

Islam and Politics: The Rise of Muslim Politics in The Post Soeharto Era

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Abstract: During Soeharto's New Order, Muslim politics was virtually banned from any political activities in Indonesia. Yet, after the fall of Soeharto Muslims are free to speak, to establish a political party, and even to adopt Islam as their political ideology. The political climate has also considerably changed from an authoritarian to democratic system. In line with this democratization and liberalization, various Muslim groups with different approaches and agenda also emerge. It is not surprising that many Islamic radical groups have also emerged since that time. This paper endeavors to examine what caused the Muslim politics to greatly gain momentum in the post Soeharto period and whether it has a link to previous Islamic movement of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. It shows that on the one hand the declining number of Islamic party voters indicates the weakening of "politik aliran" (ideology-based party) within moderate Islamic groups. However, another phenomenon emerges in form of the rise of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.

Key words: Politics, Islam, Indonesia, radicalism

A. Introduction

The relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia has long historical roots. It can be traced back to the late thirteenth century and early fourteenth century, when Islam was first disseminated in the country. The interaction between Islam and the local culture has developed well. They have become an inevitable issue in Indonesian political history. This intertwined history of Islam and politics has attracted a number of Indonesian researchers to investigate it, from the colonial period and independence to post independence, the New Order, and the Reformation era.

This paper will explore the rise of Muslim politics in the Reformation era, including contemporary Islamic radicalism. In the first three years after the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia witnessed fundamental and democratic changes of laws and regulations,

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including the most extensive decentralization process ever attempted. However, there were also many violent incidents, bombings, and inter-ethnic religious conflicts during this time. In Jakarta, numerous Chinese women were raped and hundreds were killed (many of them burnt alive in shopping centres that they appeared to be looting).¹ Furthermore, violent and ethnic-religious conflicts have occurred in several districts; for example the Muslim-Christian conflicts in the Moluccas (2000), the Christmas bombings (2000), Dayak-Madura conflicts in Sampit (2001), the Bali bombings (2002 and 2005), the vandalising of Ahmadiyah mosques in Cianjur, Majalengka and Lombok (2008),² the FPI's (the Front of Islam Defenders) attack on AKKBB (the National Alliance for Freedom of Faith and Religion) at Monas (2008), and numerous raids on bars, brothels and nightclubs under the banner of Islam in Jakarta.

Since the end of Soeharto's era the political landscape has changed considerably in Indonesia. Muslim politicians were banned from political activities in the New Order era. Nowadays, they are free to speak and establish a political party, and even adopt Islam as their political ideology. This political climate was a great opportunity for Muslim politicians to bring up topics related to the reinforcement of *shari'a* within the Indonesian legal system. With this context, three Islamic Parties, PPP, PBB, and PK, insisted on amending Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution by reinserting the seven famous words of the Jakarta Charter. They proposed it in two consecutive ST MPR, in 2001 and 2002, but their attempts were unsuccessful.³

Historically, efforts to implement the Jakarta Charter had already failed three times before the Reformation era. This happened in the Council of BPUPKI-PPKI in 1945, the *Konstituante* Assembly in 1956-1959, and the General Session of MPRS (the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) in 1966-

¹Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia", in *South East Asia Research*, 10 February 2002, p. 138.

²Nurun Nisa', "Tragedi Ahmadiyah Indonesia dari Bogor sampai Manis Lor", in <http://www.wahidinstitute.org>, accessed 10 August 2008.

³Nadirsyah Hosen, *Shari'a and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), p. 4.

1967. Nevertheless, the *shari'a* issue still remains a subject of debate nowadays. In the following section I will examine this issue by analysing the resurgence of Muslim politics after Soeharto's resignation, including the Islamic political parties and radical Islamic groups.

B. Muslim Politics in the Democratic Transition Period

The 'Muslim politics' term refers to the symbolic and political movement of Muslim groups. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori defined it as the competition and contest over both interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions that produce and sustain them.⁴ In other words, Muslim politics involves the mobilisation of widespread emotional commitment to Islam for political purposes, and it provides a powerful means for religious figures and politicians to gain the support of Muslims across numerous political and ethnic divides for their own particular interests.⁵

The proponents of Muslim politics are inclined to use Islamic issues and symbolism in the public space at the expense of the religious minority. These issues are advocated not only by Muslim groups and Islamic institutions, parties and publishers, but also by regional bureaucrats and secular political parties, because the most important thing for politicians is how to win the support of Muslim voters. What happened in South Sulawesi is a good example: even though the central boards of Golkar, NU and Muhammadiyah have resolutely refused the enactment of regional *shari'a* regulation, their local board in South Sulawesi insists on supporting it.

Following the resignation of Soeharto, after 32 years of presidency, the government reformed the power structures of the State and the electoral system. Two of the most important reforms

⁴D. F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 5.

⁵Arskal Salim, "Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation: The Religious Majority And The Rights of Minorities in The Post Soeharto", in *Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance*, ed. Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), p. 117.

were the enactment of a new decentralization law and direct general elections. They have been implemented at both national and local levels. In addition, the reforms have opened the field for new arenas of political participation, new actors and power constellations, and new forms of political interaction.

This meant an opportunity for Islamic groups to express their political interests. For more than half a century, Indonesia has not been able to conduct an uninterrupted dialogue concerning the position of *shari'a* in the existing political constellations. In 1945 and 1955, the efforts were hampered by Soekarno's order. Under Soeharto, the issue was strictly banned as well. He worried that it would break government stability.

Nowadays, Muslim politicians can freely articulate their political interests through the constitutional mechanism. The new government has also given an opportunity for Indonesian people, including Muslim groups, to establish political parties. Whereas in the New Order era only three political parties were recognized, president B.J. Habibie allowed a multi party system. There were 48 political parties from all platforms taking part in the elections on 7 June 1999.⁶

Ten of the 48 parties explicitly defined themselves as Islamic political parties, but it was only the PPP that received a significant percentage of the vote and ended up as the fourth most popular party with around eleven per cent. The PBB (Crescent and Star Party), which claimed to be the true successor of Masyumi, did not rise above two per cent, and the PK (Justice Party), which represented an 'Islamist Campus,' secured only 1.5 per cent. The other Muslim parties were even less successful.⁷

The two political parties that received most of the support from the Javanese Muslim communities (PKB, The National Awakening Party and PAN, National Mandate Party) did not declare themselves to be Islamic parties. These parties were led by prominent Muslim figures; Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais. The first primarily represents the traditionalist Muslims of

⁶Tim Litbang Kompas, *Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi, Strategi, dan Program* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1999), p. xi-xii.

⁷Martin van Bruinessen, *Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism*, p. 141.

Central Java and East Java, while the latter represents the modernist Muslims and urban voters. They claimed to be nationalist rather than Islamic parties. Both tried to appeal to non-Muslims as well as Muslim voters. However, because they also had to defend their core constituencies, this often placed them in ambivalent positions.

It is important to note that the most significant parties in the 1999 elections were dominated by the nationalist and elite parties, PDI-P and Golkar, which had respectively collected the most votes. This shows that the popularity of Islamic political parties had not increased significantly during the general elections in this country. Compared to previous elections of 1955 and 1971, votes for Islamic parties promoting the Jakarta Charter had instead decreased in 1999 and 2004.

In the 1955 general elections, the supporters of the Jakarta Charter obtained 40 percent of the seats. In 1999, the proponents of the inclusion of *shari'a* into the 1945 Constitution won only twelve per cent, a decline of 28 percent.⁸ In the more recent 2004 general elections, PPP won 8.05 per cent of the votes and PBB won only 2.62 percent of the ballots.⁹ This means that both parties together have 10.65 per cent, a slight decline from twelve percent in 1999. As a result, PBB was not permitted to compete in the 2009 general elections because it did not fulfill the required electoral threshold of three percent.

However, during the democratic transition the demand for *shari'a* implementation in Indonesia was still an interesting issue for a number of politicians and Muslim activists, apart from whether this political demand is realistic or not. In addition to the political openness factors discussed above, the resurgence of *shari'a* politics in modern Indonesia can also be examined from the Islamic political point of view. For Muslim fundamentalist, *shari'a* is believed to be the divine law that controls all Muslim behaviour and every aspect of life, including political activity.

⁸Nadirsyah Hosen, *Shari'a and Constitutional Reform*, p. 230.

⁹Mitsuo Nakamura, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Observations on the 2004 General Elections*, Islamic Legal Studies Program Harvard Law School, occasional publications 6 December 2005, p. 13.

Some argue that the Islamist attitudes are indicatively shaped by private experiences; through parents, family, education, friends and literature. These are elements of the transmission process that strengthen the political culture and behaviour of Islamists. In the political arena, the Islamic parties calculatedly chose *shari'a*-issues and religious issues that were not in the political domains of large parties. Presumably, they realized that it was unrealistic to compete with and promote the same political issues as the large parties like PDI-P, Golkar, PKB and PAN, which preferred to promote the popular issues such as pluralism, corruption, nationalism and economic development to gather votes.

Therefore, the Jakarta Charter was considered a promising issue for Islamic parties, because it had been a crucial political topic in the 1950s. In short, it makes sense that they tried to use this emotional issue to gain support from the Muslim communities, because in the 1955 elections all the Islamic parties supported it.

In the last fifty years, Muslim society in Indonesia has undergone a political polarization. According to Saiful Mujani, where in the 1950s *santri* groups were associated with the Islamic political parties, this no longer applies today, and similarly where in the 1950s the Muslim communities were relatively solid and supportive of the Jakarta Charter, now they are fragmented and some are not even interested in the formalization of the *shari'a*. Where in 1955 the opponents of the Islamic political parties were secular parties (PNI and PKI), today their rivals come from within the Muslim community.¹⁰

This indicates that the *politik aliran* (political cleavages) has been vague. In 1962 Geertz classified modern Indonesian politics as two major cleavages, *santri* and *abangan*.¹¹ The *santri* were associated with the Islamic political parties (Masyumi and PNU), while the *abangan* were inclined to articulate their political

¹⁰Saiful Mujani, "Syariat Islam Dalam Perdebatan", in *Syariat Islam: Pandangan Muslim Liberal*, ed. Burhanuddin (Jakarta: JIL, 2003), p. 40-43.


¹¹Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 203.

orientation within the nationalist or communist parties (PNI, PKI). Nowadays, the political ideology has evaporated, as shown by the PKB who explicitly disputed the implementation of the Jakarta Charter and *shari'a* regional regulations, whereas another national party, Golkar, supports the implementation of Shri'a Regional Regulation.

C. The Failure of Islamic Political Parties

The resurgence of Islamic political parties since 1999 is a distinctive feature of political freedom in Indonesia. During the 32 years Islam was politically marginalized by the New Order, Muslim activists were strictly forbidden from expressing their political thoughts and actions. Therefore, it is only natural that many Islamic political parties reemerged and adopted Islam as their ideology, symbol and platform in the Reformation era.

There are two characteristics of an Islamic party; the ideological basis and the background of its core voters. Ideologically, there are three outstanding parties which can be categorized as Islamic parties: PPP, PBB, and PKS. Although PKB and PAN are reluctant to be considered Islamic parties, their core supporters come mostly from the Muslim background, primarily from the NU and the Muhammadiyah community. This is why the Islamic parties always lose in every general election, since they have to compete within the same voter's domain.



The Ideological Cleavages of Major Indonesian Parties in the 1999 Election
Adapted from Kevin Raymond Evans, *Sejarah Pemilu & Partai Politik di Indonesia*,
(Jakarta: Arise Consultancies, 2003:34)

I have adapted the figure above from Kevin Raymond Evans' finding which shows the position of each major political party as well as their ideological cleavages. Regarding the Islamic parties, it evidently indicates that most of their voters come from the same area, the Muslim community. Notwithstanding, they have similar agendas to some extent, such as discussed earlier about the PPP and the PBB which both struggled hard to reinsert the seven famous words of Jakarta Charter into the 1945 constitution.¹² Moreover, their efforts were strongly supported by radical Islamic groups, such as HTI (Indonesian Liberation Party) and MMI (Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters), which mobilized thousands of people in front of the Parliament Building.

The emergence of formalist Islam has actually been predicted by William R. Liddle two years before the fall of Soeharto. He predicted that if the people would gain political freedom, then Muslim politics would proliferate rapidly in Indonesia, because the Muslim communities have many political resources such as social organizations, media, and access to political elites.¹³ W. R. Liddle's hypothesis turned out to be true. Since the reformation era, Islamic radicalism mushroomed all over the country. Before getting into this, I will briefly portray the resurgence of the Jakarta Charter and Islamic political parties.

The Jakarta Charter has been a political topic in Muslim politics since the very beginning. Some Muslim leaders felt betrayed when the Jakarta Charter (22 June 1945), which had been formulated through an agreement between nine members of BPUPKI (the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence), was altered on 18 August 1945. Some observers saw this as the beginning of the loss of Islam in the early national

¹²Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, "Introduction: The State and Shari'a in the Perspective of Indonesian Legal Politics", *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia*, ed. Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 1.

¹³William R. Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia", in *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, ed. Mark R. Woodward (Arizona: Arizona State University, 1996), p. 325-356.

politics.

This debate continued in the *Konstituante* Assembly on 31 May and 1 June 1959, that was meant to replace the 1950 UUDS (Provisional Constitution). Because the parliament assembly faced a deadlock, Soekarno issued a decree to return to the UUD 1945 and to dissolve the *Konstituante* on 5 July 1959.¹⁴ In the early New Order period, Islamic parties struggled for the restoration of the Jakarta Charter in the constitution. Unfortunately, their demand faced another deadlock, because the military did not allow the issue to be discussed during the MPR assembly of 1966/1967. The political tension between Islam and the state heated up again. At that time Muslim politicians were marginalized and severely repressed by the military. No political parties dared to talk about the Jakarta Charter.

However, by the end of the 1980s, the political circumstances had undergone a transformation. The relationship between Islam and the State was no longer antagonistic. Although the New Order restricted the discussion of *shari'a* topics in the parliament, they presented a more accommodative stance towards social, cultural, and Islamic community interests. This political change was caused by the attitude of cultural Muslim movements which accepted the Pancasila as their basic ideology. According to Greg Barton, the political accommodation of the New Order towards Islam had something to do with the roles of neo-modernist figures such as Gus Dur, Nurcholis Madjid, Djohan Efendi and Ahmad Wahib.

In the Reformation era, Muslim politicians gained much more freedom to express their aspirations, but they polarized in various groups as had occurred in the 1955 elections. It is worth mentioning that in the 1955 elections two *santri* political parties, Masyumi and NU, representing forty percent of the votes, favored replacing Pancasila with Islam as the foundation of the Indonesian state. The first of these parties represented the modernist group (Muhammadiyah), whereas the latter represented the traditionalists (NU).

¹⁴Nadirisyah Hosen, *Shari'a and Constitutional Reform*, p. 65.

Nevertheless, after the Reformation era, both the Muhammadiyah and the NU resolutely rejected the formalization of the *shari'a*. They canalized their aspirations through PAN and PKB respectively.¹⁵ Interestingly, at the same time, there were other parties with the same constituent bases, PBB among the modernists and PPP among the traditionalists, who both supported the restoration of the Jakarta Charter in the constitution. Regarding this issue, the Muslim politicians have distinctive political views about the Jakarta Charter among themselves; some even contradictory, yet only PPP and PBB proposed reviving the Jakarta Charter which was once a part of the draft constitution at the beginning of the Republic.

The PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), which during the 1999 and 2004 elections did not campaign about Islamic issues, participated to support the revival of the Jakarta Charter in the 2001 Annual Session of MPR. PKS declared their political platform as a *partai dakwah* (missionary party) and claimed that they are not an Islamic fundamentalist party.¹⁶ This party did not have preexisting political roots such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and nationalist groups. This is why they tried to gain the public's attention by using K.H. Hasyim Asyari, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, and even Soekarno as part of their political campaign for the 2009 elections.

In addition to the Islamic parties, the rise of Muslim hardliners was also remarkable in the post-Soeharto. Although they have different concerns, strategies and goals, they share the view that the *shari'a* should be implemented in Indonesia. Their prominent slogan is 'save Indonesia with *shari'a*.' The following section will discuss the rise of Islamic movements in Indonesia.

D. The Emergence of Radical Islamic Movements

Since the end of Soeharto's regime, Islamic radicalism has

¹⁵See Greg Barton, *Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia: Pemikiran Neo-modernisme Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib dan Abdurrahman Wahid, 1968-1980* (Jakarta: Paramadina; 1999), p. 94.

¹⁶Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer* (Bandung: Teraju, 2004), p. 182.

become very visible. Indonesian Muslims which were known as a smiling people suddenly changed into hating, intolerant, and violent people. *Jihād* and *shari'a* became prominent terms in Muslim public discourse. On 2 April 2000, thousands of people gathered at the Senayan Stadium, Jakarta, to attend a *Tablig Akbar* (a mass religious rally). This rally was meant to respond to the religious conflict which occurred in Maluku. All of the people wore white garbs, and some of them brought swords. Panglima Laskar Jihad, Ustad Ja'far Umar Thalib declared the 1421 H (Islamic year) as the year of *jihād*.¹⁷

Seven years later, on 12 August 2007, approximately one hundred thousand people returned to gather at the Gelora Bung Karno Senayan stadium, Jakarta, to attend an international *khilāfah* conference that was held by HTI. The theme of the conference was 'It is time for the *Khalīfah* (caliph) to lead the world.' The participants of the conference loudly called for the implementation of Islamic *shari'a* and asked the Indonesian government to bring an end to secularism, because they considered it the root of the nation's problems.

Moreover, numerous incidents of violence under the banner of religion also occurred after the demise of Soeharto, such as *Laskar Jihad* versus *Laskar Kristus* in the Moluccas (2000), the Christmas bombings (2000), Poso conflict (1998-2003), the Bali bombings (2002 and 2005), the vandalism of the Ahmadiyah sect (2008),¹⁸ and numerous raids on bars, casinos, brothels and nightclubs that are often conducted by the FPI in Jakarta.

Concerning the Ahmadiyah case, on 14 February 2008 three radical Islamic groups (FPI, MMI, FUI) gathered in a *pengajian* (religious ceremony) in Banjar, West Java. They insistently demanded the implementation of the *shari'a* and the dissolution of the Ahmadiyah sect. In his speech, Ahmad Sobri Lubis (an FPI preacher) made several provoking remarks under the banner of Islam to expel Ahmadiyah members from Indonesia, and in front of thousands of Muslim people he

¹⁷-, "Enam Wakil Laskar Jihad Bertemu Presiden", in *Kompas*, 7 April 2000, <http://www2.kompas.com>, accessed 1 November 2008.

¹⁸Nurun Nisa', *Tragedi Ahmadiyah Indonesia*.

provocatively shouted “*bunuh, bunuh, bunuh...*” (kill, kill, kill...) added to continuously yelling “*Allāh al-Akbar*” (the Mighty of God).¹⁹

William Liddle, a political analyst, evaluated that since the 2004 elections, the demands of the conservative Islamic group have become a larger part of public debates. In fact, his analysis is correct as there have been numerous *shari'a* issues that have been managed by the central and local governments, such as the MUI's *fatwas* - the prohibition of pluralism, liberalism, and secularism, the ban of the Ahmadiyah sects, and the implementation of SRRs.²⁰

Before further discussing the factors that affected the spread of the Islamic radicalism, it is important to define radicalism here. Literally ‘radicals’ means tending or disposed to make extreme changes in existing views, habits, conditions, or institutions. Borrowing Harun Nasution's words, this means a conservative movement that often uses violent acts in achieving their political target and transmitting their faith.²¹ In the Islamic context, this term is often used for the hardliner groups that use violence under the banner of Islam.

E. Factors Driving the Spread of Radical Islamism

The unstable politics of the ‘Reformation euphoria’ have contributed to the growth of the radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. In this section I will describe the cause of the increase in the number of organizations, divided into two kinds of factors. The first are the domestic political crises such as the economic crisis, national leadership, and the lack of law enforcement, whereas the second mostly includes global issues like religious sentiment, transnational network, and identity crisis. Both factors

¹⁹The video record of the incitement prophecy can be seen at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7RLCXNdKF4>, accessed 8 November 2008.

²⁰The *fatwa* concerning pluralism, secularism and liberalism was released by MUI (the Indonesian Ulama Council) together with the fatwa banning Ahmadiyah sect on 28 Jul. 2005. See: “Tapal Batas Tafsir Bebas”, *Gatra*, 6 August 2005, p. 75-79.

²¹See: Harun Nasution, *Islam Rasional* (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), p. 124.

occur simultaneously.

1. Internal Factors

Firstly, During the last few months of the fall of Soeharto in 1997, Indonesia faced a serious economic crisis. Many people lost their jobs and suffered from poverty. This is why some people, especially the young generation, who had difficulties finding jobs, were easily persuaded to join the radical Islamic movements. These movements not only channeled their protest about the economical problems that they were facing, but also used religious justification to blame the government policies and other groups. For example, FPI members, mostly unemployed young people, were interested in becoming jihadists.²²

The second factor was the weakness of the national leadership. Three civilian presidents were facing serious difficulties in creating socio-political stability after the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian reign. Under Habibie's presidency, press freedom and civil rights were increasing. However, the MPR rejected his accountability report at the *Sidang Istimewa* (SI, Special Session) on October 1999 and did not reelect him. He was considered a failure in establishing good governance and controlling the corrupt bureaucracy which was the legacy of Soeharto's reign. The political circumstances changed when Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) became president in 1999. Indonesian people had high expectations of him since he was considered to be the first democratically elected president. Likewise, he has been widely known as a charismatic figure, a moderate Muslim, and a pro-democracy activist in Indonesia. However, his controversial statements often triggered controversies and misunderstandings among people, such as revoking TAP MPR no. 25 about Marxism, Leninism, and Communism restrictions and the dissolution of *Departemen Penerangan* (the Information Department). Consequently, he was

²²Robert W. Hefner, "Globalization, Governance, and the Crisis of Indonesia Islam", paper presented for Conference on *Globalization, State Capacity, and Muslim Self Determination*, University of California Santa Cruz, 7-9 March 2002, p. 14.

impeached by the parliament in the middle of his term.

On 24 July 2001 Megawati took over the presidency and became the first female president of Indonesia. In the beginning Megawati was able to create political stability, but her silent attitude and capability to apply better law enforcement raised many questions, until finally the first Bali Bombing challenged her leadership. Under the Megawati presidency the KKN practices (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) were still thriving.²³

Third, the lack of law enforcement was also a significant factor in the rise of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. The absence of a state structure and uncertain political conditions hindered the law enforcement process. Corruption was still rampant, deeply rooted in several aspects of the state bureaucracy, the business sectors, and the poor judicial system. Even the government indirectly protected the suspected corruptors for political purposes, such as in the case of the misuse of BLBI (Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support) funds.²⁴ These kinds of circumstances provided an opportunity for the Islamists to promote the adoption of *shari'a* Islam as an 'alternative law' in Indonesia. In short, they argued that the secular law system caused the unstable conditions and multi dimensional crisis in the country.

2. External Factors

The first factor is religious sentiment provoked by certain situations in Islamic countries. The world witnessed the injustice of George W. Bush's pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and his attempts overthrow the Taliban regime led by Mullah

²³M. Syafi'i Anwar, *Shari'a, Pluralism and the Prospect of Democracy in Post Soeharto Indonesia*, paper presented at EU-Indonesia Day conference on Pluralism and Democracy: Indonesian Perspective, organized by the European Commission in collaboration with European Institute for Asian Studies', Brussels Charlemagne Building, 7 December 2006, p. 14.

²⁴BLBI scandal revolves around Rp. 144.7 trillion (US\$12.3 billion) in state money expend to 48 banks during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. See: -, "KPK Could Give up Probe into Huge Bank Scandal", in *Jakarta Post*, 18 November 2008.

Mohammad Omar. Another situation occurred in Iraq, when Bush's accusation and subsequent invasion on the pretext of Saddam Hussein owning weapons of mass destruction caused the people of Iraq to suffer in war. In fact, after Saddam Hussein was captured and sentenced to death, the existence of the frightening weapons has never been proven.

The radical Islamic groups convinced the people that George W. Bush's policy was part of a conspiracy to destroy Islam. They used this global issue to strengthen their anti-American political agenda, with issues such as the implementation of the *shari'a*. In addition, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan also influenced the Islamic political landscape in Indonesia. The protest against the invasion of Afghanistan worsened the diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and the United States. It ignited the radical Islamic groups in this country; they were planning to forcefully expel U.S. citizens from Indonesia with a 'sweeping' operation. Their actions scared the international people, particularly Americans and other Westerners. Over 1.3 million tourists cancelled their trips to Bali and other destinations in Indonesia from 11 September 2001 until the middle of October.²⁵ Since that time Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has become much more visible.

The second factor is the existence of transnational networks. After the attacks on the WTC in New York (11 September 2001), international concern was focused on radical Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The ICG (International Crisis Group) reported that the incidents of religious violence in Indonesia might be associated with international terrorist cells in Afghanistan, because several hundreds of Indonesian Muslims were involved in the Islamic fighting against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. According to military intelligence resources there were around eight hundred Indonesian Muslims that had joined the

²⁵Cees van Dijk, *The Hearts and the Minds of the People: Southeast Asia After 11 September 2001*, paper presented in International Seminar, Islamic Militant Movements in Southeast Asia, 22-33 Jul. 2003 in Jakarta (Indonesia-Netherlands cooperation in Islamic Studies INIS-Leiden), p. 30.

jihad in Afghanistan in 1980s.

Except for the al-Qaeda link, *Salafism* and *Wahabism* has also undeniably played a role in increasing Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. Two prominent figures of hardliner groups, Ja'far Umar Thalib and Habib Rizieq Syihab, are known to have a close connection with the *Wahabist* and *Salafist* networks in the Middle East. They have spent many years studying in Saudi Arabia with conservative *ulama*. Therefore, it is not surprising that they teach the *Wahabist* doctrine, *jihad*, and adopt Arabic symbols in Indonesia such as using turbans, long garbs, and growing beards.²⁶

The third factor is the identity crisis. Globalization has increased the dependency of Muslim countries in economics, politics, and technology. Aware of this, they cautiously encounter the 'global impact' by expressing their own cultural identity. Most Indonesian Muslims realize that globalization has entered their daily life, whether it is negative or positive, but they are convinced that globalization is a product of Western civilization which should be treated carefully. Furthermore, the Islamist groups argue that Western products are not 'value free.' They contain an ideological, political, and cultural hegemony that threatens the existing moral, religious, and cultural values.²⁷

According to Islamist groups, Indonesian Muslim society has become 'more permissive' nowadays. They claim that has been increasing tremendously both in print and electronic media since the Reformation era. The decadence of morality is often used by Islamist groups to support their anti-America campaign. They promote the idea of 'back to our Islamic identity' by establishing *shari'a* laws and Islamic symbols. Generally, they call for returning the Islamic glory of the past when responding to the globalization process. This reaction demonstrates the existence of an identity crisis with an inability to resist the tide of globalization. Ironically, their actions lean towards violence and

²⁶For a comprehensive explanation see Noorhadi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (NY: SEAP Cornell University, 2006), p. 63-91.

²⁷Ahmad Shboul, "Islam and Globalization", in *Islam Perspective on the New Millineum*, ed. Virginia Hooker (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), p. 56.

anarchy, which can hinder their own position in opposing Western culture.

F. The Profile of Radical Islamic Organizations

This section will discuss the historical background of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. Not all militant Islamic groups have a link to the former *Darul Islam* (DI) movement. Some of them were established in the post-Soeharto era, such as *Laskar Jihad* and the FPI. However, there are also new organizations that still have a link to the past underground Islamist movement *Darul Islam*. Although this organization was exterminated entirely in the 1960s, many of its members remained active and are linked to modern groups, most prominently to the MMI.

To some extent, these groups share the same goal but have different methods for achieving their political agendas, for instance the implementation of *shari'a* laws, purification of Islamic teachings, anti-America campaign, anti-secularism,-pluralism, and -liberalism. Here, the radical Islamic groups are divided into two categories; conservative radicalism and the neo-conservative groups. The first time are the radical Islamic organizations that operated under the past regime, or current groups that have a link to the former; 'New face-Old vision.' The second are the groups that have been established in the post-Soeharto era, and probably do not have any structural links with the former radical Islamic movement.

1. Conservative Radical Groups

The DI (*Darul Islam*) movement was founded in 1948, and led by Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo. Literally, this term means 'Home' or the territory of Islam where the Islamic faith and Islamic regulations must be obeyed. Its opposite is *Darul Harb* which means 'the territory of war, the world of infidels.'²⁸ The DI movement first started in the mountainous region of West Java, and was then extended to South Kalimantan (1950), South

²⁸Cees Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under The Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 10.

Sulawesi (1952), and Aceh (1953).²⁹

On 7 August 1949, Kartosoewirjo formally proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in Cisampang, West Java.³⁰ Although religion was not really the main reason for establishing this organization, Islam was the factor glueing the leaders together. All agreed that the state should be based on the *shari'a*; therefore they agreed to establish the United Front of the NII in 1953. This insurrection movement was divided into seven local commandos (KW) that were led initially by Kartosoewirjo. Later, in the mid 1970s, the regions were expanded with two locations, KW 8 in Lampung and KW 9 in Jakarta and its surroundings.³¹ Formally, this movement had a constitution called *Qanun Asasi*.

The constitution of the NII closely resembled the 1945 Constitution. After proclamation of the NII, the rebellion movement under the name DI rapidly proliferated in several districts of Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. However, after around thirteen years (1948-1962) the insurrection of the DI was successfully terminated by the national military and the main leaders were killed or arrested. Kartosoewirjo was sentenced to death by the Military Court in 1962, and Kahar Muzakkar's was shot dead by Kujang Battalion troops of the TNI (Indonesian National Military) in 1965. However, not all their members were captured; many of them have persisted in underground movements until the present. Lately, the radical Islamic groups such as *Komando Jihad* and the MMI struggling for the implementation of *shari'a* in Indonesia are said to have structural links to the former *Darul Islam*.

Komando Jihad, in the 1970s and early 1980s there were repeated eruptions of Islamic terrorism - arson, bombing of churches, night clubs, and cinemas - which were attributed to the *Komando Jihad*.³² Based on government information, this organization rejected Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Its

²⁹ICG, "Daur Ulang Militan di Indonesia: Darul Islam dan Bom Kedutaan Australia", Brussels: *Crisis Group Asia Report* no 92, 22 February 2005, p. 2.

³⁰Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syari'at Islam: dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria* (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), p. 65.

³¹ICG, *Daur Ulang Militan di Indonesia*, p. 2.

³²Martin van Bruinessen, *Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism*, p. 128.

long-term aim was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, while the short-time objective was destroying communism.

However, the ICG reports that it was merely a creation of Ali Moertopo and BAKIN (State Intelligence Coordinating Agency) to dissuade people from voting for the one remaining Muslim party, PPP, in the 1977 elections. After a number of the former DI leaders responded to Murtopo's idea, in the middle of 1977 the state apparatus had 185 people arrested who were engaged in *Komando Jihad*. They were accused of continuing Kartosoewirjo's idea of establishing the NII. The arrested leaders of *Komando Jihad* were Haji Ismail Pranoto and Haji Danu Mohammad Hasan; both were Kartosoewirjo's close accomplices. In 1983 Haji Danu admitted in front of the court that he was recruited by members of BAKIN.³³

Komando Jihad later referred to other names, Asep Warman alias Musa Warman. He became a key informant of the *Komando Jihad* in the Palembang and Lampung territories. He was also involved in the DI movement and remained a useful scarecrow until the mid-1980s.³⁴ Starting in January 1979, Warman joined forces with Abdullah Umar, a teacher of Ngruki *pesantren*, and conducted a series of violent acts that became known as 'Terror Warman.' Their first action was killing the rector of Universitas Sebelas Maret, in Solo.³⁵ According to a court document, the victim was killed because he gave information to the government about the existence of the *Jaringan Islamiyyah* (JI), which caused the arrest of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir.³⁶

On 1 March 1979, Warman's group succeeded in robbing a car that was transporting the salaries of employees of the IAIN (State Islamic Religious Institute) in Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta. A few weeks later, they attempted a second robbery by blocking a

³³Taufik Adnan Amal, *Politik Syari'at Islam*, p. 68.

³⁴Martin van Bruinessen, "Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in Indonesia", in *Indonesien am Ende des 20*, ed. Ingrid Wessel (Jahunderts-Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996), p. 26-27.

³⁵Taufik Adnan Amal, *Politik Syari'at Islam*, p. 69.

³⁶See further account in ICG, *Daur Ulang Militan di Indonesia*, p. 8-9.

car that transported the salaries of the employees of the IKIP in Malang, East Java, but they failed.³⁷ This robbery was based on the Islamic concept of *fa'i*, raising funds by attacking enemies of Islam. After looking at Warman's team's operation, the underground DI leaders recruited them for the DI structure. However, by the end of 1980, Komando Jihad was successfully destroyed by the security apparatus. Warman himself was shot dead by the TNI on 23 July 1981 in Soreang Kolot, Bandung.³⁸

The MMI (the Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters), although it was established just after the fall of Soeharto, most leaders were involved in the former radical Islamic groups (DI, DDII, and JI) under the previous Indonesian regime. This organization was formed based on the result of the 1st Mujahidin congress on 7 August 2000 in Yogyakarta. The Congress produced a 'Yogyakarta Charter' and a number of recommendations.³⁹ The results of that congress were submitted to the *Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (FPP, United Development Fraction) preceding the ST MPR 2000.

The first MMI congress was attended by around 1.500 people; some of them were veterans of the Afghanistan War, religious leaders who supported the adoption of *shari'a* laws in Indonesia, and former members of the DI movement. The congress elected Abu Bakar Ba'asyir from the *pesantren* al-Mukmin Ngruki as the *amir al-Mujahidin* (supreme leader of the movement). He was allegedly connected with the DI, *Komando Jihad*, and the *Usroh* movement.

In 1978 Ba'asyir was sent to prison for four years because of his harsh criticism of Soeharto's policies, and he was accused of rebelling against the government for his *da'wah* (sermon) about establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. After being released from prison in 1982 he did not stop criticizing the government. Specifically when Soeharto imposed the Pancasila as the sole

³⁷ICG, "al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the Case of the Ngruki Network", in *Indonesia*, ICG Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002, p. 8.

³⁸-, "Akhir Perburuan di Soreang", in *Tempo*, 1 August 1981.

³⁹The proceedings of the 1st conference and Yogyakarta Charter can be found in Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakkan Syari'ah Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001).

basis ideology of all organizations in the mid 1980s, he rejected this policy. Because he was aware that he would be jailed for a second time, he decided to flee and went to live in Malaysia. Ba'asyir spent a decade and a half in exile in this state; he built a network of contacts among committed Muslims in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, occasionally referred to as *Jamaah Islamiyyah* (JI). The Malaysian and Singaporean police authorities saw Ba'asyir as the suspected *al-Qaeda* commander responsible for terrorist violence in Southeast Asia.⁴⁰

However, Ba'asyir denied this. He argued that JI is a Western fabrication used to stigmatism Muslims. After Soeharto's resignation in 1998, he returned to Indonesia in October 1999. When the 2002 ST MPR failed to reinsert the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution, Ba'asyir and his groups pressured the MUI to immediately issue a fatwa about which political parties should be supported by Muslims in the 2004 elections.⁴¹

2. Neo-conservative Groups

The FKAJWJ (Communication Forum of *Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah*) was established by Ja'far Umar Thalib on 14 February 1998 at the Manahan stadium in Solo, Central Java.⁴² The main purpose of this group was essentially to purify or return to the original Islam. In this regard, the group was ideologically influenced by the *Wahhabi Salafism* teachings of Arab preacher Muhammad Abdul Wahhab in the 18th century.⁴³

As Robert W. Hefner called it:

A neo-fundamentalist or neo-*salafy*, because it emphasizes extreme political views not associated with earlier variants of

⁴⁰Ba'asyir did not actually go alone; he fled together with the late Abdullah Sungkar to Malaysia. See: Saiful Umam, "Radical Muslims in Indonesia: The Case of Ja'far Umar Thalib and The Laskar Jihad", in *Exploration in South East Asian Studied*, vol 6, no. 1 spring 2006, p. 9.

⁴¹Taufik Adnan Amal, *Politik Syari'at Islam*, p. 81.

⁴²Saiful Umam, *Radical Muslims in Indonesia*, p. 11-12.

⁴³S. Yunanto, *Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and South East Asia* (Jakarta: Ridep Institute-FES, 2003), p. 37.

salafism, including those still popular in Saudi Arabia. One such emphasis is the firm belief that the United States and Israel are leading a world-wide conspiracy to destroy Islam and the response by Muslims to this effort must be armed jihad.⁴⁴

In this regard, Ja'far accused the United States, Israel, and Christians in general of masterminding the religious violence in Ambon. He speculated that the Maluku islands are 'a pilot project' of the Christianisation of Indonesia, which is organized by the Zionist-Christian International conspiracy.⁴⁵

Two years after establishing the FKAWJ, Thalib declared a *Laskar Jihad* on 30 January 2000 at the Kridosono Stadium Yogyakarta, DIY. The main purpose of this *Laskar* was to recruit, train, and deploy Islamic paramilitaries in Ambon to help and protect their Muslim brothers from *Laskar Kristus* attacks.⁴⁶ *Laskar Jihad* was a paramilitary wing of FKAWJ formed to respond to the religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Maluku. When the ICG reported the massacring of over 400 Muslims by Christians at Tobelo in North Maluku during the last week of December 1999, the large number of victims inflamed emotions of Muslims throughout Indonesia.⁴⁷

On 6 April 2000 six representatives of *Laskar Jihad* met with President Abdurrahman Wahid at the Merdeka palace. They conveyed their harsh criticism to Gus Dur concerning the Maluku conflict, the idea of revoking TAP MPRS 25/1996, and the plans to start a diplomatic cooperation with Israel. While Gus Dur talked with the six representatives, hundreds of *Laskar Jihad* members demonstrated in front of the Merdeka palace. Although the government asked them to leave Java, they traveled with ease

⁴⁴Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi Violence in Indonesia* (nc.: np., 2002), p. 6.

⁴⁵Ja'far Umar Thalib, "*Jihad fi sabilillah*: Solusi Problematika Bangsa dan Negara Indonesia", in *Salafy*, no. 34, 2000, p. 33.

⁴⁶*Laskar Kristus* came from the Petra church and held a sacred mission to fight Muslims under the banner of Christianity. It was lead by Agus Wattimena who claimed his organization had 20.000 members in Ambon. See Lindsay Murdoch, "Revenge Fuels Cycle of Religious Violence", in *The Age Saturday*, 27 Jan. 2000.

⁴⁷-, "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku", in *International Crisis Group, Asia Report*, no. 31, 8 February 2002, p. 5.

to Ambon. There were approximately 3000 *jihadists* sent to Ambon.⁴⁸ They traveled to Maluku by ship from Surabaya port in East Java. Their arrival at Maluku port was welcomed by military troops who provided weapons for them such as AK-47s and SS-14s. There have been persistent allegations that Laskar Jihad's operation was supported by the 'green TNI' faction. Hefner wrote that in January 2000 Ja'far was approached by the military with the message that they approved of his plans to escalate the armed campaign against the Christians in Maluku.⁴⁹

Apart from military involvement, this group was clearly part of a transnational network (*Wahabi Salafism*). Before fighting against Christians in Maluku, *Laskar Jihad* had received *fatwas* (religious decrees) from seven *muftis* (religious authorities) in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. These muftis were Abd al-Razzaq ibn Abd al-Muhsin al-Abbad, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i, Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, salih al-Suhaymi, Ahmad Yahya ibn Muhammad al-Najm, Wahid al-Jabiri, and Zaid ibn Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali.⁵⁰

Ja'far Umar Thalib himself was of Madurese-Arab descent. He studied at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, with funding from DDII (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council). However, he did not finish his education there due to a disagreement with his lecturer. In 1987 he decided to fight in the Afghanistan war under the financial aegis of the *Rabi'ah al-'Alam al-Islami* (Muslim World League). His broad experiences and ability to mobilize forces and pioneer groups made Laskar Jihad grow in popularity, and soon they claimed to have around 10.000

⁴⁸Taufik Adnan Amal, *Politik Syari'at Islam*, p. 73.

⁴⁹Robert W. Hefner, "Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics", in *American Anthropologist*, vol. 104, no. 3, September 2002, p. 762.

⁵⁰In this fatwa the hatred of Christians was visible because the requester had explained to the *muftis* that the Maluku conflict had turned into a massacre by Christian of Muslims, therefore it is not surprising that al-Wadi'i asked all Indonesian Muslims to rise up and conduct jihad in the name of Allah and conquer the Christians who occupy Muslim territory. See Noorhaidi Hasan, *The radical Muslim Discourse on Jihad and the Head of Christians*, paper presented in the International Symposium on Christianity in Indonesia, Perspective of Power, held in the University of Frankfurt, Germany, from 12-14 December 2003, p. 9.

members.⁵¹ However, four days after the Bali bombing, 12 October 2002, he disbanded this group, not including FKAWJ.

Although formally FKAWJ is an umbrella organization for Laskar Jihad, the latter is more popular among the Indonesian people, because during the Maluku conflict it had widely reported its daily activities and photos of the massacre in Maluku through various publications such as websites, bulletins including *Maluku Hari Ini* and *Berita Laskar*, a sermon cassette and CD titled '*Tasjilate Ihya Sunnah*' which contained lectures and sermons from Ja'far Umar Thalib and his fellow preachers Muhammad as Sewed, Usamah Mahri, and Dzul Akmal.⁵²

The FPI (Front of Islamic Defenders), widely conceived to be a 'rent jihad' rather than a genuine Islamic movement, was established on 17 August 1998 by Misbahul Alam (a NU-trained cleric) and Habib Rizieq Syihab (an Arabic extradite). Originally, its goal was to become a nationwide support base for the PPP, but it was later redefined as a street-level 'anti-vice' movement.⁵³ Like the Laskar Jihad, FPI has a close relationship with the military and political elites.

This hardliner group began to be widely known in Indonesian society because of its engagement on the national political stage. Initially, this group served as *PAM Swakarsa* (voluntary security forces), attacking student movements who refused to reelect President B.J. Habibie in the *Sidang Istimewa* MPR on November 1998. Furthermore, FPI appears to have close relationships with the military and political elites. It was initially entwined with Prabowo Subianto, a son in law of Soeharto. Yet when Prabowo fell, the FPI approached General Wiranto.⁵⁴ The close relationship between the FPI and Wiranto can be analysed from their ransacking the office of Komnas HAM (National Human Right Commission) on 23 June 2000.⁵⁵

⁵¹S. Yunanto, *Militant Islamic Movements*, p. 43.

⁵²S. Yunanto, *Militant Islamic Movements*, p. 41.

⁵³Ian Douglas Wilson, "Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post New Order Indonesia", in *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 38, 2 June 2006, p. 282-286.

⁵⁴Robert W. Hefner, *Globalization*, p. 14-15.

⁵⁵-, "Front Dan Brigade Jadi Hakim", in *Gatra*, 31 July 2000.

After Wiranto retired, FPI lost its patron and began shifting their attention to anti-America issues, establishing the *shari'a*, and against deviant religious sects. The FPI has assisted PPP and PBB, especially in terms of mobilizing proponents and campaigning for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter during the 2001 and 2002 ST MPR.⁵⁶ Dealing with the anti-U.S. campaign, the FPI organised demonstrations of over 10.000 people in Jakarta to protest against the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (October 2001), and led large demonstrations against the U.S. war in Iraq. During a demonstration, Rizieq, the leader of the FPI, menacingly stated in front of the U.S. Embassy; 'I consider the attack on Iraq an attack on Islam.' This statement further ensured his existence in the political limelight.⁵⁷

Where Ja'far Umar Thalib is of Madurese-Arab Descent, Habib Rizieq Syihab is of Batavian-Arab descent. He studied Islam at the University of King Saud in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The FPI also has a paramilitary wing called *Komandan Laskar Pembela Islam* (KLI, Islam Troop Command) which aims to accelerate the realisation of the organisation's goal. The most visible action of the KLI was the 'Monas Tragedy.' On 1 June 2008 hundreds of KLI paramilitaries suddenly attacked the AKKBB who were advocating for the rights of *Ahmadiyah* at Monas, Jakarta.⁵⁸

Ironically, there was not a single security apparatus that prevented the action or even operated in that location. In fact the incident took place near the Presidential Palace. KLI claimed that their action was legitimized by the decree of Bakorpakem (the Coordination Board for the Monitoring of Non-Institutionalized Religious Groups) which decided that the *Ahmadiyah* sect is a banned organisation.⁵⁹

⁵⁶Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia and 9-11: Reaction and Implications", in Han Sung-Joo (et.al.), *Coping with 9-1: Asia Perspectives on Global and Regional Order*, (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2003), p. 64.

⁵⁷-, "Indonesia Stage Mass Prayer against War in Iraq", in *Reuters*, 10 March 2003.

⁵⁸The video or recorded event can be seen at <http://tv.kompas.com>, accessed 14 December 2008.

⁵⁹An audio visual account of this event can be seen at: <http://www.youtube.com>, accessed 14 December 2008.

G. Conclusion

The rise of Muslim politics in the post-Soeharto era is not surprising. For around 32 years, political Islam was repressively marginalised by the authoritarian regime. Nowadays, the political system has shifted from authoritarian to democratic in Indonesia. Many Islamic political groups have emerged since the 1998 Reformation, either political parties or radical Islamic groups.

During the ST MPR in 2000 and 2001, they formally proposed the (re)inclusion of the Jakarta Charter via PPP and PBB, but again they failed. Compared to the 1955 elections, they even decreased in the 1999 and 2004 elections. In the 1955 general elections, the supporters of the Jakarta Charter won forty percent of the seats. In 1999 they only won twelve percent, a decline of 28 percent. Following the recent 2004 general elections, PPP won 8.05 percent of the votes and PBB only won 2.62 percent of the ballot. In other words, the Islamic parties together have 10.65 percent, a slight decline from twelve percent in 1999.

It indicates that the *politik aliran* is somewhat blurred today. Fifty years ago the *santri* groups were comparatively solid in their support for the Jakarta Charter, yet after the Reformation era they are fragmented, and some even rejected the *shari'a* agenda, like the NU and the Muhammadiyah, associated to PKB and PAN respectively. This is a remarkable difference from the past political landscape. However, along with this change, Islamic radicalism also rapidly proliferated in this country. Although their numbers are lower than moderate Muslims groups, their political movement is more vocal and often gains public attention in the press.

Next, the radical Islamic groups can be divided into two categories, the conservatives and the neo-conservatives. The first group rejects Pancasila and insists on reinserting the Jakarta Charter into the constitution (Darul Islam, Komando Jihad, and the MMI). The second group also calls for the formalization of *shari'a* but allow Pancasila as a state ideology (Laskar Jihad, the FPI, and KPPSI). Seemingly, they gradually change their

strategy (from bottom up) in striving for Islamic ideology but it is too early to conclude it.

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