KEHENDAK DAN LEGITIMASI TANGGUNG JAWAB MORAL: STUDI KOMPARATIF-KRITIS ABU AL-HASAN AL-ASY’ARI DAN FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

Ahmad Fauzi, NIM.: 21105010019 (2026) KEHENDAK DAN LEGITIMASI TANGGUNG JAWAB MORAL: STUDI KOMPARATIF-KRITIS ABU AL-HASAN AL-ASY’ARI DAN FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Skripsi thesis, UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA YOGYAKARTA.

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Abstract

The problem of human will and moral responsibility constitutes one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy and theology. In a world understood to be governed by necessity—whether in the form of causal necessity or divine will—a tension arises between the determinacy of reality and the legitimacy of moral praise and punishment. Classical approaches often reduce this problem to an opposition between freedom and determinism, whereas the more fundamental question concerns how moral responsibility can be normatively justified within a determinative framework of reality. This study examines this problem through a critical–comparative analysis of the thought of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both reject libertarian free will, yet each seeks to preserve the possibility of moral responsibility through radically different mechanisms. Al-Ashʿarī articulates the doctrine of kasb as a mechanism of action-attribution within the framework of divine will and the structure of taklīf, whereas Nietzsche develops the concept of the will to power as an immanent mechanism of willing that affirms performative ownership of action through the affirmation of life’s necessity. This research employs a qualitative approach in the form of documentary study, using a descriptive–analytical–comparative method within a philosophical framework. The findings show that both systems retain moral responsibility within a deterministic world, but through distinct sources of normative legitimacy. The framework of kasb secures normative stability and legal–moral certainty, yet risks weakening human causal agency. By contrast, the framework of the will to power affirms agency in a productive sense, but carries the risk of lacking universal normative protection. Accordingly, this study demonstrates that every account of moral responsibility entails specific ontological and normative costs in its attempt to preserve moral accountability.

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