called *"Asas Tunggal Pancasila."* In the local political arena, the situation was similar, with the emergence of radical Islamist movements in various regions, including Madura—a region known for the "piety,"[18] "tradition," and "violence" of its people.[19] Madura is a region where the social religious life is encapsulated by three key terms: kiai, pesantren, and traditionalism which most researchers simplify to NU or Nahdlatul Ulama,[20] a religious organization commonly adhered to by the local community. However, as found in this study, traditional Islam in Madura also has ties to Sarekat Islam, at least as discovered in Pamekasan Regency.

Traditionalism in Indonesia is rooted in the general condition of society when Islam first entered, which was predominantly agrarian and rural, hindering the development of a more rational and modern form of Islam. Thus, the Shafi'i school, embraced by traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia, emphasizes loyalty to religious leaders (kiai) over the rational substance of Islamic teachings.[21] Traditional Islam, therefore, supports a habitus of *taqlid* (blind following) to scholars and kiai.

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[18] Islam and Madura are two things that cannot be separated. Sociologically, almost all Madurese are Muslims—a fact that cannot be denied. Their obedience to Islamic doctrine is a part of their self-characteristics as Madurese people. See A. Latief Wiyata, *Mencari Madura,* (Jakarta: Bidik – Phronesis Publishing, 2013), 3. Their unique (Islam) fashion includes wearing *samper, kebaya,* and *burgo'* for women, while using *sarong* and *songko'* for men. See Mien Muhammad Rifa'I, *Manusia Madura,* (Yogyakarta: Pilar Media, 2007), 3.

[19] Yanwar Pribadi, *Islam, State, Society in Indonesia: Local Politics in Madura,* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 88.

[20] Samsul Ma'arif, *The History of Madura: Sejarah panjang Madura dari Kerajaan, Kolonialisme sampai Kemerdekaan,* (Yogyakarta: Araska, 2015), 155.

[21] Fachry Ali & Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam,* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), 47.

Traditional Islam flourished in Madura, understandably, due to the initial encounter of Islam with Madura through Sunan Giri (one of the Wali Songo) and Muslim traders visiting the island.[22] Traditional Islam refers to those who follow Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, meaning "the followers of the tradition of Prophet Muhammad and the consensus of the scholars *(Ijma' Ulama)*." By identifying themselves as followers of the Prophet's tradition and *Ijma' Ulama,* the kiai, as important figures in traditional Islamic society, explicitly distinguish themselves from "Islamic modernists" who adhere only to the Qur'an and Hadith and reject the *Ijma' Ulama*. Traditionalists refer to the thoughts of the four imams of the *mazhab*, most commonly adhering strongly to Imam Shafi'i. In matters of tauhid (theology), they follow the teachings of Imam Abu Hasan Al-Ash'ari and Imam Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi. In the field of Sufism, traditionalists follow the foundational teachings of Imam Abu Qasim Al-Junaid or Al-Ghazali[23]. Meanwhile, Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, often abbreviated as ASWAJA, or "Sunni,"[24] means followers of the Prophet's traditions and his companions.[25]

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[22] Abdurrahman, *Sejarah Madura Selayang Pandang,* (Sumenep: Matahari 1971), 16.

[23] Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai,* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), 148-149. See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Traditional Islam in the Modern World,* (London - New York: Keagan Paul International, 1987), 14-16. See also Siradjuddin, *I'itiqad Ahlussunah wal Jamaah,* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyah, 1996), 16-17. See also Muhammad Tholhah Hasan, *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah dalam Persepsi dan Tradisi NU,* (Jakarta: Lantabora Press, 2005), 13-33. See also Nur Hidayat Muhammad, *Benteng Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah: Menolak Faham Salafi, Wahabi, MTA, Hizbut Tahrir dan LDII,* (Kediri: Nasyrul'ilmi, 1912), 38-44.

[24] Said Agiel Siradj, *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah dalam Lintas Sejarah,* (Yogyakarta: LKPSM, 1997), 6. See also Muhammad Abdul Hadi Al-Mishri, *Manhaj dan Aqidah Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah,* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1992), 86-88.

[25] Saleh A. Nahdi, *Siapakah Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah,* (Jakarta: Arista, 1920), 16. There are three views regarding the genealogy of the term Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah: (1) some say that the term existed and was used during the time of Prophet Muhammad SAW; (2) another view states that the term emerged at the end of the fifth decade of the Hijri year, known as 'amul jamaah', a year marked by the event of Hasan bin Ali relinquishing his position as caliph and handing it over

A cursory reading of the characteristics of traditional Islam in Madura might leave researchers astonished by the emergence of various radical Islamist movements on the salt island. For example, Zainul Hamdi, was surprised by the strengthening of radical Islamist movements in Madura.[26] Mukhammad Zamzami, Abdul 'Ala, and other researchers captured the Islamist movements in Pamekasan led by AUMA, FKM, and BASSRA.[27]

Such readings have weaknesses, at least in several aspects related to traditional Islam in Madura and the recent strengthening of Islamist movements. First, Hamdi got caught in the assumption that traditional Islam in Madura, that is "Sunni" Madura, is definitely NU or Nahdlatul Ulama. However, traditional Islam in Pamekasan, in fact, had social-religious organizational affiliations with Sarekat Islam even before the Republic of Indonesia was declared on August 17, 1945. Second, there is an excessive generalization that the case in Bangkalan, as mentioned earlier, represents Madura as a whole. Third, Zamzami and 'Ala did not specifically state the linkage of new radical groups emerging post-reformation in Pamekasan with SI, or more explicitly, that these groups are metamorphoses of

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to Mu'awiyah; (3) others say that the term only appeared in the second century of the Hijri calendar, during the peak of the flourishing of Islamic theology or Ilm al-Kalam. See H.Z.A. Syihab, *Akidah Ahlussunnah,* (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 1998), 14-15.

[26] Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, *Pergeseran Islam Madura (Perjumapan Islam Tradisional dan Islamisme di Bangkalan, Madura, Pasca Reformasi),* (Surabaya: Pasca UIN Sunan Ampel, 2015). See also Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, "Radicalizing Indonesian Moderate Islam from Within: The NU-FPI Realationship in Bangkalan" in *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013. 71-95. See also Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, "Radicalising the Traditionalists: A Contemporary Dynamic of Islamic Traditionalism in Madura-Indonesia", in Epistemé, Vol. 15, No. 1, June 2020, 1-21.

[27] Mukhammad Zamzami, "Kontribusi Forum Kiai Muda (FKM) Madura dalam Membangun Islamisme di Pamekasan", in *Procedings of the International Conference on Mulism Society and Thought,* Surabaya-Indonesia, 2-3 October 2017. 651-664. See also Abdul 'Ala et.al., "Islamism in Madura: From Religious Symbolism to Authoritarianism", in *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* Volume 12, Number 02, December 2018. 159-194.

SI—despite SI not being completely inactive as an organization. SI metamorphosed into PSI, then changed to PSII,[28] and later in 2003, it returned to being SI as a mass organization.[29]

The emergence of FPI and AUMA in Pamekasan also created tensions with NU, which is considered a moderate traditionalist group. Examples of this can be seen in the discourse on "Islam Nusantara," "Non-Muslim Leadership," and other similar issues.[30] The first group, FPI, emphasizes the importance of strict enforcement of Islamic law, while the latter, AUMA, with its moderate approach, is seen as less assertive in addressing moral and religious issues. The contestation between these two groups is often evident in the struggle for religious authority, and social influence, even in the context of local politics. FPI and AUMA frequently use certain issues, such as opposition to immorality or the construction of facilities deemed incompatible with Islamic values, as a way to strengthen their positions and differentiate themselves from NU. Meanwhile, NU, with its broader influence and network, often seeks to respond to these challenges through a more inclusive and diplomatic approach.

Based on the phenomenon and debate surrounding the strengthening of "Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" (IATM) in Madura post-reformation, this study aimed to explore several important aspects: 1) the genealogy of the development of Islamism in Indonesia; 2) the portrait of the

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[28] Nasihin, *Sarekat Islam Mencari Ideologi 1924-1945,* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2012), 80-279.

[29] *Profil Syarikat Islam Indonesia,* in https://sii.or.id/profil. Accessed 27 September 2023.

[30] Abdul Hannan and Zainuddin Syarif, "Konservatisme vs. Moderatisme: Kontestasi Pemikiran Keagamaan Kontemporer di Kalangan Ormas Islam Lokal di Madura Indonesia", in *Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan,* Volume 10 Number 2 2002. 344.

religious field in Pamekasan before the reform; 3) the reasons why FPI and AUMA emerged in Pamekasan during the Reform Era; and 4) the contestation among various Islamic groups in vying for religious authority, involving both radical and moderate Islamic groups.

Thus, this study essentially focuses on explaining the emergence of "Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims," in this case, FPI and AUMA, in Pamekasan, as well as their contestation with another Islamic group, namely NU, within the framework of Islamism as activism according to Bayat and Wictorowicz, and Bourdieu's theory of practice.

B. Research Questions

From the background of the problem outlined above, the researcher formulated the issues this research aimed to address:

1. What is the genealogy and development of Islamism in Indonesia?

2. How was the religious landscape in Pamekasan before the emergence of AUMA and FPI?

3. What is the background, habitus, identity, and network of the Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims (IATM) in Pamekasan?

4. To what extent is there contestation between traditionalist-Islamist and traditionalist-moderate groups in competing for authority in the religious field in Pamekasan?

C. Research Objectives

In general, this study intended to depict the face of Islam in Madura after the New Order, along with the issues of power, discourse, and ideology of movements that grew and developed in that period. In accordance with the research questions above, this study had the following objectives:

1. To describe the genealogy and development of Islamism in Indonesia;

2. To describe the landscape and the realm of Islam in Pamekasan before the emergence of the traditionalist-Islamist movement;

3. To depict the "Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" (IATM): background of the emergence, habitus, identity, and their network.

4. To determine the contestation between traditionalist-Islamist and traditionalist-moderate groups competing for authority in the religious field in Pamekasan.

D. Literature Review

The term Islamism is often used interchangeably with "Political Islam" and sometimes referred to as "radical Islam" or labelled as "Islamic fundamentalism" or "Islamic extremism." For instance, Noorhaidi Hasan,[31] Zachari Abuza,[32]

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[31] Noorhaidi Hassan, *Islam Politik di Dunia Kontemporer: Konsep, Genealogi, dan Teori,* (Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press, 2012), 1-29.

[32] Zachari Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia,* (London -New York: Roudledge, 2007), 13-36.

Abraham E. Fuller,[33] and Bassam Tibi[34] commonly refer to Islamism as "Political

Islam." Boseman,[35] Emmanuel Sivan,[36] and Daniel Lav[37] call it "radical Islam."

Meanwhile, Fazlur Rahman,[38] Beverley Milton,[39] Mathieu Guidere,[40] Dilip Hiro,[41]

Youssef M. Choueiri,[42] William Montgomery Watt,[43] Mansoor Moaddel,[44]

Maulana Wahiduddin Khan,[45] and Sayed Khatab[46] refer to it as "Islamic

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[33] Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), i-xvii.

[34] Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Form Jihadist to Instutional Islamism,* (London - New York: Roudlege, 2014), 1-12.

[35] Anita D. Boseman and Vann Boseman, *Radical Islam: Past, Present, and Future,* (Createspace, 2015), 97.

[36] Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Theology,* (New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 1990), 1-15.

[37] Daniel Lav, *Radical Islam and the Revival Medieval Theology,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5-7.

[38] Fazlur Rahman, *Revival and Reform In Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), 70-101.

[39] Beverley Milton and Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945,* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1-8.

[40] Mathieu Guidere, *Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism,* (Lanham - Toronto: The Scarecrow Press, 2012), 1-12.

[41] Dilip Hiro, *Holy War: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism,* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 22-26.

[42] Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundametalism: The Story of Islamists Movements,* (London - New York: Continuum, 2010), 1-6.

[43] William Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity,* (London - New York: Routledge, 2013), 140-143.

[44] Mansoor Moaddel, *The Class of Values: Islamic Fundamentalism and Liberal Nationalism,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 116-149.

[45] Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, *Islamic Fundamentalism,* (New Delhi: Goodwood, 2022), 6-32.

[46] Sayed Khatab, *Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism,* (Cairo - New York: The American University in Chairo Press, 2011), 1-19.

fundamentalism." Some researchers, like John Hughes,[47] Jack Covarrubias,[48] John Maszka,[49], and Mike Hardy,[50] prefer to call it "Islamic extremism."

Jocelyne Cesari describes Political Islam as religious nationalism that has had a colorful face in the Islamic world after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Political Islam first emerged as a modern governance technique with the adoption of the nation-state and the westernization/secularization of Islamic traditions. Political Islam takes four main forms: coercive, hegemonic, civil, and transnational or global. Political Islam is the effort of the Muslim community to implement the teachings of the Qur'an and hadith in daily life, including socio-political life.[51] For Muslims, Islam is not just a religion but a total way of life, a belief system and civilization, a comprehensive legal system, an economic system, a political system, and so on.[52]

Bassam Tibi differentiates between "Islamism" and "Islam." For him, Islamism is a political order, not a belief or faith. It is also not just political but is the sacralization of politics. Tibi explicitly stated that Islamism is a strong

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[47] John Hughes, *Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas: Lessson from Indonesia,* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 1-5.

[48] Jack Covarrubias, et.al., *The New Islamic State: Ideology, Religion and Violent Extremism in the 21st Century,* (London - New York: Routledge, 2016), 94-96.

[49] John Maszka, *Washington's Dark Secret: the Real Truth about Terrorism and Islamic Extremism,* (Nebraska: Potomac Book, 2018), 17-18.

[50] Mike Hardy, et.al., *Muslim Identity in a Turbulent Age: Islamic Extremism and Western Islamophobia,* (London - Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publisher, 2017), 1-7.

[51] Graham Fuller and Marcel Kurpershoek, *What Future of Political Islam?: Dilemmas and Opportunities for the Next Decade,* (Den Haag: WRR / Scientific Council For Government Policy, 2005), 15.

[52] M. Rusli Karim, *Dinamika Islam di Indonesia: Suatu Tinjauan Sosial dan Politik,* (Yogyakarta: Hanindita, 1985), 4. See also John L. Esposito, *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change,* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980).

religious fundamentalism in a global context.[53] Similarly, Meghnad Desai emphasized that one must separate Islam as a religion, both in theory and practice, from Islamism as an ideology. For him, Islamism triggers terrorism, radicalism, and all ideologies capable of violence. This ideology is political, aiming to win power over society. In this regard, Islamism is similar to other ideologies: Communism, Anarchism, Nationalism, and so on. Furthermore, Desai states that ideology and religion differ. They share many aspects, and as both change, each takes on different characteristics. A religion is based on its explanation of God or supernatural and irrational principles. Meanwhile, as a product of enlightenment, ideology is based on reason and systematic study of causes to provide explanations. This is the difference between religion and ideology.[54]

Wilkinson, who was more detailed than Tibi and Desai on the topic, differentiates Islam from Islamism and Islamist extremism. He divides Islam into five groups: *traditional Islam, activist Islam, ideological Islamism, non-violent Islamist extremism, and violent Islamist extremism.* First, *Traditional Islam* represents mainstream Islam, which views society as unity in diversity. Muslims' loyalty to Islam is measured by adherence to behavior permitted by Allah and by avoiding what is forbidden by Allah. The understanding of tauhid (monotheism) for them is the worship of God as a single entity without partners. Second, *activist Islam* views society as diversity-in-unity. Here, loyalty to Islam is measured by the drive to act as commanded by God and oppose behavior forbidden by God,

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[53] Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam,* (New Haven & London: Tale university Press, 2012), 1.

[54] Meghnad Desai, *Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of New Terror,* (London – New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 23-59.

including political injustice. The concept of tauhid Muslims believe in must encourage doing good and challenge injustice. Third, *ideological Islamism* has a worldview that society is polarized into Muslims and non-Muslims. Loyalty to Islam here implies the necessity of establishing a state that exclusively follows Sharia law and rejects systems outside Islam. For this group, tauhid demands the establishment of a state that exclusively follows Sharia law. Fourth, *non-violent Islamist extremism* holds the worldview that the Muslim and non-Muslim polarity is absolute. Loyalty to Islam here requires establishing an Islamic state that exclusively follows Sharia law and rejecting—as a form of faith—all people who appear non-Muslim, customs, cultures, religions, and political ideologies. Therefore, tauhid for them necessitates establishing an Islamic state that strictly and exclusively follows Sharia law and rejects all other religions and political ideologies as part of faith. Fifth, *violent Islamist extremism* is a group that holds the worldview that the Muslim and non-Muslim polarity is absolute with the consequence of fighting or killing them. For them, loyalty to Islam means establishing an Islamic state that exclusively follows Sharia law and rejects and destroys—as part of faith—all other religions and political ideologies. For them, tauhid demands establishing an Islamic state that applies Sharia law and rejecting even destroying religions and political ideologies outside Islam.[55]

The above mapping provides a picture of how diverse the interpretations of Islamic teachings are, ultimately forming a spectrum of groups within Islam. Therefore, if a researcher assumes that radicalism in Islam stems from Islamic

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[55] Matthew L.N. Wilkinson, *The Genealogy of Terror: How to Distiguish between Islam, Islamism, and Islamist Extremism,* (London - New York: Routledge, 2019), 5-6.

teachings, it may be because the research subjects are ideological Islamists, non-violent Islamist extremists, or even violent Islamist extremists. For instance, Quintan Wiktorowicz states that the Islamic radicalism movement originates from Islamic teachings about the term "kufr." Most Muslims believe that, as the Prophet said, "whoever accuses a believer of being a kafir, it is like killing him" (Sahih Bukhari 8, p. 73; 8, p. 126).[56]

Regarding the reasons for the birth of Islamism in the Islamic world, Jorg Friedrichs, has stated that global Islamism is nothing but a political project. The movement will never follow the spirit of the Cosmopolitan World Society because of fundamental differences and objectives.[57] Susan Buck-Morss, says that Islamism is not terrorism but the politicization of Islam in a postcolonial context, where contemporary Islamic politics is a discourse of opposition and debate, addressing issues of social justice, legitimate power, and ethical life in ways that challenge the hegemony of Western political and cultural norms. Buck-Morss adds that Islamist extremists are brutal and militant. On the other hand, Islamism was initially a critical discourse expressed by intellectuals and scholars toward the global public sphere. However, it is important to underline that the political

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[56] There are some hadith talk about the term "kufr", namely: (1) *If a Muslim calls another kafir [unbeliever], then if he is a kafir let it be so; otherwise, he [the caller] is himself a kafir. (saying of the Prophet from Abu Dawud, Book of Sunna, edition published by Quran Mahal, Karachi, vol. iii, p. 484), (2) No man accuses another man of being a sinner, or of being a kafir, but it reflects on him if the other is not as he called him. (saying of the Prophet from Bukhari, Book of Ethics; Book 78, ch. 44) (3) Withhold [your tongues] from those who say "There is no god but Allah"— do not call them kafir. Whoever calls a reciter of "There is no god but Allah" a kafir, is nearer to being a kafir himself. (reported from Ibn Umar)...*See Quintant Wictorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam", in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 75-97.

[57] Jorg Freidrich, "Global Islamism and World Society", in *Telos,* Number 163 Summer 2013, 7-38.

impact of Islamism is far from monolithic; it can be reactionary, conservative, democratic, revolutionary, and conspiratorial—depending on the specific and fluctuating national and international milieu in which Islamism has developed over generations.[58]

In line with the above idea, according to Asef Bayat, Islamism is a term used as a language of self-affirmation by the marginalized Muslim middle class through economic, political, or cultural processes in society. For Bayat, Islamism is a way for society to say no to modern capitalism and utopian socialism, which they believe have failed, and propose the moral language of religion as an answer to these problems. In more definite terms, Islam as a political system is a substitute for systems deemed to have failed. For example, the Muslim middle class rejects those "outside" themselves, namely: national elites, secular governments, and Western allies. They reject "Western cultural domination," its political rationality, moral sensitivity, and normative symbols, although they also use these features on many occasions, such as ties, food, education, and technology.[59]

Bobby S. Sayyid presents a different view from Bayat. Sayyid interprets Islamism as an expression of identity, where it is used politically to create an alternative narrative to the dominance of the "modernization project" influenced by colonialism and authoritarianism in Muslim countries. Referring to post-structuralist theories such as "hegemonic discourse" and "key signifiers,"

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[58] Susan Buck-Morss, *Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left,* (New York: Verso, 2003), 1-5.

[59] Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn,* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 6-7.

Sayyid analyzes Islamism as a challenge to the existing construction of Islam in modernity, particularly from a Eurocentric perspective.[60] According to Sayyid, Islamism is a counter-discourse to Eurocentric modernity. Sayyid outlines five aspects that make the Islamist movement possible, namely: failure of nationalist secular elites, lack of political participation, the crisis of the petty bourgeoisie, petrodollars and uneven economic development, and the effect of cultural erosion.[61]

The ideas and movements of Islamism spread throughout the Islamic world, such as through Egypt, Iran, and so on. The Islamist movement spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun) is a socio-political movement in Egypt. Roel Meijer sees the "Muslim Brotherhood" as a political movement that has undergone significant changes. If some consider that the birth of this organization was based on various acts of terrorism, they must concede that they have recently begun to moderate. However, as a political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood upholds the principle of "Islam as a Total System." The Muslim Brotherhood faces ambiguity in applying its maxims. This ambiguity can be seen from the views of Hasan Al-Banna as the main ideologue. At this point, Meijer writes:

> "Hasan Al-Banna has made different, often contradictory, remarks on the Constitution and democracy. On the one hand, he claimed that the Constitution of 1923 was not un-Islamic as long as it did not oppose the shari'a and an Islamic system of rule. He praised the modern democratic notion that the ruler should represent 'the power of the people' and 'respect its will'. He also believed that a constitution

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[60] Bobby S. Sayyid, *Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism,* (London & New York: Zed Books, 1997), 155-161.

[61] Booby S. Sayyid, *Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrim…,* 19-22.

should 'define the power and duties of the ruler and his relations with the ruled'. He even accepted the possibility that pluralism could emerge after gaining independence. On the other hand, he condemned the system and actively worked to undermine it by rejecting the concept of hizbiyya, which in his view had the negative connotation of party politics and divisiveness (fitna)…"[62]

Meijer describes how, initially, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) was a political movement as a 'response' or 'reaction' to British colonialism. That approach model has been abandoned over time; however, the Brotherhood still experiences unrest as a political movement.

One Islamist movement that has drawn significant global attention is the Iranian Revolution of 1979. John L. Esposito, in "The Iranian Revolution Ten Years Later: What has been its Global Impact?" states that the most comprehensive way the Iranian revolution has influenced the Muslim world is at the level of ideas and ideology. For example, in Indonesia, Shariati's writings are widely circulated, and influential journals like "Prisma" and "Dakwah" have given considerable attention to his thoughts.[63]

Ervand Abrahamian, in "Why The Islamic Republic Has Survived," describes why the Islamic Republic of Iran has endured to this day. Abrahamian begins his essay with the prejudice of those who predicted that the Islamic Republic of Iran would not last long, with this prejudice beginning even from its inception. However, these predictions have been proven wrong, as the country has survived for thirty years since the movement was declared. According to Abrahamiam, four

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[62] Roel Meijer and Edwin Bakker (ed.), *Muslim Brotherhood in Europe,* Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013. 295-317.

[63] John L. Esposito & James Piscatori, *the Iranian Revolution Then Years later: What has been its Global Impact?,* (Washington DC: Middle East Istitute, 1989), 8-9.

aspects explain why the Islamic Republic of Iran has endured: it eliminated terror, the occurrence of the Iran-Iraq war, abundant oil resources, and Shia Islam. Nonetheless, the best explanation for the longevity of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not religion but economic and social populism.[64]

In Indonesia, Islamist movements have also emerged and developed. According to Syaiful Arif in *"Deradikalisasi Islam: Paradigma dan Strategi Islam Kultural,"* Islamism is a form of radical Islam or political Islam because its primary goal is to establish an Islamic state, often incorporating violent strategies in their da'wah (preaching).[65] In the early activism period, Islamic activism was represented by Sarekat Islam (SI) around 1911, which was spearheaded by Samanhoedi, Abdoel Moeis, and Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, among others.[66] During the independence era, a movement called Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo emerged.[67] Furthermore during the reform era, other groups appeared, some of which were genealogically linked to pre-independence Islamic activism movements, such as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Jamaah Ansorut Tauhid (JAT), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Jamaah Ansoru ad Daulah (JAD), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad,[68]

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[64] Ervand Abrahamian, "Why the Islamic Republic Has Survived", in https://www.merip.org/mer/mer250/why-islamic-republic-has-survived, 12 November 2018.

[65] Syaiful Arif, *Deradikalisasi Islam: Paradigma dan Strategi Islam Kultural,* (Depok: Penerbit Koekoesan, 2010), 3-4.

[66] Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942,* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), 114-169.

[67] Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan: Islamisme dan Diskursus Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru,* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009), 166-167. See also Abdul Jamil Wahab, *Islam Radikal dan Moderat,* (Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia, 2019), 43-49.

[68] There's an interesting study on Laskar Jihad which was witten by Prof. Noorhaedi Hasan. The study analyses the intellectual and political history of Laskar Jihad, the most spectacular

HAMMAS, and others.[69] The emergence of these Islamic social organizations has made the national political stage increasingly crowded with Islamic aspirations, such as demands to return to the Jakarta Charter, shari'atization, and rejection of a female president.[70]

Currently, within the local context, the wave of Islamism is also growing in Madura. Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, in his dissertation *"Pergeseran Islam Madura (Perjumpaan Islam Tradisional dan Islamisme di Bangkalan, Madura, Pasca Reformasi),"*[71] as well as in his articles *"Radicalizing Indonesian Moderate Islam from Within: The NU-FPI Relationship in Bangkalan"*[72] and *"Radicalising the Traditionalists: A Contemporary Dynamic of Islamic Traditionalism in Madura-Indonesia,"*[73] assumes that the fall of the New Order regime, marked by democratic openness, drove the birth of a new hybrid between traditionalists and Islamists, particularly in Bangkalan. This movement was initiated by Kiais who have become key figures in the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front). Another researcher, Mukhammad Zamzami, who wrote *"Kontribusi Forum Kiai Muda*

Muslim paramilitary group that emerged in Indonesia in the aftermath of the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998. See Noorhaedi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia,* ISIM, Leiden / University of Utrecht, Utrecht, 2005.

[69] Abdul Jamil Wahab, *Islam Radikal dan Moderat,* (Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia, 2019), 65-140.

[70] Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia,* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002).

[71] Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, *Pergeseran Islam Madura (Perjumpaan Islam Tradisional dan Islamisme di Bangkalan, Madura, Pasca Reformasi),* (Surabaya: Pasca UIN Sunan Ampel, 2015).

[72] Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, "Radicalizing Indonesian Moderate Islam from Within: The NU-FPI Relationship in Bangkalan" in *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013. 71-95.

[73] Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, "Radicalising the Traditionalists: A Contemporary Dynamic of Islamic Traditionalism in Madura-Indonesia", in *Epistemé,* Vol. 15, No. 1, June 2020, 1-21.

(FKM) Madura dalam Membangun Islamisme di Pamekasan,"[74] and Abdul 'Ala who, along with other researchers, wrote the article *"Islamism in Madura: From Religious Symbolism to Authoritarianism,"*[75] have captured the Islamist movement in Pamekasan commanded by AUMA, FKM, and BASSRA.

There are some notes I have made regarding the research outlined above. First, Hamdi's research reveals a hybrid of two Islamic models—traditionalism and Islamism—that are usually considered incompatible and unlikely to merge into a movement pattern. This assumption can be understood because both Hamdi and Zamzami are trapped in the thesis that traditionalism is always identical to NU (Nahdlatul Ulama). However, in the context of political Islam in Pamekasan—that from long before the independence era, Islamic traditionalism intimately intersected with Islamism through SI (Sarekat Islam). This has led this present study to explain the genealogy of radical Islamist movements in Madura, especially in Pamekasan, which has much stronger ideological roots in SI than the other three regencies in Madura: Bangkalan, Sampang, and Sumenep. Second, Zamzami and 'Ala's research related to the post-reformation Islamist movements of AUMA has not yet shown the ideological connection of these local organizations with SI, which is their ideological root. Additionally, these studies do not place Islamism as Islamic activism as a "practice"—in Bourdieu's terms—that is an accumulation of "habitus," "capital," and "field" where agents

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[74] Mukhammad Zamzami, "Kontribusi Forum Kiai Muda (FKM) Madura dalam Membangun Islamisme di Pamekasan", in *Proceeding of the International Conference on Mulism Society and Thought,* Surabaya-Indonesia, 2-3 October 2017. 651-664.

[75] Abdul 'Ala et.al., "Islamism in Madura: From Religious Symbolism to Authoritarianism", in *Journal of Indonesian Islam,* Volume 12, Number 02, December 2018. 159-194.

compete with one another. Based on the above academic reasoning, this study presents a different perspective on the phenomenon I refer to as the birth of the Islamist activism of traditionalist Muslims in Madura.

E. Theoretical Framework

In this theoretical framework, the issues of authority, Islamism as activism, and practical theory are presented as the basis for understanding the emergence of FPI and AUMA in Pamekasan, which are competing for authority with other Islamic groups in the religious field.

1. Authority

According to Weber, authority is "imperative control" or domination. Authority is a form of legitimate domination and comes in three forms: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal.[76] Traditional authority is rooted in long-standing beliefs and customs. Charismatic authority is derived from the charisma possessed by an individual. Rational-legal authority, on the other hand, is based on laws and regulations. According to Weber, these various types of authority play a crucial role in multiple organizations and societies, shaping power dynamics and leadership structures.

In the context of religion, authority operates in realms of power built upon routines (traditional) and the charisma possessed by individuals. In the context of what is called the "foundational past" that has been lost, unlike Weber,

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[76] Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 15-17. See also Max Weber, *The Theory Social and Economic Organization,* (Illinois: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1947), 153-154. See also T.H. Rigby, *Weber's Typology of Authority: A Difficulty and Some Suggestions*, North Dakota State University Library,on May 29, 2015. 1-15.

Ismail Fajrie Alatas follows Hannah Arendt's view. He states that authority does not depend on common sense or the power of the ruler, but on the recognition of hierarchy considered valid by all parties involved. Therefore, someone considered authoritative is perceived to have a prophetic connection to a past recognized by others. Thus, authority is a hierarchical relationship linking a group of people to a past they recognize as foundational, thereby giving those with authority the capacity to transmit and transform that past into an example for the present.[77]

Building on the perspective above, Muhammad Qasim Zaman views religious authority (in the context of Islam) as intricate and multifaceted, engaging a wide range of actors, institutions, and interconnected discourses. This authority extends beyond traditional ulama figures to include Islamic educational institutions, religious organizations, and state mechanisms that oversee religious life.[78]

This present research found that the contestation for authority not only involves Islamic groups such as FPI and AUMA, but also includes the kiai as important figures in the social life of the Pamekasan community. It even extends to the educational institutions owned by these actors, reflecting the complexity of the competition for authority in religious, political, economic, and cultural spheres.

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[77] Ismail Fajri Alatas, *What is Religious Authority? Cultivating Islamic Communities in Indonesia,* (Pricetown & Oxford: Pricetown University Press, 2021), 4.

[78] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama and Contestations on Religious Authority," in *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates,* 2009, 206-36.

2. Islamism as "Imagined Loyalty"

According to Asef Bayat, the internal dynamics of Islamist movements tend to be fluid, fragmented, and differentiated, yet these fragments remain connected within a social movement. Social movements generally require unity of purpose and action, but in the context of Islamist movements, a common purpose often manifests through what is called "imagined solidarity," where actors imagine shared interests and values despite coming from different backgrounds. Differences within social movements can arise from two main sources: differing interests and differing interpretations. Interests, whether objective or subjective, and perceptions shaped by various individual experiences, play a significant role in fueling disputes. However, despite these differences, social movements can often unite various "partially shared" interests to achieve a common goal. In short, the concept of "imagined solidarity" among heterogeneous social movement actors is similar to how citizens of a nation imagine their community as a nation. This solidarity forms when different actors reach a consensus through the subjective construction of shared interests and values. However, this imagination is not uniform; just as various groups imagine a nation differently, social movement actors also imagine common goals in different ways. As a result, imagined solidarity becomes a negotiated and contested entity.[79]

Bayat adds that leadership within social movements often plays a crucial role in framing the message and building consensus through deliberate

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[79] Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory", in *Third World Quaterly,* Vol. 26 No. 6 (2005), 901-903.

mobilization strategies, such as frame alignment and coalition building. Examples include Islamist movements in Egypt and Iran and the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, which demonstrate how solidarity can form despite differences among constituents. Under authoritarian conditions, such as during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, imagined solidarity tends to emerge more strongly due to political repression and limitations on effective communication. Conversely, under democratic conditions, like the Iranian Reform Movement in the late 1990s, differences and debates more easily emerged due to the availability of means for the open exchange of ideas. This emphasizes that while imaginative solidarity can facilitate unity under repressive conditions, democratic conditions tend to reveal differences and fragmentation within social movements.[80]

In the context of local Islamist movements in Pamekasan, "imagined Loyalty" is built upon the shared desire of FPI and AUMA supporters to implement Islamic values in Pamekasan through local regulations. Moreover, at the time these two groups emerged, the people of Pamekasan were eager to present themselves as an Islamic community evident through the rise of the "Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Islami" (Gerbang Salam). The framing of these Islamist groups' activism is shaped by local kiais, whose roles are crucial for the local community; these local figures themselves compete for religious authority in Pamekasan.

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[80] Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement.., 903-905.

3. Islamic Activism in Social Theory

According to Wictorowicz, combining Islamic activism studies with social theory has become crucial, particularly since the late twentieth century. Activism studies have provided new ways to test social movement theories, prompting scholars to reassess their views on conflicts involving Islamic movements.[81] David Snow and Susan Marshall were early advocates for integrating Islamic activism into social movement theory, highlighting how Islamic movements utilize factors like structural tensions, mobilization of ideologies, and resource mobilization to resist cultural imperialism.[82]

Researchers now view religious movements as a subset of social movements, emphasizing that religious movements are part of broader social movements. Rhys H. Williams suggests that social movements arise among marginalized groups seeking to influence societal systems using unconventional methods.[83] Sidney Tarrow further compares Islamist movements to other social movements, emphasizing their contentious nature and collective action.[84]

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[81] Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach,* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 5.

[82] David A. Snow and Susan Marshall, "Cultural Imperialism, Social Movements, and The Islamic Revival", in *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change,* Vol.7, 1984. Greenwich, Corm: JAI Press, 131-152.

[83] Rhys H. Williams, "Movement Dynamics and Social Change: Transforming Fundamentalist Ideology and Organizations" in *Accounting Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of Movements,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 786.

[84] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)*,* 6-11.

Quintan Wictorowicz and colleagues have firmly positioned Islamic activism within social movement theory, defining it as the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes, encompassing various forms of activism from da'wah to terrorism.[85]

Initially, Islamic social movements were analyzed through a socio-psychological lens, attributing them to psychological discomfort from failed modernization, socio-economic issues, and political failures like the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This approach, supported by scholars such as Waltz[86] and Dekmejian,[87] was later found inadequate for explaining the complexities of Islamic activism. This limitation led to the development of Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), which views social movements as rational, organized actions dependent on managing resources like time, money, and legitimacy. RMT focuses on strategic and political factors rather than psychological aspects, highlighting the role of resources like mosques, NGOs,

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[85] Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism…,* 2-3.

[86] In Susan Waltz's research in Tunisia related to the Muslim protest movement consolidated in the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) or Al-Ittihad Al-Islami. This movement was born as an expression of dissatisfaction with the practiced faith. In Tunisia, in practice, Islam has been subject to a secular government and the role of Islam in society has been progressively curtailed. The constitution had declared Islam as the state religion in Tunisia, but since independence in 1956, sharia courts have been abolished, the state has regulated the text of sermons to be read in mosques, the family law or "The Code of Personal Status" is based on a liberal interpretation of Islamic law, and the education sector has been secularized with the establishment of a faculty of theology replacing the "Zaytuna Mosque" as the center of education. According to Waltz, there are three factors driving the MTI protest movement in Tunisia, namely: economic, political, and psycho-social. However, psycho-social alienation was the most fundamental factor in the birth of the Muslim social movement in the country. See Susan Waltz, "Islamist Appeal in Tunisia", in *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 40, No. 4 (Autumn, 1986), 651-670.

[87] R. Hrair Dekmejian, in his research, views that revivalism in Islam is a product of the multi-dimensional crisis of the Islamic world. Fundamentalism, especially in the Arab world, is not only caused by a socio-political or economic crises, but more so by a crisis of spiritual and moral authority. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World,* (New York: Syracus University Press, 1995). 1-7.

and political parties in mobilizing activism. The Political Process Approach (PPA) further emphasizes that social movements are influenced by political opportunities and institutional resources, explaining why some movements succeed while others do not. Finally, the New Social Movement (NSM) approach shifts away from Marxist views of class struggle, focusing instead on cultural and symbolic changes. NSM highlights the importance of cultural domains and collective or individual efforts to drive change.[88]

In the context of this study, the activism of FPI and AUMA carries a psychological nuance for their supporters, although this may be a common symptom that is not only related to the emergence of Islamic groups due to the failure of the Suharto regime, which eventually collapsed in 1998. Mosques and pesantren serve as crucial resources for FPI and AUMA in Pamekasan to realize their activist agendas, as the key actors are the kiais. Furthermore, the political aspirations of FPI and AUMA members are largely channeled through the "Partai Persatuan Pembangunan" (PPP). In essence, the aspects mentioned above can also be encompassed by what Bayat refers to as "imagined loyalty," which encapsulates all possible definitions of Islamic activism.

4. **Bourdieusian Perspective: Movement as Practice**

In the previous sub-chapter, Islamic activism was presented within the framework of social theory or social movements. This sub-chapter presents the possibility of Islamic activism as a social movement within the framework of the Bourdieusian theory of practice. In short, social movements are interpreted

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[88] Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism…,* 2-3.

as social practice *a la* Pierre Bourdieu. Many Bourdieusians discuss the possibility of using Bourdieu's theories to analyze social movements and institutions. This means that the concepts of habitus, capital, and field are used as tools to explore the phenomenon of specific social movements and institutions. Among them are Crossley, Hanna-MariHusu, Starrett, Haluza-Delay, Diani, Emirbayer-Johnson, Swartz, Goldberg, Ancelovici, Schmitt, Harvey, Edward, and so on.[89]

Broadly speaking, Bourdieu formulates his theory of practice as follows: [(habitus)x(capital)] + field = practice.[90] Some Bourdieusians equate "practice"

[89] Hanna Mari Husu, "Bourdieu and Social Movements: Considering Identity Movements in Terms of Field, Capital and Habitus." *Journal of Social, Cultural adn Political Protest*, 2012, 1-16, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.704174. Accessed 3 December 2020. See Gregory Starrett, "The Hexis of Interpretation: Islam and the Body in the Egyptian Popular School." *American Ethnologist*, vol. 22, no. 4, Nov., 1995, 953-969, http://www.jstor.org/stable/646394. Accessed 15 June 2020. See Randolph Haluza-Delay, "A Theory of Practice for Social Movements: Environmentalism and Ecological Habitus." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 2, 1 June 2008, 205–218, https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.13.2.k5015r82j2q35148. Accessed 14 June 2020. See Mario Diani, "Social Movements and Social Capital: A Network Perspective on Movement Outcomes." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1997, 129–147, https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.2.2.w6087622383h4341. Accessed 10 June 2020. See Mustafa Emirbayer and Victoria Johnson. "Bourdieu and Organizational Analysis." *Theory and Society*, vol. 37, no. 1, February 2008, 1-44, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40211023. Accessed 10 June 2020. See David L. Swartz, "Bringing Bourdieu's Master Concepts into Organizational Analysis." *Theory and Society*, vol. 37, 2008, 45-52, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-007-9053-x. Accessed 7 June 2020. See Mustafa Emirbayer, and Chad Alan Goldberg. "Pragmatism, Bourdieu, and Collective Emotions in Contentious Politics." *Theory and Society*, vol. 34, no. 5/6, December 2005, 469-518, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4501735. Accessed 21 September 2020. See Marcos Ancelovici, "Bourdieu in Movement: Toward a Field." *Social Movement Studies*, vol. 20, 26 Jun 2019, 155-173, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2019.1637727. Accessed 20 June 2020. See Lars Schmitt, "Bourdieu Meets Social Movement Lars Schmitt." *Social Theory and Social Movements: Mutual* Inspirations, edited by Jochen Roose and Hella Dietz, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2016, 57-74. See Charles Harvey et al., "Bourdieu, Strategy and the Field of Power." *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, vol. 73, December 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2020.102199. Accessed 10 May 2021. See also Bob Edwards, *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. Edited by Donatella Della Porta, et al., Wiley, 2013. Accessed 23 November 2023.

[90] Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984. 101. See also Karl Maton, "Habitus." in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, edited by Michael Grenfell, Acumen, 2008, 49-65. See also Loic J.D. Wacquant, "Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu." *Sociological Theory*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring), 1989, 26-63, http://www.jstor.org/stable/202061. Accessed 23 May 2021.

with "movement." [91] This sub-chapter explains these critical theories as follows:

a. Habitus

The discussion about "habit" actually has a long history. Genealogically, this issue was first discussed by Aristotle in his work Nichomacean Ethic. According to Aristoletes, good character is the result of "habituation" (ethos), or repetitive actions called "habit".[92] The word "habitus" in Bourdieu's dictionary of thought has a slightly different meaning. The word is used by Bourdieu when he wants to explain social practice, and his attention is focused on individuals' actions in everyday life. For him, social life cannot be simplified as a collection of individual habits. Social practice is also not merely individual decision-making on the one hand, nor is it determined by supra-individual 'structures', on the other. The word "habitus" is raised as a bridge between subjectivism and objectivism, which seem extreme in viewing social practice.[93]

Regarding the definition of Habitus, he said: *"What I call the habitus, by which I mean dispositions that are permanent lifestyles resulting from learning, training and incorporation - for the moment I shall ask you to be satisfied with this definition."*[94] He also said; *"the habitus - as a system of*

[91] Nick Crossley, *Making Sense of Social...,* 182.

[92] Tom Sparrow, and Adam Hutchinson, editors. *A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu*, (New York, Lexington Books, 2013), 19.

[93] Richard Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu*, (London & New York, Routledge, 1992), 45.

[94] Pierre Bourdieu, *Habitus and Field: General Sociology, Volume 2 (1982-1983)*. Edited by Patrick Champagne, et al., translated by Peter Collier, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2020), 26.

schemas of perception, appreciation, and action produced by the socially instituted body."[95] So, habitus is formed by a person's past and present environment, such as family upbringing and educational experiences. Habitus also shapes a person's present and future patterns of action. Habitus includes a system of dispositions that shape a person's perceptions, appreciations, and actions.[96] In this regard, Bourdieu emphasized:

> "To do this, one has to return to practice, the site of the dialectic of the 'opus operatum' and the 'modus operandi'; of the objectified products and the incorporated products of historical practice; of structures and habitus…the conditioning's associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.[97]

So, habitus is a structure that is formed by existential conditions and creates practices, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, and so on related to the habitus itself. Another thing is that habitus is interpreted as a property owned by social agents - whether individuals, groups, or institutions - which can be summarized as *"a structure and structuring structure"*.[98] It should also be noted that habitus does not work alone in creating social praxis. But

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[95] Pierre Bourdieu, *Habitus and Field…,* 344.

[96] Karl Maton, "Habitus", in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key…,* 51.

[97] Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, (Standford, Stanford University Press, 1990), 52-53.

[98] Karl Maton, "Habitus." in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key…,* 51.

it is an *"unconscious relationship"* between habitus and field. Related to this, he said:

> "I want to re-emphasize that the principle of philosophical (or literary) strategies is not cynical calculation, the conscious pursuit of maximum specific profit, but an unconscious relationship between a habitus and a field. The strategies I am talking about are actions objectively oriented towards goals that may not be the goals subjectively pursued. And the theory of the habitus is aimed at establishing the possibility of a science of practices that escapes the forced choice between finalism and mechanism."[99]

b. Capital

Bourdieu's definition of "capital" is broader than the usual notions of economics and monetary exchange. Capital is all of a person's asset ownership, whether material or embodied. Bourdieu states:

> Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its "incorporated," embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor.[100]

Capital itself can take four forms within the field. First, economic capital is capital which can be converted directly into money and institutionalized in the form of property ownership (money and property). Second, cultural capital is capital which can be converted under certain conditions into economic capital and can also be institutionalized through educational qualifications (knowledge, skills, educational qualifications). Third, social capital is created by social connections that can be converted in certain situations into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the

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[99] Pierre *Bourdieu*, *Sociology in Question*, (London, SAGE Publications, 1993), 76.

[100] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital", in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Edited by John G. Richardson, (New York, Greenwood Press, 1986), 241.

form of rank (connections and membership of a group). Fourth is symbolic capital. This is all capital whether economic, cultural, or social that, when it gets recognized, becomes symbolic capital. In short, symbolic capital is the prestige, reputation, and respect that a person has that is recognized by society.[101]

Cultural capital[102] can take three forms: the embodied state, for example, in the form of long dispositions of mind and body; the objectified state, in the form of cultural objects such as pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, and so on; and the institutionalized state, in the form of educational qualifications.

It should be noted that the above explanation of the different types of capital must be linked to the habitus theory explained earlier and the field theory, which will be explained further.

Figure 1.1. Based on Bourdieu's The Forms of Capital (1986).

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[101] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital"..., 243.

[102] The idea of cultural capital was first put forward by Bourdieu, when he discovered in research he conducted that there were inequalities in the school achievements of children from different social classes. Bourdieu found that children from certain social classes find it relatively easier to succeed because they have unique advantages in the academic market due to the distribution of cultural capital owned by each social class.

c. **Field**

The field in French uses the term "La Champ." [103] Bourdieu himself defines the field as follows:

> "I define a field as a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions that are defined objectively, in their existence and in the determinations they impose on their occupants, agents, or institutions, by their present and potential situation (site) in the distributional structure of the species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific advantages at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relations to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.)." Each field presupposes, and produces by its function, the belief in the value of the stakes it offers. Each field presupposes, and generates by its functioning, a belief in the value of the stakes it offers."[104]

The field is an arena of power in which there are struggles for resources and efforts to gain specific access close to the power hierarchy. The pattern of agents' relationships with their positions in the field can take the form of domination, subordination homology, and so on, which can change over time. Changes in the network or configuration also depend on the rules of the field itself. The agents' strategies rely on their position in the field, and, of course, their actions are also aimed at the most favorable interests for their products.

Like a football field, it is a field with certain boundaries where a game is played. The players must have positions arranged with specific rules to play the game. Players can only take action based on the rules of the game itself. The physical condition of the soccer field also affects the possibilities

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[103] Patricia Thomson, "Field", in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key…,* 68.

[104] Wacquant, Loic J.D. "Towards a Reflexive Sociology…, 39.

that can be carried out by the players playing - for example, the wet or dry situation of the field.[105]

Thus, Bourdieu sees social life as a game. The social field contains positions occupied by social agents - individuals or groups - that are limited by the field and its rules. The game in the social space or field is competitive, with various social agents using strategies to achieve, maintain, and improve their positions. The accumulation of capital is at stake in the field - either the process within the field or the product of the field itself. The players who can use their capital well have the advantage of accumulating their capital and appearing more successful than others.

The analogy above simply describes the field and its relationship with capital. Bourdieu states:

> "A capital does not exist and function but in relation to a field: it confers a power over the field, over the materialized or embodied instruments of production or reproduction whose distribution constitutes the very structure of the field, and over the regularities and the rules which define the ordinary functioning of the field, and thereby over the profits engendered in this field.[106]

He also emphasized:

> "The field of power is defined as the space of the positions from which power is exerted over capital in its different species. One must indeed distinguish between the mere possession of (say, economic or cultural) capital and the possession of a capital conferring power over capital, meaning over the very structure of a field, and

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[105] Patricia Thomson, "Field", in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key...,* 68.

[106] Loic J.D. Wacquant, "Towards a Reflexive Sociology…, 39-40.

therefore, among other fields, over profit rates, and by extension, overall ordinary holders of capital."[107]

So, what is the relationship between habitus and field? Bourdieu thinks that habitus and field influence each other. He said:…*" The field structures the habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity…the habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world.*[108]

Habitus is how a person acts, feels, thinks, and exists. It guides how one navigates their history, how that history is brought to the present situation, and how one then makes certain decisions and not others. Habitus is "an ongoing and active process" - one is engaged in a continuous process of creating history, but not entirely under one's preconditions. When a person lives in a moment, it is the result of countless events in the past that eventually shape their path more accurately, perhaps, their personhood. The person most certainly would have faced various crossroads, choices of actions, and beliefs. Of course, the array of choices depends on the person's current context and position in a particular social sphere, and even at the same time, the available choices- both visible and invisible to the person- are the result of a long past journey. In other words, one's experiences have helped shape one's vision. Ultimately, a person's choices depend on the options available (the conditions of a particular field), the array of options

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[107] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Field of Power and the Division of the Labour of Domination", in *Researching Elites and Power: Theory, Methods, Analyses*. Edited by Francois Denord, et al., (New York, Springer International Publishing, 2020), 34.

[108] Loic J.D. Wacquant, "Towards a Reflexive Sociology…, 44.

visible to him, and his disposition (habitus), which is the experience embedded in his life journey. Ultimately, those choices will shape the possibility of the person's future; each choice involves previous decisions and guides the person on a distinctive path that further shapes the understanding of himself and the world. The structure of a person's habitus is not a "ready-made device" but "develops" - it is durable and can change, and can even be impermanent. At the same time, the social field, through which the person goes - the contextual field - also develops according to its logic - based on the contribution of the person's habitus as well. The relationship between habitus and field shapes each other in social practice. That is, to understand social practice, one must understand the fields that develop where a social agent is situated and the social agent's habitus that contributes to his social field as social practice.[109]

From the above explanation, the so-called social practice can be articulated in the following manner:


Figure 1.2. Social Practice (Movement) based on Bourdieu's theory

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[109] Karl Maton, "Habitus." in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key…,* 52-53.

5. Islamic Activism as Religious Practice

The previous sub-chapter explains the possibility of examining the Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims (IATM) as a social movement within Pierre Bourdieu's theory of praxis. Since IATM is a religion-based social movement, the research here shows that IATM's social practices are understood as religious social practices. Therefore, Bourdieu's formula related to the theory of praxis has been modified as follows: (Religious Habitus x Religious Capital) + Religious Field: Religious Practice.

Religious habitus is a person or agent's most evident specific religious dimension. It is a subjective principle that determines and influences a person's particular religious interests, tastes, dispositions, and needs, how he feels and responds to using religious symbols and engaging in his rituals, his reactions to religious leaders, what forms of religious capital he considers worthy of achievement, and how he should move in the religious field in general.[110] So, religious habitus is how religion offers a habitus to a person, whether it is instilled from childhood to adulthood or a new habit adopted by a person or agent. But both of these indicate a distinctive way of life that comes from certain religious teachings.[111]

Religious capital, on the other hand, is the capital that an agent or person strives for in the religious field, such as legitimacy in the social order,

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[110] Terry Rey, *Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy,* (London - New York: Routledge, 2007), 92.

[111] Stepen Grusendorf, "Bourdieu's Field, Capital, and Habitus in Religion", in *Journal for the Sociological Integration of Religion and Society,* Volume 6 No.1 Spring 2016, 1-13. Accessed 7 June 2020.

economic or power boosts, and the meaning that religion gives to a person or agent's life.[112] "Religious capital" is also called "spiritual capital," which is closely related to "symbolic capital" - capital that an agent acquires in or through the religious field.[113] In this regard, Bourdieu states:

> "This religious capital is the generative basis of all thoughts, perceptions, and actions conforming with the norms of religious representation of the natural and supernatural world. It is objectively adjusted to the principles of a political vision of the social world—and to them only. On the one hand, religious capital depends, at a given moment in time, on the state of the structure of objective relations between *religious demand* (i.e., the religious interests of various groups or classes of laity) and *religious supply* (i.e., religious services, whether orthodox or heretical) that the various claimants are brought to produce and offer under their position in the structure of relations of religious power, that is the as the function of their religious capital."[114]

The "religious field" is a field where several agents and institutions compete for religious capital. Competition for capital - whether material or immaterial - is the cause of change. Religious capital is a scarce commodity because agents and institutions contest it in the religious field.[115] At this point, social life is understood as an "arena of struggle," with each agent linked in constant competition. Some agents are dominant, while others are subordinated or marginalized in the field. It should be noted that the position of agents or actors in the field is not entirely deterministic, but rather influenced by social

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[112] Terry Rey, *Bourdieu on Religion…,* 94-95.

[113] Stepen Grusendorf, "Bourdieu's Field, Capital…, 3-7.

[114] Pierre Bourdieu, "Genesis and Structure of the Religious", in *Comparative Social Research, Volume 13,* (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1991), 22.

[115] Stepen Grusendorf, "Bourdieu's Field, Capital…, 1-3. See also Terry Rey, *Bourdieu on Religion…,* 44-46.

context, social class, and so on. However, the position of the agent or actor can change with the development of the agent or actor's habitus, where the habitus shapes reality. In trying to improve or stabilize their position, an actor or agent uses various resources to change their position again, including using resources from other fields, such as political and economic power, to improve their religious status or vice versa.[116]

From the above description, religious practice/movement can described as follows:

Figure 1.3. Religious Practice/Movement

Furthermore, examining the IATM in the context of Bourdieu's theory of practice requires conducting a field analysis, which includes three critical

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[116] Sita Steckel, "Historicizing the Religious Field: Adapting Theories of the Religious Field for the Study of Medieval and Early Modern Europe", in *Church History and Religious Culture 99* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 337-340. See also Terry Rey, *Bourdieu on Religion…,* 75-78. Stepen Grusendorf, "Bourdieu's Field, Capital…, 1-3.

steps: 1) the position of the field, which is faced with the field of power; 2) the position of agents or actors in the field; and 3) the habitus of the agent or actor that determines changes in reality or the field.[117] In this research, FPI and AUMA as organizations are positioned in their contestation with other groups, which also reflects the contestation among the kiais who serve as key figures in the religious sphere in Pamekasan.

This concludes the discussion of Islamism, Islamic activism within the social theory framework, and Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice as part of the *"New Social Movement theory."*

F. Research Method

This research combines theoretical and empirical investigation. I gathered sources for the investigation from bibliographies and field studies. The theoretical investigation focused on studying Islamism in Pamekasan, including books, theses, journals, articles, opinions, and other sources specifically related to the two organizations of FPI and AUMA. The empirical data were obtained from interviews, observations, documentation, recordings, and other related items to these two organizations.

The empirical investigation I conducted was ethnographic in nature.[118] Ethnography involves the direct experience and examination of a specific social or

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[117] Wacquant, Loic J.D. "Towards a Reflexive Sociology…, 40.

[118] James P. Spradley, *The Ethnographic Interview,* (Illinois: Waveland Press, 2016), 1-222. See also J.W. Creswell, *Educational Research, Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative andQualitative Research,* (New Jersey: Pearson Education Merrill Prentice Hall, 2008), 464.

cultural environment, usually conducted through participant observation. This method investigates and describes various communities, environments, and cultural settings. Historically, ethnography began in the early 19th century within anthropology, and was primarily focused on studying non-industrialized or so-called "primitive" cultures, often with an objective, distant approach. This method was marked by detailed and systematic observation, although it was often shaped by the personal biases of the researchers. There have been three key elements in the development of ethnography, namely: (1) Malinowski's Social Anthropology: This pioneered a more involved form of ethnography, highlighting the importance of understanding the perspective of the studied group and promoting a holistic approach to social anthropology; (2) The Chicago School: this played a significant role in advancing ethnography within sociology, focusing on fieldwork and the analysis of everyday life and interactions, particularly in urban settings; (3) Virtual Ethnography: this is the advent of the internet that has led to new forms of ethnography, such as digital, online, and virtual ethnography. These methods adapt traditional ethnographic practices to online settings, allowing researchers to study virtual communities and digital interactions. Meanwhile, the Philosophical Paradigms in Ethnography are: (1) Positivist Ethnography, which emphasizes objectivity and researcher detachment, aiming to discover generalizable laws governing human behavior; (2) Post-modern or Constructivist Ethnography, which stresses the subjective nature of reality, focusing on the perspectives of participants and rejecting the notion of universal truths; and (3) Critical Ethnography, which is similar to post-modern approaches

but also seeks to address and challenge power structures and social injustices within the studied cultures.[119]

In this research, the researcher's tendency in the ethnographic approach leans more towards postmodern or constructivist ethnography. The postmodern approach emphasizes that reality is shaped through interactions, perceptions, and people's experiences within the social world. This indicates that the world is socially or individually constructed, leading to multiple and ever-changing realities. Therefore, in this research, I focused on analyzing the viewpoints and interpretations of research subjects regarding their experiences in the world. Consequently, I was involved in and observed the lives of the people in Pamekasan, where FPI and AUMA emerged, as well as NU, the most widely followed community organization there. At this point, I do not want to generalize the phenomena being studied but rather uncover the deeper meanings of the various phenomena, as understood by Geertz with "thick description." Geertz used this term to emphasize the importance of understanding not only the visible behaviors *(thin description)* but also the context, meaning, and interpretations underlying those behaviors *(thick description)*.[120] Therefore, as a researcher, I do not merely record what happens but also try to understand the meanings behind these actions from the perspectives of the people involved. I aimed to unravel the complex layers of meaning associated with actions or symbols within a phenomenon or culture, allowing outsiders to grasp the social and cultural contexts underlying those actions. For example, the meaning behind the *aqiqah*

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[119] Ryan, Gemma Sinead, "An introduction to the origins, history and principles of ethnography", in *Nurse Researcher,* 24 (4) 2017, 15–21.
[120] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures,* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 10-30.

rituals, such as cutting the baby's hair and feeding them honey (see Chapter IV), and the meaning of the *takbir* (chanting "Allahu Akbar") commonly recited by members of FPI and AUMA during demonstrations (see Chapter V).

During this process, I engaged frequently in participatory observations from January 2019 to December 2023. During this period, I frequently visited and stayed in Pamekasan. I met and communicated with local Kiai (Islamic scholars), santri in Pesantren, and the general public as part of an emic process. Finally, I interpreted the empirical data ethically. This research aimed to objectively capture the phenomenon being studied.

I conducted open-ended interviews, allowing informants to answer freely and enabling myself to ask in-depth questions. To describe the profile and activities of AUMA, I interviewed KH. Fudholi Moh. Ruham, the general secretary of AUMA, and Ust. Baits, a santri of KH. Ali Karrar Shinhaji and the chairman of AUMA. I met directly with the two informants at their homes. I conducted interviews twice with KH. Fudholi Moh. Ruham at Pondok Pesantren Al-Fudhola in Barurambat Timur Pamekasan, first on May 18, 2022, and for the second time on September 21, 2023. I interviewed Ust. Abdul Baits at Ma'had Islami Salafi Darut Tauhid Ulumuddin in Lenteng Proppo Pamekasan on Friday, May 20, 2022. Initially, I wanted to meet KH. Ali Karrar Shinhaji directly, but he delegated one of his santri to be interviewed about AUMA and KH. Ali Karrar Shinhaji himself. He directly authorized Abdul Baits for this interview. I asked both about the background of AUMA's establishment, key figures involved in the organization's

activities, the organization's funding sources, its activities, its network, and its relationship with major organizations like NU.

To understand FPI in Pamekasan, I interviewed KH. Moh Ali Salim (Chairman of FPI Pamekasan). I met with him on Tuesday, September 5, 2023, at his residence, Pondok Pesantren Al-Islah Bringin Pamekasan. Initially, he was reluctant to be interviewed by me due to the situation of FPI at the time, which is considered a banned organization by the government. However, after I persuaded him and explained that my research was scientific in nature, he agreed to the interview. He even invited me to join him in delivering a lecture in the Waru area, which is one of the bases of FPI and AUMA supporters in Pamekasan. The questions I asked revolved around the emergence of FPI in Pamekasan, key figures within the organization, the organization's funding sources, its network, and the relationship between FPI and other pre-existing organizations such as NU.

I also interviewed KH Abd. Aziz Syahid (Chairman of LPI/RMI Madura) to enrich my data on FPI in Pamekasan. I met him at his home, Pondok Pesantren Al-Inayah Sumberbatu Pamekasan, on Thursday, May 19, 2022. I also met with Ust. Nawawi (Field Coordinator of FPI North Pamekasan) at his home on Saturday, September 7, 2023, to ask about his reasons for joining FPI and the activities of FPI in his area. I also interviewed Khalilurrahman, a Banyuanyar and Al-Islah Bringin santri, on September 13, 2023, at a café near the "Universitas Islam Madura" (UIM) campus. I asked Khalilurrahman about the figure of KH. Moh. Ali Salim, the Head of FPI Pamekasan, as well as questions about the life of pesantren in Pamekasan, particularly in Banyuanyar and Al-Islah.

In order to be able to describe the situation of Islamic affairs in Pamekasan post-reformation, marked by the strengthening of Islamism as evidenced by the emergence of the "Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Islami," also known as Gerbangsalam, I met with the Chairman of LP2SI (Institute for the Study and Implementation of Islamic Sharia) at his home in Larangan Tokol Trankaln, Pamekasan, on Thursday, September 7, 2023.

Meanwhile, to describe the relationship between FPI, AUMA, SI, and the Hadrami family in Pamekasan, I interviewed Sayuri Rustam, the former chairman of SI Pamekasan for the 2016-2022 period. The interview was conducted at his home in Pagar Batu, Sumenep, on Friday, September 8, 2023. Meanwhile, to delve into the support from the Hadrami family in Pamekasan for FPI, I conducted an in-depth interview with Habib Mustofa Fadaq at his home on Jalan Jokotole, Pamekasan, on Tuesday, September 19, 2023.

Finally, to understand the contestation among Islamic groups in Pamekasan and NU's response to the emergence of AUMA and FPI, I interviewed KH. Fadli Ghazali (Vice Chairman of PCNU Pamekasan, Member of MUI, and Senior Politician of PPP Pamekasan) at his home in Bugih, Pamekasan, on August 25, 2023. I also interviewed KH. Zainul Hasan (Vice Chairman of Tanfidziyah PCNU Pamekasan) at the PCNU Pamekasan Office on Sunday, September 24, 2023, and KH. Maltuful Anam, the Chairman of the Pamekasan Branch of the Gerakan Pemuda Anshor, at the Cahaya Berlian Hotel in Pamekasan on Monday, September 25, 2023. Additionally, I interviewed Shofiyullah (Vice Chairman of

IPNU in charge of Dakwah and Pesantren Networks) in Bugih, Pamekasan, on Thursday, May 19, 2022.

The data analysis process in this research followed the steps outlined by Miles and Huberman, which include data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing.[121] During the data reduction process, I wrote summaries and performed coding, categorization, memos, and other activities based on field data, including interviews, observations, and literature studies on the emergence of FPI and AUMA as Islamic activism in Pamekasan. Secondly, I attempted to synthesize all the existing data into systematic relationships. Finally, I provided conclusions and presented the research findings.

Based on the research questions posed in this study, in line with the framework of Islamism as activism according to Bayat and Wicktorowiz, as well as Bourdieu's theory of practice, data analysis was conducted in three stages:

1. Analyzing data related to the genealogy and development of Islamism in Indonesia. At this stage, the researcher found that the seeds of the Islamist movement can be traced back to the emergence of SI in the first half of the 19th century, influenced by Pan-Islamism thought that developed in the Middle East. Islamism then strengthened during the reform era with the emergence of Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).

2. Analyzing data related to the "religious field" in Pamekasan, highlighting the important role of kiai in the region. In this study, the researcher found a

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[121] Mattew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook,* (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 10-12.

historically long-standing contestation between NU kiai and SI kiai in the struggle for authority within society.

3. Analyzing data related to the background of the emergence of FPI and AUMA in Madura as Islamic activism in the post-reform era. This research found that the emergence of these two religious organizations was influenced by the opening of democratic opportunities with the fall of the New Order and the strengthening of the spirit of implementing Islamic values and laws in Pamekasan. These organizations also represent a blend of Islamism and traditionalism in Madura. Their activism operates synergistically, supported by SI and the Hadrami families in Pamekasan. For instance, this traditionalist-Islamist group was involved in the 212 Islamic Defenders action in Jakarta, sweeping actions against prostitution activities in Pamekasan, protests against "Kota Cinema Mall" (KCM) in Pamekasan, and so on.

4. Analyzing data related to Islamic activism carried out by FPI and AUMA in the struggle for authority in the religious field in Pamekasan. This study found that the movements of FPI and AUMA, or what is referred to as "Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" (IATM), represent religious practices and a means of distinguishing themselves from other groups in the struggle for (religious) authority. The competition between Islamic groups in Pamekasan is not limited to the religious field but also impacts social, political, and economic spheres. FPI and AUMA use mosques to strengthen their religious identity and adopt the slogan "*nahi munkar*" as a

tool for distinguishing themselves and shaping their movement's narrative. Meanwhile, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), as the dominant traditional Islamic group, views the presence of IATM as an opportunity to partner in "*fastabiqul khairat*," which means competing in doing good deeds in various aspects of life.

To test the validity and reliability of the data, I employed triangulation techniques[122] that combined data collection from observations, in-depth interviews with key informants, and related documents regarding the emergence of FPI and AUMA in Pamekasan after the Reform Era. For this reason, the same question was posed to several different informants to find valid answers—this is known as source triangulation. Additionally, the answers from these informants were cross-checked through observations and reviewing existing documents—this is known as technique triangulation. Aside from the importance of the validity and reliability aspects of this research, research ethics were also a significant concern in this study, as they included honesty, objectivity, integrity, openness, and so on.

G. Research Structure

This study includes six chapters. This first chapter has presented the background of the issues raised, their significance, and the methods used in the study. The second chapter discusses the genealogy and development of Islamism in Indonesia. The third chapter describes the religious field in Pamekasan, which

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[122] Sugiono, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif dan Kuantitatif, dan R & D,* (Bandung: Alfabeta, 2013), 269-274. See also John. W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches,* (Los Angeles - London: Sage Publications, 2009), 191-192.

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includes the critical role of pesantren and kiai in the life of Madurese society. The fourth chapter describes the birth background of "The Islamist-Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" (IATM), its habitus, identity, and networks. The fifth chapter explores the contestation between "The Islamist-Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" (IATM) and "the traditionalist-Moderate" in the competition for authority in the religious sphere in Madura. The sixth chapter covers the conclusions of the research by formulating the problem proposed in the first chapter concerning the phenomenon of "The Islamist-Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" (IATM).

CHAPTER VI

CLOSING

A. Conclusion

This study found that Islamism is among the problems and challenges facing the Muslim community today. The spirit of realizing Islamic values in all aspects of life—including in the context of the state or at least the implementation of Islamic law—constitutes the essence of Islamism. This reality can be seen in the idealism of Islamic groups such as FPI and AUMA in Pamekasan. The researcher presents the following conclusions:

Firstly, Islamism has a long history. The discussion surrounding Islam and its relationship with the state remains challenging for some Islamic factions. Influenced by reformist notions from the Middle East, Islamism emerged and developed during the late colonial period through an organization known as Sarekat Islam (SI). The enthusiasm for Islamism declined under the pressures of the Soekarno administration, and then exacerbated further during the Suharto era, which aimed to reduce the ideological influence of Islam. Subsequently, the Reform era, characterized by the downfall of the New Order regime, saw the resurgence of Islamist groups that long sought to establish either an Islamic state or a state that adheres to Islamic law. These groups perceive Islam as a comprehensive system governing human life. Such is the portrait of the genealogy of the development of Islamism in Indonesia.

Second, Pamekasan is a strongly Islamic "religious field." The encounter between Islam and the Madurese community occurred around the 15th century, mediated by Arab traders and the Walisongo. Islamic teachings took deep roots in Madura due to the influential role of kiai and pesantren with their symbolic habitus and capital. One of the most influential ulama clans in Pamekasan is the Bani Itsbat. The descendants of Kiai Itsbat established major pesantren in Pamekasan, including Banyuanyar, Ta Bata, Penyeppen, and Bettet. Religious education in these pesantren is based on "traditional Islam" following the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWAJA) principles. In terms of theology, they adhere to the thoughts of Asy'ariyah and Maturidiyah. At the same time, in legal matters, they rely on the ideas of the four schools of thought: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali.

Additionally, Al-Ghazali's teachings are their foundation for Sufism. Interestingly, the Kiai descendants of Kiai Itsbat have different choices in their Islamic activism *ijtihad*. Kiai Sirajuddin, the caretaker of Pesantren Bettet and the son of Kiai Nasruddin, who leads Pesantren Penyeppen, chose to establish a branch of NU in Pamekasan as a platform for social and community struggles. On the other hand, the pesantren Banyuayar and Ta Bata, led by Kiai Abdulmajid, Kiai Baqir, and Kiai Khazin, opted for Sarekat Islam (SI) as their social-religious organization. This difference in choice led to contestation within the large family of Kiai Istbat, both as Kiai with their respective pesantren and the social-religious organizations they chose, namely

SI and NU. This study shows that the interaction between Islamism and traditionalism is longstanding in Madura, especially within Pamekasan Regency. This interaction is closely linked to the competition among local kiai (Islamic scholars) for authority in the socio-religious arena.

Third, the "Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims" movement emerged in Pamekasan alongside strengthening religious conservatism following the fall of the New Order regime led by Soeharto in 1998. This religious conservatism brought about a spirit of formalizing Islamic law and aspirations for an Islamic state. In Pamekasan, the community demonstrates their passion for formalizing Islamic law in various regulations, such as the ban on alcohol, compulsory wearing of *jilbab* for government employees, stopping activities during the call to prayer, adding Islamic studies hours, and wearing Islamic attire on Fridays. The pinnacle of this passion was the decision of the Pamekasan Regent to establish Gerbangsalam (Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Islami) as a model and strategy for da'wah. These two situations have fueled the rise of Islamic activism initiated by two prominent conservative groups, FPI and AUMA. The religious habitus of these groups is rooted in "traditional Islam," yet in their activism, they adopt the aggressive, expressive, and conservative style inherited from Sarekat Islam (SI). Their identities are thus formed by the "traditional Islam" habitus along with the critical style of SI towards the government, often seen in demonstrations and "sweeping" activities targeting what they perceive as sins. FPI and AUMA, in Pamekasan, are interconnected as a network. They are

supported by the diaspora Hadrami families or *habaibs*, especially since the central figure of FPI in the national context is Habib Rizieq Syihab (HRS), who comes from this Yemeni immigrant clan.

Fourth, the emergence of FPI and AUMA (referred to as the Islamist Activism of Traditionalist Muslims) in the religious field of Pamekasan has sparked competition with the "Moderate-Traditionalist" group, namely NU. The activism carried out by the IATM group, borrowing from Bourdieu's ideas, is a way for them to differentiate themselves from NU. This competition for authority extends beyond the religious realm and encompasses politics, culture, and economics. The IATM group is considered the second class as it is a minority compared to the "Traditionalist-Moderate" group, which constitutes the main class, and the majority of the Pamekasan community supports the latter. This differentiation process by the second group is manifested in various mass mobilization activities, often starting from the Asy-Syuhada Mosque in Pamekasan. As another form of differentiation, the traditionalist-conservative group has developed a differential framing of discourse to distinguish themselves from NU who are "Moderate-Traditionalists." NU, in response to the emergence of the "IATM" group, strengthened its internal cadre and positively responded by saying that as long as the presence of this group becomes a platform for competing in acts of virtue (*fastabiqul khairat)* among Islamic organizations in Pamekasan, there is no problem.

B. Contributions

The contributions of this research are at least twofold. First, it enriches the study of Islamic activism within the new social movement theory framework by using a Bourdieusian approach. In this context, FPI and AUMA are viewed through the lens of their Islamic activism, analyzed through their habitus and capital in their contestation within the religious sphere in Pamekasan.

Second, in the context of the rise of Islamism in Madura post-Reformation, this research presents new findings that differ from the views of previous researchers. For instance, Ahmad Zainul Hamdi assumed that the post-Reformation gave birth to new Islamist groups that were a hybrid of traditionalists (i.e., NU) and Islamists. He argued that there was a phenomenon of radicalization within NU, citing the example of several kiai in Bangkalan joining FPI, an organization born during the Reformation era.

In contrast to these findings, this research reveals that while there is indeed a hybrid of traditionalists and Islamists in Pamekasan, the traditionalist group in Pamekasan refers to kiai who, in terms of religious organization, are affiliated with Sarekat Islam (SI). In Pamekasan, traditionalists are not necessarily synonymous with NU, as some traditionalists belong to SI. FPI and AUMA see NU as their main competitor in vying for religious authority in Pamekasan. This highlights a significant difference in the rise of Islamism in Pamekasan compared to Bangkalan. Therefore, one cannot oversimplify or

generalize the phenomenon of Islamism in Madura, consisting of four regencies, each with distinct characteristics.

C. Limitations

This research has several limitations. First, the data collection process was the most challenging aspect of this study. Since FPI, as a mass organization, was disbanded by the Indonesian government in 2020, it was difficult for me as a researcher to obtain information from informants, as they felt uncomfortable providing details about the activities and operations of their organization. Similarly, with AUMA, FPI's partner in Pamekasan, the informants appeared cautious when sharing information about themselves. However, I convinced them to answer important questions for this research through a persuasive approach.

Second, the limitation of time was also a challenge. This research would have been more comprehensive if the time frame had been extended. This would allow for a more precise depiction of the structure of FPI and AUMA as Islamic activist movements in Pamekasan.

D. Suggestions

There are several recommendations for further research. First, more studies are needed on Islamic activism as conceptualized by Asef Bayat and Quintan Wiktorowicz. This is important to ensure that efforts to place Islamic

activism within the debate of social movement theory gain greater recognition from social theory scholars.

Second, further research on the rise of Islamism in Madura post-Reformation is necessary. Based on my observations, studies on this issue have only been conducted in the Pamekasan and Bangkalan districts. Meanwhile, researchers have yet to explore the rise of Islamism in Sampang and Sumenep. A comprehensive examination of the Islamism phenomenon in Madura must encompass all four districts to capture the religious dynamics on the island of Salt in a thorough manner. Such a comprehensive study is crucial for fully portraying the Islamic dynamics in this region.

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